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Summary
The Finance-Growth Nexus in Britain, 1850-1913
Walter Jansson
This thesis argues that the nancial sector played a positive, but limited role
in British economic growth from 1850 to 1913. It examines empirically the role
played by dierent types of nancial institutions: commercial banks, stock markets
and merchant banks. To this end, the thesis uses recently developed time series
and dynamic panel methods for the econometric analysis, alongside new data on
dierent parts of the nancial system. The results suggest that at a national
level, the growth of commercial banks had a limited impact on British economic
development over the long run, and stock markets had no impact. However,
changes in bank lending inuenced economic growth to a signicant extent in the
short term. Growing conservatism in bank lending practices did not signicantly
increase credit constraints, as had been previously suspected. Findings from new
geographically disaggregated data indicate that the spread of bank oces improved
the economic performance of English and Welsh counties. Increased concentration
of the banking industry did not hinder economic growth, a result that challenges
widespread suggestions in the relevant literature. Moreover, the development of
provincial stock exchanges  exchanges outside London - did not inuence county-
level economic growth, contrary to the view that they were important for the
expansion of local industry. Finally, this thesis is the rst to assess econometrically
the role of merchant banks. It demonstrates that their trade nancing activities
were benecial not only for the growth of British international trade, but also for
that of the domestic economy.
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Introduction
This thesis investigates whether from 1850 to 1913 the development of the
British nancial sector was related to economic growth. I focus on the role that
commercial banks, stock markets, and merchant banks played in the economy.
Furthermore, I examine the impact of nancial development at a regionally disag-
gregated level, and apply recently developed time series methods for the economet-
ric analysis. The empirical approach, combined with new data, makes it possible
to investigate the evolution over time of the links between nancial development
and macroeconomic growth in the British context with unprecedented clarity and
detail.
Overall, this thesis shows that commercial banks played a role in British eco-
nomic growth, whereas the stock markets did not. Changes in bank lending in-
uenced economic growth in the short term, but they were not a signicant de-
terminant of British economic development in the long run. Moreover, the spread
of commercial bank oces inuenced local economic growth, whereas provincial
stock markets did not have such an impact. This thesis also demonstrates how
the international trade nancing activities of merchant banks inuenced not only
the growth of British exports and imports, but also that of the domestic economy
in general. It transpires that their positive contribution to the tradable sector was
substantial enough to impact the economy at large.
Macroeconomic research has provided signicant empirical evidence of a rela-
tionship between the growth of the nancial sector and that of the real economy
using post-WW2 data. A causal relationship has typically been found to run from
nance to growth.1 This topic has also been, for a long time, of considerable in-
1. For extensive reviews of the literature, see: Ross Levine, `Finance and Growth: Theory and
Evidence', in Handbook of Economic Growth, ed. P Aghion and S Durlauf, vol. 1 (Amsterdam:
Elsevier, 2005), 865934; and James B Ang, `A Survey of Recent Developments in the Literature
of Finance and Growth', Journal of Economic Surveys 22, no. 3 (2008): 536576. Meta-analyses
of the literature are provided by: Philip Arestis, Georgios Chortareas and Georgios Magkonis,
`The Financial Development and Growth Nexus: A Meta-Analysis', Journal of Economic Surveys
29, no. 3 (2015): 549565; and Petra Valickova, Tomas Havranek and Roman Horvath, `Financial
Development and Economic Growth: A Meta-Analysis', Journal of Economic Surveys 29, no. 3
(2015): 506526.
1
terest in economic history. Both Gerschenkron and Cameron et al. used historical
evidence to argue that the growth of the banking sector accelerated the economic
development of several backward European economies in the 19th century.2 In a
related vein, based on evidence from 35 countries from 1860 to 1963, Goldsmith
posited that the size of the nancial sector and that of the economy have tended
to be correlated over the long run.3 Yet, to investigate the signicance and dir-
ection of causality between nance and economic growth beyond mere theoretical
statements, a more rigorous quantitative approach is needed. A growing body of
econometric studies has shown that the growth of the nancial sector has tended
to cause, rather than merely to correlate with, historical economic growth.4
Notwithstanding the fact that Britain had by far the largest nancial sector
in Europe from 1850 to 1913, there is little econometric research on the nation's
nance-growth nexus. This is despite the fact that the relationship between the
British nancial sector and the economy has been a hotly debated issue in the his-
torical literature.5 In one of the few quantitative studies on the UK, Rousseau and
Wachtel nd that bank assets and per capita GDP had a signicant relationship
from 1880 to 1929. Moreover, they show that the level of nancial development
achieved at a given time was a signicant predictor of economic growth in the
2. Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective. (Cambridge,
MA.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1962); Rondo E Cameron et al., Banking in
the Early Stages of Industrialization: A Study in Comparative Economic History (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1967).
3. Raymond William Goldsmith, Financial Structure and Development (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1969).
4. Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh, Frans Buelens and Ludo Cuyvers, `Stock Market Development and
Economic Growth in Belgium', Explorations in Economic History 43, no. 1 (2006): 1338; Sibylle
Lehmann-Hasemeyer and Jochen Streb, `The Berlin Stock Exchange in Imperial Germany: A
Market for New Technology?', American Economic Review 106, no. 11 (2016): 35583576; Anders
Ögren, `Financial Revolution and Economic Modernisation in Sweden', Financial History Review
16, no. 01 (2009): 4771; Michael D Bordo and Peter L Rousseau, `Historical Evidence on the
Finance-Trade-Growth Nexus', Journal of Banking & Finance 36, no. 4 (2012): 12361243.
5. The literature will be reviewed subsequently. See: William Kennedy, Industrial Structure,
Capital Markets, and the Origins of British Economic Decline (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1987); Philip L Cottrell, Industrial Finance, 1830-1914: The Finance and Organiz-
ation of English Manufacturing Industry (London: Methuen, 1980); Michael Collins and Mae
Baker, Commercial Banks and Industrial Finance in England and Wales, 1860-1913 (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2003).
2
following period.6 The results in the cases of the US, Sweden and Germany also
tend to point towards a positive eect running from nance to growth in the late
19th century.7
Generally, there are signicant limitations in this line of research as it currently
stands. Economic historians have rarely used methods which allow for changes in
the nance-growth nexus over time. This is important, because the link is very
likely to have changed considerably over time in consequence of changes in the
regulatory environment, of economic downturns, or as the nancial sector itself
matured. Furthermore, our understanding of the channels through which nance
inuenced economic growth remains limited. This is partially to do with the fact
that the existing literature has mostly focused on examining highly aggregated
time series, such as broad money and GDP, and as such has not fully accounted
for the complexity of the nancial system. Finally, few researchers have utilised
geographically disaggregated historical data, which can provide a more accurate
view of how nance and growth may have been intertwined.
Finance comes in many forms, and dierent forms can impact the economy in
distinct ways.8 Therefore, I will examine the relationship between the economy
and dierent types of nancial institutions. In this vein, my analysis of merchant
banks investigates whether shocks in trade credit impacted the economy through
exports, and if stock markets caused investment-led economic growth. Moreover,
there is an increasingly widespread appreciation that the macroeconomic impact of
nancial uctuations may change in dierent economic environments.9 To detect
6. Peter L Rousseau and Paul Wachtel, `Financial Intermediation and Economic Performance:
Historical Evidence from Five Industrialized Countries', Journal of Money, Credit and Banking
30, no. 4 (1998): 65778. The authors also nd this relationship in Canada, the US, Sweden and
Norway in 1870-1929.
7. See, for example: Pontus Hansson and Lars Jonung, `Finance and Economic Growth:
The Case of Sweden 18341991', Research in Economics 51, no. 3 (1997): 275301; Katharina
Diekmann and Frank Westermann, `Financial Development and Sectoral Output Growth in
Nineteenth-Century Germany', Financial History Review 19, no. 2 (2012): 149174; Matthew
Jaremski, `National Banking's Role in US Industrialization, 18501900', The Journal of Eco-
nomic History 74, no. 01 (2014): 109140.
8. See: Asli Demirgüç-Kunt and Ross Levine, `Finance, Financial Sector Policies, and Long-
Run Growth', World Bank Policy Research Working Paper Series, 4469, 2008, and the section
below on theoretical background for a review of some of the most important theoretical models.
9. Martin Bijsterbosch and Matteo Falagiarda, `The Macroeconomic Impact of Financial Frag-
mentation in the Euro Area: Which Role for Credit Supply?', Journal of International Money
and Finance 54 (2015): 93115.
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such time-dependent shifts in the relationship between nancial development and
economic growth, this thesis will deploy recent developments in Bayesian time
series econometrics. It will also apply tools from dynamic panel econometrics to
examine how the experiences of dierent counties varied in terms of nance and
growth.
The thesis proceeds by rst examining the role of banks and stock markets in
the economy as a whole in 1850-1913. This is followed by a more detailed exam-
ination into the impact that changes in bank lending had on economic outcomes,
which is made possible by new monthly data on bank credit. The third chapter ex-
amines the role that banks played in county-level economic growth, and the fourth
chapter does the same with provincial stock exchanges. The fth chapter looks at
merchant banks and international trade nancing, and assesses the importance of
their business activities for the British economy.
Historical Context
Britain had the world's most developed nancial sector throughout the period
1850 to 1913.10 The stock market in London, along with the banking system,
had by 1850 reached a size that was both unprecedented and very considerable.11
Yet, the inuence of an earlier legislative and institutional framework was still
lingering in the mid-19th century. This meant that the nancial system continued
to transform not only as a result of increased innovation and fundamental economic
factors, but also in consequence of the new opportunities created by the removal
of regulation inherited from the early 19th century. This section outlines the most
important developments in the nancial sector's structure and the surrounding
legal framework, and discusses how historians view the role of banks and stock
markets in 1850-1913.
Restrictive legislation on the formation of joint-stock enterprises, combined
with the Bank of England's lobbying to maintain its dominance, had constrained
10. Ranald C Michie, The London Stock Exchange: A History (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1999), 70-74; Youssef Cassis, Capitals of Capital: A History of International Financial
Centres, 1780-2005 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 98.
11. Ibid., Ch. 3.
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the banking system's growth until 1826. Before 1826, England and Wales had
many small banks, which took on small-scale commercial banking functions: of-
fering deposit and checking accounts as well as lending to businesses.12 Their
operations were limited in scale, because banks were restricted to six partners
(owners), whereby the amount of capital they could raise was limited. In con-
trast, joint-stock banks could issue securities to a large number of investors. This
allowed them to build a substantial capital base and to have more resources at
their disposal. Legislation in 1826 allowing joint-stock banking largely came to
being after a string of banking crises in the late 18th and early 19th centuries
made it clear that a system consisting of small unit banks was extremely fragile.13
Policymakers and contemporary observers looked to Scotland as an example to fol-
low.14 From the early 18th century, the nation had developed a system of deposit
banking with a few large joint-stock banks at its core.15 As a result the Scottish
system had exhibited a considerably higher degree of nancial stability than the
English and Welsh one.
Over 100 joint-stock banks were formed in England and Wales between 1826
and 1844, either as new entities or as a result of conversions and mergers of private
banks. The formation of new joint-stock banks was discouraged again in 1844,
when minimum capital and nancial reporting requirements were implemented.16
The legal environment for banks became very liberal only after 1857, when they
started to be governed by a more lenient corporate law, which placed few restric-
tions on the formation of joint-stock companies. Banks were allowed to opt for
limited liability in 1858. With limited liability, investors were no longer at risk
of losing all of their personal wealth if their bank failed, whereby an important
source of uncertainty that came from owning bank shares was eliminated. Instead,
12. In the 19th century, commercial banks rarely ventured into lending to individuals for non-
business purposes. At the beginning of the century, several banks also nanced their activities
by issuing notes. See: Richard S Grossman, Unsettled Account: The Evolution of Banking in the
Industrialized World Since 1800 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 46-47.
13. Ibid., 173-176; John D Turner, Banking in Crisis: The Rise and Fall of British Banking
Stability, 1800 to the Present (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 36-38, 69-70;
Ranald C Michie, British Banking: Continuity and Change from 1694 to the Present (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2016), 75-76.
14. Larry Neal, `The Financial Crisis of 1825 and the Restructuring of the British Financial
System', Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, no. May (1998): 5376.
15. Sydney George Checkland, Scottish Banking: A History, 1695-1973 (Glasgow: Harper
Collins, 1975), 117-119.
16. Grossman, Unsettled Account , 180-181. Only 7 joint-stock banks formed from 1844 to 1857.
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investors' liability became commensurate to the capital they invested.17 Yet, the
limited liability form saw widespread adoption in England and Wales only after
the failure of the City of Glasgow Bank in 1878. Although the event itself did not
constitute a signicant crisis outside Scotland, it focused attention on the prob-
lems associated with unlimited liability, as most shareholders of the bank went
bankrupt after the failure.18
Besides the adoption of limited liability, perhaps the most signicant changes
in the structure of the late 19th century banking sector were the merger waves
in the 1880s and 90s. Among the drivers for the combinations of banks was a
low interest rate environment, which forced banks to seek new sources of returns,
while still managing their risk exposure.19 Through mergers and the rapid spread
of branches, the English and Welsh banking system came to be dominated by a
handful of large banks with hundreds of oces by the turn of the century. More
permissive legislative frameworks in Ireland and Scotland had allowed their bank-
ing systems to embark on a path towards consolidation considerably earlier, so
that, by 1900, each part of the UK had a high degree of banking sector concen-
tration.20 The nation's commercial banks ranked among the world's largest at the
beginning of the 20th century, although they focused on a considerably narrower
range of functions than the largest continental banks.21
The capital market - the market for debt and equity instruments - also un-
derwent substantial changes from 1850 to 1913, although it operated under fewer
legal constraints than the banking sector during this period.22 An organised mar-
ket for securities existed in London already in the 18th century, although the
London Stock Exchange (LSE) was ocially founded in 1801. The Napoleonic
wars proved an important catalyst for the market's expansion, as continental n-
17. Grossman, Unsettled Account , 178-180, 183.
18. John D Turner, `'the Last Acre and Sixpence': Views on Bank Liability Regimes in
Nineteenth-Century Britain', Financial History Review 16, no. 02 (2009): 111127.
19. Grossman, Unsettled Account , 185-187; Joseph Sykes, The Amalgamation Movement in
English Banking, 1825-1924 (London: P.S. King & Son, 1926), 48.
20. Michie, British Banking , 77-79.
21. Caroline Fohlin, Mobilizing Money: How the World's Richest Nations Financed Industrial
Growth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 50.
22. Of course, company laws may have constrained what entities could use the stock markets
to raise capital. These laws could have mattered at least until the late 1850s, when it became
easier to limit on shareholder liability.
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anciers ed to London, while the UK kept expanding its placements of war debt.23
A repeal of the Bubble Act in 1825 removed obstacles for joint-stock company
formation, and allowed new companies to issue securities without Parliamentary
charters.24 Yet, despite increasing issuance of company shares, in 1850, the Lon-
don Stock Exchange remained primarily a market for government debt. Over the
late 19th century, it transformed itself into a market where a wide range of se-
curities were traded. It drew considerably more activity than its competitors in
New York, Berlin and Paris, and was still the world's leading stock exchange in
1914.25 Britain also had several smaller stock exchanges in cities outside London,
which provided markets for the securities of provincial companies.26 However, the
role that these exchanges played in the economy has received comparably little
attention from economic historians. This dissertation aims to ll this gap.
The stock market became increasingly integrated with the rest of the nan-
cial system over the 19th century. Insurance companies and banks, along with
other institutional investors, relied on the market for buying securities for their
reserves.27 Stock brokers also had a constant need for short-term loans. By lend-
ing to brokers and dealers who held longer-term securities, banks could earn a
relatively high rate of return on their funds, while still being able to withdraw
them at short notice.28 Michie argues that this made credit eectively cheaper
by allowing banks to achieve higher returns on their short-term assets, while the
liquidity of these loans also contributed to the banking system's stability.29
London was not just Britain's, but the world's leading nancial centre through-
out 1850-1913.30 Over time, the nation's nancial system took on an increasingly
international orientation. Indeed, perhaps the most remarkable change in the
British capital markets in the late 19th century is that they became, in a sense,
23. Michie, London Stock Exchange, 33-34.
24. Graeme G Acheson et al., `Rule Britannia! British Stock Market Returns, 1825-1870', The
Journal of Economic History 69, no. 04 (2009): 11071137.
25. Michie, London Stock Exchange, 70-71.
26. John R Killick and William Thomas, `The Provincial Stock Exchanges, 18301870', The
Economic History Review 23, no. 1 (1970): 96111.
27. Ranald C Michie, The Global Securities Market: A History (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2006), 26-28.
28. Michie, London Stock Exchange, 27-28, 52-53, 67; see also: Leslie Sedden Pressnell, Country
Banking in the Industrial Revolution (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956).
29. Michie, The Global Securities Market: A History , 28-30.
30. Cassis, Capitals, 41, 83-85.
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less British. The LSE listed a growing number of foreign and colonial securities
as the 19th century progressed. Securities relating to the debt of foreign govern-
ments, railways and other types of infrastructure became especially prominent.
The stock exchange thereby facilitated the channelling of savings from Britain to
several parts of the world.31
Another dimension in which the City took a leading international role was in
the money markets - markets where short-term debt securities are traded. Lon-
don became the centre through which merchant banks nanced international trade,
and where both domestic and foreign nancial institutions would park their short-
term funds. In this context, London's leading position was even stronger, relative
to competing nancial centres, than it was in terms of the stock markets. Yet,
both trade nancing and the money markets more broadly have been given com-
paratively little attention in the historical literature, and their role in the British
economy has hardly been explored.32
The nancial system was characterised by a high degree of specialisation. That
is, dierent types of nancial institutions tended to focus on a narrow range of
tasks, instead of providing a wide range of nancial services through a single en-
tity. This contrasts with the traditional characterisation of universal banks, found
in several continental European countries, which would provide a comprehensive
range of services under one roof.33 In addition to providing credit, universal banks
could provide investment banking functions, whereby they would help their cus-
tomers raise capital from nancial markets, or to arrange mergers and acquisitions.
British commercial banks would largely limit themselves to the provision of short-
term credit for domestic companies. If a customer of a commercial bank needed
to raise external capital for a longer period, it would need to seek it through the
stock markets or, more often in the case of smaller rms, privately through friends
and acquaintances.
31. Irving Stone, The Global Export of Capital from Great Britain, 1865-1914: A Statistical
Survey (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999); see also: Michael Edelstein, Overseas Investment
in the Age of High Imperialism: The United Kingdom, 1850-1914 (New York: Taylor & Francis,
1982).
32. On the money markets see: Wilfred T C King, History of the London Discount Market
(London: Routledge, 1936); and on merchant banks, see: Stanley D Chapman, The Rise of
Merchant Banking (London: Taylor & Francis, 1984).
33. Caroline Fohlin, `The Balancing Act of German Universal Banks and English Deposit
Banks, 1880-1913', Business History 43, no. 1 (2001): 124.
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While the nancial system grew considerably from 1850 to 1913, the nation's
economic performance was also reasonably good.34 British real GDP per capita
growth averaged 1.2% from 1850 to 1913.35 The second industrial revolution was
underway in the late 19th century, during which several other European economies
were growing substantially faster, thereby catching up with the British economy.36
This is to be expected from standard economic growth models, and recent literat-
ure argues that Britain generally grew at a rate that was close to its potential.37
Productivity dierences in Britain, Germany and the US remained roughly con-
stant throughout the period at issue, and the key reason for Germany catching
up with Britain in terms of industrial output was an increase in its manufacturing
workforce.38 In Britain, competition served to make producers more ecient, but
signicant ineciencies existed mainly in strongly cartelised industries, such as
railways and chemicals. A low degree of competition and slow adoption of new
technology was primarily an issue in the service sector, which led to lower pro-
ductivity growth.39 In manufacturing, the methods of mass-production that were
emerging in the US were not yet suited to many industries in the British isles, as
the market for goods was often signicantly smaller.40
Until the 1990s, several economic historians argued that there were important
weaknesses in the nancial sector in 1850-1913, which potentially constrained the
growth of the British economy. These views stemmed largely from a negative
view of the sector's structure and of its international orientation. One argument
was that the banking sector did not provide enough long-term nance to domestic
rms, because banks were preoccupied with short-term lending, and were perhaps
34. Nicholas Crafts, `Economic Growth During the Long Twentieth Century', in The Cambridge
Economic History of Modern Britain, ed. Roderick Floud, Jane Humphries and Paul Johnson,
vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 2659.
35. Jutta Bolt and Jan Luiten Zanden, `The Maddison Project: Collaborative Research on
Historical National Accounts', The Economic History Review 67, no. 3 (2014): 627651. The
data will be plotted and examined in more detail in the rst chapter.
36. In terms of GDP per capita, Britain remained well ahead of both Germany and France by
1913, while USA had caught up with Britain.
37. For a review, see: Crafts, `Economic Growth'.
38. Stephen N Broadberry, `Anglo-German Productivity Dierences 18701990: A Sectoral
Analysis', European Review of Economic History 1, no. 2 (1997): 247267.
39. Stephen N Broadberry,Market Services and the Productivity Race, 1850-2000 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2006), 129-137.
40. Nicholas Magee, `Manufacturing and Technological Change', in The Cambridge Economic
History of Modern Britain : Economic Maturity : 1860 - 1939, ed. Roderick Floud and Paul
Johnson, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 7498.
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excessively conservative. This constrained nance to new and more innovative in-
dustries. A related argument was that the stock markets channelled funds abroad
at the expense of the domestic economy, while at the same time failing to give
sucient attention to rms in emerging industries.41
The negative opinions of British banks originated partially from the perceived
success of German (and several other continental) universal banks in providing
long-term nance to industry. They were thought to have had superior lend-
ing practices relative to British banks, which lent on a short-term, transactional
basis. Moreover, universal banks occasionally held supervisory board seats, along
with equity stakes in their largest clients. They were thus thought to have inu-
enced the management of companies and their merger decisions.42 Gerschenkron's
highly inuential hypothesis suggests that banks - universal banks in particular -
were highly benecial for the rapid industrial take-o of late industrialisers such
as Germany. Gerschenkron maintained that this was the result of banks mobil-
ising savings and helping satisfy the high capital demands of late industrialising
countries.43 In this respect, however, regardless of whether universal banks were
better for the economy than commercial banks, the former were better suited for
relatively undeveloped economies, and may not have been as important in the
macroeconomic context of Britain in 1850-1913. The needs for rapid capital mo-
bilisation in Britain were not as large as in poorer continental countries, and there
were already other channels - both formal and informal capital markets - through
which capital could be raised when needed.44
Since the 1990s, historians have argued that the dierences between the lend-
ing practices of continental universal banks and British commercial banks have
been greatly exaggerated, by traditional comparisons resting on stereotypes which
41. Kennedy, Industrial Structure, 120; Cottrell, Industrial Finance; Frank W Paish, `The
London New Issue Market', Economica 18, no. 69 (1951): 117. On capital exports specically,
see: Sidney Pollard, `Capital Exports, 18701914 Harmful or Benecial?', The Economic History
Review 38, no. 4 (1985): 489514.
42. Richard Tilly, `Universal Banking in Historical Perspective', Journal of Institutional and
Theoretical Economics (JITE)/Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, 1998, 732.
43. Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective., 12-15.
44. Ranald C Michie, The London and New York Stock Exchanges 1850-1914 (London: Allen
& Unwin, 1987), 107-111.
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are ungrounded in historical facts.45 It turns out that short-term lending was the
primary form of extending credit in both Germany and Britain. British banks
commonly rolled over short-term loans over several years, as did their continental
counterparts. This both limited their risk and provided a means to monitor their
customers, which might have led to borrowers using their funds in a more pro-
ductive manner.46 Collins also shows that the loan terms of British banks were
generally exible, while Capie and Collins argue that it was rare for banks to
turn down loans from industrial customers.47 In other words, the extent to which
British rms faced bank credit constraints seems to be limited. British banks
were not involved with the management decisions of companies, but the degree
to which (German) universal banks did so was also limited.48 Moreover, if Brit-
ish banks hardly ever invested in industrial equities, German banks only did so
very rarely.49 At least from a comparative perspective, the case for deciencies in
British banking is thus greatly weakened.
With regards to capital markets, in most countries smaller rms would seek
capital privately, and rely on retained prots for funding long-term capital ex-
penditures.50 Needs for signicant amounts of external capital only became relev-
ant as rms grew in scale, and could no longer rely on informal capital markets.
But on the eve of WW1, the British economy primarily consisted of small rms.
Whether nance had a role to play in this outcome, or whether the formal n-
ancing of domestic industry was limited in scope because of the size of rms, is
not easily answered using purely historical accounts. Economic historians have
45. Caroline Fohlin, `Universal Banking in Pre-World War I Germany: Model or Myth?', Ex-
plorations in Economic History 36, no. 4 (1999): 305343.
46. Michael Collins, `English Bank Development within a European Context, 18701939', The
Economic History Review 51, no. 1 (1998): 124. However, British banks rarely lent for xed
capital investment.
47. Forrest Capie and Michael Collins, `Industrial Lending by English Commercial Banks,
1860s1914: Why Did Banks Refuse Loans?', Business History 38, no. 1 (1996): 2644; Forrest
Capie and Michael Collins, `Banks, Industry and Finance, 18801914', Business History 41, no.
1 (1999): 3762.
48. Jeremy Edwards and Sheilagh Ogilvie, `Universal Banks and German Industrialization:
A Reappraisal', The Economic History Review 49, no. 3 (1996): 427446; Fohlin, `Universal
Banking'.
49. However, there were signicant exceptions on the continent. For example, Belgian banks
held a signicant amount of industrial shares in their portfolios. See: Tilly, `Universal Banking',
11-12.
50. Robert Cull et al., `Historical Financing of Small-and Medium-Size Enterprises', Journal
of Banking & Finance 30, no. 11 (2006): 30173042.
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nevertheless argued that the lack of access to large markets for mass-produced
goods - not other factors such as a lack of nance - was behind the small scale of
the typical British rm's operations.51
Additionally, there is no evidence of British investors showing a `foreign bias':
they did not irrationally eschew domestic securities and favour foreign ones.52
Instead, investors quite rationally diversied their portfolios in order to benet
from higher expected risk-adjusted returns from foreign securities.53 There is little
evidence that such foreign investment crowded out domestic enterprises seeking
funds on the capital markets.54 Instead, savings tended to ow abroad during
times of domestic economic weakness, when the incentives to invest domestically
were lower.55
Britain beneted from having a remarkably stable nancial system after the
1880s, whereas nancial crises were a frequent occurrence in other countries during
the late 19th century. The costs of nancial instability should be factored in
when assessing the benets of the nancial sector to the economy. Before large
banks with national branch networks were formed, and before banks adopted more
prudent business practices, even Britain experienced frequent banking crises: 1810,
1825, 1836, 1847, 1857, 1866 and 1878.56 To some extent, it was the experience
with the crises of 1866 and 1878 that spurred banks to become more conservative
in their lending practices, to adopt a more transactional, arms-length, approach
to dealing with clients, and to allocate a smaller share of their resources to loans
to industrial customers.57 Yet herein lies an unresolved issue in British nancial
history: did the same banking practices that led to nancial stability come at a cost
51. For a review of the literature, see: Crafts, `Economic Growth'.
52. Michael Edelstein, `Foreign Investment, Accumulation and Empire, 1860-1914', in The
Cambridge Economic History of Modern Britain, ed. Roderick Floud and Paul Johnson (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 190226.
53. William N Goetzmann and Andrey D Ukhov, `British Investment Overseas 18701913: A
Modern Portfolio Theory Approach', Review of Finance 10, no. 2 (2006): 261300; Benjamin
R Chabot and Christopher J Kurz, `That's Where the Money Was: Foreign Bias and English
Investment Abroad, 18661907', The Economic Journal 120, no. 547 (2010): 10561079.
54. Edelstein, `Foreign Investment'.
55. Mauro Rota and Francesco Schettino, `The Long-Run Determinants of British Capital
Exports, 18701913', Financial History Review 18, no. 01 (2011): 4769.
56. Turner, Banking in Crisis, Ch. 4. The City of Glasgow bank crisis of 1878 was not a major
crisis across the UK (although it was in Scotland), while the Baring crisis in 1890 hardly aected
domestic commercial banks.
57. Collins and Baker, Commercial Banks, 83-91.
12
for the economy? Collins and Baker consider the evidence of growing conservatism
in lending practices consistent with the notion that banks became less supportive
of industry, although given the limited evidence of rms facing credit constraints,
they do not go as far as to argue that bank conservatism stied economic growth.58
Overall, economic historians have taken an increasingly forgiving, albeit cau-
tious, view of the British banking system and capital markets as it pertains to
their contribution to the economy. The nancial system did have some weak-
nesses, which will be discussed in the chapters below, but there is little evidence
of rms facing substantial nancial constraints. However, clear gaps remain in the
literature. Namely, the quantitative aspects of the link between nance and growth
warrant much more attention. In this respect, the literature on pre-WW1 Britain
is particularly lagging behind research on the US and several other European cases.
A further gap in the literature is that it has given little attention to the role of more
specialised types of nancial institutions, other than commercial banks and stock
markets. We know little about the economic role of merchant banks, although
they are known to have helped nance a large amount of British trade, and in this
way might have promoted economic growth. Regional aspects of British nance
and growth are also yet to be explored in sucient detail, although economic his-
torians and economists have highlighted several benets to using geographically
disaggregated data for studying the impact of nancial development.59 The eco-
nomic importance of provincial stock exchanges - exchanges outside London - has
hardly been studied at all, although they collectively formed a signicant part of
the domestic capital market.
Given the amount of work that has gone into studying the historical features
of various aspects of the British nancial system from a qualitative perspective,
this thesis will focus on quantitative aspects, where the scope for originality is
considerably greater. A quantitative framework is suited for answering the re-
58. Ibid., 203-219; 251-258; Mae Baker and Michael Collins, `English Commercial Bank Stabil-
ity, 1860-1914', Journal of European Economic History 31, no. 3 (2002): 493493; Mae Baker and
Michael Collins, `Financial Crises and Structural Change in English Commercial Bank Assets,
18601913', Explorations in Economic History 36, no. 4 (1999): 428444.
59. See, for example: Iftekhar Hasan, Michael Koetter and Michael Wedow, `Regional Growth
and Finance in Europe: Is There a Quality Eect of Bank Eciency?', Journal of Banking &
Finance 33, no. 8 (2009): 14461453; Jaremski, `National Banking's Role'; Fabio Braggion, Narly
Dwarkasing and Lyndon Moore, `Nothing Special About Banks: Competition and Bank Lending
in Britain, 18851925', The Review of Financial Studies, 2017, 35023537.
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search questions of this thesis, as it is helpful for ascertaining the direction and
signicance of a causal relationship between nance and growth. After all, the
nancial sector's growth may have been a mere symptom of economic growth.
And if nancial development did aect economic growth, what was the size and
the magnitude of this eect? Even an approximate answer to these questions will
greatly improve our understanding of the role that nance played in the British
economy, while making it easier to compare the British case with ndings from
other historical and modern cases.
Theoretical Background on Finance and Growth
This section outlines the main ndings from the theoretical literature on the re-
lationship between nancial and economic development. The overview is general,
and more in-depth discussions on relevant points and the empirical literature will
be provided in the chapters ahead.
The theoretical literature on the links between the nancial sector and the
real economy has expanded considerably since the 1980s, when the nancial sec-
tor began to be incorporated into several endogenous economic growth models.60
These models allow the nancial sector's growth to be inuenced by economic
growth, and vice versa. Some of these contributions are formalisations of old ideas,
but theoretical advances have also provided new perspectives on the topic. In par-
ticular, novel insights have been gained through the application of the concept
of asymmetric information to nancial markets. In this context, asymmetric in-
formation exists when one party to a nancial contract or transaction has more
knowledge than another. For example, borrowers know more about their rms'
prospects than lenders do, making it more dicult for lenders to discriminate
between borrowers who are creditworthy and ones who are not. Moreover, lenders
need to ensure that their funds are not diverted into projects that are either
wasteful or extremely risky. An important function of nancial intermediaries is
to reduce the costs that arise from asymmetric information. By doing so, they
60. For a review, see: Levine, `Finance and Growth'.
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inuence investment and savings decisions that are taken in an economy.61
The concept of nancial development is not adequately captured by one indic-
ator or criterion. Instead, there are several functions performed by the nancial
sector that can support economic development. Levine puts these into ve general
categories.62 These are as follows:
1. Mobilising and pooling savings to productive investment;
2. Facilitating diversication, trading and thus, the management of risk;
3. Producing information about potential investments and screening borrowers,
thus improving the eciency of capital allocation;
4. Enhancing corporate governance and the enforcement of contracts;
5. Facilitating the exchange of goods and services by improving the system of
payments, and by nancing transactions.
Financial development occurs when the nancial sector becomes better at per-
forming these functions.63 Note that each function relates to two more general
channels through which the nancial sector can contribute to economic growth:
improving capital accumulation; or improving productivity and innovation.64
Perhaps the most intuitive of these ways is the act of mobilising and pooling of
savings for productive investment.65 Banks enjoy economies of scale in the costly
process of collecting deposits from several savers. They can therefore specialise in
lending these funds for productive purposes as parts of well-diversied and liquid
61. Joseph E Stiglitz and Andrew Weiss, `Incentive Eects of Terminations: Applications to
the Credit and Labor Markets', The American Economic Review 73, no. 5 (1983): 912927;
Bengt Holmström and Jean Tirole, `Market Liquidity and Performance Monitoring', Journal of
Political Economy 101, no. 4 (1993): 678709; Bengt Holmström and Jean Tirole, `Financial
Intermediation, Loanable Funds, and the Real Sector', the Quarterly Journal of economics 112,
no. 3 (1997): 663691.
62. Levine, `Finance and Growth'.
63. Here, I follow the widely accepted denition by Levine. See: Ibid., 869-870. See also:
Martin ihák et al., `Financial Development in 205 Economies, 1960 to 2010', Journal of Fin-
ancial Perspectives 1, no. 2 (2013): 1736.
64. This point is highlighted by Ang, `Survey'. See also: Nieuwerburgh, Buelens and Cuyvers,
`Stock Market Development'.
65. Valerie R Bencivenga and Bruce D Smith, `Financial Intermediation and Endogenous
Growth', The Review of Economic Studies 58, no. 2 (1991): 195209.
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portfolios. Likewise, stock markets allow investors to pool their resources into ven-
tures through buying shares. The importance of pooling resources is demonstrated
by an inuential model by Acemoglu and Zilibotti, where high-risk projects require
large, indivisible lump-sum investments. These projects would not be nanced if
everyone managed their own, relatively small portfolios. Intermediaries possessing
larger resources, collected from several savers, can undertake large lump-sum in-
vestments while maintaining diversied portfolios, thus improving the allocation
of resources within an economy.66
Savers can be induced to pool their funds if nancial intermediaries allow
them to earn higher risk-adjusted returns through portfolio diversication. Mod-
ern portfolio theory posits that investors can expect to earn superior risk-adjusted
returns by owning a well-diversied portfolio of securities, instead of a few indi-
vidual securities. Yet, creating such a portfolio is dicult for individuals with
comparatively little capital, especially when investments are indivisible. If in-
vestors are not able to pool their resources into diversied portfolios, they may
prefer to allocate all of their funds to low-risk, low return investments. In the con-
text of the real economy, portfolio diversication (for example, of a bank's loans)
can lead to the channelling of resources to high risk, high-return projects, which
in the long run can be benecial for economic growth.67 More innovative ventures
tend to be risky, but intermediaries can help allocate a part of their funds to such
projects, while diversifying some of the underlying risk away.68
A related way in which nancial intermediaries and markets allow investors to
reduce the risk of their portfolios is through liquidity transformation. If investors
are unwilling to commit a signicant share of their savings to projects which pay
o after a long time, they may limit themselves to low-risk but liquid investments.
Financial intermediaries make claims to long-gestation projects easily tradable, for
example in the form of shares of companies, inducing investors to allocate some
66. Daron Acemoglu and Fabrizio Zilibotti, `Was Prometheus Unbound by Chance? Risk, Di-
versication, and Growth', Journal of Political Economy 105, no. 4 (1997): 709751.
67. Jeremy Greenwood and Boyan Jovanovic, `Financial Development, Growth, and the Dis-
tribution of Income', Journal of Political Economy 98, no. 5, Part 1 (1990): 10761107; Gilles
Saint-Paul, `Technological Choice, Financial Markets and Economic Development', European
Economic Review 36, no. 4 (1992): 763781; Maurice Obstfeld, `Risk-Taking, Global Diversic-
ation, and Growth', The American Economic Review, 1994, 13101329.
68. Acemoglu and Zilibotti, `Prometheus'; Robert G King and Ross Levine, `Finance, Entre-
preneurship and Growth', Journal of Monetary Economics 32, no. 3 (1993): 513542.
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of their funds in these.69 A similar logic applies to bank deposits: banks provide
loans for several months or years, yet depositors can withdraw their funds at a
short notice.70
The portfolio diversication channel is one possible mechanism that links the
nancial sector to economic growth in Britain in 1850-1913, as banks generally lent
to a large set of customers with varying degrees of risk.71 The channel could also
have worked through the capital markets, as far as funds were raised by domestic
companies. Moreover, the substantial size of the banking sector, along with the
depth of the capital market, suggest that the maturity transformation channel
could have increased economic growth. Savers could invest in assets (including
bank deposits) with underlying maturities of several months or years, yet they
could convert these same assets to cash at short notice.
Financial intermediaries can enhance the monitoring and enforcement of con-
tracts, reducing costs associated with asymmetric information. Through monit-
oring of rms, they can induce managers to act in the investor's or lender's best
interests, which increases the eciency of how capital is employed in an economy.
The prospect of having their funds being allocated better, in turn, increases the
willingness of savers to invest their money.72 An example of how nancial insti-
tutions enhance corporate governance occurs when rms try to raise new debt
from banks or capital markets. If rms frequently apply for new external nance,
managers are motivated to show, through their actions, that they are using it
productively.73 Aghion et al. show that in this way, debt markets reduce mana-
gerial slack (resources not being employed remuneratively) through reducing the
idle cash balances that rms hold.74 Financial institutions such as banks also help
reduce the monitoring costs that savers face. In a seminal contribution, Diamond
69. Douglas W Diamond and Philip H Dybvig, `Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity',
Journal of Political economy 91, no. 3 (1983): 401419; Ross Levine, `Stock Markets, Growth,
and Tax Policy', The Journal of Finance 46, no. 4 (1991): 14451465.
70. Franklin Allen and Douglas Gale, `Financial Markets, Intermediaries, and Intertemporal
Smoothing', Journal of Political Economy 105, no. 3 (1997): 523546.
71. Capie and Collins, `Industrial Lending'; Capie and Collins, `Industry and Finance'.
72. Stiglitz and Weiss, `Incentive Eects'.
73. Enhancing corporate governance refers to aligning the interest of (say) a company's man-
agers and investors.
74. Philippe Aghion, Mathias Dewatripont and Patrick Rey, `Competition, Financial Discipline
and Growth', The Review of Economic Studies 66, no. 4 (1999): 825852.
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outlines a model in which investors outsource monitoring and enforcement activit-
ies to nancial intermediaries.75 Because the eort in monitoring is not duplicated
by each individual investor or saver, the costs of exerting corporate governance
are reduced.
In a related vein, several models posit that nancial intermediaries are able to
allocate their funds more remuneratively than individuals, because they possess
better information and expertise in evaluating borrowers and investees.76 The
productivity of capital is raised by intermediaries that channel resources to the
most productive projects, which further increases the incentives of savers to in-
vest.77 Having more capital ow into the most productive rms, in turn, eventually
translates into higher economic growth. Through scrutinising rms more closely,
intermediaries may also reduce the amount of collateral that prospective borrow-
ers need, thereby increasing the availability of nance to a larger set of lenders.
The reason for this, according to an inuential model by Holmström and Tirole,
is that nancial institutions are willing to substitute collateral requirements with
improved information gathering.78 For example, if a bank is absolutely convinced
that a borrower will generate sucient revenue to repay a loan, it might be willing
to lend without additional forms of security. Substituting between information and
physical collateral is particularly important for the nancing of new and possibly
more innovative rms, which might posses fewer tangible assets.79
There are reasons to believe that banks enhanced corporate governance in Bri-
tain in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Banks frequently reviewed and
rolled over their short-term loans to customers.80 This implied a constant threat
for a borrower that its credit line could be extinguished if funds were used waste-
fully. Lines of credit also allowed new client-specic information to be obtained
75. Douglas W Diamond, `Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring', The Review of
Economic Studies 51, no. 3 (1984): 393414.
76. John H Boyd and Edward C Prescott, `Financial Intermediary-Coalitions', Journal of Eco-
nomic Theory 38, no. 2 (1986): 211232; King and Levine, `Finance, Entrepreneurship and
Growth'; Luc Laeven, Ross Levine and Stelios Michalopoulos, `Financial Innovation and Endo-
genous Growth', Journal of Financial Intermediation 24, no. 1 (2015): 124.
77. Greenwood and Jovanovic, `Financial Development'.
78. Holmström and Tirole, `Loanable Funds'.
79. Pierre-Richard Agénor and Otaviano Canuto, `Access to Finance, Product Innovation and
Middle-Income Traps', Research in Economics 71, no. 2 (2017): 337355.
80. Mae Baker and Michael Collins, `English Industrial Distress before 1914 and the Response
of the Banks', European Review of Economic History 3, no. 01 (1999): 124.
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frequently. The role of capital markets in improving corporate governance is more
ambiguous. The law aorded investors limited protection from abuses by company
directors or managers, and imposed only light nancial reporting requirements on
public companies.81 This might have lessened the ability of investors' to monitor
and discipline a given company's management.
Banks play an important role in improving the eciency of the payments
system and the system of short-term credits. This function is at a centre of several
important theoretical models. Kashyap et al. model banks as liquidity providers:
their core function is to provide funds to help meet unpredictable needs for cash
through lines of credit, which rms can rely on when needed.82 They suggest
that banks lending on overdrafts are some of the cheapest providers of short-
term loans.83 Therefore, a more developed banking sector allows rms to deploy
their resources more eciently, as they need to maintain smaller (unproductive)
cash buers in case of unexpected economic shocks.84 British commercial banks,
being primarily focused on short-term lending in the late 19th century, could have
contributed to the economy in this manner.
Many recent theoretical contributions have linked banks' functioning as liquid-
ity providers to economic growth. Aghion et al. consider this possibility in a model
where rms face an uncertain economic environment. If the economy changes un-
expectedly, rms face a sudden need for funds in order to adjust their operations
to a new economic setting. To the extent that nancial intermediaries are able
to provide pre-agreed lines of credit, rms are more likely to invest in riskier, but
higher return projects, which ultimately leads to more economic growth.85 In such
a setting, they also become less dependent on cash buers, because pre-agreed lines
81. Gareth Campbell and John D Turner, `Substitutes for Legal Protection: Corporate Gov-
ernance and Dividends in Victorian Britain', The Economic History Review 64, no. 2 (2011):
571597. This is discussed further in section 1.2.1.
82. Anil K Kashyap, Raghuram Rajan and Jeremy C Stein, `Banks as Liquidity Providers: An
Explanation for the Coexistence of Lending and Deposit-Taking', The Journal of Finance 57,
no. 1 (2002): 3373.
83. This is because deposits provide a cheap source of funding relative to what other interme-
diaries can obtain, while overdraft contracts require banks to maintain relatively small buers
of cash.
84. Bengt Holmström and Jean Tirole, `Private and Public Supply of Liquidity', Journal of
Political Economy 106, no. 1 (1998): 140.
85. Philippe Aghion et al., `Volatility and Growth: Credit Constraints and the Composition of
Investment', Journal of Monetary Economics 57, no. 3 (2010): 246265.
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of credit provide rms the same type of insulation from adverse economic shocks
that idle cash reserves do. At the same time, credit lines can be used just as
normal loans, to nance rm growth.86 However, as alluded to above, repeated
current account transactions also provide banks with the ability to gather inform-
ation about their clients at a high frequency.87 The threat of revocation of credit
lines can thus also function as a mechanism to prevent the wasteful use of the
lender's funds.88
The theories discussed above, when tested empirically, support the view that
more developed nancial systems lead to more economic growth, although these
ndings come with some qualications. This empirical evidence has been gathered
using a wide range of methodologies and approaches.89 For reasons of economy of
space these empirical studies will be discussed in the chapters that follow.
86. Karl V Lins, Henri Servaes and Peter Tufano, `What Drives Corporate Liquidity? An
International Survey of Cash Holdings and Lines of Credit', Journal of Financial Economics 98,
no. 1 (2010): 160176.
87. Eugene F Fama, `What's Dierent About Banks?', Journal of Monetary Economics 15, no.
1 (1985): 2939; Lars Norden and Martin Weber, `Credit Line Usage, Checking Account Activity,
and Default Risk of Bank Borrowers', The Review of Financial Studies 23, no. 10 (2010): 3665
3699.
88. Viral Acharya et al., `Credit Lines as Monitored Liquidity Insurance: Theory and Evidence',
Journal of Financial Economics 112, no. 3 (2014): 287319.
89. For reviews, see: Valickova, Havranek and Horvath, `Financial Development'; Levine, `Fin-
ance and Growth'; Thorsten Beck, `The Econometrics of Finance and Growth', in Palgrave








This chapter investigates whether stock markets and banks played a role in
British economic growth from 1850 to 1913, or whether nancial develop-
ment followed economic growth. In order to answer this question, it uses
a new dataset on paid-in capital of domestic rms listed on British stock
exchanges, and exploits recent developments in time series econometrics.
These econometric techniques allow us to examine potential changes in the
relationship between the nancial sector and the economy over time. The
results suggest that the growth of the stock markets and that of the banking
sector had little impact on economic growth.
1.1 Introduction
Economic historians have generally taken a cautious view about the role of com-
mercial banks and stock markets in late 19th century British economic growth.
The London Stock Exchange raised vast amounts of capital for domestic and for-
eign railways, as well as foreign rms and governments, but the same cannot
be said about its contribution to domestic industry - at least before the 1880s.1
Commercial banks were preoccupied with short-term lending for working capital
expenditures, and their lending practices became increasingly conservative over
time.2 At the same time, historians have argued that most rms could easily
cover their long-term nancing needs through private means and through reinves-
ted prots, and that capital was generally forthcoming from the stock markets
when it was needed.3 However, discussions about the role of nancial institutions
in British economic growth, especially when it comes to the stock markets, have
1. Sidney Pollard, `Capital Exports, 18701914 Harmful or Benecial?', The Economic History
Review 38, no. 4 (1985): 489514.
2. Mae Baker and Michael Collins, `Financial Crises and Structural Change in English Com-
mercial Bank Assets, 18601913', Explorations in Economic History 36, no. 4 (1999): 428444.
3. Michael Collins, Money and Banking in the UK: A History (London: Croom Helm, 1988),
116-117; Michael Collins, Banks and Industrial Finance in Britain: 1800-1939 (London: Macmil-
lan, 1991), 32-36; Philip L Cottrell, `Domestic Finance, 1860-1914', in The Cambridge Economic
History of Modern Britain, ed. Roderick Floud and Paul Johnson (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2004), 253279; Ranald C Michie, `The London Stock Exchange and the British
Securities Market 18501914', The Economic History Review 38, no. 1 (1985): 6182.
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still largely revolved around the availability of long-term nance. This appears to
be a symptom of the disconnect between the historical and economic literature on
nance and growth.
Mobilising savings for investment is just one of the several channels through
which nancial intermediaries can inuence economic growth, and historical eval-
uations of their role should take this into account.4 The theoretical and empirical
macroeconomic literature suggests that nancial intermediaries can improve eco-
nomic performance through fostering productivity growth, rather than just capital
deepening.5 Indeed, after the 1960s, the causal link from nancial development
to economic growth has not tended to run through capital accumulation.6 Even
if nancial development is important for investment, it often enhances economic
performance by increasing the productivity of capital employed, rather than the
amount of capital that is invested.7
This chapter builds upon the empirical literature on nance and growth in
economic history. This is an active area of research, and several econometric
studies on 19th century Germany, Sweden and Belgium have found a link between
the growth of the nancial sector and the economy.8 To the best of my knowledge,
Rousseau and Wachtel are the only ones to have used time series econometrics to
study nance and growth in the UK before WW1, although their sample only
4. See the introduction to this thesis.
5. For a review, see: Ross Levine, `Financial Development and Economic Growth: Views and
Agenda', Journal of Economic Literature, 1997, 688726; Ross Levine, `Finance and Growth:
Theory and Evidence', in Handbook of Economic Growth, ed. P Aghion and S Durlauf, vol. 1
(Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2005), 865934.
6. Thorsten Beck, Ross Levine and Norman Loayza, `Finance and the Sources of Growth',
Journal of Financial Economics 58, no. 1 (2000): 261300.
7. Inessa Love and Lea Zicchino, `Financial Development and Dynamic Investment Behavior:
Evidence from Panel VAR', The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance 46, no. 2 (2006):
190210.
8. See e.g. Pontus Hansson and Lars Jonung, `Finance and Economic Growth: The Case of
Sweden 18341991', Research in Economics 51, no. 3 (1997): 275301; Anders Ögren, `Finan-
cial Revolution and Economic Modernisation in Sweden', Financial History Review 16, no. 01
(2009): 4771; Carsten Burhop, `Did Banks Cause the German Industrialization?', Explorations
in Economic History 43, no. 1 (2006): 3963; Katharina Diekmann and Frank Westermann,
`Financial Development and Sectoral Output Growth in Nineteenth-Century Germany', Fin-
ancial History Review 19, no. 2 (2012): 149174; Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh, Frans Buelens and
Ludo Cuyvers, `Stock Market Development and Economic Growth in Belgium', Explorations in
Economic History 43, no. 1 (2006): 1338.
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covers the years after 1880, and they exclude stock markets from their study.9 A
recent working paper by D'Onforio and Rousseau incorporates UK data from 1870
to 1929 into a panel time series study on broad money, trade and growth, but the
authors present little detail on nance and growth which is specic to the UK.10
This chapter thus constitutes the rst study on the role of the stock markets in
British economic growth during the period 1850-1913, while also exploring the
banking sector's role during an earlier period than previous econometric studies
on this topic.
A signicant limitation of many of the existing contributions on this topic
is that their models assume a linear and continuous relationship between the
nancial sector and the economy. British nancial history for the period 1850-
1913, however, implies that the relationship between the nancial sector and the
economy is likely to have changed considerably as stock markets started listing
more British industrial undertakings, and as the banking sector expanded in size
but became more risk-averse. Indeed, in modern times, the link between nancial
sector development and economic growth has not been stable.11 For example, it
has been claimed that as a nancial system becomes large enough, its growth may
become inconsequential for economic growth.12
This chapter utilises recent developments in time series econometrics to test
if stock markets or commercial banks contributed to British economic growth
from 1850 to 1913. The models are able to account for potential changes in the
relationship between nance and growth, and to factor in the ongoing structural
change in the economy and the nancial system. To obtain a suitable indicator for
stock market development, a new dataset on the paid-in capital of securities listed
on British stock exchanges is used. Tests for Granger-causality, which have been
applied commonly in the nance and growth literature, provide little evidence of
9. Peter L Rousseau and Paul Wachtel, `Financial Intermediation and Economic Performance:
Historical Evidence from Five Industrialized Countries', Journal of Money, Credit and Banking
30, no. 4 (1998): 65778.
10. Alexandra D'Onofrio and Peter L Rousseau, `Financial Development, Trade Openness and
Growth in the First Wave of Globalization' (2016), Working Paper, available at SSRN: http:
//dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2804072.
11. Peter L Rousseau and Paul Wachtel, `What is Happening to the Impact of Financial Deep-
ening on Economic Growth?', Economic Inquiry 49, no. 1 (2011): 276288.
12. Siong Hook Law and Nirvikar Singh, `Does Too Much Finance Harm Economic Growth?',
Journal of Banking & Finance 41 (2014): 3644.
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banking-driven growth. At most, the growth of the banking sector and that of
the economy were mutually reinforcing. The development of the stock markets
did not have a signicant impact on the economy. There is also no evidence that
stock markets or banks inuenced subsequent capital accumulation. Instead, in
a manner consistent with previous literature on postwar data, banks primarily
inuenced the economy's productivity levels. Yet even this result is statistically
weak. More advanced models provide even less evidence of nancial intermediaries
having inuenced economic growth.
1.2 Historical Features of the Financial System
1.2.1 Stock Markets
The London Stock Exchange was the world's leading securities market throughout
the period 1850-1913.13 Despite its considerable size, it was primarily a market for
public debt and railway securities until the late 19th century. This is illustrated in
gure 1.1, which shows that until the mid-1880s, the paid-up capital of these two
classes of securities accounted for over 90% of the total amount that was listed
on the exchange.14 Foreign entities constituted a growing share of new listings,
and by 1914, almost a third of the world's marketable securities could be traded
in London.15 It was not until the 1890s that a signicant number of domestic
industrial companies started to be quoted on the exchange. These are included
in the `Commercial and industrial' category in the gure below.16 The amount of
capital that companies in this category had raised from investors rose from ¿173m
13. Ranald C Michie, The London Stock Exchange: A History (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1999), 70-74, 88; Youssef Cassis, Capitals of Capital: A History of International Financial
Centres, 1780-2005 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 83, 98.
14. Paid-up capital refers to the amount of capital that has been raised from investors.
15. Larry Neal and Lance Davis, `The Evolution of the Structure and Performance of the
London Stock Exchange in the First Global Financial Market, 18121914', European Review of
Economic History 10, no. 3 (2006): 279300.
16. However, this category also includes some foreign companies, or British companies primarily
operating abroad. See: Ranald C Michie, The London and New York Stock Exchanges 1850-1914
(London: Allen & Unwin, 1987), table 2.3.
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(or 12% of UK GDP) in 1893 to ¿918m in 1913 (43% of GDP).17
Based on the limited listings of domestic enterprises, one might question the
economic importance of the LSE before 1890. But for much of the period at
issue, provincial exchanges played a signicant role in providing markets for the
securities of smaller domestic rms.18 In light of such specialisation, it is necessary
to consider the operations of all British exchanges before making inferences about
their economic impact. Yet, historians have thus far mainly examined London and
provincial stock exchanges separately.19
Figure 1.1: Paid-up capital of securities listed on the London Stock Exchange, ¿
millions, 1853-1913
Source: Ranald C Michie, The London Stock Exchange: A History (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1999), 88, table 3.2. The data is at 10-year intervals from 1853 to 1913. Public debt gures
include both government debt and that of public bodies. The Commercial and industrial category
also includes iron, steel coal and shipping companies, along with breweries and distilleries.
Before WW1, smaller British commercial enterprises primarily raised capital
17. The GDP gures are based on the balanced estimates by Solomos Solomou and Martin
Weale, `Balanced Estimates of UK GDP 18701913', Explorations in Economic History 28, no.
1 (1991): 5463.
18. Ranald C Michie, `The London and Provincial Stock Exchanges, 1799-1973: Separation, In-
tegration, Rivalry, Unity', in Enterprise and Management: Essays in Honour of Peter L. Payne,
ed. Peter Lester Payne, Derek Howard Aldcroft and Anthony Slaven (Aldershot: Scolar Press,
1995), 200-202; Cottrell, `Domestic Finance', 267.
19. William Thomas, Provincial Stock Exchanges (London: Cass, 1975); Michie, London and
New York .
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through informal channels, such as the owners' personal contacts.20 For many of
these companies, it was often cheaper to do so, as underwriting services could be
expensive.21 Nevertheless, companies that needed external capital from the stock
markets - especially as they started growing larger - generally found it forthcom-
ing.22 Even rms in riskier, but possibly more innovative industries, such as car
manufacturing or electrical engineering, encountered relatively few problems rais-
ing funds.23 According to Cottrell, this shows that lack of demand for external
capital may have been the main cause of the low levels of industrial nancing
raised through the stock market before the 1890s.24
At the outset, it is important to note that the core function of a stock ex-
change is to provide a secondary market for securities, not to raise new capital.25
The latter function is often performed by institutions and actors connected to
the stock market (such as company promoters), and through the market (such
as initial public oerings).26 But even secondary markets can be important for
encouraging investment. Rousseau and Sylla argue that the incentives for rais-
ing new capital might be lower without stock markets, because markets make it
easier for entrepreneurs to sell their shares onwards.27 Prospective entrepreneurs
thus have a means to `cash out' if their ventures succeed. As pointed out in the
introduction, stock markets may also increase the incentives for investors to n-
20. Ibid., 107-111.
21. Alexander Kirkland Cairncross, Home and Foreign Investment, 18701913 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1953), 101.
22. Katherine Watson, `The New Issue Market as a Source of Finance for the UK Brewing and
Iron and Steel Industries, 18701913', in The Evolution of Financial Institutions and Markets
in Twentieth-Century Europe, ed. Youssef Cassis, Gerald D Feldman and Ulf Olsson (Aldershot:
Scolar Press, 1995), 211248.
23. Ranald Michie, `The Finance of Innovation in Late Victorian and Edwardian Britain: Pos-
sibilities and Constraints', Journal of European Economic History 17, no. 3 (1988): 491. Michie
suggests that the main exception to this were industries where government regulations consti-
tuted a signicant constraint, such as the case of telephones.
24. Philip L Cottrell, Industrial Finance, 1830-1914: The Finance and Organization of Eng-
lish Manufacturing Industry (London: Methuen, 1980), 187-188, 269-270; Cottrell, `Domestic
Finance'.
25. Peter L Rousseau and Paul Wachtel, `Equity Markets and Growth: Cross-Country Evidence
on Timing and Outcomes, 19801995', Journal of Banking & Finance 24, no. 12 (2000): 1933
1957; Michie, London and New York , 100-102.
26. Michie argues that this has been a major source of confusion in the historical literature on
British capital markets. See: Ibid.
27. Peter L Rousseau and Richard Sylla, `Emerging Financial Markets and Early US Growth',
Explorations in Economic History 42, no. 1 (2005): 126.
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ance enterprises, because they facilitate trading claims on projects which require
a long-term commitment of capital, while at the same improving their ability to
construct diversied portfolios. Moreover, they can also make it easier for groups
of investors to monitor and instil discipline on company directors.28 The insti-
tutional context of the capital markets may nevertheless have constrained their
ability to perform some of these functions.
Despite the few apparent constraints on capital from the stock markets, the
markets did suer from some institutional weaknesses. Britain had little legisla-
tion for the purposes of protecting investors before WW1.29 Minority sharehold-
ers could do little to monitor, let alone constrain the behaviour of directors or
managers, and they could not individually sue a company's management for the
misappropriation of resources.30 Presumably, this would have increased the per-
ceived riskiness of a whole host of securities, while diminishing the capital markets'
ability to improve corporate governance. Furthermore, nancial disclosure require-
ments of publicly traded companies were largely voluntary before 1900, and were
very limited throughout the rest of the prewar years. By law, companies in only
a few industries needed to publish balance sheets during initial public oerings
(IPOs) before 1908. This made it more dicult for investors to evaluate potential
investments and to monitor a given company's performance.31
Stock exchanges could themselves impose rules to make up for the limitations of
existing legislation. Like other exchanges in Britain, the London Stock Exchange
was a largely self-regulating organisation before 1914.32 Raising capital on the
exchange could be done both through special settlement - an unregulated form -
or through an ocial quotation, whereby the exchange put various requirements
for an IPO.33 These requirements included allotting at least two thirds of shares
to the public, and a minimum capital requirement of ¿100,000. But even in the
regulated form of IPOs, the stock exchange only required nancial statements to
28. See the introduction of this thesis.
29. Julian Franks, Colin Mayer and Stefano Rossi, `Ownership: Evolution and Regulation',
Review of Financial Studies 22, no. 10 (2009): 40094056.
30. Ibid.
31. Leslie Hannah, `Pioneering Modern Corporate Governance: A View from London in 1900',
Enterprise and Society 8, no. 3 (2007): 642686.
32. Neal and Davis, `Evolution'.
33. Carsten Burhop, David Chambers and Brian Chens, `Regulating IPOs: Evidence from
Going Public in London, 19001913', Explorations in Economic History 51 (2014): 6076.
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be circulated in the early 1900s.34
Economic historians have questioned if such legislative lacunae in the protec-
tion of investors had harmful consequences, and if self-regulatory approaches by
the stock exchanges were sucient to compensate for these weaknesses. Empirical
evidence suggests that while the overall failure rate of London IPOs in 1900-1913
was similar to that found on modern stock markets, the failures of unregulated
IPOs - the majority of new issues - was high, and their share price performance was
typically poor.35 In this sense, lack of shareholder protection was indeed harmful
for investors, although stock exchange regulations could mitigate the issue.
If it was primarily smaller rms which resorted to unregulated IPOs, their high
failure rate could have been related to problems with adverse selection. Investors
may have become sceptical of any new issues, owing to the diculty of evaluating
their prospects. Such scepticism would have translated into the costs of raising
capital, potentially aecting even better companies. It follows that high-quality
companies may have been discouraged from seeking external funds, unless they
qualied for an ocial quotation. This is supported by qualitative evidence, which
indicates that a lack of regulations led to fraudulent practices in company pro-
motion, such as misleading accounts, which increased public mistrust of domestic
industrial issues.36 Indeed, although most companies found capital forthcoming,
there is some evidence of very small companies - ones that had to rely on unregu-
lated IPOs - that occasionally experienced diculties when trying to raise capital
from the public in London.37
A signicant body of research argues that legal protection of shareholders is an
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid. The authors control for rm characteristics. Failure is measured as delisting within
ve years of the oering without compensation to the shareholders.
36. John Armstrong, `The Rise and Fall of the Company Promoter and the Financing of British
Industry', in Capitalism in a Mature Economy: Financial Institutions, Capital Exports and Brit-
ish Industry, 1870-1939, ed. J J van Helten and Y Cassis (Cambridge: Edward Elgar, 1990), 115
138; David Kynaston, The City of London: Vol. II: Golden Years 1890-1914 (London: Chatto
& Windus, 1996), 457-465.
37. AE Harrison, `Joint-Stock Company Flotation in the Cycle, Motor-vehicle and related
industries, 18821914', Business History 23, no. 2 (1981): 165190. However, Harrison also
acknowledged that these rms could meet the capital shortfall through subsequent share issues
with more generous terms, or through bank lines of credit.
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important determinant for the degree to which the public holds shares.38 Identi-
fying managers that are misallocating resources requires reliable nancial reports,
and rectifying the situation necessitates a legal system capable of enforcing con-
tracts between managers and shareholders. Widespread share ownership in late
19th century Britain itself suggests that there were factors which mitigated issues
with lacking legal protection of shareholders.39 Indeed, in such environments, al-
ternative (albeit imperfect) mechanisms to enhance corporate governance are often
used. For example, Campbell and Turner show that high dividends were used to
compensate for limited investor rights in the late 19th century.40 Dividend pay-
ments are an observable measure of a rm's performance, and a company cannot
pay excessive dividends for a prolonged period of time without increasing its debt
burden or drawing on its productive assets. A high payout policy may furthermore
leave managers with less capital to misallocate. Additionally, rms often enshrined
rules into their articles of association that went beyond legal requirements. These
regulated the extent to which shareholders were provided nancial reports; what
matters they could vote on; and set limitations on insider dealing.41 According to
Acheson et al., such measures were widely applied in late Victorian Britain, and
may have allowed the stock markets to improve corporate governance.42
The overarching view that may be drawn from the literature on this issue is
that there were few observable constraints on stock market nancing for domestic
rms, with the caveat that the capital markets also suered from certain institu-
tional weaknesses. Nevertheless, the degree to which stock markets contributed to
economic growth remains unclear. Additionally, since domestic enterprises star-
ted quoting on stock exchanges in increasing numbers towards the end of the 19th
century, the relationship between stock markets and economic growth might not
38. Rafael La Porta et al., `Law and Finance', Journal of Political Economy 106, no. 6 (1998):
111311.
39. Graeme G Acheson et al., `Corporate Ownership and Control in Victorian Britain', The
Economic History Review, 2015, Graeme G Acheson et al., `Corporate Ownership, Control, and
Firm Performance in Victorian Britain', The Journal of Economic History 76, no. 1 (2016): 140;
Franks, Mayer and Rossi, `Ownership: Evolution and Regulation'.
40. Gareth Campbell and John D Turner, `Substitutes for Legal Protection: Corporate Gov-
ernance and Dividends in Victorian Britain', The Economic History Review 64, no. 2 (2011):
571597.
41. Graeme G Acheson, Gareth Campbell and John D Turner, `Common Law and the Origin




have been constant over time.
1.2.2 Commercial Banks
British commercial banking expanded rapidly in the late 19th century. Even as the
last restrictive pieces of legislation had been removed by the 1860s, several other
changes in the banking system may have inuenced its contribution to economic
growth. Banks became larger through increased branching and merger activity,
but amalgamations of banks also increased the prevalence of collusive practices.
And while the resources that banks had at their disposal increased, the share of
their assets lent to businesses declined.
Commercial banks reduced their private sector lending considerably after the
1870s. There was a sharp increase in the safety and liquidity of bank balance
sheets after the City of Glasgow Bank failure in 1878.43 The crisis left most of
the bank's shareholders bankrupt, and was followed by most commercial banks
limiting the liability of their owners by 1885.44 Although the crisis itself may
have been sucient to increase bank conservatism, the adoption of a new legal
structure also contributed to bank prudence. In the absence of deposit insurance,
limited liability banks had to convince depositors that their money was safe, as
depositors could no longer rely on the private wealth of shareholders in case their
bank failed. To do so, limited liability banks maintained higher ratios of capital
to liabilities than did banks with unlimited liability.45 As long as depositors were
satised in their bank's safety, limited liability could have induced banks to take
additional risks. But this incentive to increased risk-taking was counterbalanced
by the practice of retaining uncalled capital: capital which the bank could demand
from shareholders when needed. To avoid having to do so, bank shareholders still
had every incentive to ensure their banks were prudent, which led to banks lending
43. Baker and Collins, `Financial Crises and Structural Change'.
44. John D Turner, `'the Last Acre and Sixpence': Views on Bank Liability Regimes in
Nineteenth-Century Britain', Financial History Review 16, no. 02 (2009): 111127.
45. Graeme G Acheson and John D Turner, `The Death Blow to Unlimited Liability in Victorian
Britain: The City of Glasgow Failure', Explorations in Economic History 45, no. 3 (2008): 251-
252.
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less relative to their assets.46
Previous experiences of crises and the adoption of limited liability may not
have been the only factors increasing the conservatism of bankers in the late 19th
century. Private and small joint-stock banks were typically absorbed into larger
banks through the merger waves of the 1880s and 1890s, which coincided with
the creation of large bank branch networks across the country.47 This mattered,
because smaller provincial banks, along with (typically smaller) private banks,
tended to commit a larger share of their assets to private sector lending.48 As
will be discussed in the third chapter, the largest banks needed to codify lending
rules in order to manage the risk that was taken at hundreds of dierent branches,
which might have led to less exible lending practices.49
According to Grossman, increased concentration rendered banks inecient in
allocating capital by relieving them of competitive pressures, while allowing them
to maintain signicantly more conservative balance sheets.50 There were certainly
potential advantages to banking sector consolidation, as larger banks could enjoy
higher economies of scale by economising on administrative overheads.51 Yet, hav-
ing fewer competitors also encouraged collusive behaviour of the largest London-
based banks. For example, these banks agreed to x the interest rate on deposits
in the three decades before WW1.52 Additionally, banks in counties with less com-
petitive banking sectors constrained their lending to certain types of customers,
46. Richard S Grossman and Masami Imai, `Contingent Capital and Bank Risk-Taking Among
British Banks before the First World War1', The Economic History Review 66, no. 1 (2013):
132155.
47. Cottrell, `Domestic Finance', 255, 270-273; Richard S Grossman, `Rearranging Deck Chairs
on the Titanic: English Banking Concentration and Eciency, 18701914', European Review of
Economic History 3, no. 3 (1999): 323349.
48. Michael Collins and Mae Baker, `Sectoral Dierences in English Bank Asset Structures and
the Impact of Mergers, 1860-1913', Business History 43, no. 4 (2001): 128.
49. Lucy Newton, `Regional BankIndustry Relations During the Mid-Nineteenth Century:
Links between Bankers and Manufacturing in Sheeld, C. 1850 to C. 1885', Business History
38, no. 3 (1996): 6483; Victoria Barnes and Lucy Newton, `How Far Does the Apple Fall from
the Tree? The Size of English Bank Branch Networks in the Nineteenth Century', Business
History, 2017, 127.
50. Grossman, `Rearranging'.
51. Joseph Sykes, The Amalgamation Movement in English Banking, 1825-1924 (London: P.S.
King & Son, 1926), 56-59. This will also be discussed in more depth in the third chapter.
52. Charles A E Goodhart, The Business of Banking, 18911914 (London: Weidenfeld /
Nicolson, 1972), 178-179.
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while requiring more collateral from borrowers.53
Notwithstanding the fact that banks were generally conservative, in a series
of contributions, Baker and Collins have argued that there were several positive
aspects related to the developments in late 19th century banking. Banks were
indeed preoccupied with short-term lending during the latter half of the 19th
century, but they would commonly roll these loans over.54 This practice made it
easy to gather information about customers at frequent intervals, while reducing
agency problems, as customers had to prove repeatedly that loans were used for
productive purposes.55 Rolling over short-term loans thus made it possible to lend
to a wider range of customers - even riskier ones - while oering exible loan terms
if problems arose.56 Nevertheless, this was only thanks to the maintenance of a
transactional approach to customer relationships, coupled with increasingly liquid
loan portfolios. This inevitably translated into a smaller share of banks' resources
dedicated to loans for rms.57
Commercial banks' increased reliance on London's nancial and money mar-
kets, where they could buy securities and make short-term loans to obtain higher
returns on their near-cash holdings, may have improved the stability of the bank-
ing system.58 However, Baker and Collins suggest that this same development
could have made banks less supportive of British industry, as an increasing share
of their resources was allocated elsewhere.59 This question will be examined in
more detail in the following chapter. However, as mentioned above, there is little
evidence of constraints on commercial bank credit for rms, as short-term loans
53. Fabio Braggion, Narly Dwarkasing and Lyndon Moore, `Nothing Special About Banks:
Competition and Bank Lending in Britain, 18851925', The Review of Financial Studies, 2017,
35023537.
54. Michael Collins, `English Bank Development within a European Context, 18701939', The
Economic History Review 51, no. 1 (1998): 124.
55. Michael Collins and Mae Baker, Commercial Banks and Industrial Finance in England and
Wales, 1860-1913 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 251-252.
56. Mae Baker and Michael Collins, `English Industrial Distress before 1914 and the Response
of the Banks', European Review of Economic History 3, no. 01 (1999): 124.
57. Ibid.; Mae Baker and Michael Collins, `English Commercial Bank Stability, 1860-1914',
Journal of European Economic History 31, no. 3 (2002): 493493.
58. Mae Baker, Caroline Eadsforth and Michael Collins, `Avoiding Toxic Assets and Ensuring
Bank Stability: English Commercial Bank Investments, 18801910', Business History 51, no.
6 (2009): 854874; John D Turner, Banking in Crisis: The Rise and Fall of British Banking
Stability, 1800 to the Present (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 180.
59. Baker and Collins, `Financial Crises and Structural Change'.
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were generally easy to obtain.60 Notwithstanding the evidence that banking sector
concentration led to some instances of local credit constraints, banks appear to
have rejected a rather small percentage of loan applications.61 Nevertheless, a
large share of rejected loan applications in the late 19th century came from young
rms, which may have been more innovative, despite their riskiness.62 Bankers
sometimes refused these loans, because bank managers were sceptical of certain
industries, or because rms in emerging sectors could not oer sucient collateral
or evidence of stable cash ows.63 But rejecting some customers with uncertain
cash ows appears to be sound banking practice, rather than excessive conservat-
ism, especially since we observe that a large majority of rms found bank loans
forthcoming.
As the literature on banking now stands, we know a good deal about the lending
practices of British banks, and about their relationships with certain classes of
borrowers. But as is the case for the stock market, we do not have a rigorous
understanding of the macroeconomic impact of their operations.
1.3 Empirical Literature on Finance and Growth
A large number of empirical studies, based on post-WW2 data, have found evid-
ence of a relationship between nancial development and economic growth.64 A
seminal study in this eld was conducted by King and Levine, who used cross-
country growth regressions to show that the level of nancial development was
60. Forrest Capie and Michael Collins, `Banks, Industry and Finance, 18801914', Business
History 41, no. 1 (1999): 3762.
61. Forrest Capie and Michael Collins, `Industrial Lending by English Commercial Banks,
1860s1914: Why Did Banks Refuse Loans?', Business History 38, no. 1 (1996): 2644. Of
course, customers who knew they could not get loans may have been discouraged from applying.
62. Ibid.
63. Collins and Baker, Commercial Banks, 208-219.
64. See:Levine, `Finance and Growth' and James B Ang, `A Survey of Recent Developments in
the Literature of Finance and Growth', Journal of Economic Surveys 22, no. 3 (2008): 536576
for surveys of the literature. For recent meta-analyses of the research, see: Petra Valickova,
Tomas Havranek and Roman Horvath, `Financial Development and Economic Growth: A Meta-
Analysis', Journal of Economic Surveys 29, no. 3 (2015): 506526 and Philip Arestis, Georgios
Chortareas and Georgios Magkonis, `The Financial Development and Growth Nexus: A Meta-
Analysis', Journal of Economic Surveys 29, no. 3 (2015): 549565.
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correlated with subsequent economic growth in the years 1960-1989, even when
several other factors associated with economic development (such as education or
political stability) are controlled for.65 Rousseau and Sylla perform similar growth
regressions on historical data in a study of 17 countries over the period 1850-1997.
They show that the ratio of broad money to GDP was associated with subsequent
economic growth through several sub-periods in their sample, especially during
the years 1850-1929.66
A shortcoming of standard cross-country regressions is that they are rarely
useful for making claims about causality. Suppose, for example, that a country's
banking sector expands rapidly in a given year, followed by rapid economic ex-
pansion in a subsequent period. Did the nancial sector grow because bankers
expected the economy to expand, or did the economy expand because the nan-
cial sector grew? It is dicult to exclude the former possibility ex ante, which
means that the growth of the nancial sector is said to be endogenous to economic
growth. Causal statements about nance and growth can be made by examining
the impact of the exogenous component of nancial development, which is the
part that cannot be explained by other factors, such as economic fundamentals.
Early attempts to make causal inferences used instrumental variables for nan-
cial development, such as a country's legal origin, nding that earlier results from
cross-national regressions remain largely valid.67
Researchers have subsequently rened their approach to studying nance and
65. Robert G King and Ross Levine, `Finance, Entrepreneurship and Growth', Journal of
Monetary Economics 32, no. 3 (1993): 513542. The authors measure nancial development by
either bank credit divided by bank and central bank domestic assets; bank liquid liabilities to
GDP; or credit to the private sector to GDP.
66. Peter L Rousseau and Richard Sylla, `Financial Systems, Economic Growth, and Globaliza-
tion', in Globalization in Historical Perspective, ed. Michael D Bordo, Alan M Taylor and Jerey
G Williamson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 373416. The authors' results are
robust to using the rate of ination as an instrument.
67. Ross Levine, `The Legal Environment, Banks, and Long-Run Economic Growth', Journal
of Money, Credit and Banking, 1998, 596613. The logic behind this instrumental variable is
that dierent legal systems - such as common law or civil law - impact the growth of the nancial
system dierently. See: La Porta et al., `Law and Finance'.
35
growth in a cross-national setting by using methods for dynamic panel data.68
Besides mitigating issues with endogeneity, the methodology is able to exploit the
time dimension of the data. Studies using this framework have therefore been
able to look at several yearly observations for any given country, rather than just
two points in time, which leads to more accurate estimates and fewer issues with
potential data-mining.
Inuential contributions by Beck, Levine and Loyayza apply dynamic panel
methods to postwar data, obtaining results which are consistent with those of
earlier cross-country regressions: a higher level of nancial development increased
economic growth.69 The authors thus argue the banking sector and the nancial
markets are causal factors in economic development. Their results also indic-
ate that nancial intermediaries boost growth through improving productivity,
while the evidence of intermediaries increasing capital accumulation is weaker.
Subsequent research suggests that this is the case particularly in more developed
countries.70 However, evidence from historical data is more ambiguous. In a dy-
namic panel study of 17 countries over the period 1870-2009, Madsen and Ang nd
that nancial development inuenced both capital accumulation and productivity
growth.71
An important limitation of most regression models utilising cross-national data
is the assumption that the relationship between nance and growth is the same
68. Panel data encompasses several observations across time for each country. The most com-
monly applied methods are those by Arellano and Bond as well as Blundell and Bond. See:
Manuel Arellano and Stephen Bond, `Some Tests of Specication for Panel Data: Monte Carlo
Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations', The Review of Economic Studies 58,
no. 2 (1991): 277297; and Richard Blundell and Stephen Bond, `Initial Conditions and Moment
Restrictions in Dynamic Panel Data Models', Journal of Econometrics 87, no. 1 (1998): 115143.
69. Beck, Levine and Loayza, `Finance and the Sources of Growth'; Ross Levine, Norman
Loayza and Thorsten Beck, `Financial Intermediation and Growth: Causality and Causes',
Journal of Monetary Economics 46, no. 1 (2000): 3177 and Thorsten Beck and Ross Lev-
ine, `Stock Markets, Banks, and Growth: Panel Evidence', Journal of Banking & Finance 28,
no. 3 (2004): 423442.
70. Felix Rioja and Neven Valev, `Finance and the Sources of Growth at Various Stages of
Economic Development', Economic Inquiry 42, no. 1 (2004): 127140; Felix Rioja and Neven
Valev, `Stock Markets, Banks and the Sources of Economic Growth in Low and High Income
Countries', Journal of Economics and Finance 38, no. 2 (2014): 302320.
71. Jakob B Madsen and James B Ang, `Finance-Led Growth in the OECD Since the Nine-
teenth Century: How Does Financial Development Transmit to Growth?', Review of Economics
and Statistics 98, no. 3 (2016): 552572. The authors measure nancial development by ratios
of: broad money; bank assets; and bank credit to GDP.
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across countries.72 This is often unrealistic, particularly when countries at dierent
stages of economic (and nancial) development are included in the same model.
In a related vein, it is also dicult to draw inferences about the experience of any
particular country from the results of these models.
The multiple time series approach provides a exible setting for examining the
interplay between nance and growth. These methods explicitly allow for the pos-
sibility that the development of the nancial sector is partially driven by economic
factors, while imposing few restrictions on the functional form between nancial
and economic variables. The approach is especially useful for economic historians
interested in country-specic studies. Evidence from time series methods indicates
that in most countries after the 1960s, nancial development had a causal impact
on growth.73 Nevertheless, there are also prominent time series studies which nd
evidence of causality running from economic development to the growth of the n-
ancial sector, or evidence in support of a bidirectional causal relationship between
nance and growth, which suggests that the nancial sector and the real economy
tend to co-evolve.74
Econometric studies on historical links between banking and growth have so
far concentrated largely on Germany, Sweden and the US.75 Studies on Germany
have reached at least mildly positive results. Burhop uses the multiple time series
approach for German data spanning the years 1880-1913. He nds that joint-stock
banks inuenced the growth of heavy industry, although the evidence of their
72. Fohlin makes several additional remarks on problems with cross-country regressions in this
context. See: Caroline Fohlin, Mobilizing Money: How the World's Richest Nations Financed
Industrial Growth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 204-207.
73. Philip Arestis, Panicos O Demetriades and Kul B Luintel, `Financial Development and
Economic Growth: The Role of Stock Markets', Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 2001, 16
41; Dimitris K Christopoulos and Efthymios G Tsionas, `Financial Development and Economic
Growth: Evidence from Panel Unit Root and Cointegration Tests', Journal of Development
Economics 73, no. 1 (2004): 5574.
74. James B Ang and Warwick J McKibbin, `Financial Liberalization, Financial Sector De-
velopment and Growth: Evidence from Malaysia', Journal of Development Economics 84, no. 1
(2007): 215233; Panicos O Demetriades and Khaled A Hussein, `Does Financial Development
Cause Economic Growth? Time-Series Evidence from 16 Countries', Journal of Development
Economics 51, no. 2 (1996): 387411; Kul B Luintel and Mosahid Khan, `A Quantitative Reas-
sessment of the FinanceGrowth Nexus: Evidence from a Multivariate VAR', Journal of Devel-
opment Economics 60, no. 2 (1999): 381405. Bidirectional causality also implies that nancial
development does not play a strong independent role in economic growth.
75. Studies on nance and regional growth in economic history will be discussed in the third
chapter of this thesis.
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contribution to economic growth more broadly appears to be weaker.76 However,
Diekmann and Westermann nd more positive results by using similar methods,
but data for a wider set of German banks.77 They show that increases in bank
lending inuenced German economic growth, and that it contributed primarily to
the growth of the service and agricultural sectors. Equity nance, on the other
hand, mainly contributed to the growth of the industrial sector. The underlying
reasoning behind this result is that large rms became increasingly reliant on
capital markets for their nancing needs, while smaller rms relied on banks.
These ndings support this chapter's empirical approach, where both banks and
stock markets are included into an econometric model, because these institutions
may have contributed to economic growth in dierent ways.
Time series studies focusing on the Swedish case have also tended to nd a
positive link between the banking sector and economic growth in the late 19th
century.78 However, these results may not be robust. When the start date of
the dataset of these studies is extended to the earlier part of the 19th century,
and when the insurance sector's development is taken into account, the banking
sector's contribution to growth becomes less signicant.79
As mentioned above, Rousseau and Wachtel have previously used time series
methods to study the economic impact of the banking system's growth in the
UK, while also examining the cases of the US, Norway, Sweden and Canada.80
The authors nd evidence of nance-led growth from 1880 to 1929, but their
econometric approach is problematic. Their Granger-causality test may not be
robust when applied to non-stationary series, and they do not adequately control
for the stock markets or the distortion caused by WW1. Thus, the British nance-
growth nexus certainly needs further econometric research. Moreover, the analysis
should be extended to the pre-1870 period.81
The econometric literature on stock markets and historical economic growth
76. Burhop, `Did Banks'.
77. Diekmann and Westermann, `Financial Development and Sectoral Output'.
78. Ögren, `Financial Revolution'; Hansson and Jonung, `Finance and Economic Growth'.
79. Mike Adams et al., `Commercial Banking, Insurance and Economic Growth in Sweden
between 1830 and 1998', Accounting, Business & Financial History 19, no. 1 (2009): 2138.
80. Rousseau and Wachtel, `Financial Intermediation'.
81. The omission of stock markets is also a shortcoming of D'Onofrio and Rousseau, `Financial
Development'.
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is still in its infancy. The evidence gathered so far points towards a positive link
between the two. In the case of Belgium, Nieuwerburgh et al. use a time series
approach to show that the growth of stock markets contributed to the nation's
economic performance from 1832 to 2002.82 Similarly, the Berlin stock exchange in
1892-1913 played a signicant role in the nancing of innovative rms, indicating
that it had a positive role in the modernisation of the German economy.83 Rousseau
and Sylla show that an increase in the listed securities on the stock markets (along
with the growth of the money stock) predicted subsequent economic growth in
major US cities in 1790-1850.84 Stock markets may also have indirectly contributed
to economic growth through supporting the growth of the banking sector.85 For
example, Rousseau argues that the banking system in late 19th century New York
expanded partially because share prices revealed information about the soundness
of individual banks.86 This further motivates the need to examine the economic
impact of stock markets and banks jointly.
Economists have recently taken a more nuanced view of the link between n-
ance and growth. An important advance in several recent studies is to allow for
non-linearities in the relationship. The strength of the nance-growth nexus tends
to depend on a country's degree of economic development. For example, Aghion
et al. show that between 1960 and 1995, nancial development had a larger im-
pact on the economic growth of poorer countries.87 Specically, they show that
more nancial development (measured by private credit) helps countries to catch
up more rapidly to the income levels of rich countries. The positive contribution
of nance weakens as convergence occurs. Fung provides further evidence on this,
while also showing that poorer countries tend to catch up in terms of nancial
development, and not just economic growth.88 Such ndings are, to a certain ex-
82. Nieuwerburgh, Buelens and Cuyvers, `Stock Market Development'.
83. Sibylle Lehmann-Hasemeyer and Jochen Streb, `The Berlin Stock Exchange in Imperial
Germany: A Market for New Technology?', American Economic Review 106, no. 11 (2016):
35583576.
84. Rousseau and Sylla, `Emerging'.
85. Ögren, `Financial Revolution'.
86. Peter L Rousseau, `The Market for Bank Stocks and the Rise of Deposit Banking in New
York City, 18661897', The Journal of Economic History 71, no. 4 (2011): 9761005.
87. Philippe Aghion, Peter Howitt and David Mayer-Foulkes, `The Eect of Financial Devel-
opment on Convergence: Theory and Evidence', The Quarterly Journal of Economics 120, no.
1 (2005): 173222.
88. Michael K Fung, `Financial Development and Economic Growth: Convergence or Diver-
gence?', Journal of International Money and Finance 28, no. 1 (2009): 5667.
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tent, consistent with the Gerschenkron hypothesis, which implies that nance can
be particularly helpful in catch-up growth, whereas the most developed countries
benet less from a large nancial sector.89 In the case of the UK in 1850-1913,
these ndings imply that, as the leading economy, the country may have stood to
gain less from nancial development than did more backward countries.
Following the Great Recession, the view that nancial development is import-
ant for growth has come under even more scrutiny. There is now evidence that
after a certain point, the nancial sector's expansion becomes inconsequential, or
even a drag, on economic performance.90 This (somewhat arbitrary) threshold
exists partially because the impact of nancial instability tends to be more severe
when the nancial system itself is large. Additionally, economies where credit
grows too rapidly tend to be more prone to nancial crises.91 This appears to
have been the case for more than a century, as evidence from cross country data
from 1870 to 2008 suggests that rapid credit expansion has been a good predictor
of subsequent nancial crises.92
The link between nance and growth has also tended to weaken after the 1990s,
casting further doubt on whether the results of most of the pre-crisis literature
still hold.93 Many developed economies transitioned from highly regulated n-
ancial systems before the 1980s to increasing liberalisation, by removing several
constraints on the availability of nance. Empirically, less severe constraints on
nance should show up as a more tenuous relationship between nancial and eco-
nomic development. Moreover, the positive impact of nancial intermediation is
reduced in the post-1990s data by an increased occurrence of nancial crises.94 A
further factor restraining the nancial sector's contribution has been the changing
composition of bank credit. In several developed economies, a growing share of
89. Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective. (Cambridge,
MA.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1962).
90. Law and Singh, `Too Much Finance'; Jean-Louis Arcand, Enrico Berkes and Ugo Panizza,
`Too Much Finance?', Journal of Economic Growth 20, no. 2 (2015): 105148.
91. Lorenzo Ductor and Daryna Grechyna, `Financial Development, Real Sector, and Eco-
nomic Growth', International Review of Economics & Finance 37 (2015): 393405; Pierre-Olivier
Gourinchas and Maurice Obstfeld, `Stories of the Twentieth Century for the Twenty-First', Amer-
ican Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 4, no. 1 (2012): 226265.
92. Moritz Schularick and Alan M. Taylor, `Credit Booms gone Bust: Monetary Policy, Leverage
Cycles, and Financial Crises, 1870-2008', American Economic Review 102, no. 2 (2012): 102961.
93. Rousseau and Wachtel, `Happening'.
94. Ibid.
40
bank lending has been granted for the purposes of nancing household consump-
tion and real estate transactions, which has not been found to benet economic
growth.95
In light of this evidence, allowing for the possibility of a changing relationship
between the nancial sector and the economy is important when it comes to stat-
istical inference. Indeed, recent studies on the economic impact of nancial shocks
have demonstrated that the link between nancial and economic conditions varies
substantially over time.96 Their ndings suggest that simpler models may lead
to wrong conclusions about the link between nance and growth. A signicant
advantage of this chapter's methodology is to allow for such time-variance.
1.4 Data
The empirical literature on nance and growth has not reached a consensus on
which indicator for nancial development should be used. Traditionally, proxies for
the size of the banking sector (for example broad money, deposits, private sector
lending) or the stock market (market capitalisation, transaction volumes) have
been used. These indicators say little about how ecient the nancial sector was
in allocating resources and mitigating information asymmetries.97 Nevertheless,
in post-WW2 data, proxies of the nancial sector's size tend to correlate with
other measures of nancial development, such as access to nance, or the nancial
sector's cost-eciency in providing its services.98 The availability of data for the
95. Thorsten Beck et al., `Who Gets the Credit? And Does it Matter? Household vs. Firm Lend-
ing Across Countries', The BE Journal of Macroeconomics 12, no. 1 (2012); Arcand, Berkes and
Panizza, `Too Much Finance?'; Dirk Bezemer, Maria Grydaki and Lu Zhang, `More Mortgages,
Lower Growth?', Economic Inquiry 54, no. 1 (2016): 652674.
96. Martin Bijsterbosch and Matteo Falagiarda, `The Macroeconomic Impact of Financial Frag-
mentation in the Euro Area: Which Role for Credit Supply?', Journal of International Money
and Finance 54 (2015): 93115; Michael Ellington, Chris Florackis and Costas Milas, `Liquid-
ity Shocks and Real GDP Growth: Evidence from a Bayesian Time-Varying Parameter VAR',
Journal of International Money and Finance 72 (2017): 93117; Oana Peia and Kasper Roszbach,
`Finance and Growth: Time Series Evidence on Causality', Journal of Financial Stability 19
(2015): 105118. This literature will be discussed further in the second chapter of this thesis.
97. Asli Demirgüç-Kunt and Ross Levine, `Finance, Financial Sector Policies, and Long-Run
Growth', World Bank Policy Research Working Paper Series, 4469, 2008, Ang, `Survey'.
98. Martin ihák et al., `Financial Development in 205 Economies, 1960 to 2010', Journal of
Financial Perspectives 1, no. 2 (2013): 1736.
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pre-WW1 years, moreover, acts as a signicant constraint to the indicators that
can be used. Therefore, this chapter follows much of the existing literature in
terms the choice of the choice of proxies for nancial development. These will be
outlined in the subsections below.
A further caveat about the data is that it measures the growth of components
of the formal nancial sector. It is thus not an all-encompassing measure of the
availability of nance, especially as long-term nancing of smaller companies was
often done through personal contacts rather than formal channels. However, this
issue is largely inescapable in the context of the 19th and early 20th centuries,
and is not entirely resolved even in the context of modern developing countries.99
The yearly economic data used in this chapter is consistent with much the
of empirical literature on nance and growth.100 These real economic variables
for the UK include GDP, total factor productivity (TFP) and gross xed capital
formation (excluding dwellings). TFP is a proxy of how eciently factors of
production (capital and labour) were employed, although the measure used here
ignores other potentially important factors such as human capital. Fixed capital
formation is a measure of capital investment in the economy. The data is plotted
in gure 1.2. These series are used in separate models to test if nance inuenced
growth through any specic channel.101 However, I also experiment with models
including both xed capital formation and GDP.
TFP cannot be measured directly, but needs to be calculated through meas-
uring economic output after accounting for the labour force and capital stock em-
ployed the economy.102 Any inaccuracies in GDP, capital stock, or labour share of
income are thus directly translated into inaccuracies in the measurement of TFP.
99. Meghana Ayyagari, Asli Demirgüç-Kunt and Vojislav Maksimovic, `Formal Versus Informal
Finance: Evidence from China', The Review of Financial Studies 23, no. 8 (2010): 30483097;
Franklin Allen et al., `Financing Firms in India', Journal of Financial Intermediation 21, no. 3
(2012): 409445.
100. Thorsten Beck, `The Econometrics of Finance and Growth', in Palgrave Handbook of Eco-
nometrics, ed. T Mills and K Patterson, vol. 2 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 1180
1209.
101. Arestis, Demetriades and Luintel, `Financial Development'.
102. For calculation and background on TFP, see: Charles R Hulten, `Total Factor Productivity:
A Short Biography', in New Developments in Productivity Analysis, ed. Charles R Hulten, Edwin
R Dean and Michael Harper, vol. 63 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), 154.
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Figure 1.2: Fixed capital formation, TFP and GDP, 1850-1913
Sources: see text. Fixed capital formation and GDP in real, per capita terms.
None of these series are perfectly accurate in the case of the UK before WW1.103
Nevertheless, TFP remains the most comprehensive measure of productivity avail-
able for our purpose.
The TFP data is taken from the calculations of Thomas et al., which, in turn,
are based on data compiled by Mitchell.104 The other economic data is in real
terms. Data on xed capital formation at constant prices, excluding buildings
and works, is taken from Mitchell, who relies on previous work by Feinstein.105
For GDP data, I primarily rely on series by Solomou and Weale for the years
103. Charles Hilliard Feinstein, National Income, Expenditure and Output of the United King-
dom, 1855-1965, vol. 6 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972).
104. Ryland Thomas and Nicholas Dimsdale, A Millennium of UK Data, Bank of England
OBRA dataset, 2017, https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/- /media/boe/files/statis
tics/research- datasets/a- millennium- of- macroeconomic- data- for- the- uk.xlsx,
accessed: 18 January 2018; Brian RMitchell, British Historical Statistics (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1988).
105. Ibid., Ch. XVI, Table 6. I also experimented with xed capital formation data compiled
by Feinstein and Pollard, which did not change the results. See: Charles H Feinstein and
Sidney Pollard, Studies in Capital Formation in the United Kingdom 1750-1920 (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1988), Table III, 431-432.
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1870-1913.106 This series has been linked to estimates by Feinstein covering years
before 1870, and converted to real terms (in market prices) by Thomas et al.107
To convert the nancial data, discussed below, to real terms, I use the price index
by O'Donoghue et al.108
1.4.1 Banking
I use deposits as the primary indicator for the development of the banking system.
Figures on British bank deposits from 1870 to 1913 are quite comprehensive,
and are available in statistics compiled by Capie and Webber.109 This series has
been combined with earlier, slightly less comprehensive data running from 1850
to 1870, in order to obtain a continuous series from 1850 to 1913. This is done
through backwards extrapolation of the later series by applying to it the growth
rate of the earlier series. Note that the longer series (1850-1913) is examined using
econometric models which yield unbiased estimates for the years for which accurate
data is available (1870-1913), even though the pre-1870 part of the sample might
contain inaccuracies.110
Estimates of bank net public liabilities for the years 1844-80 for England and
Wales have been constructed by Collins.111 While this series also includes notes
issued by commercial banks, deposits are by far the largest component of these
liabilities. In 1866-1870, for example, commercial bank notes were only 2% of
deposits. The sample on which Collins estimates net bank liabilities accounts for
approximately 40-60% (depending on the year) of the oces of joint-stock banks in
England and Wales. For banks missing from the sample, he assumes that they had
106. Solomou and Weale, `Balanced'
107. Thomas and Dimsdale, Millenium. The series in question is the `Chained composite meas-
ure of UK GDP at market prices.' For details on Feinstein's estimates, see: Feinstein, National
Income.
108. Jim O'Donoghue, Louise Goulding and Grahame Allen, `Consumer Price Ination Since
1750', ONS Economic Trends, no. 604 (2004).
109. Forrest Capie and Alan Webber, A Monetary History of the United Kingdom: 1870-1982
(London: Allen / Unwin, 1985).
110. Further discussion about this is deferred to section 1.5.2.
111. Michael Collins, `Long-Term Growth of the English Banking Sector and Money Stock,
1844-80', The Economic History Review 36, no. 3 (1983): 374394.
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the same amount of liabilities per oce as banks in his sample did.112 A downside
of the gures by Collins is that they are smoothed, presumably to reduce a high
degree of variability that the series would display otherwise.
In order to make the pre-1870 series cover all of the UK, and thus to make
it consistent with the available economic data, I add Scottish and Irish data on
bank public liabilities to my sample.113 For Scotland, Checkland provides com-
prehensive data on bank public liabilities from 1865 to 1870.114 From 1850 to 1865
gures of Scottish bank public liabilities are constructed from the balance sheets of
individual banks, both from published sources and archival records. The included
banks are listed in appendix table 1.6. The earlier gures on Scottish banks are
spliced with data provided by Checkland. Data on Irish bank deposits is available
in work by O'Rourke.115 These series are then added to the series by Collins,
which covers England and Wales.
Bank deposits essentially measures the amount of resources that banks had
available, but says little about the way in which these funds were allocated.116
Therefore, the implicit assumption of this chapter is that their ability to provide
credit to the economy, along with their eciency in allocating credit, was propor-
tional to deposits. There is not much choice on alternative proxies for the banking
system, given the scarcity of data for pre-WW1 UK. It is nevertheless worth ex-
ploring the validity of some other potential indicators that have been used in the
literature.117
Data on prewar British bank credit is available only for a short period, covering
the years 1880-1913.118 For an earlier period, there are several problems with
constructing series from published data, and unpublished data is not available
for a substantial number of banks. It was uncommon for private banks to report
112. The availability of archival sources suggests that it would be dicult to make a large
improvement upon the estimates by Collins.
113. I use public liabilities instead of deposits, to make the data consistent with Collins' series.
114. Sydney George Checkland, Scottish Banking: A History, 1695-1973 (Glasgow: Harper
Collins, 1975).
115. Kevin H O'Rourke, `Monetary data and proxy GDP estimates: Ireland 18401921', Irish
Economic and Social History 25, no. 1 (1998): 2251.
116. Demetriades and Hussein, `Does Financial Development Cause'.
117. Levine, `Finance and Growth'.
118. David K Sheppard, The Growth and Role of UK Financial Institutions, 1880-1966 (London:
Methuen, 1971).
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their credit gures before the 1890s. Before the late 1870s, a signicant share
of joint-stock banks did not report these gures either. As far as outstanding
credit was reported, the gures could be highly aggregated, lumping together
bills, advances, loans to brokers and the money market, and sometimes even the
investments in government and railway bonds.119 As a robustness check for this
chapter's empirical results, the credit data for 1880-1913 is analysed using simpler
econometric techniques.
Broad money aggregates have fallen out of favour as indicators for nancial
development, although several early studies relied on such data.120 These series ag-
gregate measures of monetisation with measures of nancial development (namely
deposits), and thus do not directly measure the resources available to nancial
institutions. Broad money, as an indicator, therefore risks needlessly obscuring
the concept of nancial development. In the context of prewar British data, it is
also known that existing aggregates of narrow money are not accurate, especially
for years before 1870.121 These inaccuracies would lead to further measurement
error, biasing the econometric estimates.122 Therefore, monetary aggregates are
not used in this chapter. Preliminary testing does, however, suggest that this
chapter's results with data from 1870-1913 are robust to using M3 instead of bank
deposits.123
1.4.2 Stock Markets
An important component of this chapter's original contribution derives from the
use of new data on British capital markets. There are no satisfactory pre-existing
proxies for their development. Intuitively, one might expect that the market capit-
alisation of British stock exchanges gives an indication of how the nancial markets
119. Collins and Baker, Commercial Banks have published data on various credit ratios, created
from published and internal bank balance sheets that could be found, but have not made the
underlying data available.
120. Levine, `Finance and Growth'.
121. Nuno Palma, `Reconstruction of Money Supply over the Long Run: The Case of England,
12701870', The Economic History Review, 2017,
122. See: Qi Liang and Teng Jian-Zhou, `Financial Development and Economic Growth: Evid-
ence from China', China economic review 17, no. 4 (2006): 395411; and references therein for
further discussion of the problems with using M2 or M3 as a measure of nancial development.
123. This is presumably because most of the variation in M3 estimates is due to deposits.
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developed, but this is not a suitable indicator to use in a time series econometric
context. Stock market valuations are forward-looking indicators: they partially
reect investor expectations of future economic conditions. Even in a historical
context, stock market valuations have tended to carry predictive power for the sub-
sequent growth of the economy.124 Using this data in an econometric model would
thus unduly bias the results in favour of the nance-led growth hypothesis.125 Fur-
thermore, yearly uctuations in market valuations are unlikely to proxy accurately
how well capital markets function.
This chapter builds a new series on paid-in capital as an indicator for the
development of capital markets. This measure has previously been used in the
historical nance-growth literature.126 Paid-in capital measures how much capital
has been raised or converted into public securities through stock markets. Firms
before WW1 would often issue shares with a nominal capital that was higher
than the paid-in (or paid-up) capital - the amount of capital that was actually
raised. Investors thus only paid a part of a share's nominal value during and IPO.
Shareholders could then be liable to contribute more capital, up to the amount
of nominal capital, if called by the company to do so. As a proxy for the growth
of capital markets, paid-in capital has the advantage of being less sensitive to
changes in investor expectations than market capitalisation. However, it might
still include a minor forward-looking element, but to a far lesser extent than in
the case of market valuations. After all, rms are more likely to receive external
nancing if investors think they have positive prospects, which partially depends
on expectations of economic growth.
Grossman provides yearly series of paid-in capital of British equities for the
years 1869-1929, but his data leaves out preferred shares and debentures (xed-
income securities).127 My dataset improves upon this work. As the most important
improvement, I have included debentures and preference shares to the dataset,
124. Samad Sarferaz and Martin Uebele, `Tracking down the Business Cycle: A Dynamic Factor
Model for Germany 18201913', Explorations in Economic History 46, no. 3 (2009): 368387.
Testing if market capitalization predicts growth may thus tell us about the behaviour of capital
markets, rather than nance and growth.
125. Ang, `Survey'.
126. Diekmann and Westermann, `Financial Development and Sectoral Output'.
127. Richard S Grossman, `Bloody Foreigners! Overseas Equity on the London Stock Exchange,
18691929', The Economic History Review 68, no. 2 (2015): 471521.
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so that the amount of capital raised by the market is not understated. This is
important, because a signicant amount of capital, even for industrial companies,
was raised through xed-income securities, which several investors preferred.128
Additionally, I have created a monthly series - although in this chapter I use
yearly averages of the monthly gures. I have also manually excluded foreign
securities, or securities of companies that operated abroad. Finally, the dataset
includes securities listed on provincial stock exchanges.
The underlying data on paid-in capital comes from the Investor's Monthly
Manual (IMM), which is hosted at the Yale International Center for Finance
(YICF).129 The dataset based on the IMM covers the years 1870-1913 and includes
information on most securities listed on British stock exchanges.130 It consists of
over 1.3 million rows of data - one row for each security per month that it was
listed, giving information on several features related to the size of an issue as well
as a security's price movements. The primary elds of interest in this study are the
paid-in capital per share and the number of shares for each security, from which the
total paid-in capital can be calculated. The raw data from YICF is not t for use
because of several inaccuracies due to the optical character recognition software
that has been used for reading in the tables from the IMM, as well as errors in
the IMM itself. How the data was made usable thus requires some explanation.
The data was cleaned up in two stages. First, the errors made in the digitisation
of the IMM were detected and corrected. There were thousands of entries which
were marked as `unreadable' or where the software mixed numbers up. Most
typically, 3 was confused with 8, or 5 with 3. The fact that the number was
wrong could be detected as a temporary discontinuity in the paid in capital of a
company.131 The true value of paid in capital could then be manually obtained
from a copy of the IMM. There were also hundreds of missing entries for certain
128. Janette Rutterford, `The Merchant Banker, the Broker and the Company Chairman: A
New Issue Case Study', Accounting, Business & Financial History 16, no. 1 (2006): 4568.
129. Yale International Center for Finance, London Stock Exchange Project, Yale School of
Management, 2017, https://som.yale.edu/faculty-research/our-centers-initiatives/
international-center-finance/data/historical-financial-research-data/london-
stock-exchange, accessed: 22 December 2017.
130. YICF hosts data from 1869 to 1929.
131. If there the paid in capital per share is e.g. ¿8 for several years, changing to ¿3 in one
month in between, there would most probably be an error.
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years.132 These cases showed up as discontinuities in the series, which could be
detected and then corrected. When months of data were missing, I inserted the
relevant gures from copies of the IMM.
The second step was to correct for inaccuracies in the IMM itself, which was
more problematic.133 There are hundreds of cases where the paid-in capital per
share or the number of shares of a given security are left blank for an extended
period of time. There are also several cases where a security is only included in the
IMM data well after its IPO, or when a security is removed without explanation.
Although there is no guarantee that all of these types of errors could be found,
a signicant number could be cross-checked with The Economist, as well as the
Stock Exchange Yearbook. Furthermore, the IMM itself lists details of new issues
in a separate section of the publication, which could be compared to the gures
in the database.
For the years prior to 1870, there is a limited amount of accurate data on
the listings on all British stock exchanges. The best available series on paid-in
capital is provided by Acheson et al., who create their dataset from a contemporary
publication, The Course of the Exchange.134 While providing a comprehensive set
of data for the London Stock Exchange, a signicant downside of this series is
that it excludes provincial exchanges. This exclusion might introduce a degree
of measurement error in the underlying time series before 1870, which is dicult
to adjust for, given the limited amount of surviving information from provincial
stock markets. However, it should be noted that several provincial stock markets
saw subdued activity for a few decades following the end of the second railway
mania in 1846, so the measurement error induced by their exclusion is unlikely to
be large.135 The methodology employed in this chapter also does not yield biased
estimates for years with accurate data, even if data at the start of the sample is
potentially inaccurate.
132. Especially 1894 proved problematic, when hundreds of securities were missing from the
database for no apparent reason, even though they were listed in the IMM.
133. For a more extensive discussion of problems in this publication, see Richard S Grossman,
`New Indices of British Equity Prices, 18701913', The Journal of Economic History 62, no. 01
(2002): 121146.
134. Graeme G Acheson et al., `Rule Britannia! British Stock Market Returns, 1825-1870', The
Journal of Economic History 69, no. 04 (2009): 11071137.
135. John R Killick and William Thomas, `The Provincial Stock Exchanges, 18301870', The
Economic History Review 23, no. 1 (1970): 96111. See also the fourth chapter of this thesis.
49
Certain exclusions from the stock exchange data are warranted when the ob-
jective is to examine the impact of capital markets on growth. It is dicult to
justify in theory why portfolio investment in foreign stocks would have a signi-
cant impact on the British domestic economy through increasing investment,
productivity or improving corporate governance. Hence, companies which were
foreign, or which had all of their activities abroad, are excluded. In doing this,
I follow the approach of Nieuwerburgh et al., who identify and remove foreign
rms, or rms operating abroad, for testing the Belgian stock market's eects on
the economy.136 I also follow the literature by excluding public sector debt secur-
ities, which might needlessly distort the underlying series, by making them less
informative about the extent to which the private sector was served by the capital
markets.137
The rst step in the process of removing foreign securities followed the approach
of Grossman, who removes all securities denominated in foreign currencies, and
tries to identify foreign companies by name.138 More accuracy was then gained by
cross-referencing some of the names of suspected foreign companies with issues of
The Economist and the IMM, both of which often provided information about a
new issue when it was listed.
Figure 1.3 shows the yearly stock market and deposit data used in this chapter.
As the historical literature suggests, the paid in capital of domestic rms expanded
signicantly throughout the period 1850-1913, with especially strong growth after
the 1880s. The composition of this expansion changed over time, however, with
companies in sectors other than railways, infrastructure and nance starting to
account for an increasing portion of the growth in the last 30 years of the sample.139
The growth of deposits was already signicant in the 1860s and 1870s, although
noticeable uctuations can be observed during the Overend and Gurney crisis of
1866, and the failure of the City of Glasgow bank in 1878.
136. Nieuwerburgh, Buelens and Cuyvers, `Stock Market Development'.
137. Ibid.; Ang, `Survey'.
138. Grossman, `New Indices'.
139. Michie, London Stock Exchange, 88. See also gure 1.1.
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Figure 1.3: GDP, deposits and paid-in capital, 1850-1913
Sources: See text. The data is in this gure is in real terms and scaled by population.
1.4.3 Comparison with Other Indicators for the Develop-
ment of Capital Markets
The purpose of this subsection is to illustrate briey that the series on paid-in
capital correlates well with other available indicators of the development of British
stock markets, thus validating its use.
Securities Listed on the London Stock Exchange Ocial List
Hannah has recently criticised data collected by Grossman from the IMM on the
paid-in capital of securities listed on the London Stock Exchange.140 He shows
that there are wide disparities between contemporary published gures on paid-in
capital on the LSE and the gures that Grossman reports. This is a clear problem
140. Leslie Hannah, `The London Stock Exchange 1869-1929: New Bloody Statistics for Old?',
LSE Economic History Working Papers, nos. 263/2017 (2017); Grossman, `Bloody Foreigners!'
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with Grossman's data, and brings into question the validity of constructing series
based on the IMM. My data on paid-in capital is more consistent with contempor-
ary data, as it addresses issues with Grossman's series by including debt securities
and preference shares.
The London Stock Exchange's Share and Loan Department reported annual
gures on the paid-in capital of securities on the exchange from 1881 onwards.141
These were published in Burdett's Ocial Intelligence in 1881-1897, and the Stock
Exchange Ocial Intelligence thereafter. This data - referred to as the `ocial list
data' - is presented together with my data on paid-in capital in gure 1.4. One of
the series shows the growth of the total capital quoted on the ocial list, except
for securities with coupons payable abroad. Another shows the growth of capital
of mostly domestic securities on the ocial list, excluding public sector debt. The
series is mostly domestic, because some securities in the categories included may
also be foreign, particularly later in the sample.142
Whatever the problems in Grossman's data are, they do not appear to be
present in the data used in this chapter. Figure 1.4 shows that the growth of my
data on paid in capital is, for the most part, consistent with the growth rate of the
ocial series. The primary exception to these similarities in growth trends occurs
around 1900-1902, where the domestic ocial list series expands more rapidly than
my paid-in capital series. There is no individual item that can explain why the
domestic series grew so quickly in these two years, although the capital of banking
and insurance companies expanded markedly during this time. It is likely that
this is in part driven by listings of foreign nancial institutions. The ocial list
does not distinguish between domestic and foreign banks.
Even if we were to assume that the 1900-1902 episode of growth in the domestic
series is was due to an increase in domestic listings, this omission would be of little
consequence for the econometric results. This is because the change only happens
over two or three years. In fact, the bias would be irrelevant for the conclusions
of this chapter when methods outlined in section 1.5.2 are used.
141. As no earlier data is available, the series are not used for econometric purposes.
142. The calculations make it impossible to distinguish between foreign and domestic securities,
for example, categorised as power, gas and electric lighting companies.
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Figure 1.4: Amount of paid-in capital quoted on the London Stock Exchange
compared with data used in this thesis, 1881-1913
Note: Data in real, per capita terms.
Sources: Data from Burdett's Ocial Intelligence for years 1881-1897, and from the Stock Ex-
change Ocial Intelligence thereafter. Domestic securities listed on the ocial list include
categories primarily composed of rms conducting their business in the UK. The categories are:
UK railways; banking, commercial, industrial & etc., power, gas and electric lighting; insur-
ance; iron, coal and steel; shipping; telegraphs and telephones; tramways and omnibus; and
waterworks. The `Ocial list - total' includes public sector securities.
Membership of the London Stock Exchange
Several studies in the nance-growth literature have favoured turnover ratios - the
value of shares traded divided by a market's total capitalisation - or other measures
of liquidity to measure the development of capital markets.143 Unfortunately, such
data is not available for prewar Britain, especially before the turn of the century.
Indeed, relatively little is known about the liquidity of stock exchanges for most
of the late 19th century.
It would be dicult to build a consistent series on transaction volumes based
on tax records. Stock exchange transactions were taxed from the 1870s to 1893,
but the tax was abandoned as the government feared that business would be
143. See Ross Levine and Sara Zervos, `Stock Markets, Banks, and Economic Growth', American
Economic Review, 1998, 537558 and Ang, `Survey'.
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driven to other nancial centres.144 Stamp duties were collected on transfers of
certain marketable securities after 1893, but there were major changes in what
types of securities were subject to this tax. For example, there was an imposition
of duties on previously excluded foreign and colonial certicates at the turn of the
century.145 These inconsistencies, together with an extremely high year-on-year
variability, render the stamp duty data unsuitable for econometric purposes.
A proxy for the ease of trading shares on the capital market can be obtained
from the membership gures of the London Stock Exchange.146 Members of the
Stock Exchange were individuals for whom stockbroking was the primary occu-
pation. They were thus in the business of providing liquidity to the markets.147
Figure 1.5 compares the membership of the LSE with the data on paid-in cap-
ital. The gures clearly suggest that paid-in capital was quite well correlated with
stock exchange membership. Therefore, paid in-capital might also correlate with
the market's overall liquidity.
The close co-movement between paid-in capital and LSE membership is some-
what surprising, because there were several changes to the rules that governed
the growth of the membership. For example, higher membership fees were in-
troduced in 1881, and new members were required to buy shares of the London
Stock Exchange after 1900.148 Nevertheless, the membership kept increasing re-
markably steadily until 1905-1907, when several members were unable to meet
their commitments and went bankrupt.149 Indeed, this episode indicates the rst
clear divergence between the two series in gure 1.5, and suggests that paid-in
capital might be better for our purposes.
144. Michie, London and New York , 89.
145. Commissioners of Inland Revenue, Forty-Sixth Report For the Year ended 31st March 1903
p. 129.
146. Membership of provincial stock exchanges is not discussed in this chapter, because the data
is not continuous for most exchanges before 1890.
147. A minor caveat is that members could, of course, deal in any type of security. If some
members specialised on foreign stocks, the gures may not fully reect the ease of dealing in
domestic securities.
148. Neal and Davis, `Evolution'.
149. Ibid.
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Figure 1.5: Membership of the London Stock Exchange, 1859-1913
Membership data from: Minutes of the Trustees and Managers of the London Stock Exchange,
1859-1914, CLC/B/004/B/03/MS19297, Records of the London Stock Exchange, Guildhall Lib-
rary, London.
1.5 Econometric Evidence
The empirical results are presented in two stages. I begin with models which
are consistent and comparable with those used in several other studies. This is
followed by a more advanced approach.
The questions that this chapter addresses are as follows:
1. Did the growth of the banking system or capital markets play a causal role
in economic growth?
2. If so, did they boost growth through capital accumulation or through pro-
ductivity growth?
3. Was the growth of the banking system or capital markets a symptom, rather
than a cause, of economic growth?
4. How strong was the link between the nancial sector and the economy?
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5. Did the relationship between the nancial sector and the economy change
over time?
1.5.1 Granger-Causality
The rst set of hypothesis tests are performed using yearly data and standard
tools from multivariate time series econometrics: vector autoregressions (VARs).
This approach is appropriate for testing hypotheses in a country-specic setting,
and makes it possible to examine the channels potentially linking nance and the
economy. Because other studies in this eld of economic history and economics
have often used a similar approach, the results are easily comparable with ndings
from other cases.150 The VAR approach has the benet of needing few a priori
restrictions on how the data should behave, making it less likely that results are
driven by potentially implausible constraints imposed on a model.
In order to test if nance causes growth using multivariate time series econo-
metrics, we typically test if the growth of stock markets or banks Granger-caused
GDP growth. Finance is said to Granger-cause GDP if past growth of the nancial
sector helps predict subsequent changes in GDP. To illustrate this using a basic
example, consider the following VAR system with one lag (i.e. incorporating data
from one previous year):
stockmktt = α1 + β11,1stockmktt−1 + β12,1gdpt−1 + u1,tgdpt = α2 + β21,1stockmktt−1 + β22,1gdpt−1 + u2,t (1.1)
The variables stockmktt and gdpt are indicators for the development of the
stock market and the economy at time t, respectively. βij are parameters to be
estimated, which link past values of economic or nancial development with their
values at time t. αi represent constants, or trends if stockmktt and gdpt are in
dierences. ui,t for each equation is a residual - the part that cannot be explained
150. See: Beck, `The Econometrics of Finance and Growth' for a discussion on econometric
aspects of studying nance and growth, along with a review of studies using the time series
approach.
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by the model. The system of equations says that the development of stock markets
and the economy in a given year is a function of: 1. the state the stock markets
in the previous year; 2. the state of the economy in the previous year; and 3. a
constant or a trend.
If the hypothesis that β21,1 = 0 cannot be rejected, the stock market does
not Granger-cause GDP. In other words, if β21,1 = 0, then past values of the stock
market's development cannot help predict the economy's subsequent development.
If we have several lags, we test if all the parameters linking the state of the stock
markets in past periods to GDP at time t are zero.151
Note that in the VAR model, we allow for the possibility that nance and
growth interact with each other over time: economic development may lead to
more nancial development and vice versa. In other words, the variables in the
model (nance, growth and other indicators) are allowed to be potentially endo-
genous. The VAR applied to the present setting thus has some degree of consist-
ency with endogenous growth models, which allow a degree of mutual interaction
between the real economy and the nancial sector.





Biyt−i + ut (1.2)
where yt is a vector of the variables at time t. In model (1.1), we would have











For causality tests, the VAR model lag lengths are selected using the Akaike
Information Criterion (AIC), while ensuring that residuals are not autocorrelated
151. The hypothesis that several parameters are zero is tested using a Wald-test.
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as suggested by the Portmanteau and LM-tests.152 The AIC is commonly used to
select a model which ts the data well, but does not include too many paramet-
ers.153
The variables considered in this chapter are: GDP; deposits; paid-in capital;
TFP; and xed capital formation (investment). All of the variables are not in-
cluded in the model simultaneously. While cross-sectional regressions need several
control variables to deal with omitted variable bias (bias induced by the exclusion
of relevant variables), the time series approach tries to reduce this bias by using a
sucient lag structure combined with several observations across time.154 Indeed,
adding too many variables into a VAR model without a large sample can lead to
imprecise estimates. The baseline set of results are obtained using data from 1870
to 1913. For these years, the quality of the data is signicantly more accurate than
for 1850-1870. Specically, for these years we have far more accurate measures of
deposits and paid in capital as indicators of nancial depth.
All variables, except for TFP, are set in logarithmic real, per capita terms.
Another alternative, used in some studies, would be to divide the indicator for
nancial development by GDP. But such a transformation makes it dicult to
study the possibility of reverse Granger-causality - of economic growth causing
nancial development - because the economy appears in the denominator of the
nancial variable.155 The results are, however, robust to using models where the
nancial variable is scaled by GDP.
A traditional approach to testing for Granger-causality would be to start by
testing if the underlying series are non-stationary, which would tell us if the series
exhibit explosive behaviour, and need to be dierenced. A second step would
entail testing for cointegration: whether non-stationary series in the VAR share
common stochastic trends. If the series have these properties, causality tests would
152. Helmut Lütkepohl, New Introduction to Multiple Time Series Analysis (New York: Springer
Science & Business Media, 2007), 146-148, 169-173.
153. The AIC selects the model based on the model t, but induces a penalty for the number
of parameters used.
154. Beck, `The Econometrics of Finance and Growth'.
155. For a discussion on this point, see: Jong Hun Kim and Peter L Rousseau, `Credit Buildups
and the Stock Market in Four East Asian Economies', Journal of Macroeconomics 34, no. 2
(2012): 489503.
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be conducted on a vector error correction model.156 However, research has shown
that the Wald-statistic for causality tests in a VECM may not have an asymptotic
χ2 distribution.157 A correct distribution for the test statistic is essential for
accurate statistical inferences.
To get around these issues, and to test for causality in a more general sense,
this chapter employs the methodology by Toda and Yamamoto.158 The test is
robust to integration (non-stationarity) and cointegration properties of the time
series being tested, and is therefore applicable here. The authors show that testing
for causality with non-stationary variables can be done by estimating a VAR with
data in levels with one extra lag. Parameter estimates of this additional lag are
then excluded from a Wald-test, which is used to test for causality. Besides not
relying on a biased test-statistic, an important advantage of the Toda-Yamamoto
test is that it does not necessitate potentially low-powered tests of stationarity.
Consequently, this has become a generally recommended approach for causality
testing.159
Results from Granger-causality Tests
Table 1.1 shows results from Toda-Yamamoto tests for Granger-causality when
real deposits per capita is used as a proxy for the banking sector's development.
Under the heading `Test', the variable on the left is the one that Granger-causes
the right-hand side one. If the value in the column `p-value' is less than 0.05 (or
at least less than 0.1), we may infer Granger-causality from the causal variable to
the dependent (right-hand side) variable.
The results show that there was bidirectional causality between deposits and
GDP growth, although both relationships are signicant only at the 10% level.
156. This is done, for example, in Rousseau and Wachtel, `Financial Intermediation'. For details,
see: Lütkepohl, Multiple Time Series, 262.
157. Ibid., 317-318. For a more detailed discussion, see: Hiro Y Toda and Peter CB Phillips,
`Vector Autoregressions and Causality', Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1993,
13671393.
158. Hiro Y Toda and Taku Yamamoto, `Statistical Inference in Vector Autoregressions with
Possibly Integrated Processes', Journal of Econometrics 66, no. 1 (1995): 225250. This approach
is also recommended by Lütkepohl, Multiple Time Series, 317-318.
159. Ibid.
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This means that there is some, albeit weak, evidence that the growth of the
economy and the growth of the banking sector were mutually reinforcing. However,
commercial banks did not play an independent role in fostering British economic
growth. There is no evidence of a causal relationship between paid-in capital
and GDP, suggesting that stock markets did not play signicant role in British
economic growth.
Table 1.1: Toda-Yamamoto test for Granger-causality with
proxies for stock markets and banks, data for 1870-1913
Test Chi-squared p-value Inference
Deposits → GDP 5.43 0.066* Causality
Paid in K → GDP 2.826 0.243 No causality
GDP → Deposits 5.588 0.061* Causality
Paid in K → Deposits 2.379 0.304 No causality
GDP → Paid in K 1.329 0.515 No causality
Deposits → Paid in K 1.507 0.471 No causality
The model has 2 lags. *; **; and *** indicate a p-value of less than
0.1; 0.05; and 0.01, respectively.
The result linking banks to the economy in table 1.1 becomes weaker if we re-
peat the same exercise with credit data.160 The results are displayed in table 1.2.
The growth of bank credit appears to have been a result of economic growth. In
other words, the expansion of credit was largely driven by demand, while it did
not signicantly contribute to economic performance. This exercise has similar-
ities with the Granger-causality tests used by Rousseau and Wachtel, but with
data for stock markets, a superior methodology (the Toda-Yamamoto test), and
exclusion of interwar data.161 My results might be due to the shorter sample and in-
accuracies in the credit data, but taken at face value, they suggest that Rousseau's
and Wachtel's result of nance-driven growth in Britain needs to be treated with
scepticism.
In order to examine more closely the channels linking economic and nancial
variables, models with alternative economic indicators are estimated. Table 1.3
160. Data from: Sheppard, Growth and Role, Appendix table 1.1. Bank credit here is dened
as the sum of discounts and advances. There is a break in the series in 1891, when private
banks are included in the series. The series has been made consistent with post-1891 gures by
applying the growth rate of the series from 1880 to 1891 for the series starting in 1892.
161. Rousseau and Wachtel, `Financial Intermediation'.
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Table 1.2: Toda-Yamamoto test for Granger-causality with
credit as a proxy for banking, data for 1880-1913
Test Chi-squared p-value Inference
Credit → GDP 1.49 0.475 No causality
Paid in K → GDP 0.313 0.855 No causality
GDP → Credit 5.468 0.065* Causality
Paid in K → Credit 1.226 0.542 No causality
GDP → Paid in K 2.591 0.274 No causality
Credit → Paid in K 2.146 0.342 No causality
The model has 2 lags.
presents results from models using two dierent indicators: TFP and xed cap-
ital formation. In the rst specication, TFP and deposits interact in a mutually
reinforcing manner, although evidence of causality running from banking to TFP
growth is only signicant at the 10% level. Moreover, there is no causal relation-
ship between banks and investment, as shown on right-hand side of the table. This
is to be expected, because banks rarely lent for capital investment.
Table 1.3: Toda-Yamamoto tests for Granger-causality with data on
TFP or investment
1. Model with TFP 2. Model with investment
Test p-value Test p-value
Deposits → TFP 0.067* Deposits → Investment 0.881
Paid in K → TFP 0.752 Paid in K → Investment 0.976
TFP → Deposits 0.048** Investment → Deposits 0.195
Paid in K → Deposits 0.486 Paid in K → Deposits 0.981
TFP → Paid in K 0.527 Investment → Paid in K 0.892
Deposits → Paid in K 0.439 Deposits → Paid in K 0.032**
The lag length of the model with TFP is 2, whereas that of the model with
investment is 1 .
The ndings shown in table 1.3 provide no evidence of stock markets driving
either productivity growth or investment. We might reasonably expect investment
to have been the primary channel through which stock markets were linked to the
economy. In this light, the result reinforces the notion that stock markets were not
important for British economic growth. The result that deposits Granger-caused
paid-in capital is not straightforward to explain, but the fact that this nding is
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not present in other model specications in this section suggests that the result
might be spurious.
The specications used so far have been parsimonious and followed several
past studies in terms of variable selection.162 However, as pointed by Luintel and
Khan, the omission of relevant variables can lead to misleading estimates in time
series studies on nance and growth.163 To increase theoretical consistency with
standard economic growth models, a model which includes both investment and
GDP, along with paid-in capital and deposits, is estimated. The result from this
larger model are shown in table 1.4. The ndings are consistent with those from
more parsimonious models presented in table 1.1. As in the smaller model, we
observe that there was bidirectional causality between deposits and GDP. On the
other hand, stock markets do not appear to have played a role in economic growth.
Table 1.4: Toda-Yamamoto test for Granger-causality with proxies
for investment, banking and stock markets
Test Chi-squared p-value Inference
Paid in K → GDP 4.248 0.236 No causality
Deposits → GDP 7.119 0.068* Causality
Investment → GDP 1.618 0.655 No causality
GDP → Paid in K 4.232 0.237 No causality
Deposits → Paid in K 3.675 0.299 No causality
Investment → Paid in K 4.191 0.242 No causality
GDP → Deposits 8.421 0.038** Causality
Paid in K → Deposits 4.784 0.188 No causality
Investment → Deposits 6.055 0.109 No causality
GDP → Investment 2.386 0.496 No causality
Paid in K → Investment 3.571 0.312 No causality
Deposits → Investment 5.834 0.12 No causality
The model has 3 lags.
The methodology through which these results were derived is consistent with
several existing time series studies on nance and growth, which makes the results
straightforward to compare with ndings from other cases. The results suggest
162. Stock markets, growth and banking sector development are used in a VAR specication
for example in Rousseau and Wachtel, `Equity Markets'; Arestis, Demetriades and Luintel,
`Financial Development'; Peia and Roszbach, `Finance and Growth: Time Series Evidence on
Causality'.
163. Luintel and Khan, `Quantitative Reassessment'.
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that the impact of stock markets on historical economic growth in Britain was
considerably weaker than it was in Belgium and the US.164 As for the banking
system, it may have reinforced economic growth, but it did not play a strong
independent role in driving it. To some extent, the banking sector's growth was
both a symptom and cause of economic growth, although it bears repeating that
the result is not statistically strong. This nding diers from what several other
studies on pre-WW1 nance and growth have found. Moreover, the story is not
one of banks driving investment, as it might be in the case of Germany.165 Instead,
as far as commercial banks contributed to economic activity, they did so through
fostering productivity growth. This is in line with several studies based on post-
WW2 data, and further reinforces the argument that economic historians should
emphasise other channels beyond capital deepening when examining the eect of
nance on economic performance.
Sectoral View
This section explores the impact of the banking sector's development on the output
of the manufacturing and service sectors. This could shine further light on the
types of rms that beneted from the banking sector's growth. Table 1.5 shows
the impact of deposits on gross value added in both manufacturing and services,
using Feinstein's data.166 The left panel (specication 1.) shows results when
Feinstein's series for total service sector output (excluding communication and
transportation services) is used, whereas the model in the right panel (specication
2.) uses output from distribution services. This distinction is necessary, because
the total service sector output includes non-market (i.e. public sector) services, as
well as a measure of value added in nancial services itself. Distribution services -
primarily wholesale and retail trade - accounts for a large share of market services,
and may thus serve as a more useful proxy for the service sector's output.
When the total service sector output is used in a VAR model, the results
(table 1.5) suggest that there was a positive impact of banking on growth in both
164. Nieuwerburgh, Buelens and Cuyvers, `Stock Market Development'; Rousseau and Sylla,
`Emerging'.
165. Burhop, `Did Banks'.
166. Feinstein, National Income.
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Table 1.5: Toda-Yamamoto tests for Granger-causality with data on manufacturing
and service sector output
1. Model with all services 2. Model with distribution services
Test p-value Test p-value
Services → Manufacturing 0.889 Dist. Services → Manufacturing 0.901
Deposits → Manufacturing 0.03** Deposits → Manufacturing 0.19
Manufacturing → Services 0.01*** Manufacturing → Dist. Services 0.176
Deposits → Services 0.076* Deposits → Dist. Services 0.052*
Manufacturing → Deposits 0.443 Manufacturing → Deposits 0.57
Services → Deposits 0.375 Dist. Services → Deposits 0.448
The lag length of the model with all services is 2, whereas that of the second model is 3.
Source: Charles Hilliard Feinstein, National Income, Expenditure and Output of the United
Kingdom, 1855-1965, vol. 6 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972). Manufacturing
output from table 51; and output in distributive services from table 53. Total service sector
output, excluding communication and transportation services, is based on Feinstein's data is
from Brian R Mitchell, British Historical Statistics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1988), Ch. XVI, table 8.
manufacturing and services. However, due to the issues discussed above associated
with the total service sector output data, more weight should be put on results
from a model using distribution services. When this proxy is used, the results
change signicantly. The results from specication 2. suggest that there is no
causality from deposits to manufacturing. However, the result of a causal link
from banking to services holds, albeit still only at the 10% level. Moreover, the
result on highly signicant causality from manufacturing to services in the model
including total service sector output probably have to do with the underlying
quality issues aecting the service series.
The discrepancies between the results in the table indicate a lack of robustness.
This might have to do with the highly conjectural nature of Feinstein's sectoral
data, particularly for the earlier part of the sample.167 Alternatively, it might have
to do with the results from the model using data on all services being polluted by
the problems aecting Feinstein's series for services used in that model. It follows
that the result of causality running from deposits to services from the model with
167. This is partially because his sectoral input data is lacking, forcing him to make some rough
estimates. See: Robert Charles Oliver Matthews, Charles Hilliard Feinstein and John C Odling-
Smee, British Economic Growth, 1856-1973 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), Appendix
D.
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distributive services is to be preferred. Meanwhile, the result of causality running
from deposits to sectoral growth in the rst model specication is to be considered
spurious. While there is weak evidence of nance contributing to service sector
output, owing to a lack of better sectoral output data, it is dicult to make bold
statements about the impact of nance on sectoral growth. Nevertheless, these
results are consistent with ndings from German data, in that it was primarily less
capital-intensive sectors of the economy that beneted from the banking system's
growth.168
Structural Breaks
Structural breaks in the underlying series may limit the validity of the inferences
drawn from the models discussed above. Structural breaks refer to unexpected
shifts in the evolution of a time series. If breaks represent temporary changes in
the series, they could be dealt with using dummy variables in conjunction with the
Toda-Yamamoto test.169 However, if these breaks reect more gradual changes, or
if the relationships between nancial and economic variables change, the models
applied thus far are not adequate, even when dummy variables are used. This
possibility motivates the application of more sophisticated models, outlined in the
following section.
The indicators of nancial development - deposits and paid in capital - both
include several breaks. This can be shown by utilising the Bai-Perron test.170 The
test is carried out on the following equation:
yt = α + βyt−1 + γt+ (
k∑
i=1
δiDi) + ut (1.3)
where yt is the value of a series of interest at time t. We test if any number
of parameters corresponding to dummies Di are signicant. Di is an indicator
168. Diekmann and Westermann, `Financial Development and Sectoral Output'.
169. A dummy variable is a variable which takes the value 1 in given years and 0 in others.
170. Jushan Bai and Pierre Perron, `Computation and Analysis of Multiple Structural Change
Models', Journal of Applied Econometrics 18, no. 1 (2003): 122.
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variable, taking the value 1 in a given year and zero otherwise. The date at which
Di is 1 is the proposed date of the structural break. The Bai-Perron algorithm
tests for breakpoints at unknown dates, and returns the dates at which structural
changes in the variable y are most likely to have occurred.
The Bai-Perron test on deposits suggests 2 breakpoints, for the years 1876
and 1899, based on the Bayesian Information Criterion.171 Especially the 1876
breakpoint is to be expected, as it is close to the City of Glasgow Bank failure
in 1878. With regards to paid in capital, the test suggests at least 4 breakpoints,
for the years 1880, 1889, 1895 and 1905. In the presence of such instability in the
series, it is useful to apply methods that are able to deal with non-linearities in
the underlying data.
1.5.2 TVP-VAR
The models used above assume that the relationship between nance and the
economy is stable over time. This assumption is restrictive, because the British
economy and nancial system both underwent considerable changes from 1850 to
1913. The relationship between banks and the economy may thus have been very
dierent in, say, 1900 compared to 1870. A changing relationship between nance
and economic growth should also be expected in light of the empirical studies
reviewed above, showing that the eect of nance on growth tends to weaken as
countries become more developed.172
The nancial sector grew and changed in important respects over the period
1850-1913. The banking system became more stable after the crises in 1866 and
1878 as lending practices changed and became more conservative.173 Additionally,
the banking sector went from being very fragmented to being highly concentrated.
Meanwhile, the orientation of British stock markets became increasingly interna-
tional, but they also saw more listings by domestic industrial enterprises after
171. For details, see: Bai and Perron, `Computation and Analysis'.
172. Felix Rioja and Neven Valev, `Does One Size Fit All?: A Reexamination of the Finance and
Growth Relationship', Journal of Development Economics 74, no. 2 (2004): 429447; Rousseau
and Wachtel, `Happening'.
173. Baker and Collins, `Financial Crises and Structural Change'.
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the 1880s. In order to study if any of these changes led to time-varying linkages
between nance and growth, a novel econometric approach is needed.
VAR models with time-varying parameters (TVP-VARs) have become a widely
used tools in empirical macroeconomics following the contributions by Primiceri
as well as Cogley and Sargent.174 This approach has been applied to historical
data to study monetary policy, the drivers of ination, among other topics in
macroeconomic dynamics.175 Yet, it has only recently been applied to the study
of the macroeconomic impact of nancial shocks.176 The advantage of the TVP-
VAR approach is that it allows us to examine how the relationships between
various macroeconomic time series change over time. Since it allows for these
time-varying relationships, the model has a superior forecasting performance than
several other commonly used econometric models.177
Consider the time-varying parameter VAR with ρ lags and N variables, rep-
resenting dierent macroeconomic time series :
yt = µt +
ρ∑
i=1
Bi,tyt−i + νt (1.4)
var(νt) = Rt (1.5)
174. Giorgio E Primiceri, `Time Varying Structural Vector Autoregressions and Monetary
Policy', The Review of Economic Studies 72, no. 3 (2005): 821852; Timothy Cogley and Thomas
J Sargent, `Drifts and Volatilities: Monetary Policies and Outcomes in the Post WWII US', Re-
view of Economic Dynamics 8, no. 2 (2005): 262302.
175. Tobias Straumann and Ulrich Woitek, `A Pioneer of a New Monetary Policy? Sweden's
Price-Level Targeting of the 1930s Revisited', European Review of Economic History 13, no.
2 (2009): 251282; Martin Kliem, Alexander Kriwoluzky and Samad Sarferaz, `On the Low-
Frequency Relationship between Public Decits and Ination', Journal of Applied Econometrics
31, no. 3 (2016): 566583; Pooyan Amir-Ahmadi, Christian Matthes and Mu-Chun Wang, `Drifts
and Volatilities Under Measurement Error: Assessing Monetary Policy Shocks over the Last
Century', Quantitative Economics 7, no. 2 (2016): 591611; John W Keating and Victor J
Valcarcel, `The Time-Varying Eects of Permanent and Transitory Shocks to Real Output',
Macroeconomic Dynamics 19, no. 3 (2015): 477507.
176. Bijsterbosch and Falagiarda, `Macroeconomic Impact' and Luca Gambetti and Alberto
Musso, `Loan Supply Shocks and the Business Cycle', Journal of Applied Econometrics 32, no.
4 (2017): 764782.
177. Antonello D'Agostino, Luca Gambetti and Domenico Giannone, `Macroeconomic Forecast-
ing and Structural Change', Journal of Applied Econometrics 28, no. 1 (2013): 82101.
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The vector yt contains the observations of the N macroeconomic or nancial
series at time t. µt are time-varying constants, and the N×N matrixBi,t contains
VAR-parameters to be estimated for lag i. Note the subscript t. This means that
at each time t, the parameters are allowed to change. In an ordinary VAR with
static parameters, this subscript would not exist. νt are error terms andRt contain
the variances of the errors.
The model also allows for variance of the error terms to change over time.
Modeling the variance as a time-varying random variable is referred to as stochastic
volatility, volatility being another term for standard deviation.178 Primiceri argues
that if stochastic volatility is not allowed for, the model becomes less useful for
forecasting and potentially imprecise, as it would confound economic volatility
with structural change in the relationships between macroeconomic variables.179
This is why the time-varying covariance structure, embodied in Rt, is useful. For






Where At governs the contemporaneous relationships between the error terms.
It is specied as a lower triangular matrix with 1's on the diagonal. In the trivariate
case:
At =
 1 0 0a21t 1 0
a31t a32t 1
 and Ht =
h1,t 0 00 h2,t 0
0 0 h3,t

This structure simplies considerably the estimation of the parameters, which
vary over time. Dene βt as a stacked vector of all the coecients, such that βt =
vec([µt,B1,t, ...Bρ,t]
′).180 Then the dynamics of the parameters can be summarised
as follows:
178. Recall that the standard deviation (or volatility) is dened as the square root of the vari-
ance.
179. Primiceri, `Time Varying'.
180. The vec operator denotes vectorisation, whereby a matrix is converted to a vector by
stacking its columns.
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βt = βt−1 + et; var(et) = Q (1.7)
ln(hi,t) = ln(hi,t−1) + zi,t; var(zi,t) = wi (1.8)
aij,t = aij,t−1 + vi,t; var(vi,t) = si (1.9)
for all i and j (which indicate the variable to which the parameters relate).
The equations say that the parameters evolve as random walks: they are de-
termined by their own past values and a random process. Here, the variance
matrix Q is very important, because the degree to which the coecients can vary
depend on it. The same goes for the variances wi and si, which determine how
much the error variances and covariances can change over time.
The model has several parameters, and its estimation using maximum-likelihood
methods would be inecient. Bayesian estimation is useful in this case, especially
as it provides a natural approach for achieving shrinkage for the possible parameter
values. Primiceri develops a Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm for
estimating the model, which is applied in this chapter.181 The time-varying para-
meters can be sampled using an algorithm by Carter and Kohn, which relies on
Kalman ltering.182 The stochastic volatilities are sampled using an algorithm by
Kim et al., whereby it is sampled from a mixture of normal distributions.183 More
details on estimation and priors that were used for the parameters can be found
in the appendix. Here, it suces to note that the priors are broadly consistent
with those found in the TVP-VAR literature.
181. Primiceri, `Time Varying'. There is a minor mistake in the estimation of stochastic volatility
in Primiceri's algorithm. It is xed by changing the order in which parameters in the Gibbs
sampler are sampled. See: Marco Del Negro and Giorgio E Primiceri, `Time Varying Structural
Vector Autoregressions and Monetary Policy: A Corrigendum', The Review of Economic Studies
82, no. 4 (2015): 13421345.
182. Chris K Carter and Robert Kohn, `On Gibbs Sampling for State Space Models', Biometrika
81, no. 3 (1994): 541553.
183. Sangjoon Kim, Neil Shephard and Siddhartha Chib, `Stochastic Volatility: Likelihood In-
ference and Comparison with ARCH Models', The Review of Economic Studies 65, no. 3 (1998):
361393.
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1.5.3 Results from TVP-VARs
The time-varying parameter model is estimated using the following three variables:
GDP, deposits and paid in capital. The variables are in log-dierences and conver-
ted to real, per capita terms. These types of models are typically specied with a
parsimonious lag structure, and studies with quarterly data often use two lags.184
The results in this section are derived using a VAR with one lag, although they
are robust to using models with two lags. The results are obtained from running
the MCMC algorithm 50,000 times, with the rst 30,000 draws discarded.185
Time-varying Granger-causality
This section presents results from Granger-causality tests based on the time-
varying VAR. The intuition of the test is the same as that of the ordinary Granger-
causality test. Namely, it tells us if X (e.g. nancial development) helps predict
Y (e.g. economic growth) at a statistically signicant level. To answer this, we
compare the estimated model with a model where the relevant causal variable is
set to 0. In a TVP-VAR context, such a comparison is done at each point in
time, for dierent sets of parameters. Koop et al. outline a method for doing this,
which is applied below.186 The advantage of testing for Granger-causality is that
it requires no additional assumptions of the model once it has been estimated.
This is in contrast to impulse response analysis, which is discussed in the next
subsection.
Results in gure 1.6 show the probability that there is no Granger-causality
from deposits (top panel) or paid-in capital (bottom panel) to economic growth,
at each point in time. The lower the line is on the left axis, the more likely it is
184. Primiceri, `Time Varying'; Luca Benati and Thomas A Lubik, `Sales, Inventories and Real
Interest Rates: A Century of Stylized Facts', Journal of Applied Econometrics 29, no. 7 (2014):
12101222; Kliem, Kriwoluzky and Sarferaz, `On the Low-Frequency Relationship between Pub-
lic Decits and Ination'; Amir-Ahmadi, Matthes and Wang, `Drifts and Volatilities Under
Measurement Error: Assessing Monetary Policy Shocks over the Last Century'.
185. Primiceri, `Time Varying'.
186. For further details, see: Gary Koop, Roberto Leon-Gonzalez and Rodney W Strachan,
`Dynamic Probabilities of Restrictions in State Space Models: An Application to the Phillips
Curve', Journal of Business & Economic Statistics 28, no. 3 (2010): 370379; and appendix 1.A.2.
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that there is Granger-causality. Informally, these can be thought of as similar to
p-values from a regression. To infer Granger-causality, the line should be below
0.1 (corresponding to a 10% probability). As is clear from the gures, there is no
evidence of nance-led growth in Britain from 1850 to 1913. The probabilities of
no causality to GDP uctuate between 0.45 and 0.55 in the case of deposits, and
0.6-0.75 in the case of paid-in capital.
Figure 1.6: Time-varying Granger-causality tests of deposits and paid-in capital
to GDP
There is also no evidence of reverse causality from growth to nance, as shown
in gure 1.7. In fact, it is highly probable that the growth of the banking sector
and stock markets was not driven by economic growth. These results are obtained
by using training sample priors, which are typically used in the literature, but they
are also robust to using Minnesota-type priors, and models with both 2 lags.187
The results thus bring into question the robustness of the ndings from static
models, discussed above.
187. For information about Minnesota-type priors for TVP-VARs, see: Dimitris Korobilis, `As-
sessing the Transmission of Monetary Policy Using Time-Varying Parameter Dynamic Factor
Models', Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 75, no. 2 (2013): 157179.
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Figure 1.7: Time-varying Granger-causality tests of GDP to deposits and paid-in
capital
Impulse Responses
In this section, the results from the TVP-VARs are shown as impulse response
functions (IRFs). These show how shocks in a given variable (such as deposits)
impacted others (such as GDP). We can think of a shock to deposits as the change
in deposits that cannot be explained by prevailing economic conditions, or by
other variables in the VAR. The impulse response functions on deposits essentially
shows `what would have happened if deposits grew 1% faster than expected in a
given year?' The result depends on the estimated parameters, which makes the
IRFs convenient for summarising linkages between variables, as they depict the
magnitude rather than just the signicance of a relationship. They also yield
an important robustness check to the time-varying causality results, which might
suer from slight inaccuracy due to the short sample.
For the impulse responses to have an economic interpretation, we typically
impose a structure on how the variables interact contemporaneously, while leav-
ing their relationships otherwise unrestricted. The economic interpretation arises
from identiability, which means that the econometric model has only one way to
arrive at a given result.188 To this end, I apply sign restrictions. These impose the
188. If the model is not identied, then it could be used to summarise features of the data, but
not yield an economic interpretation.
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condition that nancial and economic variables should move in the same direc-
tion contemporaneously, but can move freely subsequently.189 These assumptions
are theoretically consistent with standard endogenous economic growth models
augmented with nancial variables.190 The results are also robust to restrictions
where the nancial indicator of interest is set to move contemporaneously in op-
posite direction relative to other variables in the model.191
Figure 1.8 shows the impulse response of GDP from a shock to bank deposits
(upper panel) and paid in capital (lower panel) after one year. Impulse responses
at longer horizons are insignicant, and are thus omitted. The solid line in each
graph represents the median impulse response obtained by running the estimation
algorithm 20,000 times. The dashed lines indicate the 84% and 16% quantiles of
these draws, typically used in Bayesian statistics. To some extent, they can be
interpreted as analogues for condence intervals.192 In other words, if the lower
dashed line is above zero, then we can infer a positive eect from one variable to
another. A signicant negative eect exists if the upper dashed line is below zero.
The results in the upper panel of gure 1.8 are consistent with those obtained
from time-varying causality tests: an increase in deposits had little impact on GDP
throughout 1850 to 1913. While the median impulse does show time-variation (the
line in the middle uctuates over time), the impact is not statistically signicant
in any year.
Turning to the stock markets, the lower panel in gure 1.8 also gives little
evidence of stock markets having a positive impact on economic growth. The im-
pact of shocks to paid-in capital were marginally signicant only around 1870 and
1880, while remaining insignicant throughout the rest of the period. Although
189. For applications of sign-restrictions in TVP-VAR models, see, for example: Luca Benati,
`The Great Moderation in the United Kingdom', Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 40, no.
1 (2008): 121147; Fabio Canova and Luca Gambetti, `Structural Changes in the US Economy:
Is There a Role for Monetary Policy?', Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 33, no. 2
(2009): 477490.
190. Luintel and Khan, `Quantitative Reassessment'.
191. Identifying shocks by using Cholesky-decomposition, whereby nancial variables are allowed
to respond to economic variables instantly, but economic variables are allowed to respond to
nancial variables only after 1 or 2 lags, would clearly be unrealistic when using yearly data.
192. However, they cannot be thought of as equivalents of a `16% condence level'. The reason
we use 84% and 16% quantiles instead of 5% and 95% quantiles is because the posterior draws
are typically highly dispersed in these quantiles.
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Figure 1.8: Response of GDP to a shock in deposits and paid-in capital after 1
year
the result for these two years should not be overemphasised, it is noteworthy that
they were near the nancial crises of 1866 and 1878, potentially indicating that
these were the few years when nancial constraints were signicant. Overall, how-
ever, the model provides no evidence of economic growth having been driven by
the expansion of the stock market.
The impact of changes in economic conditions on the development of the bank-
ing sector and the stock markets was largely insignicant over a two year horizon.
The impulse response of GDP to deposits and paid-in capital after one year are
shown in gure 1.9. Note that the impulse response has relatively wide bands,
indicating a relatively large degree of variance in the responses. However, these
results are robust to using more restrictive priors as well (which would allow for
less variance) - the impact of GDP on deposits remains insignicant. This im-
plies that the commercial banking system grew, to a signicant extent, due to
factors that were not directly linked to economic conditions alone. The response
of paid-in capital from GDP is positive, but only marginally signicant during a
few years. At most, this might be taken as relatively weak evidence of the stock
market's growth having been demand-driven in certain years. However, it is likely
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that most of the market's growth can be explained by other factors.
Figure 1.9: Response of deposits and paid-in capital to a shock in GDP after 1
year
The overarching conclusion that can be drawn from the results in this section
is that there was no signicant causal relationship between the growth of banks
or stock markets on one hand and the economy on the other. Notwithstand-
ing the consistency of most of the TVP-VAR results with those obtained from
Toda-Yamamoto tests, the ndings from the simpler models might be partially
clouded by time-variance in the relationship between nancial variables and GDP,
along with macroeconomic volatility and structural breaks. Indeed, the TVP-VAR
provides substantial evidence of time-variance in these relationships, although the
relationships are not signicant at any point in time.
1.6 Discussion and Conclusion
This chapter uses new data and methods to test if there was a causal link between
nancial development and economic growth in the UK from 1850 to 1913. The
results suggest that there was not. The growth of the capital markets did not
have a signicant impact on the economy over this period. The banking sector's
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contribution to long-term economic growth, over horizons of 1 years and above,
also appears to have been limited. Models that have been widely used in the
literature provide some evidence that the growth of the banking system and that
of the economy reinforced each other from 1870 to 1913. However, these results
are statistically weak and not robust to using more accurate models. But to the
extent that such a link existed, it operated through enhancing the productivity
with which resources were deployed, and not through capital deepening.
An advantage of this chapter's methodology is that the ndings are easy to
compare with econometric studies on other historical cases. In this regard, the
results are consistent with the Gerschenkronian argument (although they do not
explicitly test it): that a leading economy such as Britain beneted less from
nancial development than did more backward economies in the late 19th and
early 20th centuries. More broadly, they are also consistent with recent literature
that argues that the growth of a large and already well-developed nancial sector
often has little impact on economic growth in advanced economies. Indeed, there
were important dierences between Britain and countries that may have beneted
signicantly from nancial development in the late 19th and early 20th centuries,
such as Germany, Japan and Sweden. These countries had substantial room to
catch with the British economy, while possessing signicantly less sophisticated
nancial sectors. In this vein, it is not surprising that Britain gained less from
further nancial development.
This is the rst study on nance and growth on pre-WW1 UK that allows
for the possibility of a changing relationship between the nancial sector and
the economy. The results from these methods have further implications on the
historical literature on British banking. Existing evidence suggests that banks
had shifted a signicant share of their assets away from loans to the non-nancial
sector, especially after the late 1870s.193 Yet, notwithstanding the clear evidence
of changes in the structure and practices in the banking system, these changes
did not have a signicant impact on the broader economy. Notably, crises such
as 1866 or 1878 did not appear to change the link between the banking sector
and the economy over the longer run, although it is precisely after these episodes
193. Michael Collins and Mae Baker, `English Commercial Bank Liquidity, 18601913', Account-
ing, Business & Financial History 11, no. 2 (2001): 171191; Baker and Collins, `Financial Crises
and Structural Change'.
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that substantial changes in banking practices and the banking industry appear to
have occurred.194 Nevertheless, a potential criticism to this chapter's approach is
that annual data aggregated at the national level is too coarse to understand the
relationship between nance and economic growth. Subsequent chapters address
this criticism by looking at the relationship from other perspectives. In particular,
the next chapter will use higher frequency data on bank credit.
The results pertaining to the stock markets also have implications for the
historical literature, supporting a cautious view of their role in promoting economic
growth during the period at issue. This is not controversial with regards to the
years 1850-1880, as before the 1880s, domestic companies (with the exception
of railways and nancial institutions) would rarely seek capital from the public.
What is more surprising is the muted role of the stock markets after 1880. Their
economic impact did not change from earlier years, despite the fact that in this
period, domestic companies in several industries began relying on stock exchanges
to a greater extent. At the same time, the chapter does not nd support the
argument that the growth of the capital markets was merely driven by domestic
demand.195 Economic growth contributed to the expansion of the stock markets
only at a marginally signicant level during a few years between 1850 and 1913. It
follows that institutional factors, along with demand coming from abroad, might
be more relevant for explaining the rapid expansion of the British stock markets.
An optimistic way to interpret the results on capital markets is to suggest that
the supply of long-term nance was not constrained signicantly in the UK in
1850-1913, at least over a horizon of one year or more. This would be consist-
ent with arguments suggesting that rms in the late 19th century could easily
nd capital through private channels if needed.196 The contribution of the stock
markets may therefore have been muted, because a large share of rms could
nd substitutes for capital raised from the public. Notwithstanding this possib-
ility, the results still imply that the capital markets did not make a signicant
contribution to the economy through other channels, such as improving corporate
194. Baker and Collins, `Commercial Bank Stability'; Turner, Banking in Crisis, 120-127;
Richard S Grossman, Unsettled Account: The Evolution of Banking in the Industrialized World
Since 1800 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 185-187.
195. Cottrell, `Domestic Finance'.
196. For reviews, see: Ibid.; Robert Cull et al., `Historical Financing of Small-and Medium-Size
Enterprises', Journal of Banking & Finance 30, no. 11 (2006): 30173042.
77
governance. As to whether the stock markets' ability to foster growth through cor-
porate governance was hindered through institutional weaknesses remains unclear,
and further research on the topic is needed.
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1.A Appendix to Chapter 1
1.A.1 Data on Scottish Banks
The sources used to supplement the deposit data with that of Scottish banks are
outlined in table 1.6.
Table 1.6: Data on public liabilities of Scottish banks included in the sample
Bank Coverage Source
Bank of Scotland 1850-1865 Bank of Scotland balance sheets,
BOS/4/7/4/1-4, Lloyds Banking Group
Archives
British Linen Bank 1860-1865 For 1860: British Linen Bank balance
sheets, BLB1/5/22/2, Lloyds Banking
Group Archives, Edinburgh. After 1861:
Richard Saville, Bank of Scotland: A His-
tory, 1695-1995 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh
University Press, 1996), table A.21
Clydesdale Bank 1850-1865 James Macarthur Reid, The History of
the Clydesdale Bank, 1838-1938 (Glasgow:
Blackie & Son Limited, 1938), 82, 153
Royal Bank of Scot-
land
1850-1865 RBS balance sheets, RB/257/2-4, RBS
Archives
Union Bank of Scot-
land
1850-1865 Saville, Bank of Scotland , table A.22
Western Bank of
Scotland
1850-1857 Western Bank of Scotland balance sheets,
WB/10, RBS Archives
Total for the Scottish
banking system
1865-1870 Checkland, Scottish Banking , table 44
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1.A.2 Priors and Estimation of the TVP-VAR
In Bayesian estimation, we are concerned with obtaining the posterior probability
distribution of parameters, which contains information about the parameters con-
ditional on the data. In order to obtain estimates, we need to specify priors, which
contain our prior beliefs about the parameters. Priors, together with the model
likelihood function which includes information about the observed data, are then
used to estimate the posterior distribution. More formally, let f(y|θ) represent
the likelihood function of the data conditional on the parameters, where y is the
observed data and θ are all the parameters. The posterior and prior distributions
are denoted p(θ|y) and p(θk), respectively.197




p(θ|y) ∝ f(y|θ)p(θk) (1.11)
Where ∝ denotes `proportional to': the estimates of the parameters are pro-
portional to the prior distributions and the likelihood function.198
Bayesian priors are a convenient way to provide some degree of restriction to
what values the parameters can take. In a time-varying model they are particularly
important, because they also determine the amount of time-variance that can take
place.199 However, it is still possible to specify priors which make the posterior
draws heavily data-driven. A common starting point for doing this is to estimate
a time-invariant VAR using a training sample. Because of the relatively short
sample in my case, and lack of data before 1850, I use the full sample as my
training sample. A similar approach has been used previously in economic history
by Straumann and Woitek, although owing to more data, they do not use all of
197. Here, `|' denotes `conditional on'.
198. For more details on estimation and prior specications for TVP-VARs, see Jouchi Na-
kajima et al., `Time-Varying Parameter VAR Model with Stochastic Volatility: An Overview of
Methodology and Empirical Applications', Monetary and Economic Studies 29 (2011): 107142;
Primiceri, `Time Varying'; Cogley and Sargent, `Drifts'.
199. Primiceri, `Time Varying'.
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their sample for training.200
The priors of the parameters in the TVP-VAR specied by Primiceri can be
summarised as follows:
β0 ∼ N(β̂0, cβ · V (β̂0)) (1.12)
H0 ∼ N(Ĥ0, ch · IN) (1.13)
A0 ∼ N(Â0, ca · V (Â0)) (1.14)
Q ∼ IW (k2Q · V (Qprior) · κ, κ) (1.15)
W ∼ IW (k2W ·N, IN) (1.16)
Si ∼ IW (k2S · (i+ 1) · V (Sprior), (i+ 1)) (1.17)
The underlying parameters to be estimated are outlined in section 1.5.2. Here,
Si is the ith row of matrix S. S is block diagonal such that: S1 = s1; S2 = [s2, s3].
W is a diagonal matrix with elements wi.
β̂0; Ĥ0 and Â0 are estimates based on a constant-parameter VAR on the
full sample. V (·) denotes the estimated variances of these parameters. N(·) and
IW (·) are the normal and inverse-Wishart distributions, respectively. κ is the
prior degrees of freedom allowed for the distribution of Q. To avoid unnecessary
restrictions, it is set to the minimum allowed for the prior to be proper: (1 +
Nρ) ∗N + 1.201 This allows the data signicant freedom to determine how much
time-variance there is in the parameters.
Following Kang et al., I specify V (Qprior) = IN×(Nρ+1) and V (Sprior) = IN .202
This constitutes and uninformative and relatively at prior, and contrasts with
the more traditional approach by e.g. Primiceri, who sets V (Qprior) = V (β̂0) and
V (Sprior) = V (Â0).203 In a small sample, the latter approach is too restrictive,
200. Straumann and Woitek, `Pioneer'.
201. Cogley and Sargent, `Drifts'.
202. Wensheng Kang, Ronald A Ratti and Kyung Hwan Yoon, `Time-Varying Eect of Oil
Market Shocks on the Stock Market', Journal of Banking & Finance 61 (2015): 150163.
203. Primiceri, `Time Varying'.
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as it imposes too many prior constraints on the amount of time-variance that the
model can exhibit. In a longer sample this matters less. However, my results are
robust to using the latter specication, although this type of model's time-variance
is muted.
For the hyperparameters, I set kQ = 0.0035; kS = 0.01; kW = 0.05.204 For
the priors of β, A and H , I set cβ = 4; ca = 4 and ch = 4, which are consistent
with the specication of Primiceri.205 I have experimented with setting priors of
kQ between 0.001 and 0.01; kS between 0.01 and 0.1; kW between 0.01 and 0.1. I
have also tried changing cβ; ca and ch between 1 and 4. The results are robust to
these changes, although high levels of kQ and low values of kW led to high degrees
of dispersion and instability in the draws.
These priors are broadly consistent with those used in the macroeconomic
literature.206 More details on estimation is provided by Del Negro and Primiceri.207
Once the model parameters have been estimated, it is possible to test for
Granger-causality in a time-varying setting using the approach outlined by Koop
et al.208 This method builds on the intuition behind Bayesian model selection.
Suppose we have two models, M1 andM2, where model 1 incorporates restrictions
on the relationship between nance and the economy. In other words,M1 contains
the restriction that all elements of β that link past values of nancial development
to economic growth are zero, which implies Granger non-causality. Let p(M1)
denote the prior probability that model M1 is correct, whereby the corresponding
probability for the unrestricted model is p(M2) = 1− p(M1).
To ascertain whether there is Granger-causality, we evaluate the probability
that M1 is true. The posterior odds ratio is used to compare the restricted and
unrestricted models:
204. kQ and kS are set to relatively small values to adjust for the impact of setting uninformative
priors on time-variances (V (Qprior) and V (Sprior)).
205. Primiceri, `Time Varying'.
206. Cogley and Sargent, `Drifts'; Primiceri, `Time Varying'.
207. Del Negro and Primiceri, `Time Varying Structural Vector Autoregressions and Monetary
Policy: A Corrigendum'; Primiceri, `Time Varying'. See also the appendix of the working paper
version of Gambetti and Musso, `Loan Supply Shocks and the Business Cycle'.













Where p(Mi|y) is the posterior probability that model i is true under the data
y, and BF stands for `Bayes factor', which is central to the method outlined by




Let βrestricted incorporate the restriction that there is no Granger-causality
from nance to economic growth. Koop et al. show that in the TVP-VAR case,
the Bayes factor can be obtained as the ratio of the unrestricted posterior and





This calculation can be based directly on the draws of the TVP-VAR es-
timation algorithm. Koop et al. outline the precise formulae for doing this.209
Once the Bayes factor is calculated, it is possible to calculate the probability of
a Granger-causal relationship between macroeconomic variables during each year
in the sample.
1.A.3 Robustness of TVP-VAR Results
Variables in Levels
This section shows results of a model where the variables are in log levels, not
dierences. In applied work with VARs using higher frequency data, variables
are frequently set in levels. This is because dierencing variables might needlessly
209. Ibid.
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throw away information.210 Furthermore, in Bayesian settings where large samples
of data are available, keeping non-stationary variables in levels is rarely an issue.211
This is even less of an issue with the TVP-VAR, where the model is by default
able to take into account structural change.
However, there are downsides to using non-stationary variables in this type
of a model with a comparatively small sample. Namely, numerical instability be-
comes an issue, which makes the model either impossible to estimate or the results
dicult to replicate. In order to get rid of this problem, we need to impose more
restrictive conditions on the model than we would in with a model in dierences.
This can either be done by placing highly restrictive priors, or by forcing each
draw to be stationary. The former could lead to model misspecication, while the
latter approach has been shown to be mathematically wrong.212 Indeed, earlier
work with TVP-VARs combined with yearly data has used dierenced data.213
Due to the model's lack of stability with several prior specications when the
data is in levels, the results from a model with levels data should be treated with
a degree of scepticism.214 It is nevertheless reassuring that ndings from a TVP-
VAR with data in levels, shown in table 1.10, are consistent with those found in
the models with dierenced data.
210. Walter Enders, Applied Econometric Time Series, 4th ed. (New York: John Wiley & Sons,
2015), 291.
211. Christopher A Sims, `Bayesian Skepticism on Unit Root Econometrics', Journal of Eco-
nomic Dynamics and Control 12, nos. 2-3 (1988): 463474; Christopher A Sims, James H Stock
and Mark W Watson, `Inference in Linear Time Series Models with Some Unit Roots', Econo-
metrica, 1990, 113144.
212. Gary Koop and Simon M Potter, `Time Varying VARs with Inequality Restrictions',
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 35, no. 7 (2011): 11261138.
213. Keating and Valcarcel, `The Time-Varying Eects of Permanent and Transitory Shocks to
Real Output'.
214. The priors, following the notation in section 1.A.2, were set to kQ = 0.001; kS = 0.01;
kW = 0.01 ; cβ = 4; ch = 2;ca = 4.
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Figure 1.10: Time-varying Granger-causality tests of deposits and paid-in capital
to GDP, variables in levels
Systems with Fixed Capital Formation
Figure 1.11 shows results from a VAR system with GDP, deposits, and xed
capital formation. In gure 1.12, the exercise is repeated with a VAR including
data on GDP, paid-in capital, and xed capital formation. Neither system provides
evidence of causal relationships between nancial and economic variables. There
is no evidence of investment-led growth being caused either by stock markets or
banks.
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Figure 1.11: Time-varying Granger-causality tests between GDP and deposits,
equation with xed capital formation
Figure 1.12: Time-varying Granger-causality tests between GDP and paid-in cap-
ital, equation with xed capital formation
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Chapter 2
Bank Credit and the Economy, 1880-
1913: A Monthly Perspective
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Chapter Summary
This chapter uses a new monthly dataset to show that changes in bank
credit inuenced British economic growth in the short term in the period
1880-1913. It highlights the role of banks in alleviating credit constraints
in the economy, which could not be observed from yearly data used in the
previous chapter. Furthermore, it shows that prudent banking practices
during the period rendered bank lending far less sensitive to interest rates
than what it is today. Yet, the fact that bank lending practices became
progressively more conservative after the 1880s does not appear to have
worsened credit constraints signicantly. This is in contrast with the pre-
valent view in the history of British banking.
2.1 Introduction
How important were changes in bank lending for the British economy in 1880-
1913? This chapter supplements the previous one by focusing on the impact of
monthly changes in credit availability. The motivation for this arises from the fact
that banks lent predominantly on a short-term basis, and that the yearly data,
used in the previous chapter, may thus be too coarse to reveal the links between
nancial conditions and economic growth.
This chapter demonstrates that changes in bank credit inuenced British eco-
nomic growth in the short term, over horizons of 12 months and below. The
banking sector could thus act as a signicant driving force behind business cycles,
even though the nancial system in 1880-1913 was remarkably stable. Moreover,
the ndings highlight an important consequence of the prudent banking practices
in place from the 1880s, which is that bank lending was considerably less sensitive
to money market interest rates than it is today. Yet, the growing conservatism of
banks' lending practices did not lead to constraints on the supply of credit.
The period 1880-1913 is characterised by substantial changes in the commer-
cial banking sector, which began in earnest following the 1878 City of Glasgow
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Bank failure. Banks increased the liquidity of their assets by lending on a shorter
time-frame, while concurrently reducing the relative share of credit to rms out-
side the nancial sector.1 These developments have been highlighted as potential
hindrances to the level of support that banks aorded to industrial customers.
Yet, the implications of these developments for credit availability remain unclear.2
Understanding the economic impact of these changes is central to the debate over
the role of British banks in the economy at the time.
Had the market for loans functioned perfectly, we could simply dismiss these
changes by arguing that the supply of credit was determined by the demand for it.3
Yet, the banking sector was far from being perfectly competitive. Waves of mergers
lessened the competitive pressures faced by banks, allowing them to tighten their
lending standards and to constrain credit in counties where they had signicant
market power.4 Grossman argues that a lack of competition allowed banks to
extract positional rents from their customers, as evidenced by high prots.5 And
yet, it is dicult to reconcile increased market power of banks with evidence
showing that banks rarely refused to grant credit to rms, and oered rather
exible terms for their loans.6 We clearly need to shed more light on the role of
banks and credit constraints in this period.
While the changing composition of bank balance sheets and lending practices
has received signicant attention from economic historians, there is remarkably
1. Michael Collins and Mae Baker, `English Commercial Bank Liquidity, 18601913', Account-
ing, Business & Financial History 11, no. 2 (2001): 171191.
2. Mae Baker and Michael Collins, `Financial Crises and Structural Change in English Com-
mercial Bank Assets, 18601913', Explorations in Economic History 36, no. 4 (1999): 428444;
Mae Baker and Michael Collins, `English Commercial Bank Stability, 1860-1914', Journal of
European Economic History 31, no. 3 (2002): 493493; Michael Collins and Mae Baker, Commer-
cial Banks and Industrial Finance in England and Wales, 1860-1913 (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2003), 219.
3. Philip L Cottrell, `Domestic Finance, 1860-1914', in The Cambridge Economic History of
Modern Britain, ed. Roderick Floud and Paul Johnson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2004), 253279.
4. Fabio Braggion, Narly Dwarkasing and Lyndon Moore, `Nothing Special About Banks:
Competition and Bank Lending in Britain, 18851925', The Review of Financial Studies, 2017,
35023537.
5. Richard S Grossman, `Rearranging Deck Chairs on the Titanic: English Banking Concen-
tration and Eciency, 18701914', European Review of Economic History 3, no. 3 (1999): 323
349. Competition between banks is discussed in more detail in the third chapter of this thesis.
6. Michael Collins, `English Bank Development within a European Context, 18701939', The
Economic History Review 51, no. 1 (1998): 124.
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little empirical work on the eects these changes had. Goodhart produced im-
portant pioneering work on this topic in the 1970s.7 He used published monthly
data on British bank balance sheets from 1891 to 1914, and examined, among
other things, how changes in balance sheet ratios correlated with proxies of nan-
cial and economic conditions. For example, he showed that advances (short-term
loans) correlated positively with domestic economic conditions. However, to as-
sess whether banks helped generate economic growth, we need to ascertain more
than just simple correlation, and prove the existence of a clear causal relationship
between credit conditions and economic performance.
This chapter uses extensions of the new tools from multiple time series eco-
nometrics outlined in the previous chapter to examine the economic impact of
changes in bank credit at higher frequencies. Surely, if bank credit played an
important role in the economy, then changes in credit should lead to observable
changes in economic conditions.8 The methodology makes it possible to study not
only the role that banks played in economic growth, but also to explore the impact
of changing lending practices. The latter can be done by examining how the rela-
tionship between bank credit and the economy changed over time. The empirical
investigation is based on a new dataset of monthly credit gures of several banks,
covering the years 1880-1913.9
Although this chapter chiey focuses on nance and growth, it also relates
to the literature examining the impact of credit supply shocks.10 Credit supply
shocks, broadly dened, refer to changes in bank credit that are not warranted
by prevailing economic or nancial conditions.11 The focus in this literature is
typically on shorter term economic growth rather than the long run approach of
the nance-growth literature. Nevertheless, these two strands are intertwined.
Studying credit shocks can also deepen our knowledge about nance and growth
in the longer term. For example, Helbling et al. demonstrate that credit shocks
7. Charles A E Goodhart, The Business of Banking, 18911914 (London: Weidenfeld /
Nicolson, 1972).
8. Randall S Kroszner, Luc Laeven and Daniela Klingebiel, `Banking Crises, Financial De-
pendence, and Growth', Journal of Financial Economics 84, no. 1 (2007): 187228.
9. The data is discussed in more detail in section 2.2.1.
10. For a review, see: James Morley, `Macro-Finance Linkages', Journal of Economic Surveys
30 (2015): 698711.
11. Ben S Bernanke and Alan S Blinder, `Credit, Money, and Aggregate Demand', The Amer-
ican Economic Review 78, no. 2 (1988): 435439.
90
were an important driver of economic growth in G-7 countries from 1988 to 2009,
but that they were especially important during recessions.12 Kroszner et al. show
that sectors that are highly reliant on external nance contract disproportionately
during banking crises, while during normal times, a large banking sector allows
them to grow faster than other sectors.13 Their evidence from crisis and non-crisis
periods suggests that banks play a central role in lessening credit constraints,
which makes them important for the growth of rms that are heavily dependent
on external nance.14
Credit supply shocks have become an important area of study following the
Great Recession, especially as the nancial sector has been better integrated into
macroeconomic models.15 Changes in bank loan supply have constituted an im-
portant driver of recent business cycles in developed countries, thus being central
to our understanding of their macroeconomic performance.16 Evidence from time-
varying models has shown that credit supply shocks had a positive impact on the
economies of the Euro area before the nancial crisis of 2007-2009, but that they
also explained a signicant part of the economic decline in the crisis years.17 In the
case of the US, the impact of nancial shocks has also been found to be signicant
but time-varying. Before the Great Recession, nancial factors could explain 20%
of variation in the evolution of GDP, but during the recession they could explain
up to 50% of it.18 Ignoring time-variation would thus lead to inaccurate inferences
about the impact of changes in credit supply. Indeed, the importance of credit for
business cycles, especially during periods of macroeconomic instability, has been
12. Thomas Helbling et al., `Do Credit Shocks Matter? A Global Perspective', European Eco-
nomic Review 55, no. 3 (2011): 340353.
13. Kroszner, Laeven and Klingebiel, `Banking Crises, Financial Dependence, and Growth'.
14. See also: Raghuram G Rajan and Luigi Zingales, `Financial Dependence and Growth', The
American Economic Review 88, no. 3 (1998): 559.
15. Morley, `Macro-Finance Linkages'.
16. Andrea Gerali et al., `Credit and Banking in a DSGE Model of the Euro Area', Journal
of Money, Credit and Banking 42, no. s1 (2010): 107141; Nikolay Hristov, Oliver Hülsewig and
Timo Wollmershäuser, `Loan Supply Shocks During the Financial Crisis: Evidence for the Euro
Area', Journal of International Money and Finance 31, no. 3 (2012): 569592.
17. Martin Bijsterbosch and Matteo Falagiarda, `The Macroeconomic Impact of Financial Frag-
mentation in the Euro Area: Which Role for Credit Supply?', Journal of International Money
and Finance 54 (2015): 93115; Luca Gambetti and Alberto Musso, `Loan Supply Shocks and
the Business Cycle', Journal of Applied Econometrics 32, no. 4 (2017): 764782.
18. Esteban Prieto, Sandra Eickmeier and Massimiliano Marcellino, `Time Variation in Macro-
Financial Linkages', Journal of Applied Econometrics, 2016,
91
demonstrated empirically using pre-WW1 and interwar US data.19
Finally, this chapter contrasts the debate on the eects of conservative banking
practices in the late 19th century with current research on bank risk-taking. An
important driver of bank risk-taking today is the growth of credit in response to
lower interest rates. Research in this eld has shown that banks tend to increase
their lending volumes and lend to riskier borrowers when interest rates decline.20
Bank leverage and interest rates are, of course, partially determined by economic
conditions, but the nding holds even when this is factored in.21 Researchers have
interpreted these ndings as evidence of imprudent behaviour by banks.
Lower interest rates lead to more risk-taking today, because the funding costs
of banks are closely tied to short-term rates.22 Faced with lower funding costs,
banks can grow their prots by increasing their lending at longer term rates, which
are more stable, and take longer to adjust to a lower interest rate environment.23
In other words, low interest rates increase the incentives for banks to engage in
maturity transformation. Yet increasing the maturity mismatch between loans and
deposits is inherently risky. In a model by Valencia, what eventually increases a
given bank's cost of borrowing is a growing risk of default by the bank, which in
19. Charles W Calomiris and R Glenn Hubbard, `Price Flexibility, Credit Availability, and
Economic Fluctuations: Evidence from the United States, 1894-1909', The Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 1989, 429452; Ben S Bernanke, `Nonmonetary Eects of the Financial Crisis in
the Propagation of the Great Depression', The American Economic Review 73, no. 3 (1983):
257276. Bernanke uses a proxy for credit contractions - deposits in failed banks - to build his
argument. For a broader overview of credit as a driver of historical business cycles, see: Moritz
Schularick and Alan M. Taylor, `Credit Booms gone Bust: Monetary Policy, Leverage Cycles,
and Financial Crises, 1870-2008', American Economic Review 102, no. 2 (2012): 102961.
20. Gabriel Jiménez et al., `Hazardous Times for Monetary Policy: What Do Twenty-Three
Million Bank Loans Say About the Eects of Monetary Policy on Credit Risk-Taking?', Econo-
metrica 82, no. 2 (2014): 463505; Giovanni Dell'Ariccia, Luc Laeven and Gustavo A Suarez,
`Bank Leverage and Monetary Policy's Risk-Taking Channel: Evidence from the United States',
Journal of Finance 72, no. 2 (2017): 613654; Manthos D Delis and Georgios P Kouretas, `In-
terest Rates and Bank Risk-Taking', Journal of Banking & Finance 35, no. 4 (2011): 840855.
21. Valentina Bruno and Hyun Song Shin, `Capital Flows and the Risk-Taking Channel of
Monetary Policy', Journal of Monetary Economics 71 (2015): 119132.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.; Fabian Valencia, `Monetary Policy, Bank Leverage, and Financial Stability', Journal
of Economic Dynamics and Control 47 (2014): 2038. Valencia also shows that this behaviour
is exacerbated when banks have limited liability, because bank owners face limited losses if their
borrowers fail to pay back.
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turn increases its funding costs.24 The ability of depositors and counterparties to
monitor the bank is therefore crucial for the extent to which lower funding costs
are translated into higher risk-taking.25 Furthermore, if lower rates reduce the
return of holding safe assets, then banks may be incentivised to search for higher
yields in riskier assets, especially as lower rates make risky borrowers better able
to service their debts.26
There are several reasons why we should not expect short-term money market
rates to have driven credit expansion during the period 1880-1913. Banking prac-
tices at the time limited banks' ability to directly prot from lower interest rates.
Perhaps most importantly, in contrast to today's practices, banks did not engage
in liability management: they did not seek to raise funds by oering higher deposit
rates than their competitors. Interest rate xing between commercial banks held
the deposit rate steadily between 1-1.5% below the Bank of England discount rate
in 1880-1913, and interest was rarely paid on current accounts.27 Depositors thus
lacked an important incentive (the deposit rate) to `shop around' and channel their
resources to any specic bank. Leading banking manuals at the time, moreover,
considered the practice of bankers trying to get depositors to switch banks a mani-
festation of `excessive competition' which was `deplorable and dangerous', while
also being detrimental to a bank's standing.28
Banks did not, in general, rely on wholesale funding from other nancial insti-
tutions, which made their funding costs less sensitive to prevailing market rates.29
Few banks have surviving internal balance sheet gures which provide an unam-
biguous breakdown between liabilities to bankers and other agents on one hand
and other depositors on the other. Preliminary evidence from two large banks for
which such evidence is available, however, suggests that liabilities to other nancial
24. Ibid. Depositors or creditors are assumed to increase the interest rate required for a riskier
bank.
25. Ibid.; Giovanni Dell'Ariccia, Luc Laeven and Robert Marquez, `Real Interest Rates, Lever-
age, and Bank Risk-Taking', Journal of Economic Theory 149 (2014): 6599.
26. Ibid. Dell'Ariccia et al. also argue that banks might have lower incentives to monitor their
borrowers when rates are lower.
27. Anthony Hotson, Respectable Banking: The Search for Stability in London's Money and
Credit Markets Since 1695 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 5, 12; Edward T
Nevin and Edward William Davis, The London Clearing Banks (London: Paul Elek, 1970), 126.
28. JW Gilbart, The History, Principles and Practice of Banking, Vol. 2 (London: G Bell &
Sons, 1919), 13-14.
29. Hotson, Respectable Banking , 14-15.
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institutions were between 0.9-1.5% of their total liabilities in 1900-1903.30 This
gure comes close to the gure of 1.7% that Sheppard estimates as the highest
ratio of `miscellaneous liabilities' to total liabilities in 1880-1913 (this gure is
1.5% in 1900), and below the 2%-3% range within which his (imprecise) estimate
of the ratio of interbank deposits to commercial bank deposits uctuated during
this period.31
The extent to which banks engaged in maturity transformation was very lim-
ited in 1880-1913, further inhibiting their ability to prot from lower interest rates.
Late 19th and early 20th century banking practitioners and authors of banking
manuals were unambiguous about the need to keep the mainstay of banking as
short-term lending (combined with ample liquid reserves) so as to avoid signic-
ant maturity mismatches between liabilities and assets.32 These recommendations
were translated into practice, as is evidenced by only a small portion of bank loans
in 1880-1914 (less than 5%) being granted for a duration exceeding 12 months,
although banks generally allowed short term credits to be rolled over for a longer
period.33 There was no eective cartel for advances, and, as suggested earlier in
this thesis, loan terms were generally exible.34 However, Hotson suggests that
there a degree of stickiness to rates on advances, with a oor at roughly 5%, which
in turn might have made the demand for these loans less elastic to interest rates.35
Finally, the professionalisation and formalisation of banking practices, com-
bined with stronger systems of internal controls on branch managers, further con-
strained risk-taking. By 1890, there was a rm tendency towards maintaining
certain ratio (typically at least 10%) of cash to deposits which arose due to a
30. End of December gures in: Weekly Balance Sheet Figures, Metropolitan Bank, December
31, 1900 - December 31, 1903, UK R 0034, HSBC Archives; Weekly General Abstracts of Bal-
ances, North & South Wales Bank, December 31, 1900 - December 31, 1903, UK M 0084, HSBC
Archives.
31. David K Sheppard, The Growth and Role of UK Financial Institutions, 1880-1966 (London:
Methuen, 1971), 126-127, 182-183.
32. Walter Leaf, Banking (London: Williams & Norgate, 1946), 164-169; George Rae, The
Country Banker, His Clients, Cares, and Work (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1920), 207-
214. See also: Hotson, Respectable Banking , 163-166.
33. Collins and Baker, Commercial Banks, 194-197.
34. See pp. 11-13 and 32-34 of this thesis.
35. Hotson, Respectable Banking , 12.
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sense of increased public scrutiny of bank balance sheets.36 Another expression of
`ratio-consciousness' was bank directors' tendency to avoid having their bills and
advances as a share of deposits rise above a xed ratio, such as 60%.37 Evidence
from loan data suggests that branch managers were successfully applying their
banks' codied lending practices, which reduced risk-taking by requiring man-
agers to justify and seek their directors' approval for all loans exceeding certain
discretionary thresholds.38 In other words, large banks generally heeded the advice
of Gilbart by keeping branches `in strict subordination to the head oce', which
helped prevent branch managers from lending excessive amounts.39
Dwarkasing uses loan-level data to demonstrate that a 19th centuryWelsh bank
- the North and South Wales Bank - did not increase its risk-taking when faced
with lower money market interest rates.40 Depending on the model specication,
she nds a positive or insignicant relationship between its lending volumes and
interest rates, which she argues reects the bank's prudent behaviour. This chapter
presents evidence on credit volumes at the aggregate level, with data covering a
larger set of banks, conrming Dwarkasing's intuition: banks did not increase their
credit/assets ratios as interest rates declined.
2.2 Data
The dataset used in this chapter includes bank private sector credit, indicators
for economic conditions, and open market interest rates. The former two are dis-
cussed in sections 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 below. Interest rates are included in the analysis
36. Nevin and Davis, The London Clearing Banks, 78-79; As for the ratio of near-cash assets
to total liabilities, large joint-stock banks maintained a ratio above 20% after 1890. See: Collins
and Baker, Commercial Banks, 122-126, 253.
37. Goodhart, Business of Banking , 156-158.
38. Collins and Baker, Commercial Banks, 169.
39. JW Gilbart, The History, Principles and Practice of Banking, Vol. 1 (London: G Bell &
Sons, 1916), 424.
40. Narly Ratna Devi Dwarkasing, `Essays on Historical Banking', CentER, Center for Eco-
nomic Research (PhD diss., Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management, 2014),
88-125.
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following a standard practice in modelling macro-nancial linkages.41 Specic-
ally, I use the open market interest rate. This is the rate on high-quality bills
of exchange, which were short-term debt instruments acknowledging one party's
debt to another. Three reasons inform the choice of using the open market rate
rather than the discount rate of the Bank of England. First, despite a degree of
stickiness in the interest rate for advances, the open market rate was an important
benchmark for the cost of short-term nance for a substantial set of rms able to
borrow via bills of exchange.42 Indeed, Collins and Baker suggest that advances
and bills were substitutes, and they had a signicant negative correlation on bank
balance sheets in 1880-1913.43 Second, there are reasons why we might not want
to regard the Bank of England in the 19th century as a modern central bank
in the sense of independently setting the country's monetary policy. Constraints
imposed by its balance sheet - its nancial strength - and the gold standard re-
duced the credibility of some of its interest rate policy decisions.44 Third, at the
monthly frequency, the Bank rate may be too slow-moving, in that it may have
often changed signicantly only after monetary conditions changed.
2.2.1 Bank Balance Sheets and the Private Sector Credit
Ratio
In the short run, the largest changes in credit supply are likely to come from the
amount of credit that banks extend from their existing resources. At a yearly level,
on the other hand, changes in credit supply may be more heavily inuenced by
changes in the resources that banks had available - their assets. The availability
of records makes it dicult to build an accurate monthly series on the absolute
quantity of bank credit in the economy. To understand how uctuations in bank
41. See, for example: Jean Boivin, Marc P Giannoni and Ilian Mihov, `Sticky Prices and
Monetary Policy: Evidence from Disaggregated US Data', The American Economic Review 99,
no. 1 (2009): 350.
42. Stickiness in advance rates created an incentive for bankers to rediscount unsecured bills on
the open market  a practice which the largest banks were nevertheless considered unacceptable.
See: Goodhart, Business of Banking , 132. Similar restrictions did not apply to acceptance
nance, discussed in chapter 5.
43. Collins and Baker, `Commercial Bank Liquidity'.
44. Stefano Ugolini, `Liquidity Management and Central Bank Strength: Bank of England
Operations Reloaded, 1889-1910', Norges Bank Working Paper, no. 10 (2016).
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lending inuenced the economy, I have built a new monthly dataset of bank credit
to asset ratios, which is explained in detail below. The empirical model in this
chapter focuses on the impact of short-term uctuations in this ratio, and the res-
ults are therefore not aected substantially by the longer term growth of aggregate
credit volumes.
The data consists of both published and unpublished accounting records. The
unpublished records are internal monthly balance sheets. These are gathered from
the Royal Bank of Scotland, Lloyds Banking Group, HSBC and Barclays archives,
and cover the collections of most banks for which monthly accounts could be found.
Published monthly data of 14 London joint-stock clearing banks is available from
1891 to 1913.45 Details on the sources and the banks that are included in the
sample are outlined in appendix 2.A.3.
The use of archival records makes it possible to increase the coverage of banks
signicantly beyond the level allowed by published records. In particular, it allows
the inclusion of banks outside London, and a few leading private banks (such as
Barclays) to be represented. A further improvement from the existing (published)
data is to extend the coverage period backwards to 1880.46 For the years 1880-
1891 no published monthly data exists, and the data for this part of the sample
relies entirely on archival records.
Since the number of bank mergers and acquisitions was high in 1880-1913,
using raw credit data would introduce several large discontinuities in the series.
Attempts to correct for such breaks would inevitably introduce a degree of bias. I
therefore use data on credit ratios rather than credit gures in levels. This follows
both Goodhart's approach, as well as several contributions in the literature on
credit supply shocks.47
To explain how the variable for the credit/assets ratio is constructed, it is
45. As for why these banks began publishing monthly balance sheets, see: Goodhart, Business
of Banking , 4-5.
46. Although some monthly accounting records exist for the 1870s, the coverage of the data
would be very limited. These have therefore not been utilised.
47. Goodhart, Business of Banking ; Kim Abildgren, `Financial Structures and the Real Eects
of Credit-Supply Shocks in Denmark 19222011', European Review of Economic History, 2012,
490510; Morley, `Macro-Finance Linkages'.
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necessary to provide some background information on what assets British banks
held on their balance sheets.48 The assets of commercial banks during the period
at issue can be roughly classied from the most liquid to the least liquid as follows:
1. Cash and deposits at other banks;
2. Money at call and at brokers. Money at brokers included very short-term
loans to stockbrokers. Money at call was composed of deposits, typically
kept at discount houses, which invested in short-term bills of exchange;
3a. High-quality bills of exchange held for investment purposes, which were often
bought from other nancial institutions;
3b. British government bonds (consols);
4a. Other investments, such as railway or colonial government bonds;
4b. Bills of exchange;
5. Advances.
I classify private sector credit as bills of exchange and advances (items 4b and
5). The categorisation follows denitions in work by Baker and Collins.49 These
were typically the items that constituted loans to the private non-nancial sector.
These were also the riskiest and least liquid asset classes on bank balance sheets,
so the ratio also serves as an indicator of bank risk-taking. To obtain the credit
ratio, a bank's private sector credit is divided by its total assets. The ratios are
then aggregated on an asset-weighted basis. The series is shown in gure 2.1.
The series exhibits considerable variance at the beginning of the sample, with
occasional monthly uctuations of 5%. The shifts are not driven by changes in the
sample, but reect the greater weight that individual banks had in the data be-
fore 1891. After 1891, when published gures of several additional banks becomes
available, the credit ratio becomes more stable, and generally uctuates between
0.5 and 0.55. This stability of the ratio in the 1890s is consistent with evidence
from half-yearly balance gures from a large sample of contemporary joint-stock




Figure 2.1: Monthly private sector credit ratio, 1880-1913
Source: see appendix 2.A.3.
banks.50 Specically, Collins and Baker nd little long-term change in this ratio
between 1890 and 1910. Nevertheless, the changing properties (and representat-
iveness) of the sample further conrm the suitability of time-varying parameter
methods to analyse this data. These methods mitigate considerably any potential
bias caused by the high variability in the earlier part of the sample.
The classication of private sector credit is not perfectly accurate, because
both advances and bills may have included some credit to government and nan-
cial institutions, although the percentage would have been small. Advances were
typically short-term loans granted to rms. These could be further separated into
overdrafts and loans, but few banks break these gures down in their internal
reporting. Bills of exchange were certicates documenting one party's debt to
another, along with a date on which the debt was to be paid. Firms could thus
borrow from banks against writing them a bill of exchange, or by entering into a
steadier credit relationship through overdrafts. Advances had become the predom-
50. Ibid.
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inant method for nancing domestic businesses already by 1880.51 Bills continued
to be used, particularly when it came to foreign transactions.52
The way in which banks reported their credit items was not consistent across
the industry.53 Bills and advances are often summed together in published ac-
counts. This makes it more dicult to examine advances in isolation, as detailed
data is only available for a smaller sample of banks. Bills were often reported as
an aggregated gure, making it impossible to distinguish between bills that were
used for domestic or foreign transactions, or bills held for investment purposes.
An important factor to keep in mind is that banks did engage in some manip-
ulation of their published balance sheets. They would often depreciate real estate
at a very aggressive rate, or price their holdings of investments slightly under their
market value.54 The disparity between the real value and the adjusted value would
be moved to a bank's hidden reserves - reserves which were not reported publicly.
Nevertheless, the impact of such distortions is likely to be mild in my sample,
because property and consols made up a small share of a bank's total assets.
Moreover, the focus of the empirical procedure is to ascertain the impact of
short-term changes in credit ratios. Balance sheet window-dressing practices are
less consequential in a short run analysis, as they are likely to inuence balance
sheet gures only gradually, and to be near-constant over the short run. A similar
logic applies to potential issues arising from trends in bills and advances: changes
in their relative composition is likely to have been somewhat gradual, which is
unlikely to bias my estimates considerably.
2.2.2 Monthly Economic Conditions
To examine the short-term impact of credit uctuations, an indicator for changes
in monthly economic conditions is needed. GDP estimates for prewar Britain are
51. Shizuya Nishimura, The Decline of Inland Bills of Exchange in the London Money Market,
1855-1913 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971).
52. Ibid.
53. Goodhart, Business of Banking , 17-20.
54. Ibid., 20-23.
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only available at a yearly frequency. Faced with such issues, economic historians
have often resorted to using a single proxy for GDP, such as data on railway freight
receipts or industrial production.55 Despite their usefulness, the risk of using
such proxies in isolation is that they may capture only a part of the variation in
economic conditions, which can generate a problem of so-called omitted variable
bias in the estimates. Financial institutions are likely to look at a large set of
economic indicators when making lending or investment decisions. Failure to
account for this possibility might lead to less accurate estimates.
In the past two decades, factor models have become a standard methodology for
summarising a large array of data on economic conditions.56 The technical details
are discussed in the next section, but the intuition behind factor models is that
they summarise the movement of several time series into fewer series. This logic
derives from the fact that a large share of the variance of several macroeconomic
series can be explained by just a few common factors.57 Factors are series which
are specically estimated to capture the co-movement of many time series. Factor
models are commonly used for forecasting economic conditions, especially at a
higher frequency.58 In economic history, they have been used, for example, to
construct monthly British GDP series for the interwar years.59
Before discussing how these factors are estimated, I outline some of the series
included in the model. Appendix 2.A.4 provides a list of all of the variables used
in the factor model. Of the series used, many come only with slight weights
55. For a recent example, see: Masahiko Shibamoto and Masato Shizume, `Exchange Rate
Adjustment, Monetary Policy and Fiscal Stimulus in Japan's Escape from the Great Depression',
Explorations in Economic History 53 (2014): 118.
56. James H Stock and Mark Watson, `Dynamic Factor Models', in Oxford Handbook on Eco-
nomic Forecasting, ed. Michael P Clements and David F Hendry (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2011).
57. A basic way of doing factor analysis is through principal components, although in this
chapter I will utilise dynamic factor models to improve model t.
58. S Bora§an Aruoba, Francis X Diebold and Chiara Scotti, `Real-Time Measurement of Busi-
ness Conditions', Journal of Business & Economic Statistics 27, no. 4 (2009): 417427; Domenico
Giannone, Lucrezia Reichlin and David Small, `Nowcasting: The Real-Time Informational Con-
tent of Macroeconomic Data', Journal of Monetary Economics 55, no. 4 (2008): 665676 Marta
Ba«bura and Gerhard Rünstler, `A Look into the Factor Model Black Box: Publication Lags
and the Role of Hard and Soft Data in Forecasting GDP', International Journal of Forecasting
27, no. 2 (2011): 333346.
59. James Mitchell, Solomos Solomou and Martin Weale, `Monthly GDP Estimates for Inter-
War Britain', Explorations in Economic History 49, no. 4 (2012): 543556.
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in either factor, and most could hardly be thought of representing the economy
independently. However, there are a few variables which, even individually, are
of special interest. The discussion about the validity of these series relies, to a
signicant extent, on work by Goodhart.60
Goodhart chiey discusses the following variables as proxies for British eco-
nomic conditions:
1. Railway freight receipts;
2. Unemployment;
3. Bank clearings;
4. Stores of Cleveland pig iron in public warehouses.
Freight receipts is an indicator of the trac of goods across the nation. More
freight thus indicates a higher degree of business activity. The more goods were
bought or sold, the more they needed to be transported. In his study, Goodhart
argues that this is by far the best available proxy for the economy, noting that it
is highly correlated with annual economic data.61 The main downside of the series
is that it is biased towards goods which weigh more or take up a large volume
on trains. While this might not cause a signicant distortion in most years, the
series becomes very unreliable as a proxy of aggregate economic activity around
periods such as the coal strikes.62 But given that my model allows for structural
change, temporary episodes of instability are unlikely to cause a signicant bias in
the results. Railway trac has also been preferred in other studies when data on
industrial production or GDP is not available.63 Recently, Shibamoto and Shizume
have used railway freight data as their high-frequency GDP proxy when examining
the eects of ination expectations and devaluation in Japan in the 1930s.64 A
similar approach has been taken by James et al. to study the eects of US banking
60. Goodhart, Business of Banking .
61. Ibid., 73-74.
62. There was particularly severe coal strike in March, 1912.
63. Olivier Jeanne, `Monetary Policy in England 1893-1914: A Structural VAR Analysis', Ex-
plorations in Economic History 32, no. 3 (1995): 302326.
64. Shibamoto and Shizume, `Exchange Rate Adjustment'.
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crises.65
Unemployment data is problematic in the present context, because there is no
data on unemployment of non-unionised labour. The series is also not consistent
over time, since the Board of Trade only began reporting aggregated unemploy-
ment gures in 1893. Before this year, the series consists of gures from a single
trade-union.66 Moreover, in several industries, such as textiles and mining, busi-
ness contractions were met with reductions of hours worked instead of making
workers redundant.67 Problems also abound with using stores of pig iron as an
economic indicator. First, it is strongly biased towards heavy industry. Addition-
ally, the change in stocks can be assumed to partially depend on past expectations
of demand, and on stocks accumulated in the past. It thus makes more sense to
use it as a supplementary, rather than primary, indicator of economic conditions.
The volume of bank clearings is an indicator of the amount of goods traded do-
mestically, as it measures the volume of payments settled between banks. However,
the indicator's ability to proxy domestic economic conditions may have declined
as the banking industry became more concentrated. Transfers of money within
individual banks constituted mere accounting exercises, whereas only clearings
between banks would be recorded in the ocial data. This is a signicant issue
in the present case. Bank mergers could plausibly lead to simultaneous changes
in bank credit ratios and bank clearings. This is because nancing an acquisition
could signicantly inuence a bank's credit ratio in the short run: a bank's credit
would remain constant, but its cash and reserves could decline. In the process
of mergers, banks typically drew down on their reserves to reduce the capital of
the merged entity, so as to avoid overcapitalising their bank and to achieve higher
returns on equity.68 Furthermore, the series may be clouded by purely nancial
transactions, such as stock exchange settlements, which are less relevant for a
study focusing on domestic economic activity.
65. John A James, James McAndrews and David F Weiman, `Wall Street and Main Street:
The Macroeconomic Consequences of New York Bank Suspensions, 18661914', Cliometrica 7,
no. 2 (2013): 99130.
66. The Friendly Society of Iron Founders of England, Ireland and Wales.
67. Goodhart, Business of Banking , 72.
68. Joseph Sykes, The Amalgamation Movement in English Banking, 1825-1924 (London: P.S.
King & Son, 1926), 101-105.
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The series discussed here are supplemented by a large array of additional data,
which is listed in appendix 2.A.4. This includes series on trade, prices, stocks
of commodities along with nancial data. The inclusion of nancial time series
is supported by the fact that such data has been found to be informative when
modelling and forecasting GDP using high-frequency data.69
2.3 Econometric Evidence
2.3.1 TVP-FAVAR
This chapter uses an extension of the time-varying VAR model introduced in the
previous chapter by augmenting it with factors. The factor-augmented vector
autoregression with time-varying parameters (TVP-FAVAR) is a highly exible
model which improves the accuracy of VAR estimates, while still allowing for
structural change.70 The improvement in accuracy originates from the fact that
the model incorporates a large array of data, thus lessening omitted variable bias,
which occurs when the exclusion of important variables from a model causes mis-
leading estimates. This bias is reduced when we replace one proxy for economic
conditions, such as GDP, with the common components of a large number of mac-
roeconomic series. The model then becomes more realistic, because agents in the
nancial sector are likely to have taken a host of data into account when mak-
ing economic decisions. Factor-augmented VARs have become common following
work by Bernanke, Boivin and co-authors, who show that these models often have
69. Ba«bura and Rünstler, `Factor Model'. In a historical setting, Ueble and Ritschl demon-
strate that nancial data can be used to improve estimates of business cycle movements in
pre-WW1 Germany. See: Martin Uebele and Albrecht Ritschl, `Stock Markets and Business
Cycle Comovement in Germany before World War I: Evidence from Spectral Analysis', Journal
of Macroeconomics 31, no. 1 (2009): 3557.
70. For technical details, see: Dimitris Korobilis, `Assessing the Transmission of Monetary
Policy Using Time-Varying Parameter Dynamic Factor Models', Oxford Bulletin of Economics
and Statistics 75, no. 2 (2013): 157179; and Colin Ellis, Haroon Mumtaz and Pawel Zabczyk,
`What Lies Beneath? A Time-Varying FAVAR Model for the UK Transmission Mechanism', The
Economic Journal 124, no. 576 (2014): 668699.
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better forecasting ability than standard VARs.71
To augment a time-varying VAR model, we need to specify an equation for
the factors. Let zt be a vector of M directly observed series at time t, which
in the present case are: 1. the private sector credit ratio of banks; and 2. open
market interest rates. xt is dened as a vector of N economic time series, which
are incorporated into the factor model. Let xzt denote a vector where xt and zt are
stacked. Finally, let ft be the K common factors extracted from several economic
time series. Note that K is much smaller than N .72
With these denitions, we can specify the following relationship between the
economic time series and the factors:
xzt = Λ
fft + Λ
zzt + et; et ∼ N(0, exp(Σ)) (2.1)
Each element of the (N + M) × (K + M) matrix Λft denotes the extent of
co-movement that a given economic series in xt has with other series, whereas
et captures the part of each economic series that moves independently of all the
others. In the context of factor modelling, Λf is said to represent the loadings
that each series takes in the common factors. It follows that Λfft summarises the
co-movement of the large array of series in xt. In a slightly more detailed form,
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The factor model is assumed to be dynamic, in the sense that it depends on
the past values of the factors. The advantage of the dynamic factor specica-
71. Ben S Bernanke, Jean Boivin and Piotr Eliasz, `Measuring the Eects of Monetary Policy: A
Factor-Augmented Vector Autoregressive (FAVAR) Approach', Quarterly Journal of Economics
120, no. 1 (2005): 387422; Boivin, Giannoni and Mihov, `Sticky Prices'.
72. This section largely follows the exposition of Korobilis, `Transmission of Monetary Policy'.
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tion is that it is more likely to correctly specify the loading matrix, Λf . This is
especially important when the time series being studied exhibit autoregressive be-
haviour, which is commonplace for macroeconomic data. In practice, the dynamic
factor specication is better able to separate the common co-movement and the
idiosyncratic behaviour of each series.73 It follows that the factors are assumed to
evolve as follows:
ft = φ1ft−1 + νt (2.2)
Where φ1 contains the autoregressive coecients and νt are the error terms.
Identication is an important issue when estimating the factor model, as we
want to make sure that we cannot get the same likelihood estimates with dierent
combinations of rotations, scales or signs of the parameters. The FAVAR literature
provides several ways to get around this problem.74 Here I follow the approach
by Bernanke et al., whereby the upper K ×K variables in Λf are specied as the
identity matrix.75 Alternatives highlighted in the literature, such as restricting
factors only for given types of variables, would be likely to work well only if there
was more data than what is available in the present case.















The only change from a TVP-VAR model outlined in section 1.5.2 is that
not all variables in yt are treated as directly observed due to the use of factors.
If yt = zt, the equation would constitute a standard TVP-VAR model without
73. Stock and Watson, `Dynamic Factor Models'.
74. Pooyan Amir-Ahmadi, `Credit Shocks, Monetary Policy, and Business Cycles: Evidence
from a Structural Time Varying Bayesian FAVAR' (Manuscript, Goethe University, Frankfurt,
2009).
75. Bernanke, Boivin and Eliasz, `Factor-Augmented'. The identity matrix has 1's on the
diagonal and zeros elsewhere.
106
factors.
Identication in the vector autoregressive part of the model is done using
Cholesky-decomposition. This refers to ordering the variables so that the model
has an economic interpretation. Financial variables - the credit ratio and interest
rates - are ordered before macroeconomic variables, which are included in the
factors. This is a standard method in structural vector autoregression literat-
ure.76 It reects the observation that macroeconomic variables react to nancial
shocks only with a lag, whereas nancial variables can respond to macroeconomic
shocks instantly. With high-frequency data, this is not a highly restrictive as-
sumption. Following the approach by Bernanke et al., nancial variables within
the factors are specied as fast-moving, whereby they are allowed to respond con-
temporaneously to changes in interest rates and credit.77 This makes the model
even more exible, and further improves its accuracy.
The TVP-FAVAR is estimated with Bayesian methods, which provide a natural
and ecient way to achieve shrinkage for the parameter space. In practice, the
Markov-Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) estimation algorithm for the TVP-FAVAR
is an extension of the algorithm used to estimate the TVP-VAR.78 It only re-
quires adding a block for sampling the factor loadings and their variances.79 The
estimation of a Bayesian model involves specifying prior distributions for model
parameters, which in this instance also inuence how much the parameters are
allowed to change. Following previous literature on TVP-FAVARs, I use the same
empirical Bayes (or Minnesota-style) priors as Korobilis.80 These are outlined in
appendix 2.A.2. The model estimates are based on 40,000 draws from the MCMC
algorithm, from which the rst 30,000 are discarded.
76. Ibid.
77. Ibid.
78. Giorgio E Primiceri, `Time Varying Structural Vector Autoregressions and Monetary
Policy', The Review of Economic Studies 72, no. 3 (2005): 821852
79. Details on the Markov-Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) estimation algorithm can be found in:
Korobilis, `Transmission of Monetary Policy', and the references therein. However, note that I
do not include the variables Jθ in Korobilis' paper, which govern if the parameters are allowed




I use formal model selection criteria for selecting the number of lags and factors in
the model. To determine the number of factors, I apply a method by Bai and Ng
to determine that a minimum of two dynamic factors are required for explaining
a sucient amount of variance in the macroeconomic data.81 The number of
dynamic factors estimated depends on the number of static factors found by using
methods outlined in an earlier contribution by Bai and Ng, who in turn propose
several dierent information criteria.82 Depending on the information criterion
used, the end result is a model with either 2 or 3 dynamic factors. I choose the
smaller number of factors in order to avoid excessive parameter proliferation in the
VAR. The fact that model is time-varying further motivates a more parsimonious
specication.
I then apply the by Deviance Information Criterion (DIC) for selecting the lag
length of the model. The use of this type of model selection in the context of
time-varying models is a very recent development.83 While several other ways of
comparing models in Bayesian statistics exist, many do not lead to accurate results.
Chan and Grant show that the observed data likelihood, or integrated likelihood
Deviance Information Criterion, performs well compared to other approaches.84
The Deviance Information Criterion for VAR specication testing strongly sug-
gests using 2 factors instead of 3, validating the choice of a smaller model. The
criterion also suggests using a model with three lags.
2.3.3 Results
The results are presented as impulse responses. As discussed above, these show
how one variable responds to an increase in another. The gures below show the
81. Jushan Bai and Serena Ng, `Determining the Number of Primitive Shocks in Factor Models',
Journal of Business & Economic Statistics 25, no. 1 (2007): 5260.
82. Jushan Bai and Serena Ng, `Determining the Number of Factors in Approximate Factor
Models', Econometrica 70, no. 1 (2002): 191221.
83. See: Joshua CC Chan and Angelia L Grant, `Fast Computation of the Deviance Information




median response of macroeconomic variables to the credit ratio for each decade
in the sample. The years 1880, 1890 and 1900 in the gures should thus be read
as entire decades. It is standard practice in the FAVAR literature to show the
responses of several important macroeconomic variables, rather than just those of
the estimated factors.85 Following the FAVAR literature, the data are transformed
to deviations from the mean, scaled by their standard deviation. This is done to
render the factor estimates as accurate as possible.86 The results can be interpreted
as the impact of a 1% increase in the standardised mean of the credit ratio to the
standardised mean of an economic variable.87 Because the factors include series
which are allowed to respond instantly to changes in interest rates and credit, the
contemporaneous responses of macroeconomic variables can be non-zero.88 For
purposes of statistical inference, one should focus on the responses after one or
more months.
Figure 2.2 shows the impulse responses of the most important macroeconomic
variables included in the model from increases in the private sector credit ra-
tio. The horizontal axis represents the number of months from the shock.89 A
1% increase in the credit ratio would have increased railway freights by roughly
0.07-0.1% and cotton consumption by 0.05-0.07% from their standardised means.
In non-standardised terms, this impact would have been about 1-1.5% for either
variable. The result is economically and statistically signicant. As will be shown
in gure 2.5, small shocks on the order of at least 0.5% to the credit ratio were
common, even after factoring the possibility that the sample is not perfectly rep-
resentative before 1891. Overall, this evidence indicates that credit played a major
role in short-term economic uctuations. The impact of credit shocks also trans-
mitted to the economy quickly: already after 4 months, a credit shock had little
further economic impact.
There is slight time-variation in these results. The impact of credit shocks on
the economy becomes slightly stronger in 1900-1910, compared to the 1880s and
the 1890s. The response of freight receipts grows from 0.07% to 0.1% over time.
85. Boivin, Giannoni and Mihov, `Sticky Prices'.
86. For more on the underlying logic behind doing this, see: Ibid.; and Bernanke, Boivin and
Eliasz, `Factor-Augmented'.
87. Standardised so that the variable's standard deviation is 1.
88. Bernanke, Boivin and Eliasz, `Factor-Augmented'.
89. These gures do not show the cumulative impact.
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Figure 2.2: Impulse responses of real economic variables from shocks to private
sector credit
This modest change indicates that there is little evidence of worsening credit con-
straints. Had the economy became more credit constrained over time, we should
observe a progressively larger impact of shocks in private sector credit. At the very
most, the evidence can be interpreted as mild evidence of slightly worsening credit
constraints. But the fact that the pre-1891 data is less representative, combined
with the relatively small increase in the impact, should temper any such claims.
It is surprising that bank clearings responded negatively to increases in credit.
A potential reason for this is the indicator's ability to proxy macroeconomic con-
ditions. One way to examine the validity of our series as economic indicators is
to observe their responses to changes in interest rates. If they act as proxies of
economic conditions and behave in accordance with macroeconomic theory, they
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should respond negatively to unexpected increases in rates.90 Such a `sanity check'
of the responses of the real variables to interest rates in gure 2.3 shows that bank
clearings might indeed be a weaker proxy for the economy than freight receipts.
The variable responds with the correct sign (negatively) to shocks in rates after
1 month, but the response is marginally positive thereafter.91 Another reason
for the behaviour of bank clearings was outlined above: changes in credit ratios
and bank mergers often occurred simultaneously. The amount of clearings after
a bank merger would almost certainly drop, because a merged entity could settle
more payments internally. In the process of mergers, banks would typically reduce
the outstanding capital of a bank through a cash transaction. This would show
up as a temporary reduction in the size of the balance sheet, while keeping the
volume of credit constant, which in turn implies a larger credit ratio.92 Because of
these issues, little importance should be attached to the relationship between bank
clearings and credit. Indeed, the results in this chapter are robust to excluding
data on bank clearings from the model.
The impact of private credit on trade strengthens the inferences drawn from
the results for freight receipts and cotton consumption. Figure 2.4 shows that fol-
lowing an increase in credit, imports increased, while exports declined. We would
expect exports to decline if domestic consumers and rms have increasing demand
for goods that would otherwise be exported.93 The responses of other macroeco-
nomic variables are also often consistent with credit having a positive impact on
economic conditions. These include, for example, the prices and stocks of various
commodities. Figures on their impulse responses are shown in appendix 2.A.1.
A further way to examine the importance of credit shocks is to use forecast
error variance decomposition (FEVD). This tells us how much variance in the
forecast of a given variable is due to another, at a given forecast horizon. In
the present context, it can tell us how much of the variance in the forecasts of
economic conditions, after one year, is due to shocks in credit. This allows us
90. See, for example: Fabio Canova and Luca Gambetti, `Structural Changes in the US Eco-
nomy: Is There a Role for Monetary Policy?', Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 33,
no. 2 (2009): 477490; Bernanke, Boivin and Eliasz, `Factor-Augmented'.
91. Recall that the contemporaneous impact should be ignored, because certain variables in-
cluded in the factor estimates are allowed to respond contemporaneously to interest rate shocks.
92. Sykes, Amalgamation, 101-105.
93. Assuming foreign economic conditions are held constant.
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Figure 2.3: Impulse responses of real economic variables from shocks to interest
rates
to infer how important credit was in driving short-term growth. Table 2.1 shows
that on average, after 12 months, credit accounted for 8.1% of the forecast error
variance of the rst factor, and up to 17.51% of the other. This adds further
support to the argument that credit was an important driver of business cycles.
Note also that the contribution of credit to the forecast error variance of the
factors does not increase signicantly after 6 months, which in turn reinforces the
argument that shocks in credit were quickly transmitted to the economy.
The results presented so far indicate that the impact of shocks in bank credit
ratios were economically and statistically signicant, contributing to economic
growth over the short run. However, there were few major shocks in credit ratios
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Figure 2.4: Impulse responses of trade indicators from shocks to private sector
credit
Table 2.1: Forecast error variance decomposition
from credit shocks
Horizon (months) 3 6 12
Factor 1 6.31% 7.53% 8.10%
Factor 2 16.85% 17.21% 17.51%
Note: Rows corresponding to `Factor 1' and
`Factor 2' show the percentage of forecast error
variance in the rst and second factors that is
due to shocks in credit.
after the 1880s.94 Figure 2.5 shows the standard deviation of model residuals - the
degree to which a variable deviated from its expected value. This is the standard
94. This is consistent with ndings from yearly data and from a larger sample of banks. See:
Michael Collins and Mae Baker, `Sectoral Dierences in English Bank Asset Structures and the
Impact of Mergers, 1860-1913', Business History 43, no. 4 (2001): 128.
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deviation of the shocks that occurred. Less formally, it can be thought of as the
average deviation of a given indicator from what its value should have been, based
on macroeconomic fundamentals.
Figure 2.5: Standard deviation of model errors for each variable
The upper panel of gure 2.5 shows the standard deviation of shocks to the
factors that proxy economic conditions. The middle and the bottom gures show
the standard deviations of the shocks to private sector credit and open market
rates, respectively. There is evidence of time-varying volatility for all variables,
which adds further support to the choice of the model. The standard deviation
for the interest rate was around 0.3-0.7 in standardised terms, and around 0.1-0.3
for the factors that proxy the real economy. The standard deviation of shocks to
the credit ratio were 0.5-0.6 for the less representative part of the sample (before
1891) and 0.1-0.2 subsequently. This indicates that meaningful, albeit not major,
shocks to the credit ratios from their (standardised) predicted values would have
occurred often throughout the sample.
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The standard deviations of residuals in gure 2.5 also suggest that the private
sector credit ratio was far less volatile than the open market interest rate, especially
after 1890. This can be partially explained by the characteristics of the sample. It
covers a larger set of banks after 1891, which means that idiosyncratic changes in
any individual bank's credit receives less weight in the aggregated series. Never-
theless, it is also possible that once the banking system had become consolidated
and prudent by the 1890s, banks were less vulnerable to economic and nancial
shocks. In such a case, banks would not have needed to respond to periods of
strain on the money market or the nancial system by constraining credit to the
private sector. This brings us to the relationship between interest rates and bank
credit.
We should remember that today, interest rates are an important determinant
of bank risk-taking.95 In light of the banking practices that were prevalent in 1880-
1913, it is interesting to empirically explore the link between interest rates and
risk-taking during this period. The impulse response of the private sector credit
ratio to interest rate shocks is shown in gure 2.6. The response is fairly modest,
since a 1% increase in the interest rate only increased the ratio of private credit to
assets by 0.03-0.07%, which translates to approximately 1% in non-standardised
terms. This suggests that bank credit was not highly sensitive to uctuations in
interest rates. The sign of the response of credit from interest rate increases is
positive, which contrasts with ndings from modern cases. Today, lower interest
rates tend translate into signicantly higher bank lending volumes and higher
risk-taking.96 Because banks in 1880-1913 focused mainly on short-term lending,
their ability to prot from maturity transformation was smaller than what it is
for today's nancial institutions. Banks' funding costs were also less sensitive
to interest rates, because they did not rely on liability management or wholesale
funding, while they maintained interest rate agreements for deposits with other
banks. Finally, banks' ability to maintain somewhat sticky rates on advances
might have kept their customers' debt service costs less responsive to interest
rates than they are today.
The result supports the notion that the business practices of British banks in
95. See the introduction to this chapter.
96. Jiménez et al., `Hazardous Times'.
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Figure 2.6: Impulse response of private sector credit from shocks to interest rates
1880-1913 were prudent, which signicantly lessened the impact of what today is a
key factor in bank-risk-taking. It is also consistent with the ndings of Dwarkasing,
who shows that loan volumes of the North and South Wales bank were positively
associated with interest rates. This is partially because lower rates induced less
creditworthy rms to attempt to borrow more. Banks adjusted to this by reducing
loan volumes, which is the exact opposite of what they have tended to do in recent
times.97
At face value, the evidence in gure 2.6 also indicates that commercial banks
did not amplify uctuations in the money market (the market for short-term debt)
by constraining their lending. Considering the results in light of the fact that open
market interest rates were determined by both domestic and international factors
has further implications for our understanding of the banks' behaviour. The com-
mercial banks' limited response to money market conditions could help explain
why international nancial disturbances were not transmitted more heavily to the
domestic economy, even though the London money market linked the domestic
97. Dwarkasing, `Essays on Historical Banking', 108-109.
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and foreign nancial systems.98 This nding is not conclusive, but paves the way
for further research into whether British commercial banks had a role in mitigat-
ing the impact of uctuations in international nancial markets to the domestic
economy.
Figure 2.7: Impulse response of interest rates from shocks to private sector credit
Figure 2.7 shows how changes in the private sector credit ratio impacted in-
terest rates on the money market. The cost of short-term nance increased as
bank credit grew. Commercial banks reallocating their resources away from the
money market may have increased yields on bills due to reduced liquidity and de-
mand. But regardless of the mechanisms involved, given that open market rates
themselves were a determinant of the borrowing costs of a signicant set of rms
relying on bills of exchange, one might reasonably infer that changing conditions
on the money market imposed constraints on the demand for bill nance.
98. Youssef Cassis, Capitals of Capital: A History of International Financial Centres, 1780-
2005 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 83-86; Youssef Cassis, Crises and Oppor-
tunities: The Shaping of Modern Finance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 5-20.
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2.4 Conclusion
This chapter shows that in the short term, the growth of bank credit had a con-
siderable inuence on British economic growth. Credit shocks were fully diused
to the economy already after 6 months, but within this time frame, they explained
a signicant amount of the variation in economic conditions. Moreover, we ob-
serve that the link between the credit ratio and economic conditions grew relatively
little over time, which implies that the suggestion of progressively worsening credit
constraints is not supported.
There is a clear discrepancy between the results contained in the rst chapter,
showing little in the way of a relationship between nance and growth in the
longer term (a horizon of 1 year and beyond), and those contained in this chapter
analysing the relationship in the shorter term. At the very least, in light of this
chapter's ndings, the inferences drawn in the rst chapter need to be softened
and qualied. Banks did matter for the economy, but their impact on long run
growth might have been limited.
Previous contributions to the literature on this topic have presented convincing
evidence that bank lending practices changed from 1878 onwards, with banks
becoming signicantly more risk-averse.99 The results in this chapter suggest that
the economic impact of these changes may have been, at worst, mildly negative.
Declines in bank credit ratios aected economic activity, but these eects were
transitory. Over the long run, the resources that banks had available to lend
increased, which might have counterbalanced the changes aecting credit/assets
ratios. Indeed, because credit shocks were diused to the economy in a matter
of months, the results are consistent with ndings that there were relatively few
observable credit constraints over the longer term.100
The limited evidence of progressively worsening credit constraints found in
this study is dicult to reconcile with the notion that growing bank conservatism
99. Baker and Collins, `Financial Crises and Structural Change'.
100. Forrest Capie and Michael Collins, `Industrial Lending by English Commercial Banks,
1860s1914: Why Did Banks Refuse Loans?', Business History 38, no. 1 (1996): 2644; Collins
and Baker, Commercial Banks, 203-217.
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hurt the real economy over the long run. Therefore, arguments about negative
consequences of bank conservatism in British banking need to be moderated and
revised. At least in the short term, there was no substantial trade-o between the
increasing stability of the banking system and its contribution to the economy. In
a related fashion, the ndings have implications for the prevalent views about the
impact of lessening competition in the banking sector. Although banks may have
constrained credit due to being subject to fewer competitive pressures, the results
here suggest that such practices had limited consequences for the real economy. If
they had, we should observe substantially tighter credit conditions as the banking
sector became more concentrated.
Banks tended to decrease their private sector credit ratios following declines in
interest rates. This contrasts with ndings from modern data, which indicate that
bank risk-taking increases when interest rates decline. In Britain in 1880-1913,
several prudent contemporary banking practices reduced banks' ability to take
advantage of lower interest rates to make more loans at a higher prot. Among the
most important of these practices was a focus on short-term lending, which reduced
the scope for maturity transformation, as well as a lack of liability management
or reliance on wholesale funding. This result on the insensitivity of credit supply
to the interest rate environment adds substantially to our understanding of the
determinants of British banking stability in the years 1880-1913.101 The fact that
credit was unconstrained with rising interest rates had implications for the real
economy. It suggests that banks did not exacerbate the impact that uctuations
in the money markets had on the debt service costs faced by rms.
The observation that bank credit was relatively unresponsive to interest rates
could have had wider implications for the functioning of the nancial system. It
indicates that a key mechanism through which monetary policy operates, the bank
lending channel, may not have been signicant in Britain over the three decades
preceding WW1. The bank lending channel suggests that monetary policy can be
eective through encouraging banks to lend more when faced with lower interest
101. Hotson, Respectable Banking , 163-173.
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rates.102 This is one dimension in which the Bank of England might have diered
from modern central banks in terms of what its policy could achieve, and our
historical understanding of its role may need to be revised. Yet, given the high
degree of nancial stability in 1880-1913, it is also likely that the Bank's policy
had dierent eects during the crisis episodes earlier in the 19th century.103 An
in-depth analysis of these factors is outside the scope of this chapter, but they
certainly warrant further study.
A further nding of this chapter is that market interest rates increased follow-
ing increases in bank credit. It is dicult to infer what the precise mechanisms
behind this phenomenon were. But the fact that this occurred means that the
borrowing costs of bank clients (at least via bill nance) would have increased
as leverage in the system grew. Was this a consequence of the banking practice
of maintaining caps on credit ratios, which could have led to constraints on bill
nance specically? Or did banks' reallocation of credit from money markets to
the real economy itself strain the market for bills? Answering these questions con-
stitutes an important research agenda for our understanding of British banking in
this period.
The methodology used in this chapter could be fruitfully applied to several
other aspects of macro-nancial linkages in Britain. More focus on periods of
nancial strain would be particularly useful, as these are outside the scope of this
chapter. Additionally, we need to understand better the extent and eects of
nancing constraints at a more general level. For this purpose, it would be useful
to incorporate credit spreads - dierences between the yields of government debt
and riskier private sector bonds - into the econometric analysis.104
102. Anil K Kashyap and Jeremy C Stein, `What Do a Million Observations on Banks Say
About the Transmission of Monetary Policy?', American Economic Review, 2000, 407428; Ben
S Bernanke and Alan S Blinder, `The Federal Funds Rate and the Channels of Monetary Trans-
mission', The American Economic Review, 1992, 901921.
103. Nicholas Dimsdale and Anthony Hotson, `Financial Crises and Economic Activity in the
UK Since 1825', in British Financial Crises Since 1825, ed. Nicholas Dimsdale and Anthony
Hotson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 12-20.
104. Simon Gilchrist and Egon Zakraj²ek, `Credit Spreads and Business Cycle Fluctuations',
The American Economic Review 102, no. 4 (2012): 16921720.
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2.A Appendix to Chapter 2
2.A.1 Additional Impulse Responses
It is reasonable to assume that an unexpected increase in domestic demand should
reduce the stocks of commodities. This is precisely what we observe after an
increase in private sector credit in gure 2.8.
Figure 2.8: Impulse response of stocks of commodities from shocks to private
sector credit
Consistency with macroeconomic theory ends, though, when we move to the
impulse responses of prices. Theory suggests that increased bank credit has a
positive impact on domestic demand. Consequently, we should observe a positive
response of prices from a shock in credit. Yet, as seen in gure 2.9, the response
of prices is often negative for metals, although textile prices exhibit a positive
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response.
Figure 2.9: Impulse response of prices from shocks to private sector credit
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2.A.2 Priors
The TVP-FAVAR priors are similar to those outlined for the TVP-VAR in sec-
tion 1.A.2. The two additions to the priors of the TVP-VAR are Λ and Σ, the







The priors of the parameters in the TVP-FAVAR can then be written as follows:
Λ0 ∼ N(0, cΛ · V (Λ̂0)) (2.5)
Σ0 ∼ IG(aΣ, bΣ) (2.6)
β0 ∼ N(β̂0, cβ · V (β̂0)) (2.7)
H0 ∼ N(Ĥ0, ch · IN) (2.8)
A0 ∼ N(Â0, ca · V (Â0)) (2.9)
Q ∼ IW (k2Q · V (Qprior) · κ, κ) (2.10)
W ∼ IW (k2W ·N, IN) (2.11)
Si ∼ IW (k2S · (i+ 1) · V (Sprior), (i+ 1)) (2.12)
The notation follows that given in sections 1.5.2 and 1.A.2. N(·); IW (·); IG(·)
are the normal; inverse-Wishart; and inverse-Gamma distributions, respectively.
Following Korobilis, I set V (Λ̂0) = 4 × IN ; aΣ = 0.01; and bΣ = 0.01.105 Addi-
tionally, following the suggestions of Korobilis, I use a Minnesota-style prior for
β.
The Minnesota-style prior adapted here is as follows. β̂0 is set to 0.9 for the
rst lag of each dependent variable of itself, whereas all other elements are set to
0. Denote V βij,l as the element of V (β̂0) corresponding to the covariance between
105. Korobilis, `Transmission of Monetary Policy'.
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for own lags (i = j)
0.001σ2i
l2σ2j
for own lags (i 6= j)
for lags : l = 1, 2.., ρ (2.13)
The elements σi and σj are derived from the residual variances of AR(ρ) mod-
els with variable i as the dependent variable and variable i or j as the independent
variable: yi,t =
∑ρ
k=1 γkyj,k,t + et. This specication places relatively few a priori
restrictions on the variables, except that it assumes that the terms in the cov-
ariance matrix shrink as the lag length increases. This is a desirable property
especially in heavily parametrised models such as TVP-FAVARs, but have also
been found to be successful in large-scale VAR models.106
Because the dataset is considerably larger than in the previous chapter, we
can also allow the data to have more freedom to determine the estimates for other
parameters. In this regard, I also do not deviate signicantly from the specication
by Korobilis. I set: cΛ = 4; V (Â0) = IN ; V (Qprior) = IN×(Nρ+1); V (Sprior) = IN .
The other priors are also consistent with the TVP-VAR literature. They are
specied as follows: kQ = 0.01; kS = 0.1; kW = 0.01; cβ = 4; ca = 4 and ch = 4;
κ = (1 +Nρ) ∗N + 1.107
106. Marta Ba«bura, Domenico Giannone and Lucrezia Reichlin, `Large Bayesian Vector Auto
Regressions', Journal of Applied Econometrics 25, no. 1 (2010): 7192.
107. Primiceri, `Time Varying'; Timothy Cogley and Thomas J Sargent, `Drifts and Volatilities:
Monetary Policies and Outcomes in the Post WWII US', Review of Economic Dynamics 8, no.
2 (2005): 262302. See also references in sections 1.5.2 and 1.A.2.
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2.A.3 Banks Included in the Sample
Table 2.2 lists the banks that are included in the dataset.
Table 2.2: Banking data included in the sample
Bank name Coverage Archive Reference
Metropolitan
Bank
1880-1913 HSBC Weekly balance sheet gures,




1880-1909 HSBC Weekly general abstracts of
balances, UK M 0079 to 0086
Nottingham
Joint-Stock Bank




1880-1897 Barclays Company statistics book,
0025-0386
Glyn Mills & Co. 1880-1913 RBS Balance books, weekly, 1880-
1913, GM 203/3 to 6
Pares Leicester-
shire
1880-1902 RBS Monthly statements, 1880-
1902, PAR/2
Bank of Liverpool 1880-1888 Barclays Record book no. 2 - statistics
of ledger balances, 1167-0001
Bradford Banking
Co.








1893-1901 HSBC Balance sheet gures, weekly,
UK AD 0020 and 0021
Beckett & Co. 1880-1892 RBS Statistics books, Bel/81/2
Lambton & Co. 1880-1907 Lloyds (Lon-
don)
Monthly statements, ledger
balances A/47/b/30 to 34
Martins Bank 1891-1913 Barclays Weekly balance sheets, 0140-
0047
Barclays 1896-1913 Barclays Monthly balance books:





1892-1896 Published Goodhart (1972)
City Bank 1891-1898 Published Goodhart (1972)
Capital and
Counties
1891-1913 Published Goodhart (1972)
London and Mid-
land
1891-1913 Published Goodhart (1972)
Parr's 1891-1913 Published Goodhart (1972)
Prescott Dims-
dale
1891-1903 Published Goodhart (1972)
Williams Dea-
con's
1891-1913 Published Goodhart (1972)
London and
County Bank
1891-1913 Published Goodhart (1972)
London Joint
Stock Bank
1901-1913 Published Goodhart (1972)
Union bank of
London
1891-1913 Published Goodhart (1972)
National Provin-
cial Bank
1891-1913 Published Goodhart (1972)
London and
South Western
1891-1913 Published Goodhart (1972)
London and
Westminster
1891-1909 Published Goodhart (1972)
Lloyds 1891-1913 Published Goodhart (1972)
Goodhart (1972) refers to the appendix of Goodhart, Business of Banking .
2.A.4 Data Used to Estimate Factors
Table 2.3 lists the monthly macroeconomic time series used to estimate the factors
in the TVP-FAVAR. In the few isolated cases where gaps exist, these have been
made up by using a model with local levels through the Kalman smoother. Fol-
lowing the FAVAR literature, the series are transformed to be stationary for factor
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estimation. Series for unemployment, the credit ratio and series related to interest
rates are in logarithms. All other series are log-dierenced.108 The series are also
seasonally adjusted.109
Table 2.3: Macroeconomic series used to estimate the factors
Series name Source Series ID and notes
Freight receipts NBER m03005
Currency in circulation NBER m14081
Bank clearings NBER m12021
Clearings on stock ex-
change settling days
NBER m12024
Cotton consumption Thomas et al.
Import volume NBER m07029
Export volume NBER m07024
Balance of payments (cur-
rent account)
GFD TDGXGBRLM
Exports of railway materi-
als
NBER m07033a
Imports of raw materials Thomas et al.
Exports of cotton piece
goods
NBER m07036a
Exports of cotton yarn NBER m07034
Suez canal trac bound for
the UK
NBER m03029
Tonnage entered NBER m03025
Tonnage cleared NBER m03024




Pig iron stocks The Economist
Tobacco stock The Economist
Tea stock The Economist
108. See: Bernanke, Boivin and Eliasz, `Factor-Augmented'; Boivin, Giannoni and Mihov,
`Sticky Prices'.
109. This is done using the X-13 ARIMA method. See: U.S. Census Bureau, X-13ARIMA-
SEATS Reference Manual, Washington, DC, 2016, https://www.census.gov/srd/www/x13as/,
accessed: 18 June 2016.
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Coee stock The Economist
Cocoa stock The Economist
Unemployment Thomas et al.
Sauerbeck price index Thomas et al.
Wholesale prices Klovland and NBER Klovland (1993) before 1890,
NBER series m04053 thereafter




chemical export price NBER m04114
metal import prices NBER m04107
Iron and steel export price NBER m04112
Pig iron price NBER Before 1886: Price for Scotch
pig iron, m04012a ; subsequently:
Pig Iron Prices, Cleveland No. 3,
m04012b.
Oils and seed oils import
price
NBER m04108
Textile import price NBER m04106
Textile Export price NBER m04110
Wheat price NBER m04002
Consol Yield Thomas et al. Based on Klovland (1994)
Excess of the New York
commercial paper rate over
the London open market
rate
NBER 13018A
Excess of the Paris open
market rate over that pre-
vailing in the London
NBER 13018C
Excess of the Berlin private
discount rate over the Lon-
don open market rate
NBER 13018B
Bank of England: other de-
posits
NBER m14085
Bank of England: reserves
of notes and coin
Thomas et al.
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Bank of England: reserves
to liabilities
NBER m14087
Fixed income securities in-
dex
NBER m11019
Railway share price index GFD GBLTRANM
Industrial share price index NBER m11012a
Bank of England discount
rate
Thomas et al.
Open market discount rate NBER m13016
Import value NBER m07029. Not used in the second
chapter. Used in the fth chapter
instead of import volumes
Export value NBER m07024 Not used in the second
chapter. Used in the fth chapter
instead of export volumes
Notes: NBER refers to the National Bureau of Economic Research Macrohistory Data-
base, http://www.nber.org/databases/macrohistory/contents/, accessed: 22 Janu-
ary 2018. GFD refers to Global Financial Data, GFDATABASE, https://www.
globalfinancialdata.com/Databases/GFDatabase.html, accessed: 20 January 2018.
Thomas et al. refers to: Ryland Thomas and Nicholas Dimsdale, A Millennium of UK Data,
Bank of England OBRA dataset, 2017, https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/
boe/files/statistics/research-datasets/a-millennium-of-macroeconomic-data-
for-the-uk.xlsx, accessed: 18 January 2018. The Economist refers to the following sec-
tion that appeared regularly in various issues: `The Economist monthly trade supplement
& ocial trade and navigation accounts of the United Kingdom'. Klovland (1993) refers
to: Jan Tore Klovland, `Zooming in on Sauerbeck: Monthly Wholesale Prices in Britain
1845-1890', Explorations in Economic History 30, no. 2 (1993): 195228. Klovland (1994)
refers to: Jan Tore Klovland, `Pitfalls in the Estimation of the Yield on British Consols,
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Chapter Summary
This chapter explores the relationship between banks and economic
growth in British counties from 1871 to 1911. During this period, banks
expanded their branch networks at a rapid pace, while mergers increased
banking sector concentration in several counties. The empirical investiga-
tion relies on a new dataset on bank oces and local income tax assess-
ments, along with recent developments in spatial panel econometrics. The
results suggest that an increase in the number of bank oces in English and
Welsh counties had a positive impact on local economic growth. Scottish
counties, on the other hand, did not benet from an increase in branches.
In contrast with previous studies, this chapter nds no evidence of banking
concentration having an adverse impact on local economic performance.
3.1 Introduction
Can nancial development help explain local economic growth patterns in Britain
from 1871 to 1911? Studies in the eld of regional nance and growth have typic-
ally shown, much like their cross-country counterparts, that the geographic spread
and development of nancial institutions contributes to local economic activity.1
These ndings are relevant to the case of Britain in the late-Victorian and Edwar-
dian period, when both the nancial sector and regional economic growth were
unevenly distributed.2 This chapter shows that banks had a positive impact on
English and Welsh local economic growth in 1871-1911. Yet, this result does not
apply to Scotland.
1. Sandra E Black and Philip E Strahan, `Entrepreneurship and Bank Credit Availability', The
Journal of Finance 57, no. 6 (2002): 28072833; Iftekhar Hasan, Michael Koetter and Michael
Wedow, `Regional Growth and Finance in Europe: Is There a Quality Eect of Bank Eciency?',
Journal of Banking & Finance 33, no. 8 (2009): 14461453.
2. See Ben Gardiner et al., `Spatially Unbalanced Growth in the British Economy', Journal
of Economic Geography 13, no. 6 (2013): 889928 for a historical perspective and overview of
British regional growth disparities. For estimates of British regional GDP in the prewar era,
see: Frank Geary and Tom Stark, `Regional GDP in the UK, 18611911: New Estimates', The
Economic History Review 68, no. 1 (2015): 123144; and Nicholas Crafts, `Regional GDP in
Britain, 18711911: Some Estimates', Scottish Journal of Political Economy 52, no. 1 (2005):
5464.
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Why does local nancial development matter? A central nding from studies
on regional nance and growth is that even today, banks incur higher costs in
evaluating and monitoring borrowers further aeld. These information frictions
arising from geographic distance play an important role in bank lending decisions
and in the nancing costs of rms.3 Accessibility and proximity, rather than
just the size of the nancial sector, are thus important for economic outcomes.
In the case of Britain in the late 19th century, the importance of geographical
proximity due to information asymmetries could be assumed to be even greater
than it is today. Communications were more expensive, and banks had less access
to information about their borrowers. Bankers may thus have been reluctant to
lend to customers located far away.
Geographic proximity is not the only factor that determines how well banks are
able to support local economic growth. A related strand of research has found that
the degree of competition between nancial intermediaries matters when it comes
to the cost and ease of receiving nancing.4 This is also relevant for understanding
the degree to which British banks supported their customers. Recent research
suggests that competition in the banking sector declined over the late 19th century,
potentially reducing its contribution to economic growth.5
From an empirical perspective, studying the role of nance at a regional level
has several advantages over the cross-country regression approach. For example,
statistical results need not be biased by changing institutional or regulatory char-
acteristics, which are dicult to account for in cross-national data.6 Hence, eco-
nomic historians have begun studying nance and growth at a local level in 19th
3. Stephan Hollander and Arnt Verriest, `Bridging the Gap: The Design of Bank Loan Con-
tracts and Distance', Journal of Financial Economics 119, no. 2 (2016): 399419; Sumit Agarwal
and Robert Hauswald, `Distance and Private Information in Lending', The Review of Financial
Studies 23, no. 7 (2010): 27572788.
4. Hans Degryse and Steven Ongena, `Competition and Regulation in the Banking Sector:
A Review of the Empirical Evidence on the Sources of Bank Rents', in Handbook of Financial
Intermediation and Banking, ed. Anjan V Thakor and Arnoud Boot, vol. 2008 (Amsterdam:
Elsevier, 2008), 483554.
5. Richard S Grossman, `Rearranging Deck Chairs on the Titanic: English Banking Concen-
tration and Eciency, 18701914', European Review of Economic History 3, no. 3 (1999): 323
349; Fabio Braggion, Narly Dwarkasing and Lyndon Moore, `Nothing Special About Banks:
Competition and Bank Lending in Britain, 18851925', The Review of Financial Studies, 2017,
35023537.
6. In cross-national data, the relationship between nance and growth in a given country can
depend on its regulatory and institutional setting.
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and early 20th century economies, even though there are obvious issues with data
availability. The preliminary conclusions reached by these initial historical invest-
igations is that nancial development was a signicant contributing factor to local
economic growth in the US, Germany and Japan.7
English and Welsh branch banking spread rapidly in the second half of the 19th
century. The spread was accelerated by a rise in mergers and acquisitions in the
1880s, which for the rst time led to the establishment of national branch networks.
Having operated in a more permissive regulatory environment, Scottish banks had
built large branch networks already by the mid 19th century. Mergers rendered the
banking system more concentrated and dominated by large banks, whereas purely
local banks ceased to exist. Several economic historians have argued that these
developments led to growing conservatism and potential ineciencies in lending
practices.8 Nevertheless, the proliferation of bank oces might have improved
access to nance for rms and individuals, as better proximity to bank branches
could have reduced information asymmetries arising from geographic distance.
Moreover, banks with large branch networks were able to economise on adminis-
trative overheads, and historical research has suggested that English banks with
a national presence were typically more competitive than purely local banks.9 In-
deed, I demonstrate that the benets of large branch networks outweighed the
potential costs associated with other developments in banking practices.
This chapter makes several contributions to the literature on nance and
growth in economic history. It uses new developments in spatial panel econo-
metrics to test if the expansion of bank branch networks was associated with
7. Matthew Jaremski, `National Banking's Role in US Industrialization, 18501900', The
Journal of Economic History 74, no. 01 (2014): 109140; Sibylle Lehmann-Hasemeyer and Fabian
Wahl, `Savings Banks and the Industrial Revolution in Prussia: Supporting Regional Develop-
ment with Public Financial Institutions', Hohenheim Discussion Papers in Business, Economics
and Social Sciences, nos. 18-2017 (2017); John Tang, `Financial Intermediation and Late Devel-
opment in Meiji Japan, 1868 to 1912', Financial History Review 20, no. 02 (2013): 111135.
8. Grossman, `Rearranging'; Michael Collins and Mae Baker, Commercial Banks and Indus-
trial Finance in England and Wales, 1860-1913 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); Lucy
Newton, `Regional BankIndustry Relations During the Mid-Nineteenth Century: Links between
Bankers and Manufacturing in Sheeld, C. 1850 to C. 1885', Business History 38, no. 3 (1996):
6483. See also section 1.2.2 of this thesis.
9. Joseph Sykes, The Amalgamation Movement in English Banking, 1825-1924 (London: P.S.
King & Son, 1926); Charles W Calomiris and Stephen H Haber, Fragile by Design: The Political
Origins of Banking Crises and Scarce Credit (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2014),
101-102.
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county-level economic growth, while also accounting for the impact of changes
in the banking sector's concentration. These tests are based on a new dataset
on the number of bank oces in each British county from 1870 to 1911, along
with local measures of banking sector concentration. Furthermore, this dataset is
supplemented with gures on yearly income tax assessments in British counties,
which are used to proxy local economic conditions. In the appendix, archival data
on the accounts of hundreds bank branches is used to reinforce the validity of
this chapter's main ndings. This exercise also provides new insights into how
a county's nancial and economic environment was associated with the business
conduct of its bank oces.
3.2 Literature Review
3.2.1 Finance and Local Growth
Economic historians have taken a growing interest in the role of nancial institu-
tions in local economic growth. But given the scarcity of pre-WW1 data, studies
on late 19th and early 20th century cases are limited to a few countries. To the
best of my knowledge, there is only one econometric study incorporating data
from Britain in the late 19th century. Heblich and Trew study nance and growth
using census data on the county and parish levels in England and Wales for the
years 1817-1881.10 They nd that the number of bank employees in 1817, along
with the number of banks, inuenced signicantly the number of workers in the
secondary sector (manufacturing) over 60 years later. A major weakness in their
contribution is the failure to exploit the time-dimension of their data, as they use
only two observations more than 60 years apart (1817 and 1881) for each parish.
Research on an earlier period suggests that a higher number of banks in a given
English or Welsh county narrowed the local interest rate dierential with London
in 1770-1820.11 Brunt and Cannon argue that this led to increased local investment
10. Stephan Heblich and Alex Trew, `Banking and Industrialization', University of St Andrews
School of Economics and Finance Discussion Papers, no. 1415 (2014).
11. Liam Brunt and Edmund Cannon, `Do Banks Generate Financial Market Integration?'
(2004), Unpublished paper, available at: gates.comm.virginia.edu/LB6PG/bank10.pdf.
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and economic growth.12
The empirical literature is considerably more developed in the case of the US.
Bodenhorn and Cuberes study the eects of the banking sector's expansion on the
growth of cities in the North East of the US from 1790 to 1870.13 Using several
dierent econometric techniques, they nd a relationship between the existence
of a bank in a given city and its subsequent population growth. State-chartered
banks also had a positive impact on manufacturing capital and urbanisation in
US counties in 1850-1870.14 Furthermore, Jaremski shows that changes in the geo-
graphic distribution of banks, driven by dierences in state-level bank legislation,
were important for explaining the geographic distribution of US manufacturing
industries in the late 19th century.15 The spread of US national banks, which were
banks chartered by the federal government that mainly focused on short-term
lending, increased the production of goods and the specialisation of economic
activity in US counties from 1870 to 1900.16 Banks remained important contribut-
ors to state-level economic growth from 1900 to 1940, when states which allowed
bank branching typically experienced higher manufacturing productivity and wage
growth.17 Overall, there is thus strong evidence of nance-led growth in the US in
the 19th and early 20th century.
Similarly, in one of the few non-US studies on 19th century nance and growth,
Tang uses a spatially disaggregated dataset on rm creation in Meiji-era Japan,
and nds that an increase in nancial intermediation in a given prefecture was
associated with a growth in the number of local industrial enterprises.18 Increased
access to nance was particularly important for the growth of less capital intensive
industries such as textiles, which have traditionally been considered important for
the nation's industrialisation. Additionally, in a study on 19th century Prussia,
12. The authors derive the rate of return to capital from wheat prices, which makes their results
less reliable.
13. Howard Bodenhorn and David Cuberes, `Financial Development and City Growth: Evid-
ence from Northeastern American Cities, 1790-1870', no. 15997 (2010).
14. Matthew Jaremski and Peter L Rousseau, `Banks, Free Banks, and US Economic Growth',
Economic Inquiry 51, no. 2 (2013): 16031621.
15. Jaremski, `National Banking's Role'.
16. Scott L Fulford, `How Important are Banks for Development? National Banks in the United
States, 18701900', Review of Economics and Statistics 97, no. 5 (2015): 921938.
17. Rajeev H Dehejia and Adriana Lleras-Muney, `Why Does Financial Development Matter?
The United States from 1900 to 1940', NBER Working Paper, no. w9551 (2003).
18. Tang, `Financial Intermediation'.
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Lehmann-Hasemeyer and Wahl show that savings banks were associated with city
growth, primarily through their role in local business and infrastructure invest-
ment.19
Much of the historical literature discussed so far relies on somewhat crude
proxies for regional economic and nancial development. Nevertheless, research
based on more comprehensive post-WW2 data also nds evidence of nance-driven
growth at the local level. These studies demonstrate that the nancial sector has
contributed to regional economic development in both Europe and China.20 In
an inuential study, Jayaratne and Strahan show that the liberalisation of inter-
state branch banking regulations in several US states since the 1970s increased
their economic growth rates signicantly.21 More ecient credit allocation favour-
ing more productive investment projects constituted the main channel through
which this happened. However, Acharya et al. suggest that improving access
to banks through branch deregulation in the US increased production across in-
dustrial sectors, rather than driving growth because of sectoral specialisation in
itself.22 Local nancial development can thus have a signicant positive impact
on growth, regardless of local tendencies to specialise in individual industries.
Rich datasets on regional nancial and economic conditions have become avail-
able in the last few decades, and these have been used for testing a large variety
of channels through which local nancial institutions impact growth. An increase
in a region's bank oces has been found to promote process innovation and R&D
investments of local rms, particularly in the cases of small and high-tech rms.23
Similarly, better availability of nance in Chinese provinces has been associated
19. Lehmann-Hasemeyer and Wahl, `Savings Banks'.
20. Hasan, Koetter and Wedow, `Regional Growth'; Jin Zhang, Lanfang Wang and Susheng
Wang, `Financial Development and Economic Growth: Recent Evidence from China', Journal
of Comparative Economics 40, no. 3 (2012): 393412; Xiaoqiang Cheng and Hans Degryse, `The
Impact of Bank and Non-Bank Financial Institutions on Local Economic Growth in China',
Journal of Financial Services Research 37, nos. 23 (2010): 179199.
21. Jith Jayaratne and Philip E Strahan, `The Finance-Growth Nexus: Evidence from Bank
Branch Deregulation', The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1996, 639670.
22. Viral V Acharya, Jean Imbs and Jason Sturgess, `Finance and Eciency: Do Bank Branch-
ing Regulations Matter?', Review of Finance 15, no. 1 (2011): 135172.
23. Luigi Benfratello, Fabio Schiantarelli and Alessandro Sembenelli, `Banks and Innovation:
Microeconometric Evidence on Italian Firms', Journal of Financial Economics 90, no. 2 (2008):
197217.
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with more innovation at the provincial level.24 Indeed, evidence from the Great
Depression era in the US suggests that disruptions to local banking conditions
were especially troublesome for capital and R&D intensive rms, although a large
share of such companies operated outside areas with distressed banks.25 Addition-
ally, evidence from Italian provinces suggests that a higher degree of local nancial
development encourages entrepreneurship more generally.26 This evidence implies
that access to nancial intermediaries should ultimately translate into higher eco-
nomic and productivity growth at the local level.
Information asymmetries that arise locally between banks and borrowers still
play an important role in lending decisions, even in the presence of modern re-
porting standards and communications technology.27 This is evidenced by interest
rates on bank loans rising as the distance between the borrower and the bank
grows. The amounts that banks lend to more distant customers also tend to be
lower. Higher interest rates for distant borrowers reect premia asked by banks
from lending to customers about whom they possess less information.28 This
might be because lenders still place considerable emphasis on `soft' information
about customers and about local business conditions, which might be dicult to
acquire from a distance.29 As information frictions were larger in the 19th century
than they are today, one would reasonably expect that local nancial development
mattered even more in prewar Britain.
24. Aoife Hanley, Wan-Hsin Liu and Andrea Vaona, `Credit Depth, Government Intervention
and Innovation in China: Evidence from the Provincial Data', Eurasian Business Review 5, no.
1 (2015): 7398.
25. Ramana Nanda and Tom Nicholas, `Did Bank Distress Stie Innovation During the Great
Depression?', Journal of Financial Economics 114, no. 2 (2014): 273292.
26. Luigi Guiso, Paola Sapienza and Luigi Zingales, `Does Local Financial Development Mat-
ter?', in The Banks and the Italian Economy, ed. Damiano Bruno Silipo (Heidelberg: Springer,
2009), 3166.
27. Marcello Bofondi and Giorgio Gobbi, `Informational Barriers to Entry into Credit Markets',
Review of Finance 10, no. 1 (2006): 3967; Matteo P Arena and Michaël Dewally, `Firm Location
and Corporate Debt', Journal of Banking & Finance 36, no. 4 (2012): 10791092.
28. Andrea Bellucci, Alexander Borisov and Alberto Zazzaro, `Do Banks Price Discriminate
Spatially? Evidence from Small Business Lending in Local Credit Markets', Journal of Banking
& Finance 37, no. 11 (2013): 41834197; Hollander and Verriest, `Bridging the Gap: The Design
of Bank Loan Contracts and Distance'.
29. Anzhela Knyazeva and Diana Knyazeva, `Does Being Your Bank's Neighbor Matter?',
Journal of Banking & Finance 36, no. 4 (2012): 11941209; Agarwal and Hauswald, `Distance
and Private Information in Lending'.
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3.2.2 Banking Sector Competition and the Economy
A lack of banking sector competition can lessen the positive economic impact of
local nancial development. A vast literature examines how competition in the
banking sector aects the way in which banks conduct their business.30 This is
important, as the growth of nancial intermediaries might not inuence economic
outcomes if their services are uncompetitively priced, or if concentration leads to
credit being constrained or misallocated. Concentration in the banking sector in-
creases when a given set of banks increase their market share, for example when
two banks combine. Concentration is often used to proxy for banking sector com-
petition, because fewer banks competing in a given market can reduce competitive
pressures, while making it easier to maintain collusive agreements.31
Empirical studies on the historical impact of banking concentration have star-
ted to emerge only recently. Braggion et al. show that British counties with a
higher degree of banking sector concentration produced lower tax revenues and
had worse employment outcomes in the period 1885-1925.32 Evidence from the
US presents a more nuanced view about the eects of banking sector competi-
tion on growth. Ager and Spargoli show that in the mid 19th century US, states
that increased the degree of competition within the banking sector through free
banking laws experienced higher per-capita output growth.33 Yet, Mitchener and
Wheelock nd that banking concentration in the US had positive eects on man-
ufacturing growth in 1899-1929.34 Specically, concentration helped the types of
rms that might be expected to depend heavily on bank nancing: smaller rms
which had limited access to capital markets.
Empirical studies on more recent data tend to support the view that more
30. For a review, see: Degryse and Ongena, `Competition'.
31. Ibid.
32. Fabio Braggion, Narly Dwarkasing and Lyndon Moore, `The Economic Impact of a Banking
Oligopoly: Britain at the Turn of the 20th Century' (2014), Working paper, available at: https:
//www.rse.anu.edu.au/media/592266/Moore-Paper.pdf.
33. Philipp Ager and Fabrizio Spargoli, `Bank Deregulation, Competition and Economic
Growth: The US Free Banking Experience', Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper, no. 13-
210/IV/DSF69 (2013).
34. Kris James Mitchener and David C Wheelock, `Does the Structure of Banking Markets
Aect Economic Growth? Evidence from US State Banking Markets', Explorations in Economic
History 50, no. 2 (2013): 161178.
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banking sector competition is better for the economy. Claessens and Laeven show
that a higher degree of competition between banks at the national level improves
the growth prospects of industries which depend the most on external nance.35
Such ndings have since been replicated at the regional level, although they come
with some qualications. For example, while the spread of banking itself has
contributed to growth in Spanish provinces, bank market power has a nonlinear,
inverse `U-shaped' eect.36 That is, a moderate amount of market power by banks
actually enhanced their ability to foster growth, whereas too little competition
hindered it. Bonaccorsi et al. reach similar conclusions in their study of Italian
regional banking: a moderate degree of banking system concentration increases
rm creation, but too much concentration reduces it.37 These ndings reect the
possibility that too much competition hinders the development of long-term client
relationships, as suggested by the theoretical literature discussed below.
Theoretical studies on why too much competition might lead to worse credit
allocation often focus on information asymmetries in banking, along the lines of
seminal work by Stiglitz and Weiss.38 Information asymmetries occur when bor-
rowers know more about the prospects of their businesses than lenders do. Lending
in the presence of such factors requires that a bank invests in gathering informa-
tion about opaque rms, in order to assess the creditworthiness of its customers.39
In a related vein, information is necessary for the monitoring of borrowers. After
all, banks want to make sure that borrowers do not use their funds for unproduct-
ive or overly risky purposes. But gathering information is costly, and might be at
risk when banks compete for the same customers.
An inuential model by Petersen and Rajan states that returns to gathering
customer information decrease with increasing competition between banks, lead-
35. Stijn Claessens and Luc Laeven, `Financial Dependence, Banking Sector Competition, and
Economic Growth', Journal of the European Economic Association 3, no. 1 (2005): 179207.
36. Juan Fernandez de Guevara and Joaquin Maudos, `Regional Financial Development and
Bank Competition: Eects on Firms' Growth', Regional Studies 43, no. 2 (2009): 211228.
37. Emilia Bonaccorsi di Patti and Giovanni Dell'Ariccia, `Bank Competition and Firm Cre-
ation', Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 36, no. 2 (2004): 225251.
38. Joseph E Stiglitz and Andrew Weiss, `Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Inform-
ation', The American Economic Review 71, no. 3 (1981): 393410.
39. Nicola Cetorelli and Philip E Strahan, `Finance as a Barrier to Entry: Bank Competition
and Industry Structure in Local US Markets', The Journal of Finance 61, no. 1 (2006): 437461.
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ing to credit market ineciencies.40 Increasing competition makes it less likely
that borrowers would continue to be customers of any given bank. Incentives to
invest in information gathering about customers therefore decline, leading to worse
lending decisions being made. Credit is no longer channelled to customers with
the best prospects, and no longer constrained for the ones that are least likely to
succeed.41 At a larger scale, this means that too much competition between banks
might lead to an economy that allocates its capital sub-optimally, leading to lower
growth.
There are several countervailing forces which render a less competitive banking
system worse for the economy. Just as monopolistic rms produce less and charge
higher prices, banks in a less competitive environment can provide less credit and
charge higher interest rates. This implies that small rms, which are especially
dependent on bank nancing, suer disproportionately from an uncompetitive
banking sector.42 Furthermore, when banks with market power charge higher in-
terest rates on their loans, rm investment incentives can get distorted, leading
them to choose riskier projects than they normally would, even though these pro-
jects might not have the highest expected returns.43 And since banks with high
degrees of market power can opportunistically demand higher interest rates from
customers in need of credit, rms may become wary of entering close relationships
with banks to begin with, instead resorting to more expensive sources of nance.44
Contrasting these theoretical ndings with those of Petersen and Rajan implies
that the impact of bank market power is ambiguous. To some extent, however,
these opposing views may be reconciled by assuming the existence of an inverse
`U-shaped' relationship between competition and growth. That is, some market
power by banks might promote economic activity, whereas too much of it can
constrain growth.
40. Mitchell A Petersen and Raghuram G Rajan, `The Eect of Credit Market Competition
on Lending Relationships', The Quarterly Journal of Economics 110, no. 2 (1995): 407443.
41. Robert Hauswald and Robert Marquez, `Competition and Strategic Information Acquisition
in Credit Markets', Review of Financial Studies 19, no. 3 (2006): 9671000.
42. Cetorelli and Strahan, `Finance as a Barrier to Entry'.
43. John H Boyd and Gianni De Nicolo, `The Theory of Bank Risk Taking and Competition
Revisited', The Journal of Finance 60, no. 3 (2005): 13291343.
44. Raghuram G Rajan, `Insiders and Outsiders: The Choice between Informed and Arm's-
Length Debt', The Journal of Finance 47, no. 4 (1992): 13671400; Arnoud WA Boot and
Anjan V Thakor, `Can Relationship Banking Survive Competition?', The Journal of Finance
55, no. 2 (2000): 679713.
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Notwithstanding the ambiguity in the theoretical literature, it bears repeating
that, for the most part, empirical evidence suggests that an absence of banking
sector competition constrains economic activity. A rather comprehensive review
of the literature suggests a lack of competition between banks is associated with
higher costs of bank credit and lower interest rates on deposits.45 A recent study
using comprehensive loan-level Mexican data shows that banks with too much
local market power in a given town tend to restrict nance to a broad set of
customers, choosing only the most protable ones.46 Belgian banks have tended
to deepen their relationships with customers in response to more competition,
and engage in more relationship-based lending, indicating that competition can
actually deepen banks' relationships with their customers and thus increase their
investment in gathering information.47 This contrasts with what the model by
Petersen and Rajan predicts.
Besides constraining the availability of nance in general, the lack of banking
competition in a locality can be particularly detrimental for new rms, potentially
hampering competition in the real sector. Cetorelli and Strahan use geographically
disaggregated data from the US to show that more competition in the banking sec-
tor is associated with both smaller average rm size and more rms in operation.48
This suggests that competitive banking sectors promote entrepreneurship and in-
novation. In contrast, bank market power may create barriers to entry for new
rms. The protability of banks with established customer relationships depends
on the success of those customers. Banks with deep relationships with clients,
combined with signicant market power, have an incentive to restrict credit to
rms which might compete with their clients, or to grant credit to existing clients
on favourable terms.49 In short, a lack of competition in the banking system might
hurt the dynamism of the real economy.
45. Degryse and Ongena, `Competition'. For additional evidence from the US, see also: Tara
Rice and Philip E Strahan, `Does Credit Competition Aect Small-Firm Finance?', The Journal
of Finance 65, no. 3 (2010): 861889.
46. Rodrigo Canales and Ramana Nanda, `A Darker Side to Decentralized Banks: Market Power
and Credit Rationing in SME Lending', Journal of Financial Economics 105, no. 2 (2012): 353
366.
47. Hans Degryse and Steven Ongena, `The Impact of Competition on Bank Orientation',
Journal of Financial Intermediation 16, no. 3 (2007): 399424.
48. Cetorelli and Strahan, `Finance as a Barrier to Entry'.
49. Giacinta Cestone and Lucy White, `Anticompetitive Financial Contracting: The Design of
Financial Claims', The Journal of Finance 58, no. 5 (2003): 21092141.
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Overall, most of the evidence suggests that the cost-eciency and competition
in regional banking, rather than merely lending volumes or access to nance, are
important factors in determining the relationship between nance and growth.50
The ndings from the literature on banking competition and economic perform-
ance are also broadly consistent with the arguments of economic historians about
the eects of banking system concentration in late 19th century Britain. The his-
torical context of British regional banking, and competition therein, is discussed
below.
3.2.3 British Local Banking
In 1870, the eects of earlier legislation were still reected in the banking sector's
structure in England andWales. Only after 1826 could joint-stock banks be formed
relatively freely, although restrictive legislation was imposed again from 1844 to
1857.51 Until the 1870s, the pace of branching in England and Wales was relatively
slow, as early joint-stock banks tended to have few oces. They mainly branched
regionally rather than nationally.52 Without the capital base of joint-stock banks,
private banks were even more reluctant to establish branches. Several Scottish
banks, on the other hand, had built extensive branch networks already by the
1850s.53 On average, English joint-stock banks in 1875 had 11 branches, whereas
Scottish banks had 84.54
The fact that English banks lacked national branch networks until the 1880s
forced them to rely on the London money market, either to lend funds which
would otherwise have been left idle, or to meet demands for loans which could not
be covered through local deposits.55 A bank with several branches could transfer
50. Michael Koetter and Michael Wedow, `Finance and Growth in a Bank-Based Economy: Is
it Quantity or Quality That Matters?', Journal of International Money and Finance 29, no. 8
(2010): 15291545.
51. See the introduction of this thesis.
52. Victoria Barnes and Lucy Newton, `How Far Does the Apple Fall from the Tree? The Size
of English Bank Branch Networks in the Nineteenth Century', Business History, 2017, 127.
53. Ranald C Michie, British Banking: Continuity and Change from 1694 to the Present (Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 77.
54. Ibid.
55. Michael Collins, Money and Banking in the UK: A History (London: Croom Helm, 1988),
22-25.
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funds between its oces more eciently, without incurring the cost of relying
on the London agents to lend or borrow funds from afar. A more substantial
advantage of branching was that customer and industry-specic risk could be
diversied through serving a wider range of industries, while at the same time
expanding the depositor base. In this respect, the English and Welsh banking
system came to resemble that in Scotland and Ireland (which also had banks with
large branch networks) over the late 19th century.56 In 1913, the average English
bank had 157 branches, against 156 for Scottish banks.57
While increased branching in itself increases local rms' access to nancial
intermediaries, several historians have argued that there were drawbacks to the
gradual disappearance of locally oriented banks. To understand what these were,
it is necessary to review some features of branch banking before the 1880s. From
the 1830s to the 1870s, English joint-stock banks tended to have close ties with
their local business communities. Bank directors were often engaged with, or had
backgrounds in, the industries that operated in their bank's vicinity. Owners of
local rms would occasionally become shareholders of the banks that their rms
did business with, which reinforced the relationships that banks had with their
customers.58
Relationships between banks and customers, coupled with the commercial ex-
pertise of bank directors, gave banks a large amount of tacit information which
could be used to improve lending decisions.59 The information that banks had on
their customers allowed them to lend in a exible manner. This could mean, for
example, lending against little or no collateral when the borrower's other charac-
teristics were favourable. Barnes and Newton argue that local information advant-
ages were an important determinant of where most regional banks would expand
before the 1880s, because insider knowledge constituted an important part of their
risk management. Therefore, the same practices that deepened the relationships
between banks and their customers also hindered branching until the 1880s.60
56. Charles W Munn, `The Emergence of Joint-Stock Banking in the British Isles a Compar-
ative Approach', Business History 30, no. 1 (1988): 6983.
57. Michie, British Banking , 77.
58. Lucy Newton, `The Birth of Joint-Stock Banking: England and New England Compared',
Business History Review 84, no. 01 (2010): 2752.
59. Ibid.; Newton, `BankIndustry Relations'.
60. Barnes and Newton, `How Far'.
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Amidst the merger movements in the 1880s and 1890s, the largest banks in
England and Wales formed national branch networks. Running such networks
was a complex aair, and required an approach to risk management that diered
from that which was prevalent among banks with only a few branches and fewer
customers. Directors possessed less knowledge about borrowers in any specic
locality, making direct monitoring of bank customers more dicult. Bank direct-
ors were also located further away from branch managers, which meant that they
had less direct knowledge of the credit risk that was being taken. Inspectors of
branches, bureaucratisation, and encoded lending rules thus came to replace the
more exible banking practices of smaller banks. Meanwhile, branch managers
were becoming increasingly professionalised, instead of having backgrounds in in-
dustry or commerce.61 These developments could have made bank credit more
dicult to obtain, because codied rules on lending meant that branch managers
were forced to ignore relevant unobservable characteristics of their clients when
making lending decisions, however informed they might have been.62
Relative to banks with small branch networks, large national banks committed
a smaller share of their assets to lending to rms.63 At the turn of the century,
joint-stock banks headquartered in London held nearly 45% of their balance sheets
in liquid assets - assets which could be converted to cash at short notice.64 Collins
and Baker dened these as government bonds, cash or near-cash assets, such as
short-term deposits at discount houses.65 The corresponding gure for provincial
banks (headquartered outside London) was only 35%, meaning that these banks
committed a larger share of their resources to the nancing of commerce and
industry.66 These dierences might imply that banks with national networks did
not nance local business activity to the same extent that provincial banks did,
which might have had implications for their contribution to local economic growth.
Based on balance sheet ratios alone, the absorption of provincial banks by national
ones may thus have come at a cost in terms of growth rates of local economies.
61. Collins and Baker, Commercial Banks, 85-87.
62. Newton, `BankIndustry Relations'; Michael Collins and Mae Baker, `Sectoral Dierences
in English Bank Asset Structures and the Impact of Mergers, 1860-1913', Business History 43,
no. 4 (2001): 128.
63. Ibid.
64. See the second chapter of this thesis.
65. Collins and Baker, `Sectoral Dierences'.
66. Ibid.
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It is likely that comparisons of credit ratios between dierent types of banks
overlook numerous confounding factors, leading to an overly negative assessment
of banks with a nationwide presence. The largest banks typically had a larger
deposit base (from which loans could be made) than smaller banks, along with
denser branch networks.67 These two features are related: dense branch networks
led the largest banks to gather more deposits, because smaller banks were more
reluctant to establish branches.68 Yet, a higher propensity to branch also led to
the establishment of bank oces in areas where commercial activity was limited
relative to the supply of deposits. Contemporary evidence from annual meetings
at the turn of the century suggests that national banks had expanded their de-
posit base faster than the demand for commercial credit had increased, leading to
complaints about lower protability.69 In this sense, the substantial expansion of
branch networks, together with the growth of banks' resources, may have counter-
acted many of the downsides associated with the lending practices of large banks.
And the pace of branching was very rapid indeed: the number of bank oces in
England and Wales nearly doubled from 1,094 in 1850 to 1,959 in 1875. But as
the large banks became increasingly dominant by 1900, the number of branches
had expanded to 4,570, ultimately reaching 6,573 in 1913.70
The fact that the largest banks had dense branch networks could make direct
comparisons between balance sheet ratios by Collins and Baker less informat-
ive about the local availability of bank credit.71 There is compelling historical
evidence suggesting that the trend in British banking was towards increasing con-
servatism, but balance sheet ratios alone are unlikely to capture the eects of
this trend given the presence of the many confounding factors discussed above.
Moreover, contemporary sources indicate that smaller, local banks were becoming
increasingly rare for a reason: they were less competitive than the largest banks,
67. Newton, `The Birth of Joint-Stock Banking: England and New England Compared'; Sykes,
Amalgamation, 116-118, 131-135.
68. Barnes and Newton, `How Far'.
69. Sykes, Amalgamation, 58-59, 130-135; Richard S Grossman, Unsettled Account: The Evol-
ution of Banking in the Industrialized World Since 1800 (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2010), 185-189.
70. Michael Collins, `The Growth of the Firm in the Domestic Banking Sector', in Business
Enterprise in Modern Britain: From the Eighteenth to the Twentieth Century, ed. Maurice W
Kirby and Mary B Rose (London: Routledge, 1994), table 10.5.
71. Collins and Baker, `Sectoral Dierences'.
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which could better economise on several administrative costs.72 The exibility and
relationship-oriented approach by local banks might thus have come at a cost to
their customers.
3.2.4 Competition and Concentration in British Banking
Just as in the modern cases reviewed above, increasing market power of individual
banks may have had economic consequences in Britain in 1871-1911, which could
have counteracted the benets of the spread of bank oces. The banking sec-
tor's concentration increased substantially after the 1870s, especially in England
and Wales during the merger waves in the 1880s and 1890s. As concentration
increased, banks engaged in agreements to restrict competition in all parts of the
UK. In practice, these agreements took the form of setting uniform interest rates
on deposits, commonly 1-1.5% below the Bank of England rate.73 In England,
there was a degree of collusion in the sector by the late 19th century, while Scot-
tish banks were engaging in explicit agreements for rate-xing at the time.74 There
were no laws explicitly banning such agreements.
The creation of large branch networks may also have been related to compet-
itive considerations. The amalgamation decisions of major banks after the 1880s
could in theory be motivated by a search for economies of scale and diversic-
ation of risk. They could constitute a more ecient way of expanding branch
networks than building completely new oces. Yet, Grossman provides evidence
from Lloyds Bank suggesting that an important reason for amalgamation was of-
ten the restriction of competition.75 The policy of Midland Bank, according to one
of its directors, was also to `destroy active competition' in certain areas through
takeovers.76 Therefore, the consequence of mergers was in several instances not
the expansion of bank oces into new areas, but the elimination of competition
in areas where the bank was already present.
72. Sykes, Amalgamation, 51-59.
73. Brian Griths, `The Development of Restrictive Practices in the UK Monetary System',
The Manchester School 41, no. 1 (1973): 5-6.




Signicant progress has been made in assessing the eects of growing concen-
tration in British banking. Braggion et al. study a dataset of over 30,000 loans
granted from 1885 to 1925 in England and Wales. They nd that in counties with
more concentrated banking sectors, banks tended to give smaller loans, require
more collateral, and lend to less risky customers.77 Braggion et al. also analyse
the balance sheets of the lending banks, and nd that banks operating primarily
in highly concentrated counties were more conservative, and may have constrained
their lending. The authors do not directly assess what eects the spread of bank-
ing itself had on local economic outcomes, but these results imply that the lack of
competition had negative eects for local economic performance.
Access to banking facilities certainly increased through a high level of branching
by large commercial banks during the period at issue. Yet, it is also possible that
the conservatism and collusive practices that these institutions engaged in rendered
them less important for the growth of local economies. An important contribution




To answer how the spread of provincial nance impacted growth, this chapter relies
on a new dataset on the number of bank oces (branches) in British counties to
proxy the level of local nancial development. Specically, the dataset contains
the number of bank branches in each county, by year, for the period from 1870 to
1911. I refer to branches and oces interchangeably. Single-oce banks (which
were becoming increasingly rare by the 1870s), along with bank head oces, are
counted as branches.
The data is collected from the Banking Almanac and the Banker's Magazine,
which have previously been used by researchers to study bank branching, but for
77. Braggion, Dwarkasing and Moore, `Nothing Special'.
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dierent periods. Braggion et al. along with Barnes and Newton, have created
datasets on bank branching in England and Wales from 1885 to 1925 and 1826
to 1877, respectively.78 The Banking Almanac provides a list of every branch
and bank in the UK by town. After 1876, both the Banker's Magazine and the
Banking Almanac list branch openings and closures in each town by year. I have
collected data from the Banking Almanac for the years 1870-1880. For subsequent
years, I have used data from the Banker's Magazine and the Banking Almanac
on branch openings and closures for each year.79 There were 10,532 such events
between 1881 and 1911, although many of these refer to transfers of oces from
one bank to another, which occurred due to bank mergers. To ensure consistency
of the data over the years, I have not relied on the datasets by Braggion et al. or
Barnes and Newton.
This chapter also improves upon the datasets of the studies mentioned above
by including Scottish branches. The experience of Scotland is an interesting case
in its own right, but to maintain a sucient sample size, Scottish data is included
in the econometric model alongside English and Welsh counties. It is important to
keep in mind that the Scottish institutional framework was dierent from that in
the rest of Britain, and the nation's banking sector had reached a higher degree of
consolidation by the 1870s. The econometric examination takes this into account
by running a subset of regressions on only English and Welsh counties.
Each branch location is matched to a historic county by using data from the
Association of British Counties Gazetteer of British Place Names.80 After initial
matching, it was necessary to ensure manually that a place name maps to the
correct county. For example, `Hockley' can refer to places in four dierent counties
in the Gazetteer data, and `Higheld' can refer to 12 dierent places. The Banker's
Magazine or the Banking Almanac would sometimes clarify in which county a
branch in these cases is located. When the issue could not be resolved using
these sources, I resorted to the Economist, where bank-specic advertisements
78. Ibid.; Barnes and Newton, `How Far'.
79. The copies of the Banker's Magazine are available at the Cambridge University Library,
whereas the Banking Almanac is available at the LSE library.
80. Association of British Counties, Gazetteer of British Place Names, https://www.gazette
er.org.uk/, accessed: 2 February 2017.
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occasionally listed their branches.81 As a last resort, I used Orbell's and Turton's
guide to British bank archives, which typically details the region in which a bank
operated.82
As a measure of the size of the banking sector in each county, I use either bank
branches per capita or bank branches per square kilometre. These indicators have
certain limitations: they do not measure the amount of credit that banks actually
extended in various localities, and do not take into account the fact that branches
diered from one another in terms of how much business they did. However, both
economists and economic historians often rely on these types of indicators.83 The-
oretically, both of these measures proxies the accessibility and density of nancial
institutions in a given county. This assumption is supported by macroeconomic
literature, where these indicators have been used to measure access to nance even
in cross-national comparisons.84 Moreover, because the data is at the county-level,
a signicant proportion of the heterogeneity between branches gets averaged out.
Indeed, my ndings in appendix 3.A.1, based on branch level balance-sheet data,
largely support the validity of using these measures at the county-level.
Figure 3.1 shows maps of branches per 1000 capita across Britain for the years
1871, 1891 and 1911. The maps are created using the QGIS software.85 The
maps do not suggest that branches per capita captures entirely the level of local
banking activity. Both Lancashire and Middlesex (which covers most of London)
had relatively few branches per capita throughout the years, despite being by
far the largest economies, as measured by income tax assessments. On the other
hand, sparsely populated areas in Wales and the North of Scotland tended to have
relatively high numbers of branches per capita by 1911.
81. Available at: The Economist Historical Archive, 1843-2014, http://find.galegroup.
com/econ/. accessed: 4 January 2018.
82. John Orbell and Alison Turton, British Banking: A Guide to Historical Records (Aldershot:
Ashgate, 2001).
83. See, for example: Jaremski, `National Banking's Role'; Tang, `Financial Intermediation';
Benfratello, Schiantarelli and Sembenelli, `Banks and Innovation: Microeconometric Evidence
on Italian Firms'.
84. Thorsten Beck, Asli Demirguc-Kunt and Maria Soledad Martinez Peria, `Reaching Out:
Access to and Use of Banking Services Across Countries', Journal of Financial Economics 85,
no. 1 (2007): 234266; Martin ihák et al., `Financial Development in 205 Economies, 1960 to
2010', Journal of Financial Perspectives 1, no. 2 (2013): 1736.
85. QGIS Development Team, QGIS Geographic Information System (Open Source Geospatial
















































































The number of branches per capita grew signicantly in all British counties
from 1871 to 1911. Scotland tended to have more bank branches per capita
throughout the period, both in the lowlands and in the rural counties in the high-
lands. This certainly conforms with our historical knowledge about the evolution
of the British banking system: Scotland had developed a system of joint-stock
banks relying extensively on large-scale branch networks already in the 1870s,
whereas a similar system in England and Wales emerged only a few decades later.86
A possible explanation for the relatively low number of branches per capita in
densely populated counties, such as Middlesex and Lancashire, is that banks in
urban areas could simply choose to expand their operations at existing branches
instead of establishing new branches nearby. For example, if a bank in Manchester
needed to expand its business, it might have made sense to hire more sta for an
existing branch rather than to set up a new oce in the same city. In more rural
areas, where economic activity was less concentrated, such an approach would not
have been optimal, given longer distances to customers. Unfortunately, there is
no yearly data on the number of employees in banks at the county-level.87
Notwithstanding the possibility that dierences in population densities might
explain disparities between branches per capita, changes in banks per capita can
still be a valid proxy for how access to nancial intermediaries changed. It will thus
be used as an alternative measure of nancial development, even though branches
per square kilometre (discussed below) seems to be a better indicator. The use of
county xed eects in the econometric models can further ameliorate the issue with
limited cross-county comparability of this measure, as long as branches per capita
measures nancial development within a given county. The included instrumental
variables will also mitigate this issue.88 Moreover, to test the robustness of the
results based on this variable, I run regressions with branches scaled by a county's
population density as an explanatory variable.
As an alternative measure of the development of the banking system, I use
banks per square kilometre. The data is mapped in gure 3.2, where darker
86. Michie, British Banking , 75-80, 96-98.
87. The use of census records are too inaccurate for these purposes, and would only provide
snapshots at 10-year intervals, which is not ideal for econometric testing.
88. Here I refer to the use of lagged values of banks per capita as instruments. These are
discussed below.
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shades indicate more bank oces per square kilometre. This measure appears to
be higher in counties which had more economic activity. Figure 3.2a suggests that
in England and Wales, only industrial counties in the North (primarily Lancashire)
along with London (Middlesex) had a signicant number of branches in 1871.
Industrial counties in the West Midlands (Warwickshire and Staordshire) also
had a higher degree of banking activity. This was also the case in the southern
parts of Yorkshire, but due to issues with the tax data in my sample, it was
necessary to merge all the parts of Yorkshire into one.
Scottish banks appear to have been concentrated around Lothian (Edinburgh)
and the West of Scotland (Glasgow) regions. But as early as the 1870s, there was
also a relatively high concentration of bank oces in areas with smaller cities,
such as Aberdeen and Dundee (Angus).89 As in the English and Welsh cases, this
measure of banking density seems to correlate better with the size of the economies
of Scottish counties than branches per capita. Relative to branches per capita,
however, it shows a signicantly smaller disparity between the developments of
the English and Scottish banking systems in 1891 and 1911.
Over the four decades from 1871, banking primarily proliferated in the indus-
trial north, the West Midlands and the south of England. Meanwhile, agricultural
areas of the eastern parts of England and the north of Wales had a low number
of branches even in 1911. The growth of bank oces was signicantly lower in
Scotland than in the rest of Britain, again conforming to the fact that the country
already had a more developed banking sector in the 1870s.
3.3.2 Concentration of the Banking System
In addition to measuring the spread of bank oces, I calculate the Herndahl-
Hirschmann Index (HHI), which is a commonly used indicator of banking sector
concentration.90 This is used as proxy for the degree of competition that existed
between banks in each county. The HHI is calculated using the following formula
89. Following the Historic Counties Standard, I treat Cromartyshire and Ross-shire as one
county. See: The Historic Counties Trust, The Historic Counties Standard, http://www.
historiccountiestrust.co.uk/standard.html, accessed: 10 February 2017, 2017.









































































where si is the market share of bank i, of a total of K banks, in a given county
in a given year. The formula says that the market share of each bank is based on
the number of branches of that bank divided by the total number bank branches
(of all banks) in a given county. The HHI is the sum of squared market shares
of all banks in a county. A high HHI indicates that a few banks held dominant
positions in the a banking market.
Using HHI to measure the degree of concentration in the banking sector is
subject to some caveats. Calculating the market share based on branches might
lead to a degree of error, because bank branches were not always homogeneous
units. Some branches were larger than others, some were serving a larger number
of customers than others, and some might have been established in primarily rural
areas chiey for gathering deposits. Yet, it bears repeating that appendix 3.A.1
indicates that much of branch-level heterogeneity gets averaged out in the county-
level data. And in the absence of better data, the HHI is dicult to improve upon
as a measure of concentration.
There are other reservations for using concentration as a proxy for competi-
tion. Banks may gain market share precisely because they are more ecient and
competitive.91 Therefore, even concentrated banking systems might have a high
degree of competition between banks.92 Indeed, although HHI is still widely used
as a proxy for competition, several researchers have recently favoured more direct
ways of measuring competition based on structural econometric models.93 Yet,
these models usually require a large amount of inputs, which is not a luxury af-
forded by the century-old data used in this chapter. Moreover, the validity of HHI
91. See: Degryse and Ongena, `Competition'; and references therein on this point. It is possible
to deal with this issue (at least partially) through the use of appropriate instrumental variables.
92. Allen N Berger et al., `Bank Concentration and Competition: An Evolution in the Making',
Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 36, no. 3 (2004): 433451.
93. Claessens and Laeven, `Financial Dependence, Banking Sector Competition, and Economic
Growth'; Degryse and Ongena, `Competition'.
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as a measure of banking sector competition in Britain from 1871 to 1911 can be
motivated by previous research. As mentioned above, Braggion et al. show that
banks in counties with more concentrated banking systems acted less competit-
ively.94 We can thus infer that in the present case, HHI is inversely correlated with
the degree of competition. Appendix 3.A.1 provides further supporting evidence
of its use as a proxy for local banking sector competition.
Figure 3.3 presents data on county-level HHI calculations. It seems that rural
counties had, on average, far higher levels of concentration than did more urban
or industrial ones, especially in England and Wales. In other words, industrial
areas such as Lancashire and Yorkshire had relatively low levels of banking sector
concentration, as did Staordshire or Warwickshire. As far as HHI proxies banking
sector competition, this shows that important industrial regions in Britain had
higher levels competition between banks than existed in several rural regions.
HHIs of less than 0.1 or more than 0.18 are widely cited thresholds of competit-
ive and concentrated banking systems, respectively.95 By these measures, much of
Britain did not have a highly competitive banking sector between 1871 and 1911.
However, the degree to which concentration changed during the merger waves of
the 1890s varies signicantly between counties. Concentration in the East of Eng-
land appears to have grown signicantly higher, but in several other counties in
England and Wales, the level of concentration changed relatively little or even de-
clined. This is consistent with contemporary accounts presented by Sykes, which
argue that the early stages of branching by large banks increased banking sector
competition in rural counties.96
94. Braggion, Dwarkasing and Moore, `Nothing Special'.
95. Degryse and Ongena, `Competition'.























































3.3.3 Local Economic Growth
This chapter is concerned with explaining local economic growth, but no data
on county-level GDP exists.97 I therefore follow the example of Crafts by using
the sum of income tax assessments for each county as a proxy of local economic
conditions.98 A central component of these assessments were `Schedule D' taxes,
which were taxes assessed yearly in each county for prots from private and public
companies, along with income from highly paid professions. The tax was set
nationally, which makes the indicator comparable across counties.
In their study of the impact of banking sector's concentration on local economic
conditions, Braggion et al. use tax revenues instead of tax assessments.99 This is
problematic, because tax rates were subject to change, whereas tax assessments
are not subject to this problem during the period in question. Moreover Braggion
et al. use an incomplete set of tax data by only relying on Schedule D assessments,
which might bias their econometric results. For this chapter, I have collected both
Schedule D and E income tax data from the National Archives at Kew.100 I have
also relied on Parliamentary papers for years for which the relevant schedule D
data is available.101 This data is available at an annual frequency from 1870 to
1911.
Schedule E taxes consisted of wages paid to individuals working for corpora-
97. Geary and Stark have recently constructed estimates of regional GDP in the UK from 1861
to 1911. There are two problems with using this dataset for the present chapter. The rst one
is its low frequency: it provides observations at a 10-year intervals, because the estimates are
based on census records. The second problem is that it is not available at a county-level, which
reduces considerably the number of available cross-sectional observations. Instead of working
with over 80 counties, the Geary and Stark data would limit us to 11 regions. See: Geary and
Stark, `Regional GDP in the UK, 18611911: New Estimates'.
98. Crafts, `Regional GDP'.
99. Braggion, Dwarkasing and Moore, `Economic Impact'.
100. Land Tax. Income Tax (Schedules A, B, D and E) and Inhabited House Duty Assessments,
1870-1911, IR 16/30-129, Records of the Boards of Stamps, Taxes, Excise, Stamps and Taxes,
and Inland Revenue, National Archives at Kew. Records for 1870-1911.
101. House of Commons (henceforth: H.C.), Miscellaneous Statistics of the United King-
dom. (Part XI.), 1882, C.3423, (London: HMSO), https://parlipapers.proquest.com/
parlipapers/docview/t70.d75.1882-058898, accessed: 5 August 2017. I used parts VIII-
XI of this series. For 1883-1884, I used: H.C., Return of Income Tax under Schedules (A.), (B.)
and (D.) of Gross Amount of Property and Prots Assessed in Great Britain and Ireland, 1882-
83, 1884-1885, no. 25, (London: HMSO), https://parlipapers.proquest.com/parlipapers/
docview/t70.d75.1884-061468, accessed: 5 August 2017.
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tions, as well as government ocials. Throughout the late 19th century, some of
the tax assessments shifted from schedule D to schedule E as the public sector
expanded, and more companies chose to incorporate. However, the public sector
still accounted for a relatively minor share of total tax assessments, and its inclu-
sion does not signicantly inuence the sum of schedule E and D assessments. In
the tax year 1911-1912, taxes on public ocials constituted approximately 17%
of total schedule E assessments. Over 90% of the tax from public sector workers
was assessed in London, where the share rises to approximately 32%. Compared
to schedule D assessments, schedule E assessments were insignicant in the 1870s
but reached 15-20% of schedule D assessments in many English counties in the
last decade of the sample. Its exclusion would therefore impact meaningfully the
trend of income tax growth across counties.
For the years before 1900 no schedule E data could be found for individual
Scottish counties. It thus had to be estimated. This was done by multiplying
a county's average share of schedule E assessments in 1900-1911 with Scotland's
total schedule E assessments in a given year. The aggregate impact of the result-
ing estimation error is likely to be limited. For years for which schedule E data
is available, the error of these types of estimates for schedule E assessments is
around 15%, but on average below 10% for the 5 counties with the largest sched-
ule E assessments. When summed with schedule D assessments, the resulting
error is typically below 5%, because Scottish schedule E assessments were signi-
cantly smaller than schedule D ones. For earlier years, and especially for rural
counties, the resulting measurement error of total income tax assessments should
be even smaller, because the share of corporate and public sector employees in
these counties was often insignicant. Scottish schedule E assessments were about
10% of those for schedule D in both 1880 and 1890, setting this as extreme upper
bound for the potential errors for the typical county.102 The error's impact is fur-
ther mitigated by setting the data into 5-year averages for econometric purposes.
Nevertheless, these potential inaccuracies further motivate Scotland's exclusion
from a subset of this chapter's regressions.
An advantage of the income tax data data is that we can rely on income assess-
102. Commissioners of H.M. Inland Revenue, Twenty-Sixth Report, 1883, C.3718, (London:
HMSO), 44-48.; Commissioners of H.M. Inland Revenue, Thirty-Sixth Report, 1892, C.6731,
(London: HMSO), 37-41.
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ments instead of taxes that were actually paid. Tax assessments are not sensitive
to changes in tax rates.103 Moreover, there were no major changes in what sched-
ule D or E income consisted of between 1870 and 1911.104 However, the income tax
assessments used here do not capture all county-level economic activity. Schedule
D and E assessments exclude income from agriculture, even though the late 19th
century saw a shift of employees from farming into manufacturing and services.
The econometric methodology is able to mitigate this issue both through using
xed eects and relevant instrumental variables. Furthermore, there are advant-
ages to omitting agriculture, because the variable measures more closely incomes
from higher productivity sectors - the sectors we would expect to benet the most
from increased access to nance. In this sense, inclusion of agriculture would, if
anything, serve to make the ndings less interesting. Indeed, both historical and
modern studies reviewed earlier often exclude agriculture entirely, using variables
such as rm creation, along with manufacturing output or employment.105
3.3.4 Railway Length
To reduce omitted variable bias in growth regressions, it is useful to include vari-
ables other than banking sector development which can explain local economic
conditions. Such data is scarce for the 19th and early 20th centuries, but con-
trolling for infrastructure can help reduce the most glaring omissions. Indeed,
there is a long literature on the relationship between railways and growth in eco-
nomic history. Among other things, railways played a role in lowering transport-
ation costs between regions, enhancing inter-regional trade and the specialisation
of local economic activity.106 Data on yearly railway length by county has been
103. The use of assessments can also mitigate issues with tax evasion, because gross assessments
incorporates income before any deductions are made. The existence of tax evasion would only
bias the results if rms and individuals in some counties were better at evading taxes than in
others.
104. For taxes in place from 1823-1913, see: H.C., Taxes (England and Wales, Scotland, and
Ireland), 1912-1913, no. 109, (London: HMSO).
105. Mitchener and Wheelock, `Banking Markets'; Tang, `Financial Intermediation'.
106. See, for example: Patrick O'Brien, Railways and the Economic Development of Western
Europe, 1830-1914 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983); Jeremy Atack et al., `Did Railroads
Induce or Follow Economic Growth?', Social Science History 34, no. 02 (2010): 171197; Abhijit
Banerjee, Esther Duo and Nancy Qian, `On the Road: Access to Transportation Infrastructure
and Economic Growth in China', NBER Working Paper, no. 17897 (2012); Dave Donaldson and
Richard Hornbeck, `Railroads and American Economic Growth: A Market Access Approach',
The Quarterly Journal of Economics 131, no. 2 (2016): 799858.
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kindly provided by the Cambridge Group for the History of Population and Social
Structure.107
3.3.5 Summary of Variables Used in the Regressions
Table 3.1 provides a summary of the variables used in this chapter's regressions.
It also indicates how the variables are transformed. The variables for branches per
capita and branches per square kilometre are multiplied by 1,000 and 1,000,000,
respectively, and then transformed into natural logarithms. This multiplication
does not inuence the statistical inferences that are drawn from the estimates.
Table 3.1: Variables used in the regressions
Variable Description Transformation
Banks/sq. km Bank oces per square kilometre. Ln(103×Branches/km2)
Banks pc. Bank oces per capita. County-level
population gures are log-linear interpol-
ations of census data.
Ln(106×
Branches/capita)
HHI Herndahl-Hirschman index. None
Railways/sq. km Railway length in kilometres divided by
county area in square kilometres.
Ln
Tax pc. Schedule D and E income tax assess-
ments per capita. These measure the in-
comes derived from businesses and cer-
tain highly paid occupations, along with
wages from public companies. A small
share of these assessments also derives
from public oces.
Ln
Tax pc. growth Growth rate of tax assessments per cap-
ita.
None
W * dtaxpc Growth rate of tax assessments per cap-
ita in nearby counties, weighted by the
distance to them. The sum of the dis-
tance to neighbours is standardised to
one. See section 3.4.2.
None
The data is transformed into 5-year averages. This is motivated in section 3.4.
107. https://www.campop.geog.cam.ac.uk/. For related work and a discussion of the data,
see: Eduard Alvarez et al., `Railways and Growth: Evidence from Nineteenth Century England




Studies on nance and growth need to distinguish causality from correlation, as the
relationship between the growth of the nancial sector and that of the economy
can be mutually reinforcing. While the expansion of a county's banking sector
might foster economic development, it is also possible that the county's banking
sector expands because of higher realised or expected economic growth, and the
consequent expansion in business opportunities that arise from it. In other words,
the expansion of a county's banking sector is endogenous to its growth.
A further factor inuencing a bank's entry into a county is competition. If
there is a high degree of competition between a county's banks, a bank might
be discouraged from entering the market, as it is expected to make less prot by
competing with several other banks. On the other hand, the degree of competition
in a county's banking sector might be low because its economic prospects are
limited. Dealing with all these confounding factors motivates the choice of the
econometric method, along with the importance of studying jointly the impact of
the growth of the banking sector on one hand and its competitive dynamics on
the other.
I use methods from dynamic panel econometrics to make causal inferences
about nance and growth. Panel data is dened as encompassing both dierent
cross-sectional units (counties) and time-periods (years). The advantage of these
estimators is that they can make use of lagged dependent and independent vari-
ables as instruments (in addition to allowing for the use of other instruments),
which addresses issues with endogeneity. These models are discussed below.
Besides endogeneity, spatial economic linkages may confound the econometric
results if they are not factored in. This is because a county's economic growth
is likely to depend signicantly on the economic growth of surrounding counties.
Factoring in the possibility of economic spillovers across county borders requires
the use of spatial econometric techniques. Such methods not only mitigate omitted
variable bias, but also strengthen instrumental variables and yield more accurate
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results.108 The use of models which deal with both endogeneity and spatial linkages
represents a substantial advantage of this chapter's methodology.
This chapter follows a common practice in the nance and growth literature
by transforming the data into non-overlapping ve-year averages.109 This meth-
odology allows us to capture long term growth eects, unaected by the vagaries
of the business cycle. Additionally, the dynamic panel estimators discussed below
are intended to analyse datasets where the cross-sectional dimension is large (i.e.
there are several counties) and where the time dimension is small (i.e. the sample
contains relatively few time periods).
3.4.1 Dynamic panels
Dynamic panel regressions have become commonly used econometric tools in the
nance and growth literature. Inuential studies by Beck, Levine and Loyayza use
these models to study the impact of nancial development on economic growth
in cross-national panels.110 The same methods have since been used for regional
panels, for example to study the impact of banking on historical US city and
county-level growth.111
The dynamic panel regression equation is as follows:
∆yi,t = α + x
′
i,tβ + γyi,t−1 + µi + λt + εit (3.2)
∆yi,t is the growth of the economy in county i at time t. yi,t is the state of the
108. Spatial econometric techniques alter the standard errors of the regression model, which
directly inuence the t-statistics and p-values. The standard errors from these models provide a
more rigorous alternative to more ad hoc assumptions, such as the regional clustering of errors.
109. Thorsten Beck and Ross Levine, `Stock Markets, Banks, and Growth: Panel Evidence',
Journal of Banking & Finance 28, no. 3 (2004): 423442; Ross Levine, Norman Loayza and
Thorsten Beck, `Financial Intermediation and Growth: Causality and Causes', Journal of Mon-
etary Economics 46, no. 1 (2000): 3177.
110. Ibid.; Thorsten Beck, Ross Levine and Norman Loayza, `Finance and the Sources of
Growth', Journal of Financial Economics 58, no. 1 (2000): 261300.
111. Bodenhorn and Cuberes, `Financial Development and City Growth'; Jaremski and
Rousseau, `Free Banks'.
163
economy in county i at time t, while xi,t is a vector of explanatory variables. β is a
vector of the corresponding coecients. α is a constant, µi represents county xed
eects, λt represents time eects, and εit is the residual. What makes this model
dynamic is the addition of the lagged dependent variable, yi,t−1 (tax assessments
in the preceding 5-year interval) and the corresponding coecient γ.112
The variables to be included in xi,t are selected from those outlined in table
3.1: bank oces per square kilometre; banks oces per capita; HHI; and the
length of railways per square kilometre. The use of these variables has already
been motivated in section 3.3. The lagged dependent variable yi,t−1 is included
in the model in accordance with standard practice in growth regressions.113 One
reason for the variable's inclusion is that it accounts for the possibility that less
economically developed counties grow faster, as their economies converge to those
of richer counties. This is a standard feature of macroeconomic growth models.114
Another, related reason for the variable's inclusion is statistical, as it allows for
the possibility that a county's growth depends on its past growth.115
Because of the addition of lagged dependent variables into the regression equa-
tion, estimates using ordinary least squares (OLS) are inconsistent and yield un-
reliable results when the time-dimension of the sample is limited. The use of
Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) estimators yields more reliable results
for two reasons. First, we can adjust for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation
of the errors.116 Second, we can use instruments - both lagged variables from
the regression and other variables - to deal with endogeneity and to correct for
the bias. The dierence-GMM estimator by Arellano and Bond and the system-
GMM estimator outlined by Arellano and Bover as well as Blundell and Bond
112. Note that an equivalent specication is to use yi,t as the dependent variable and to replace
γyi,t−1 with (1 + γ)yi,t−1 = ψyi,t−1 on the right-hand side.
113. See: Thorsten Beck, `The Econometrics of Finance and Growth', in Palgrave Handbook
of Econometrics, ed. T Mills and K Patterson, vol. 2 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009),
11801209 and references therein.
114. Daron Acemoglu, Introduction to Modern Economic Growth (New Jersey: Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 2008), chapters 1-3. Such convergence between countries has typically been found
to be dependent upon several conditioning factors, such as human capital and the quality of
institutions.
115. In other words, growth is autocorrelated.
116. Heteroskedasticity refers non-constant variance of the errors. The variance of errors is not
the same for all counties.
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have become especially common in macroeconomic modelling.117 Despite their
advantages, these estimators can yield biased standard errors in small samples,
which I correct for by using robust standard errors outlined by Windmeijer.118
The purpose of instrumental variables is to help extract the exogenous com-
ponent of any given element of xi,t (for example banks per capita) in equation 3.2.
The instrument is supposed to correlate with bank oces per capita (or bank
oces per square kilometre), but it should not have a direct independent impact
on the dependent variable (growth of tax assessments per capita). More formally,
we want a set of instruments for zi,t to have a non-zero correlation with xi,t, but
also the property that E(z′i,tεi,t) = 0. The latter is called a moment condition
based on which the model is estimated: GMM estimates require that the errors
are orthogonal to the instruments.
The Arellano-Bond estimator uses equation 3.2 in dierences, and lagged de-
pendent and independent variables in levels as instruments. However, lagged
variables in levels have been found to provide weak instruments in this specic-
ation.119 The Blundell-Bond system-GMM estimator addresses this issue. This
method estimates equation 3.2 both in levels and in dierences. For the equation
in levels, it uses lagged dierences of the dependent variable as instruments, while
for the dierenced equation it uses lagged levels of the dependent variable.120
In terms of instruments, I use the rst lag of all variables in xi,t as well as
yi,t−2. In the context of my regressions, these refer to 5-year lags. Further lags
are not used as instruments as long as the Arellano and Bond AR(2) test for
residual autocorrelation does not warrant them.121 This is because a proliferation
117. For details on how to estimate these models, see: Manuel Arellano and Stephen Bond, `Some
Tests of Specication for Panel Data: Monte Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment
Equations', The Review of Economic Studies 58, no. 2 (1991): 277297; Richard Blundell and
Stephen Bond, `Initial Conditions and Moment Restrictions in Dynamic Panel Data Models',
Journal of Econometrics 87, no. 1 (1998): 115143; Manuel Arellano and Olympia Bover, `An-
other Look at the Instrumental Variable Estimation of Error-Components Models', Journal of
Econometrics 68, no. 1 (1995): 2951.
118. Frank Windmeijer, `A Finite Sample Correction for the Variance of Linear Ecient Two-
Step GMM Estimators', Journal of Econometrics 126, no. 1 (2005): 2551.
119. Blundell and Bond, `Initial Conditions'.
120. Additional variables can also be included to the set of instruments.
121. Arellano and Bond, `Tests'.
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of instruments can bias the model estimates.122 The validity of the instruments is
also conrmed using Hansen's J-tests.123
3.4.2 Spatial dynamic panels
Equation 3.2 can be extended to take spatial linkages into account, which ad-
dress the possibility that a given economy is likely to be aected by conditions in
neighbouring economies. This is of particular relevance when modelling county-
level data, where the geographic units are close to each other. The omissions of
spatial economic linkages could lead to model misspecication and to inaccurate
hypothesis tests. A straightforward spatial extension of equation 3.2 is as follows:
∆yi,t = α + δWi∆yt + x
′
i,tβ + γyi,t−1 + µi + λt + εit (3.3)
Let N be the number of counties. The termWi∆yt is the ith row of a N ×N
spatial weights matrix W multiplied by the economic growth in each county at
time t. All other variables are as previously specied. In practice,Wi∆yt measures
how much nearby counties grew, giving less (or no) weight to counties further away.
An illustration of a spatial weight matrix W is given below. A typical spe-
cication for row i of the spatial weights matrix W is the distance from county
i to other counties, standardised so that the terms sum to one.124 The diagonal
of the matrix is set to zero, so that no county can be its own neighbour. The
closer a given county is to county i, the more the economies of these two counties
are assumed to correlate. For example, the weight given to the link between Bed-
fordshire and Buckinghamshire in matrix 3.4 is higher than the weight between
Buckinghamshire and Anglesey, as the latter two are further apart. Following
122. David Roodman, `A Note on the Theme of Too Many Instruments', Oxford Bulletin of
Economics and statistics 71, no. 1 (2009): 135158.
123. Lars Peter Hansen, `Large Sample Properties of Generalized Method of Moments Estimat-
ors', Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1982, 10291054.
124. For more on this point and alternative specications, see: Jean Paul Elhorst, Spatial Eco-
nometrics: From Cross-Sectional Data to Spatial Panels (London: Springer, 2014), 5-34.
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standard practice in the literature, I use a maximum distance of 200km beyond
which direct spatial dependence between two counties ceases to exist (the spatial
weight goes to zero).125 Increasing the maximum distance to 300km does not
change the results signicantly.
W =
Anglesey Bedford Berks. Brecknock Bucks. . . .

Anglesey 0 0.0114 0.0117 0.0214 0.0116 . . .
Bedfordshire 0.0073 0 0.0278 0.0110 0.0677 . . .
Berkshire 0.0084 0.0314 0 0.0157 0.0532 . . .
Brecknockshire 0.0152 0.0122 0.0154 0 0.0136 . . .






... . . .
(3.4)
Most developments in the eld of dynamic spatial panel econometrics have only
been made in the last decade, and the eld is by no means fully mature.126 Nev-
ertheless, these models have already been used for studying the eects of nancial
liberalisation on growth.127 Although several proposed methods for estimating
dynamic spatial panel models exist, many of these are quasi-maximum likelihood
based, and currently unsuitable for dealing with endogeneity of several independ-
ent variables.128
It is possible to estimate equation 3.3 using the system-GMM of Blundell and
Bond with a spatial lag of the dependent variable, but the resulting estimates
can be slightly biased in smaller samples.129 A more rigorous approach than the
simple extension of the system-GMM with spatial eects has been suggested re-
125. See: Ibid. and references therein.
126. Ibid., 95-117.
127. Paul Elhorst, Eelco Zandberg and Jakob De Haan, `The Impact of Interaction Eects
Among Neighbouring Countries on Financial Liberalization and Reform: A Dynamic Spatial
Panel Data Approach', Spatial Economic Analysis 8, no. 3 (2013): 293313.
128. For a review, see: Lung-fei Lee and Jihai Yu, `Some Recent Developments in Spatial Panel
Data Models', Regional Science and Urban Economics 40, no. 5 (2010): 255271.
129. Madina Kukenova et al., `Spatial Dynamic Panel Model and System GMM: A Monte Carlo
Investigation', IRENE Working Papers, no. 0901 (2009).
167
cently by Lee and Yu, who specify a GMM estimator for dynamic panels with
xed eects.130 They show that their estimator has both good asymptotic (large
sample) and nite sample properties, and allows for several types of moment con-
ditions. The method is also able to deal with the endogeneity of several variables
in the regression (such as branches per square kilometre or the HHI), while being
suitable for samples with a relatively few observations across time. Because of
these advantages, this approach is used in this chapter. Lee and Yu propose a
forward orthogonal dierence (FOD) transformation of the variables to eliminate














For a given variable x. Here, T is the total number of time periods, and t is
a given point of time in the sample. In essence, this transformation sets the vari-
ables to deviations from their future averages. It can be used as an alternative to
rst-dierencing. Dierencing can induce autocorrelation to the regression errors,
whereas the FOD transformed errors do not have this problem. Consequently,
Arellano and Bover highlight this as a viable approach to use in a dynamic panel
context.131 Simulation studies suggest that with typically recommended (parsimo-
nious) instrument specications, the FOD transformation leads to more accurate
estimates than dierencing.132
After the FOD transformation, we can also eliminate the time-eects from the
regression equation by taking mean-deviations of the variables. This can be done







′ by the matrix J = IT−ıT ı
′
T . Here,
IT is a T x T matrix with ones on the diagonal and zeros elsewhere, whereas ıT is
a vector of ones of length T. Following this transformation, all constant regressors
have been eliminated, and thus do not need to be estimated. Let x̃i,t denote given
variables xi,t that have been transformed in this fashion.
130. Lung-fei Lee and Jihai Yu, `Ecient GMM Estimation of Spatial Dynamic Panel Data
Models with Fixed Eects', Journal of Econometrics 180, no. 2 (2014): 174197.
131. Arellano and Bover, `Another Look'.
132. Kazuhiko Hayakawa, `First Dierence or Forward Orthogonal Deviation - Which Trans-
formation should be Used in Dynamic Panel Data Models?: A Simulation Study', Economics
Bulletin 29, no. 3 (2009): 20082017.
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This model can be estimated via GMM. We can use the same instruments
that we would use in a non-spatial dynamic panel model. However, these can
be supplemented with the spatial lags of the explanatory variables, which means
multiplying them by W . This has been shown to signicantly strengthen the
validity of the instruments, thereby addressing a concern expressed frequently
about non-spatial dynamic panel estimators.133 The instrument set for each county
i can thus be specied as follows: zi,t = [ỹi,t−2,Wỹt−2, x̃i,t−1,Wx̃t−1], where
ỹt−2 and x̃t−1 are vectors of lagged dependent and other explanatory variables,
respectively, incorporating data from all counties at the specied time. Therefore,
the results are derived using instruments consisting of a single time lag and a single
spatial lag of all explanatory variables. This is consistent with the recommendation
that we should avoid using too many instruments, as doing so can bias the results
of GMM estimators.134
The main advantage of using spatial instruments is that their inclusion ad-
dresses the issue of endogeneity better than instruments that are typically used
in dynamic panel GMM models. We thus come closer to observing the exogenous
components of changes in the number of bank oces and in the HHI. Spatially
lagging the instrument for banks can also help account for the fact that, for the
most part, banks expanded their branch networks close to where they already had
oces.135 In a similar fashion, spatial instruments can mitigate the possible bias
arising from banks locating to a county primarily to gather deposits that would
be lent in neighbouring counties.
133. Harry H Kelejian and Ingmar R Prucha, `A Generalized Spatial Two-Stage Least Squares
Procedure for Estimating a Spatial Autoregressive Model with Autoregressive Disturbances',
The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics 17, no. 1 (1998): 99121. For a discussion
about the validity of instruments in dynamic panel models, see also: Maurice Bun and Vasileios
Saradis, `Dynamic Panel Data Models', in The Oxford Handbook of Panel Data, ed. Badi H
Baltagi (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 76110.
134. Roodman, `Note'.
135. Narly Ratna Devi Dwarkasing, `Essays on Historical Banking', CentER, Center for Eco-




3.5.1 Baseline Results: Spatial Models
This subsection reports results from the Lee and Yu spatial dynamic panel GMM
regression.136 As argued above, this is the best available method for estimating the
impact of bank oces on county-level growth using our dataset. Regressions which
do not allow for economic linkages across county borders can suer from severe
omitted variable bias. The results therefore ought to be considered signicantly
more reliable than those derived from the system-GMM without spatial eects,
reported in the subsection below.
Table 3.2 displays results from the spatial dynamic panel regression for a
sample including all counties in England and Wales. According to the estim-
ates, more bank oces per square kilometre had a positive impact on local tax
assessments, as did the number of branches per capita. This result is economic-
ally highly signicant. A 10% increase in the number of branches per 1000 square
kilometres would have increased the growth rate of income tax assessments by
0.2-0.25% on average. With branches per (1 million) capita, the corresponding
gure would have been 0.33-0.42%. A 10% increase in branches per 1000 square
km over a 5-year interval was a fairly common occurrence towards the last two
decades of the sample: in 1895-1900, this occurred in more than 40% of counties
in Britain. The overall conclusion from these results is that banks had a positive
impact on economic growth in English and Welsh counties.
In specications 2 to 4 in table 3.2, a higher level of concentration in the
banking sector appears to have had a mildly positive impact on economic growth.
However, one must note that the result is not statistically strong, because the
HHI coecient is only signicant at the 10% level in these columns, while it is
insignicant in the rst column. Nevertheless, there is no evidence of excessive
concentration hurting economic outcomes in England and Wales. The result in
columns 2 to 4 is consistent with literature arguing that some degree of concen-
136. Lee and Yu, `Ecient GMM'.
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Table 3.2: Spatial dynamic panel regression results. The sample includes
counties in England and Wales, from 1871 to 1911
1 2 3 4
Banks per sq km 0.024 0.020
(0.008)*** (0.006)***
Banks pc 0.041 0.032
(0.011)*** (0.009)***
HHI 0.134 0.148 0.161 0.159
(0.084) (0.082)* (0.090)* (0.080)*
Tax pc, lag 1 -0.082 -0.107 -0.086 -0.108
(0.028)*** (0.031)*** (0.024)*** (0.025)***
W * dtaxpc 0.275 0.164 0.686 0.493
(0.194) (0.176) (0.278)** (0.264)*
Railway per sq km -0.054 -0.034
(0.044) (0.043)
Hansen's J-statistic 4.988 2.649 4.808 4.828
p-value of J-statistic 0.917 0.734 0.814 0.815
The dependent variable is the growth in income tax assessments per capita. The
sample includes all counties in England and Wales. The data is in 5 year averages,
and in non-overlapping 5 year intervals. Windmeijer (2005) robust standard errors
in parentheses. *; **; and *** indicate a p-value of less than 0.1; 0.05; and 0.01,
respectively.
tration can have a positive impact on the economy.137 For most of the period 1871
to 1911, it is possible that concentration in English and Welsh counties was below
the level at which it would have started to hinder economic growth.
The results in table 3.2 also indicate that regional economic spillovers played
a large and signicant role in explaining local economic growth (columns 3 and
4). This is highlighted by the term W*dtaxpc, which measures the growth in
income tax assessments in nearby counties, weighted by distances to neighbours.
The omission of spatial linkages can thus be highly problematic when trying to
local economic outcomes, which should be considered in future work on regional
economic growth. Finally, higher tax assessments in the previous period tended
to lower a county's prospective growth. This is consistent with a catch-up eect
predicted by standard macroeconomic growth models.
137. See: section 3.2.2.
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Results based on a sample that includes Scottish counties are shown in table 3.3.
In this case, the number of bank oces per capita, or branches per square kilo-
metre, are not associated with economic growth, and neither is bank concentration.
A possible reason for the results concerning branches is that branch banking had
spread considerably further in Scotland already by 1870, than it had in England
and Wales. The average Scottish county may thus have gained little from addi-
tional branches. This would be consistent with studies showing that the growth
of an already highly developed nancial sector might contribute little to the real
economy.138 However, it also bears repeating that the tax data for Scotland is less
accurate than that for England and Wales, making these results less reliable.
Table 3.3: Spatial dynamic panel regression results. The sample includes
counties in England, Wales and Scotland, from 1871 to 1911
1 2 3 4
Banks per sq km -0.009 -0.013
(0.014) (0.014)
Banks pc 0.000 0.002
(0.018) (0.014)
HHI 0.100 0.104 0.052 0.085
(0.070) (0.064) (0.064) (0.063)
Tax pc, lag 1 -0.133 -0.135 -0.144 -0.133
(0.020)*** (0.019)*** (0.023)*** (0.020)***
W * dtaxpc 1.143 0.979 0.902 0.728
(0.311)*** (0.317)*** (0.244)*** (0.222)***
Railway per sq km 0.066 0.058
(0.029)** (0.028)**
Hansen's J-statistic 2.666 3.645 3.926 7.739
p-value of J-statistic 0.736 0.838 0.73 0.948
The dependent variable is the growth in income tax assessments per capita. The
sample includes all counties in England, Wales and Scotland. The data is in 5
year averages, and in non-overlapping 5 year intervals. Windmeijer (2005) robust
standard errors in parentheses. *; **; and *** indicate a p-value of less than 0.1;
0.05; and 0.01, respectively.
While the results in table 3.2 on the positive impact of a higher HHI are
not extremely strong, it is possible that the impact becomes less signicant in
the results in table 3.3 owing to a higher level of concentration in the Scottish
138. See: section 1.3.
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banking sector, which could have had negative eects on the economy.139 In other
words, this could imply that Scotland had too much concentration in the banking
sector, counterbalancing any positive eect accruing to the rest of Britain from an
increase in this measure.
The results on the impact of railways in tables 3.2 and 3.3 reveals a striking
contrast. When only English and Welsh counties are examined, more railways
appear to have had an insignicant impact on economic growth, whereas the
inclusion of Scottish counties makes the same relationship positive. The result
might be due to features specic to the sample period, since by 1880, developed
areas in Britain already possessed large railway networks. According to the data
used in this chapter, it was mainly more remote and agricultural areas that received
signicant extensions to their railway networks. In this fashion, Scottish growth
could have beneted disproportionately from new railways.
Table 3.4 demonstrates that the results in this section are robust to using
bank oces scaled by population density as an explanatory variable. Whereas
the regressions shown above are able to account for unobserved county-level het-
erogeneity, both through the instrumental variables and the use of xed-eects
specications, incorporating data on branches scaled by population density could
more directly control for the possibility that branches proliferated as a function of
population density. It is therefore reassuring that specications in columns 1 and
2, based on English and Welsh data, are consistent with the results of nance-
driven growth in table 3.2. The results in columns 3 and 4 incorporate Scottish
data into the sample, and indicate that ndings in table 3.3 are not driven by
dierences in population densities.
3.5.2 Alternative Specications: System-GMM and OLS
Fixed-Eects
This section shows results from dynamic panel models without spatial eects.
This is done primarily for comparative purposes, because these models have thus
far dominated the literature on nance and local growth. The results dier sig-
139. See: section 3.3.2.
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Table 3.4: Spatial dynamic panel regression results with bank oces scaled
by population density as an explanatory variable
1 2 3 4
Sample E&W E&W GB GB
Banks/density 0.042 0.033 0.000 -0.009
(0.011)*** (0.009)*** (0.018) (0.011)
HHI 0.145 0.152 0.104 0.077
(0.077)* (0.075)** (0.064) (0.067)
Tax pc, lag 1 -0.107 -0.110 -0.135 -0.138
(0.030)*** (0.025)*** (0.019)*** (0.020)***
W * dtaxpc 0.161 0.470 0.979 0.882
(0.172) (0.260)* (0.317)*** (0.155)***
Railway per sq km -0.031 0.065
(0.043) (0.029)**
Hansen's J-statistic 2.586 4.82 5.957 14.788
p-value of J-statistic 0.725 0.815 0.949 0.998
For notes, see table 3.3. The dependent variable is the growth in income tax assess-
ments per capita. Columns 1 and 2 show results for a sample that includes only
English and Welsh counties, whereas specications in columns 3 and 4 also include
Scottish counties. The sample covers the years 1871-1911.
nicantly from those shown above, which further motivates the need to control
for spatial economic spillovers (and possibly the use of spatial instruments) when
studying British growth on a geographically disaggregated level. They also sug-
gest that some scepticism is warranted when interpreting the evidence of literature
which uses county-level data, but does not control for spatial linkages.
Table 3.5 presents the results from regressions that use data on English and
Welsh counties. The rst two columns show results from standard OLS (ordinary
least squares) xed-eects panel regressions, which do not correct for endogen-
eity in any way, and can be biased when lagged dependent variables are used as
regressors. The third and fourth columns present results from system-GMM re-
gressions. These two specications have a causal interpretation. While there is
some evidence of a positive correlation between bank oces per capita and growth
(column 2), there is no evidence of banks having a causal impact on local economic
development (columns 3 and 4). These models therefore indicate that the number
of bank oces in a given county did not contribute to economic growth. The
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coecients related to the HHI are also insignicant in the GMM specications.
Table 3.5: Sys-GMM and OLS results, counties in England and Wales.
Dependent variable: growth in income tax assessments per capita
OLS FE OLS FE SGMM SGMM
1 2 3 4
Banks/sq km 0.000 0.013
(0.007) (0.010)
Banks pc 0.026 0.006
(0.010)*** (0.009)
HHI -0.001 0.027 0.008 -0.009
(0.032) (0.029) (0.035) (0.026)
Tax pc, lag 1 -0.054 -0.063 -0.002 -0.003
(0.013)*** (0.012)*** (0.011) (0.013)
Railway/sq km 0.019 0.016 -0.027 -0.023
(0.021) (0.023) (0.012)** (0.013)*
Constant 0.020 -0.084 0.133 0.121
(0.097) (0.111) (0.045)*** (0.087)
Hansen's J-statistic 48.1 44.28
p-value of J-statistic 0.178 0.296
AR(2) test p-value 0.141 0.143
The dependent variable is the growth in income tax assessments per capita. The
instruments in specications 3 and 4 include the rst lags of all explanatory vari-
ables, except for railways, along with year dummies for the dierence equation.
Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard errors in parentheses.
For the GMM specications, these follow the specication by Windmeijer (2005).
*; **; and *** indicate p-values of less than 0.1; 0.05; and 0.01, respectively. The
AR(2) test refers to the test for residual autocorrelation proposed by Arellano
and Bond (1991). A p-value higher than 0.1 suggests that the model is valid.
Note that the coecients corresponding to railways in columns 3 and 4 are
negative, but this result is mainly driven by the exclusion of the variable for rail-
ways from the set of instruments, and therefore is not robust. Including the length
of railways to the set of instrumental variables makes the coecient insignicant
again. The length of railways was excluded from the set of instruments for England
and Wales in order to avoid problems associated with too many instruments, which
was evidenced by an unrealistically high value for Hansen's J-statistic. Removing
the variable for railways from the regression equations (instead of the instrument
sets) does not lead to a signicant change in the coecients for bank oces or
HHI.
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There is no signicant change in the GMM results when Scotland is included in
the sample, as show in table 3.6. Columns 3 and 4 indicate that bank branches per
capita, as well as branches per square kilometre, had no impact on the growth of
tax assessments. There is not even evidence of correlation between the growth of
tax assessments and bank oces (columns 1 and 2), which contrasts with ndings
in table 3.5. Although the consolidation of the banking system had progressed
further in Scotland, the impact of banking concentration does not appear to be
more signicant than in the estimates obtained without Scottish data.
Table 3.6: Sys-GMM and OLS results, all counties in Britain. Dependent
variable: growth in income tax assessments per capita
OLS FE OLS FE SGMM SGMM
1 2 3 4
Banks/sq km -0.009 -0.003
(0.006) (0.009)
Banks pc 0.011 0.004
(0.008) (0.006)
HHI 0.019 0.039 0.038 0.043
(0.030) (0.029) (0.035) (0.035)
Tax pc, lag 1 -0.077 -0.072 -0.012 -0.021
(0.012)*** (0.011)*** (0.011) (0.012)*
Railway/sq km -0.011 -0.013 -0.001 0.002
(0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.005)
Constant 0.200 0.125 0.058 0.028
(0.044)*** (0.057)** (0.015)*** (0.043)
Hansen's J-statistic 60.61 65.57
p-value of J-statistic 0.281 0.156
AR(2) test p-value 0.221 0.15
For details, see table 3.5. The instruments in specications 3 and 4 include the
rst lags of all explanatory variables, along with year dummies for the dierence
equation.
Overall, the models in this subsection provide little evidence of banking-led
growth in British counties. As argued above, the dierence in ndings from the
system-GMM models and the spatial models is largely due to misspecication.
Non-spatial models have not only worse sets of instruments, but also ignore eco-
nomic spillovers across county borders. It follows that results presented in subsec-
tion 3.5.1 should be preferred.
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3.5.3 Regressions using Regional Data
What was the banking system's impact on regional growth? This section examines
nance and growth at a more aggregated level. Table 3.7 reports regression results
using regional (as opposed to county-level) data for Britain. Working with regional
data means that there are 14 cross-sectional units, which constitutes a very small
sample. The rst two columns show results from standard xed-eects panel
regressions. The remaining columns show results of GMM regressions where the
equation is transformed to forward orthogonal deviations. The model uses two
lags of the explanatory variables in backward orthogonal deviations, because an
instrument set consisting of only one lag would not have been valid according to
the Hansen-test.140 Due to these transformations, the constants get eliminated
from the specications. The instruments are also collapsed in order to reduce the
instrument count, as outlined by Roodman.141 The specication was selected in
order to minimise the bias arising from using GMM methods in small samples.142
Nevertheless, the results should be considered far less reliable than those obtained
using county-level data.
The OLS panel regression in column 2 of table 3.7 suggest that an increase in
bank oces per capita had a positive relationship with regional economic growth.
Yet, no such relationship is found when the number of banks oces per square
kilometre is used to proxy nancial development (column 1). When it comes to
causal inference, the results are also rather weak. Banks per square kilometre and
banks per capita only had a positive impact on growth if the length of railways
is not controlled for, as shown in columns 5 and 6. Although not robust, the
coecients are economically very large: a 10% increase in bank oces would have
spurred growth by 0.57-0.91%. At most, this can be taken as weak and not robust
evidence of nance-led growth at the regional level. Consistent with results from
county-level data, there is no evidence of banking system concentration inuencing
economic growth.
140. The backward orthogonal transformation is discussed in Kazuhiko Hayakawa, `A Simple
Ecient Instrumental Variable Estimator for Panel AR (p) Models when both N and T are
Large', Econometric Theory 25, no. 3 (2009): 873890.
141. For more details, see: Roodman, `Note'.
142. Hayakawa shows that the FOD transformation reduces the bias of the estimates relative to
a system-GMM in limited samples. See: Hayakawa, `First Dierence'.
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Table 3.7: Bank oces and growth: regressions using regional data. Dependent variable:
growth in income tax assessments per capita
All regions OLS FE OLS FE GMM GMM GMM GMM
1 2 3 4 5 6
Banks/sq km 0.011 0.041 0.057
(0.009) (0.024) (0.028)*
Banks pc 0.020 0.056 0.091
(0.008)** (0.042) (0.038)**
HHI 0.072 0.073 0.434 0.434 0.280 0.138
(0.083) (0.073) (0.252) (0.285) (1.410) (0.480)
Tax pc, lag 1 -0.004 -0.005 -0.042 -0.036 -0.083 -0.085
(0.003) (0.003)* (0.046) (0.054) (0.046)* (0.046)*
Railway/sq km -0.002 -0.075 0.063 0.066
(0.009) (0.053) (0.088) (0.077)
Constant 0.000 -0.164
(0.055) (0.042)***
Hansen's J-statistic 2.31 2.76 4.63 4.25
p-value of J-statistic 0.679 0.598 0.201 0.236
The dependent variable is the growth in income tax assessments per capita. The set of instruments
in columns 3-6 includes two lags of all explanatory variables, transformed to backward ortho-
gonal deviations and with the instrument matrix in `collapsed' form following Roodman (2009).
Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard errors in parentheses. For the GMM spe-
cications, these follow the specication by Windmeijer (2005). * and ** indicate p-values of the
corresponding t-statistics of less than 0.1 and 0.05, respectively.
3.6 Discussion and Conclusion
This chapter investigates the impact of the spread of bank oces (branches), and
of decreased competition in the banking sector, on local British economic growth.
Being the rst study on this topic for the years 1871-1911, it presents a signicant
amount of new data on British local banking, which is supplemented with newly
collected material on local tax assessments. Results from dynamic panel models,
traditionally used in the nance-growth literature, give no indication of banks
having had an impact on local economic growth. However, by applying recent
advances in spatial econometrics, I nd that the spread of bank branches inuenced
economic growth in English and Welsh counties, but not in Scotland. There is
no evidence that increasing concentration in the banking system had a negative
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impact on local economic growth. In fact, results for England and Wales indicate
that a higher degree of concentration increased local economic growth, although
this nding is not statistically strong.
This chapter explains the benet of spatial models for studying local economic
growth, and shows how in this case they yield dierent results from simpler mod-
els. A plausible reason for the sensitivity of the results to spatial eects is that
economic linkages between counties were an important determinant of their eco-
nomic growth, and not controlling for them leads to biased estimates. Another
potential reason is that there were cross-county economic spillovers from more
bank oces. The spatial models are partially able to account for such factors,
as they use branches in neighbouring counties as instrumental variables. More
generally, spatial instruments strengthen the instruments in the regressions, thus
having a signicant impact on the estimates. Additionally, these partially con-
trol for the fact that banks often expanded their branch networks into adjacent
counties.
The nding that the spread of bank oces had a positive impact on economic
growth in England and Wales implies a need to re-evaluate and revise certain ar-
guments in the literature on British nance and growth. Several historical studies
highlight potentially negative consequences resulting from the formation of large
banks with national branch networks. They point out that such banks were more
conservative and less committed to local customers.143 While this might be the
case, it seems that these factors were not sucient to oset the positive economic
eects of increased branching. At the same time, the fact that Scotland did not
appear to benet from the availability of more branches indicates that its banking
market was more saturated than that of England and Wales.
The result that banks were important for local growth is consistent with nd-
ings from other historical cases, such as Japan and the US. It is also similar to
ndings from an earlier period in England and Wales, which indicate that nancial
development had a positive impact on local economic conditions.144 More broadly,
143. Mae Baker and Michael Collins, `Financial Crises and Structural Change in English Com-
mercial Bank Assets, 18601913', Explorations in Economic History 36, no. 4 (1999): 428444
; Collins and Baker, `Sectoral Dierences'; Barnes and Newton, `How Far'; Newton, `Bank
Industry Relations'.
144. Heblich and Trew, `Banking and Industrialization'; Brunt and Cannon, `Do Banks'.
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the results conform with both theory and with recent empirical ndings on the
local impact of banks. To the extent that the underlying mechanisms through
which banks contributed to growth in Britain are similar to those found in mod-
ern countries, the results support the notion that bank branching reduced costs
related to information asymmetries arising out of geographic distance. Proximity
to local borrowers makes the monitoring of customers easier, which leads to more
credit being extended to more promising rms.
Britain as a whole was, of course, a leading industrial nation in 1870-1913.
But employment in the manufacturing and service sectors, along with urbanisa-
tion, was unevenly distributed.145 A part of this is naturally due to regional
specialisation. But given the results, it is also possible that nancial development
increased the pace of structural change from agriculture towards the manufactur-
ing and service sectors in British counties. After all, the proxy used for economic
growth - taxes assessments - largely captures activity in the manufacturing and
service sectors. The bank branch networks expanded the fastest in more indus-
trial counties, however, which also implies that nance could have played a role in
exacerbating regional inequalities. This constitutes an interesting area of future
research.
This chapter also conrms the need to examine the spread of banking and the
sector's competitive dynamics jointly. A vast literature highlights the economic
importance of both the level of competition in the banking sector, and the proxim-
ity of nancial institutions. Ignoring either factor can lead to incorrect empirical
inferences. Yet, so far, studies on nance and local growth in economic history
have largely focused on just one of these factors.
The result that concentration had an insignicant or mildly positive economic
impact contrasts with previous studies on this topic. Researchers have argued that
excessive concentration may have hurt the economy in England and Wales.146 In
particular, it seems that the results by Braggion et al. - that concentration had
negative eects on local economic conditions in England and Wales - are par-
145. For an overview of dierences in employment based on census data, see: Clive Howard Lee,
British Regional Employment Statistics, 1841-1971 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1979); and Clive Lee, `Regional Structure and Change', in Atlas of Industrializing Britain, 1780-
1914, ed. John Langton and Robert John Morris (London: Methuen, 1986), 303.
146. Grossman, `Rearranging'; Braggion, Dwarkasing and Moore, `Economic Impact'.
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tially driven by their use of interwar and wartime data, by problems with their
tax data, or by the fact that they do not consider spatial economic linkages.147
This chapter's results also present an important caveat to interpreting more re-
cent ndings by Braggion et al. that banks in counties with more concentrated
banking sectors constrained their lending.148 It appears that the credit constraints
arising from banking concentration were insucient to create a signicant drag
on county-level economic activity.149 Moreover, the nding that concentration
had a mildly positive impact on growth in England and Wales can be taken to
mean that concentration improved credit allocation through encouraging banks to
invest in information gathering. This would be consistent with recent empirical
ndings, which suggest an inverse `U-shaped' relationship between concentration
and economic growth. In this light, it can be argued that for much of the period
in question, the local banking sectors in England and Wales were not suciently
concentrated to constrain economic activity.
It is also clear from the data that industrialised counties in the North of Eng-
land and West Midlands did not have high levels of banking system concentration.
This was rst and foremost an issue aecting Scotland and several rural counties
in England and Wales. It is therefore unclear whether banking concentration can
explain economic outcomes at the national level, since borrowers in the economic-
ally most signicant areas were probably the least aected by a lack of competition
between banks. The existing narrative of banking sector concentration in Britain
might thus need to be revised, in that the impact of regional variation in the
HHI needs to be taken into account. A related question is whether the HHI is
a useful measure overall. If banks operated a (somewhat successful) cartel, does
HHI really proxy the competition in the banking system?150 Based on my nd-
ings in appendix 3.A.1 and the ndings by Braggion et al., it probably does.151
While banks probably did not compete on deposit rates, they could compete on
service and loan terms. Nevertheless, more research into how banks competed and
colluded would certainly be useful.
147. Ibid.
148. Braggion, Dwarkasing and Moore, `Nothing Special'.
149. It is worth noting, however, that the authors focus on a slightly later period (1885-1925)
than the present study, when the banking system was more concentrated.
150. Grossman, `Rearranging'.
151. Braggion, Dwarkasing and Moore, `Nothing Special'.
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3.A Appendix to Chapter 3
3.A.1 Branch-level Data
In this section, I use new data from the accounts of a large number of bank
oces to demonstrate that several important branch-level characteristics were
not, on average, correlated with a county's income tax assessments. This means
that conducting the analysis on the county level averages out many branch-level
idiosyncrasies, which strengthens the validity of my results in section 3.5.
I also present results from multilevel regressions, showing that after branch-
level characteristics are controlled for, the impact of county-level characteristics on
bank branch conduct can be teased out. In particular, I show that the Herndahl-
Hirschmann Index (HHI) is correlated with branch-level protability, which serves
to validate its use as a proxy for competition.
The data consists of over 7000 yearly observations from branch-level accounts
in England and Wales, which have been collected from archives. Table 3.8 lists
the banks included in the sample, along with the years that the data covers. The
sample is constructed based on the availability of records.
For all banks in the sample, it is possible to get a gure on deposits to or
from the head oce, which refers to transfers of money between branches. In
other words, any excess funds in a branch were recorded as deposits to the head
oce, even though they could subsequently be lent to other branches. Figures
on expenses and revenue are also available for all banks with income statements,
whereas data on loans on current accounts (short-term loans) is available for banks
with balance sheet records.
Figure 3.4a shows correlation plots between characteristics of bank oces,
which are averaged at the county-level, and per capita income tax assessments.
The gure is based on data from 1900-1911, when the sample's coverage is the most
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Table 3.8: Branch-level data
Bank Years
covered




































Note: the last column lists the archive and the reference of the relevant branch-
level accounting records. The comprehensiveness of balance sheets varies sig-
nicantly. What can be derived from all of them are the deposits to (or loans
from) the head oce, and loans to customers.
a. Net deposits to head oce are derived from gures on income from a branch's
head oce loans. I divide this gure by the average Bank of England rate for
the year, thus obtaining a balance. I base this choice on information from ma-
terial from Midland Bank archival collections: Analysis book containing details
of prot and loss, 1895-1911, UK 0548-0003, Midland Bank, HSBC Archives,
London.
b. Named Birmingham District and Counties Bank before 1907.
comprehensive.152 It shows that on average, branch expenses, current account
credit, and loans from (or deposits to) their head oces, were not correlated
with income tax assessments. Therefore, characteristics of bank oces did not
systematically vary between richer and poorer counties once they are averaged at
the county-level.
Figure 3.4b repeats the exercise by showing associations between a county's
bank oce characteristics and bank oces per square kilometre. The gure on
expenses reinforces the notion that branch expenses did not dier between counties
with more or less oces. Moreover, the protability (income to expenditure) of
branches did not, on average, dier between counties with many branches and
152. Approximately 6400 observations are available for these years for items pertaining to the
income statements.
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Figure 3.4: Correlation plots of average branch-level characteristics with per capita
income tax assessments and bank oces per square kilometre, 1900-1911
(a) Income tax assessments
(b) Bank oces per square kilometre
Note: The gures are based on data for the years 1900-1911, for which the sample coverage is
the most comprehensive.
counties with few branches. Of course, it is possible that a new branch might
initially have been protable, but that excess prots got competed away within
a 10-year span. The only characteristic that seems to be correlated with the
number of branches in a county is the amount of deposits transferred to the head
oce. This needs to be kept in mind when interpreting the results. It likely that
the areas with more activity by the largest commercial banks had more branches
but also more deposits transferred between bank oces. Indeed, as evidenced by
correlations in gure 3.4a, this eect was not driven by the wealth of dierent
counties. On balance, gure 3.4 reinforces the validity of the regressions outlined
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in section 3.4.
I have shown that examining the data at the county-level averages out much
of the heterogeneity in the business conduct of bank oces. But examining busi-
ness conduct at the branch level, where we do not aggregate the branch data
to the county level, can be used to gain further insights into what determined
the behaviour of bank branches. To do this, I use multilevel panel regressions.
This approach is necessary for analysing hierarchical data. Branch-level data is
grouped within counties, and counties constitute a higher hierarchical layer of the
data. Ignoring this structure would lead to a loss of statistical power, along with
potentially biased estimates of coecients and standard errors.153
Multilevel analysis is thus suitable for modelling the impact of branch and
county-level variables on given branch's business practices. In the regression equa-
tion, we separate the two levels of variables as follows:




countyzjt + γt + εijt (3.7)
where the dependent variable is yijt is an indicator for a bank oce's business
conduct. It is indexed by branch i, county j, and time t. The vector xijt contains
branch-specic variables observed each year, whereas zjt contains county-specic
variables, which are common to all branches within the same county. εijt is the
random disturbance, and γt represents year xed eects.
Table 3.9 shows results from regressions on factors associated with a branch's
net deposits to other branches (rst and second columns), protability (third
and fourth columns) and credit extended. I control for the size of a branch's
business by either its expenses or the amount of credit extended. As for the
county-level factors, I include per capita tax assessments; branches per square
kilometre; and the HHI. All of the data, except for HHI, income/expenditure and
the head oce net deposits ratios are in logarithms. The random eects part of
the regression can be used to infer to what extent yijt was inuenced by factors
on the county and branch-levels. The LR-test (results not shown) run against
153. See, for example: Joop J Hox, Multilevel Analysis: Techniques and Applications, 2nd ed.
(New York: Routledge, 2010), Chapters 1 and 2.
185
a regression without hierarchical error components indicates that the multilevel
mixed eects specication is appropriate.









Net prot Income to
expenditure
Credit
Branch-level variable (control for size)
Expenses -5.176 1.245 0.151 0.745




Tax pc 1.465 0.397 -0.142 -0.072 -0.191
(2.863) (0.146)*** (0.196) (0.165) (0.242)
HHI 2.637 -2.367 1.336 0.688 4.529
(17.570) (2.086) (0.705)** (0.399)* (0.844)***
Banks/sqkm -2.558 -0.324 -0.057 -0.002 -0.003
(3.094) (0.180)* (0.138) (0.115) (0.165)
Constant 43.489 4.456 -2.469 0.982 5.900
(16.378)*** (1.982)** (0.462)*** (0.225)*** (1.060)***
Random eects parameters
County-level
var(Const.) 83.249 0.089 0.155 0.034 0.239
(38.477) (0.034) (0.058) (0.012) (0.116)
Branch-level
var(Const.) 383.729 0.479 0.694 0.330 1.064
(57.116) (0.122) (0.117) (0.113) (0.370)
Residual
var(Resid.) 57.205 0.086 0.317 0.136 0.161
(6.214) (0.031) (0.030) (0.035) (0.025)
Eects Year Year Year Year Year
SE. cluster County County County County County
Note: Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses.
From the rst two columns, we obtain limited evidence that taxes per capita
and branch density were associated with net deposits to the head oce. The
associated coecients are signicant when head oce deposits is scaled by branch-
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level credit. However, credit data is available for fewer branches than data on
expenditure, making the sample size in the second column signicantly smaller.
The more reliable results are those in the rst column, which indicate that these
county-level variables were irrelevant for determining ows of resources to and
away from branches.
Results on factors associated with branch-level protability are reported in the
third and fourth columns. Both specications indicate that HHI was positively
correlated with branch protability. The coecients for HHI are large and signi-
cant: an increase in HHI by 0.01 points would increase prots by 1.3% and the
income/expenditure ratio by 0.7%. This supports the claim that HHI is associated
with the degree of competition in a banking market, and that bank oces were
able to generate higher prots when they faced fewer competitors nearby. Never-
theless, based on the results in the chapter, it does not appear that the eects of
concentration were large enough to translate into county-level economic growth.
Another interesting, albeit unexpected nding is that bank oces in counties
with less competition tended to extend more credit, even when the scale of their
operations is controlled for by expenses. This is dicult to explain. A viable
(but speculative) explanation is that there was an inverse `U-shaped' pattern for
concentration and credit, which is discussed in the literature review above. A very
high degree of concentration might lead banks to constrain credit while demanding
high rates. But if the starting point is a high level of competition, then a slight
decrease in the competitiveness of the local banking market increases the incentives
for banks to gather information. Better information on customers, in turn, leads
to higher lending.
Despite evidence that county-level factors impacted branch business conduct,
it is still clear form the `random eects' part of the panel that most of the variation
in branch conduct in a given year could be explained by branch-specic factors.
This is highlighted by the var(Const.) lines, which indicate how much of the
variance of the constant term occurred at each level of the equation. The variance








This chapter tests if provincial stock exchanges played a role in the eco-
nomic growth of British counties from 1870 to 1911. Econometric results
suggest that they did not. This is surprising, because several stock ex-
changes outside London during this period provided markets for securities
of local commercial enterprises. Historians have previously hypothesised
that this may have made them important for their local economies, but
this chapter is the rst to test these hypotheses empirically. The analysis
is based on new data on the paid-in capital of securities listed on provincial
exchanges, along with new geographically disaggregated data on provincial
stockbrokers.
4.1 Introduction
This chapter continues on the theme of regional nance and growth, focusing on
provincial stock markets instead of the banking system. The literature surveyed
in the previous chapter suggests that the growth of the local banking sector mat-
ters for local economic development. Information asymmetries arising from geo-
graphic distance play a signicant role in the nancing decisions by lenders, since
it becomes more dicult to monitor a borrower's actions and evaluate a rm's
prospects as distance increases. Similar phenomena have been found to exist in
the context of modern stock markets.1 According to this literature, being located
near stock markets makes it easier for rms to obtain nancing, which ultimately
contributes to local economic growth. It follows that there are reasonable grounds
to expect that British provincial exchanges contributed to economic development.
This chapter is the rst to formally test this hypothesis. It nds no evidence of
stock markets inuencing the economies of British counties.
1. Tim Loughran and Paul Schultz, `Liquidity: Urban Versus Rural Firms', Journal of Fin-
ancial Economics 78, no. 2 (2005): 341374; Ulf Nielsson and Dariusz Wójcik, `Proximity and
IPO Underpricing', Journal of Corporate Finance 38 (2016): 92105; Dariusz Wójcik, `Financial
Centre Bias in Primary Equity Markets', Cambridge Journal of Regions, Economy and Society
2, no. 2 (2009): 193209.
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British capital markets consisted of several stock exchanges from the early 19th
century until the 1970s. The London Stock Exchange (LSE) was by far the largest
of these institutions. It focused primarily on the trading of government debt and
the securities of large domestic and foreign companies. So far, the literature on
the role and development of British stock markets has focused on the LSE, while
relatively little has been written about the role of provincial markets.2 What makes
the latter exchanges interesting is that they provided markets for the securities
of smaller, local companies.3 The local nature of much of their activity, in turn,
makes it feasible to study the provincial exchanges' impact on local economies.4 A
study of provincial exchanges also contributes to a more comprehensive assessment
of the capital market's role in the British economy from 1870 to 1911.
Although there are no empirical studies on the economic impact of British
provincial exchanges, historians have highlighted their potential importance for
local industry. Thomas and Michie provide useful accounts of how these exchanges
functioned, along with their historical features.5 Michie suggests that provincial
exchanges encouraged investment in local companies, which might have increased
economic growth.6 Thomas made a similar argument, although he was careful
to note the lack of empirical evidence on their economic role.7 More recently,
Campbell et al. have used a new database to argue that both the size of the
provincial exchanges and the types of rms listed therein could have rendered
2. Ranald C Michie, `The London Stock Exchange and the British Securities Market 1850
1914', The Economic History Review 38, no. 1 (1985): 6182; Ranald C Michie, The London
Stock Exchange: A History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
3. Ranald C Michie, `The London and Provincial Stock Exchanges, 1799-1973: Separation, In-
tegration, Rivalry, Unity', in Enterprise and Management: Essays in Honour of Peter L. Payne,
ed. Peter Lester Payne, Derek Howard Aldcroft and Anthony Slaven (Aldershot: Scolar Press,
1995), 200-202.
4. Securities which were not purely local were also traded on these exchanges. Perhaps the
most prominent category of such securities were railway stocks. These are excluded from this
chapter's analysis.
5. William Thomas, Provincial Stock Exchanges (London: Cass, 1975); Michie, `British Se-
curities'. Michie's PhD thesis and related work gives a fairly comprehensive account on Scottish
stock exchanges in the 19th century. See: Ranald C Michie, `The Scottish Stock Exchanges in
the Nineteenth Century' (PhD diss., University of Aberdeen, 1978) ; Ranald C Michie, Money,
Mania and Markets: Investment, Company Formation and the Stock Exchange in Nineteenth-
Century Scotland (Edinburgh: John Donald, 1981).
6. Ibid., 234-235.
7. Thomas, Provincial , 129-139.
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them important for nancing domestic enterprises.8
Why might provincial stock exchanges matter for economic growth? In a world
where investors are perfectly informed about all investment opportunities, and
rms can easily access the capital markets regardless of their location, the loca-
tion of stock markets should not matter. Yet, even today, information asymmet-
ries arise through geographic distance, introducing distortions in capital markets.
This has meaningful implications for capital mobility and inequalities in regional
development.9
Wójcik outlines several factors relating to informational asymmetries, which
render rms located outside nancial centres less likely to receive public equity n-
ancing.10 Investors, who are disproportionately clustered around nancial centres,
nd it dicult to acquire insider knowledge about potential investments outside
these centres. Initial public oerings (IPOs) involve the collection of a large
amount of tacit information - information that cannot be easily transferred over a
distance through impersonal channels. This matters not just for the prospective
investor, who needs to have condence in a company's prospects, but also for who-
ever is bringing a company public. The 19th century company promoter had to
understand the latent demand for a security, and perhaps to have a circle of cus-
tomers who had agreed to buy the issue. All this required information which might
not have been easily available to investors located far away from the company or
the provincial stock exchange.
Tacit information probably played an even larger role in investment decisions
before WW1 than it does today, because nancial reporting requirements were
very light.11 At a time when fraud relating to promotional activities were com-
mon, investors had every reason to be suspicious of new companies being promoted,
particularly if they were far away. Impersonal information that investors received
8. Gareth Campbell, Meeghan Rogers and John D Turner, `The Rise and Decline of the UK's
Provincial Stock Markets, 1869-1929', Queen's University Centre for Economic History Working
Paper, no. 03 (2016).
9. Britta Klagge and Ron Martin, `Decentralized Versus Centralized Financial Systems: Is
There a Case for Local Capital Markets?', Journal of Economic Geography 5, no. 4 (2005): 387
421; Wójcik, `Financial Centre Bias'.
10. Ibid.
11. Julian Franks, Colin Mayer and Stefano Rossi, `Ownership: Evolution and Regulation',
Review of Financial Studies 22, no. 10 (2009): 40094056.
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about existing companies consisted of opaque accounts, which often provided lim-
ited information about the soundness of a rm's business practices or its leader-
ship.12
The principal-agent problem is also exacerbated by geographic distance.13 How
can a rm's owners induce managers to act in their best interests, when the two
are separated by a long distance, which renders monitoring more dicult? This is
an important topic in economic history.14 While several mechanisms to align the
interests of managers with those of owners have been devised throughout history,
these mechanisms have tended to be increasingly costly as the distance between
the two increases.15 A local investor base, built through provincial capital markets,
could reduce these problems by bringing the principals (owners) close to the agents
(company managers).
It is well documented today that investors show not only considerable bias in
favour of domestic companies and against foreign ones, but that they also prefer
local companies to distant (albeit domestic) ones.16 This might have to do with
geographical constraints on the spread of information. Investors who are located
near a company's headquarters or other operations tend to earn higher returns
12. See section 1.2.1.
13. Wójcik, `Financial Centre Bias'. This problem exists when the principal (a rm owner,
manager) cannot ensure that an agent (e.g. employee) is acting in his or her best interest.
14. For prominent examples, see e.g. Avner Greif, `Contract Enforceability and Economic
Institutions in Early Trade: The Maghribi Traders' Coalition', The American Economic Review,
1993, 525548 and Ann M Carlos, `Principal-Agent Problems in Early Trading Companies: A
Tale of Two Firms', The American Economic Review 82, no. 2 (1992): 140145.
15. In the context of 19th century joint-stock companies, this issue was often mitigated to the
extent that company directors retained large ownership shares even after a rm went public.
16. Joshua D Coval and Tobias J Moskowitz, `Home Bias at Home: Local Equity Preference in
Domestic Portfolios', The Journal of Finance 54, no. 6 (1999): 20452073; Mark Grinblatt and
Matti Keloharju, `How Distance, Language, and Culture Inuence Stockholdings and Trades',
The Journal of Finance 56, no. 3 (2001): 10531073; Loughran and Schultz, `Liquidity: Urban
Versus Rural Firms'.
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from that company's shares due to local information advantages.17 An important
source of these advantages arises through social interactions, which intensify with
geographic proximity, thus facilitating the transfer of tacit or insider knowledge.18
The theme of local information advantages and local bias is implicit in the
historical literature on regional nance. During the railway mania in 1845-1846,
local investors and insiders contributed a disproportionate amount of capital to
local railway undertakings.19 Before the 1880s, the shareholders of regional banks
were often local, because they may have had a better understanding of the bank's
business prospects and of its customers, due to their involvement with the local
business community.20 Using a large sample of investors in 1870-1930, Rutterford
et al. provide evidence of a substantial preference for local shares in historical
investor portfolios, both in London and the provinces.21 Investors thus appear
to have been more willing to invest in nearby undertakings, which might indicate
that they possessed information that investors elsewhere lacked.
By studying an under-researched part of the British nancial sector, this
chapter contributes to our understanding of Britain's regional nancial develop-
ment and the impact thereof. It also links to the broader historical literature
on regional stock exchanges, which has interesting parallels in the cases of Ger-
17. Joshua D Coval and Tobias J Moskowitz, `The Geography of Investment: Informed Trad-
ing and Asset Prices', Journal of Political Economy 109, no. 4 (2001): 811841; Zoran Ivkovi¢
and Scott Weisbenner, `Local Does as Local is: Information Content of the Geography of Indi-
vidual Investors' Common Stock Investments', The Journal of Finance 60, no. 1 (2005): 267
306; Gennaro Bernile, Alok Kumar and Johan Sulaeman, `Home Away from Home: Geography
of Information and Local Investors', Review of Financial Studies, 2015, 20092049. However,
Seasholes and Zhu nd no evidence of excess returns generated by local investors: Mark S Sea-
sholes and Ning Zhu, `Individual Investors and Local Bias', The Journal of Finance 65, no. 5
(2010): 19872010.
18. Lauren Cohen, Andrea Frazzini and Christopher Malloy, `The Small World of Investing:
Board Connections and Mutual Fund Returns', Journal of Political Economy 116, no. 5 (2008):
951979; Harrison Hong, Jerey D Kubik and Jeremy C Stein, `Thy Neighbor's Portfolio: Word-
Of-Mouth Eects in the Holdings and Trades of Money Managers', The Journal of Finance 60,
no. 6 (2005): 28012824.
19. Gareth Campbell and John D Turner, `Dispelling the Myth of the Naive Investor During
the British Railway Mania, 18451846', Business History Review 86, no. 01 (2012): 341.
20. Lucy Newton, `Regional BankIndustry Relations During the Mid-Nineteenth Century:
Links between Bankers and Manufacturing in Sheeld, C. 1850 to C. 1885', Business History
38, no. 3 (1996): 6483.
21. Janette Rutterford, Dimitris P Sotiropoulos and Carry van Lieshout, `Individual Investors
and Local Bias in the UK, 18701935', The Economic History Review 70, no. 4 (2017): 1291
1320.
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many, France and the US.22 Moreover, this chapter contributes a novel dataset on
the membership of provincial stock exchanges and the number of stockbrokers in
British counties (including brokers not aliated with stock exchanges). Combined
with gures on the paid-in capital of companies traded at provincial exchanges,
this data is used to provide the rst econometric tests on whether the development
of provincial stock markets contributed to the economies of British counties.
4.2 Provincial Stock Exchanges
Provincial stock exchanges started forming in the early 19th century, spurred by
high stock market valuations and a urry of IPOs. The railway manias of the
1830s and 1840s, which entailed several new railway otations, were particularly
important in this regard.23 The rst railway mania in the 1830s gave rise to the
Manchester and Liverpool exchanges, and the second railway boom in the 1840s
supported the establishment of exchanges in most major cities.24 After the spec-
ulative mania in railway shares came to a halt in 1846, trading activity on the
exchanges became subdued. But many of the exchanges remained intact, provid-
ing markets for existing railway shares and some corporate securities.25 It could
thus be argued that in this case, short term speculative bubbles had long term
eects on the UK's nancial landscape.
The UK had 11 provincial exchanges in 1873, and 23 by 1913. Most exchanges
formed in cities where a substantial amount of industrial capital had been cre-
ated during the country's early industrialisation.26 These cities had often a large
investor base and several rms looking to have their securities traded publicly. Fol-
22. Carsten Burhop, David Chambers and Brian Chens, `Regulating IPOs: Evidence from
Going Public in London, 19001913', Explorations in Economic History 51 (2014): 6076; Pierre-
Cyrille Hautcoeur and Angelo Riva, `The Paris Financial Market in the Nineteenth Century:
Complementarities and Competition in Microstructures', The Economic History Review 65, no.
4 (2012): 13261353; Eugene N White, `Competition Among the Exchanges before the SEC: Was
the NYSE a Natural Hegemon?', Financial History Review 20, no. 01 (2013): 2948.
23. John R Killick and William Thomas, `The Provincial Stock Exchanges, 18301870', The
Economic History Review 23, no. 1 (1970): 96111.
24. Thomas, Provincial , 28-29, 50-69. Stock exchanges were formed most notably in: Bristol;
Hull; Leeds; York; Birmingham; Nottingham; and Newcastle.
25. Killick and Thomas, `Provincial'.
26. Ibid.
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lowing the railway manias, exchanges did indeed facilitate the raising of capital
for new rms, but they would more commonly provide a market for the shares of
already established rms.27 Secondary markets for shares were in growing demand
after new legislation was passed in 1858, which made it possible for rms to be
converted to the limited liability joint-stock form.28 Conversions of rms to a new
form, along with a public placements of shares, would commonly happen after
previous owners had died or decided to diversify their interests. By the late 19th
century, it was inevitable that many rms founded during the industrial revolution
or the mid-Victorian period would see the rst (or second) generation of owners
die, without nding family members able or willing to continue their business.29
These mature companies had been formed during a time when legislation discour-
aged joint-stock enterprise, potentially creating latent demand for the services of
provincial exchanges once altering a rm's legal structure became easier.
Converting a private company to a public one does not in itself lead to new
capital being mobilised for investment. For example, large coal companies during
the late 19th century typically converted to the joint-stock limited liability form in
order to reduce the risks arising from unlimited liability to a small circle of owners,
rather than to raise new capital.30 Several companies issuing shares could thus re-
main relatively tightly controlled by the original owners even when the number of
minority shareholders grew, which led to few changes in their management prac-
tices.31 In such cases, oating shares to the public would not have led to improved
corporate governance, thereby limiting the contribution that stock exchanges made
to productivity growth. Yet once listed, companies would commonly use the stock
exchanges as venues for raising additional capital.32 Michie argues that merely
having traded securities on the secondary market encouraged new investment into
companies, because investors would nd it easier to sell their shares onwards.33
27. Michie, London Stock Exchange, 116-118.
28. Michael Edelstein, `Rigidity and Bias in the British Capital Market, 1870-1913', in Essays
on a Mature Economy: Britain after 1840, ed. D N McCloskey (New Jersey: Princeton University
Press, 1971), 83105.
29. Marianne V Pitts, `Did Dividends Dictate Depreciation in British Coal Companies 1864-
1914?', Accounting History 3, no. 2 (1998): 3767.
30. Ibid.
31. William Kennedy, Industrial Structure, Capital Markets, and the Origins of British Eco-
nomic Decline (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), Ch. 5.
32. Edelstein, `Rigidity', 86-88.
33. Michie, Money , 235.
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Companies which were already quoted also faced fewer institutional obstacles to
raising additional capital from the public. Minutes from the Birmingham stock
exchange show that new issues from existing rms could start trading easily, with
few deliberations by the managing committee of the exchange.34
By 1870, a substantial amount of provincial capital had been raised for railway,
banking and insurance companies. Throughout the subsequent period preceding
WW1, their securities constituted a large share of the capital that was quoted
on the provincial exchanges. Over time, however, the trading of these securities
gradually moved to London. This process was catalysed by companies growing
large enough to warrant sucient interest in London, or by them merging with
London-based rms.35 In the latter case, provincial exchanges would often continue
listing the shares of the London-based entities, but from the 1880s, a growing share
of new listings consisted of local commercial, industrial and mining enterprises.36
As this specialisation occurred, provincial markets became increasingly distinct
from London in the types of securities they traded.37
In the late 19th century, the cost of issuing shares was lowered by intensifying
competition between a growing number of company promoters.38 This provided
further encouragement for rms to issue shares to the public. Breweries became
a staple industry on several exchanges after seeing a wave of mergers and new
issues in the 1880s.39 Other industries, such as car and bike manufacturers, along
with electrical and lighting companies, also constituted a signicant share of new
listings around the turn of the century. Besides listing local shares, provincial
exchanges could also specialise on certain industries. For example, Manchester
tended to focus on textile rms, and Cardi on coal companies.40 In this vein, some
provincial listings could include companies that were not merely local. Particularly
34. Minutes, Birmingham Stock Exchange, April 2, 1901, MS 1598/1/4/8, Birmingham Stock
Exchange Collection, Library of Birmingham Archives.
35. Campbell, Rogers and Turner, `Rise'.
36. Michie, Money , 212-220.
37. Michie, `London and Provincial', 200-202.
38. Edelstein, `Rigidity', 88-89, 94.
39. Katherine Watson, `The New Issue Market as a Source of Finance for the UK Brewing and
Iron and Steel Industries, 18701913', in The Evolution of Financial Institutions and Markets
in Twentieth-Century Europe, ed. Youssef Cassis, Gerald D Feldman and Ulf Olsson (Aldershot:
Scolar Press, 1995), 211248.
40. Thomas, Provincial , Ch. 6.
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in Scotland, stock exchanges also provided markets for foreign securities. The
Economist wrote:
In Scotland, Glasgow is, of course, the most important exchange. It deals
freely in most Scotch stocks, especially, perhaps, in oil shares... Indian gold
and several copper mining shares also nd a congenial home at Glasgow. In
bank, insurance, and [typically American] land and cattle shares Edinburgh
probably does most business [in Scotland]. The rst-named form a really
important market, since the paid-up capital of the ten banks ocially quoted
amounts to over nine millions, and the market value to between three and
four times as much. The shares of the Scottish insurance companies also
form a large and important class of securities... As a whole, Edinburgh is a
more important centre for local stocks than Glasgow...41
The securities of local companies found their place on provincial exchanges for
several reasons. Small issues were often unmarketable in London, because few
brokers specialised in them, and they would be unlikely to attract much attention.
On larger exchanges such specialisation could draw certain types of securities from
afar. As The Economist wrote:
Those who regard our provincial Stock Exchanges as simply local mar-
kets for the circulation of local securities misjudge their position greatly.
Glasgow and Edinburgh, Manchester, Liverpool, and Dublin do, it is true,
aord facilities for local investments which London does not aord, but
they do much more than this, for there are many classes of securities which
London has never been induced to take up, or only to take up with an al-
together lukewarm advocacy, and they have consequently found a home in
the provinces.42
Indeed, obtaining quotations on the provincial markets was typically far easier
than in London, as fewer requirements were put on companies seeking to be lis-
ted.43 Local stock exchange members, who were brokers, were mainly concerned
with how actively a stock was traded, rather than its quality. After all, the brokers'
income depended on transaction volumes. With the safest and most well-known
stocks being traded in London, provincial brokers could not be as selective with
regards to their sources of commissions.
41. `Provincial Stock Exchange Securities.' The Economist, Saturday, October 2, 1886; p.
1223; Issue 2249.
42. `The Stock Markets of the United Kingdom.' The Economist, Saturday, April 19, 1884; p.
480; Issue 2121.
43. Thomas, Provincial , 34.
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As mentioned above, local investors were better able to assess the quality of
nearby issues than investors in London were. This is supported by evidence on
contemporary shareholder clientèles, and the preference that investors exhibited
for the shares of companies that operated in their vicinity.44 Although the London
Stock Exchange was linked by telegraph to virtually all the major British cities
by the 1850s, personal connections within the local business community would
have given provincial investors a distinct advantage in assessing the quality of a
security.45 Yet, if a rm's owner's circle of acquaintances found the rm particularly
good, this would naturally lead to smaller markets (or no public markets) for the
stock. As Francis Hirst, the editor of The Economist put it in 1913:
A really good thing from Glasgow or Yorkshire, or Lancashire, or the Mid-
lands, seldom comes to London to be oated on the public. The insiders
naturally keep it to themselves and their friends.46
Of course, provincial stock exchanges were not exempt from the institutional
weaknesses outlined in the rst chapter. The practices of dishonest promoters
could have increased public mistrust of new share issues, whereas a lack of report-
ing requirements and shareholder protection constrained investors' ability to im-
prove corporate governance.47 Yet, despite possible institutional weaknesses, pro-
vincial exchanges expanded rapidly over the late 19th century, which made them
an important part of the national capital market. Indeed, while they complemen-
ted the London stock exchange through their specialisation, provincial exchanges
also became increasingly integrated with the exchange in London and with each
other. This integration was spurred by better communications, which led to more
trading between exchanges, thereby increasing the liquidity of provincial markets
44. Graeme G Acheson, Gareth Campbell and John D Turner, `Who Financed the Expansion
of the Equity Market? Shareholder Clienteles in Victorian Britain', Business History 59, no. 4
(2017): 607637; Rutterford, Sotiropoulos and Lieshout, `Individual Investors and Local Bias'.
45. Michie, London Stock Exchange, 66, 71.
46. Francis W Hirst, The Stock Exchange (London: Willard & Norgate, 1913), 216. Quoted
in: Leslie Hannah, `Pioneering Modern Corporate Governance: A View from London in 1900',
Enterprise and Society 8, no. 3 (2007): 642686.
47. For a discussion, see: section 1.2.1. See also:Pitts, `Dividends'; Philip L Cottrell, Industrial
Finance, 1830-1914: The Finance and Organization of English Manufacturing Industry (London:
Methuen, 1980), 148-154; John Armstrong, `The Rise and Fall of the Company Promoter and
the Financing of British Industry', in Capitalism in a Mature Economy: Financial Institutions,
Capital Exports and British Industry, 1870-1939, ed. J J van Helten and Y Cassis (Cambridge:
Edward Elgar, 1990), 115138.
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while broadening their investor base.48 Campbell et al. substantiate these claims
by showing that the largest provincial exchanges had a relatively good levels of li-
quidity, which contrasts with arguments contained in earlier contributions.49 This
evidence of the provincial exchanges' importance in the nancial system under-
scores the need to understand their role in the economy more generally.
4.2.1 International Comparisons
The British provincial exchanges had many similarities with those in other coun-
tries in the 19th century. Findings from these cases can help us understand the
challenges faced by the British exchanges, especially as they became a part of an
increasingly integrated market, with London at its centre. Germany had 23 stock
exchanges in 1913, and as in Britain, smaller rms tended to be listed at provin-
cial exchanges. Larger rms were commonly listed in Berlin regardless of their
location, suggesting a role for local information advantages mainly in the cases
securities pertaining to small companies.50 A similar pattern emerged in 19th and
early 20th century French and US nancial markets, where markets were becom-
ing increasingly integrated, but where provincial exchanges retained their vitality
by focusing on providing markets for securities of smaller companies.51 These fea-
tures indicate that the British stock markets' specialisation in dierent types of
securities reected a general pattern that did not arise from factors specic to the
nation's nancial system.
Institutional factors could also contribute to the growth of provincial markets.
While the activity on the US stock markets tended to become increasingly concen-
trated to the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the ascent of companies in new
industries drew a large volume of trading to peripheral markets.52 This is partially
48. Michie, `London and Provincial', 205-209.
49. Campbell, Rogers and Turner, `Rise'. Cottrell had argued that illiquidity might have been
a signicant problem at these exchanges. See: Cottrell, Industrial Finance, 148-154.
50. Carsten Burhop and Sibylle Lehmann-Hasemeyer, `The Berlin Stock Exchange and the
Geography of German Stock Markets in 1913', European Review of Economic History 20, no. 4
(2016): 429451.
51. White, `Competition'; Jérémy Ducros and Angelo Riva, `The Lyon Stock Exchange: A




because the NYSE had strict listing standards, often requiring a track record of
protability and quarterly reports. At competing exchanges, requirements were
less stringent. White suggests that this has parallels with the British case, where
shares of riskier companies were often listed on the provincial exchanges, which
had lower listing requirements than the LSE.53 In this sense, provincial markets
functioned as a market for riskier and younger enterprises, akin to the LSE's Al-
ternative Investment Market (AIM) today.
In contrast to White's study, Burhop and Lehmann-Hasemeyer nd that dif-
ferences in the rules and regulations of provincial exchanges had little impact on
listing decisions in Germany.54 Instead, rm size tended to be the best predictor of
where rms were listed. In terms of information advantages, geographical factors
also made rms more likely to list on nearby German stock exchanges, but loc-
ation ceased to be a good predictor of listing decisions in the early 1900s. This
suggests that advances in communication made distance less of a factor in listing
decisions. Contrasting these ndings with the British case is interesting. While
data on paid-in capital shows that London was becoming more dominant, mem-
bership gures of provincial exchanges suggest that they retained their vitality till
the very end of the pre-WW1 era. One possible explanation for this discrepancy
could be that from the 1880s onwards, the LSE proved slower than some of its
counterparts in adopting new communications technologies.55
4.3 Data
4.3.1 Stock Exchange Members and Provincial Brokers
This chapter contributes new data on the number of members of British provincial
stock exchanges from 1875 to 1913. To the best of my knowledge, comprehensive
membership data has previously been collected only for the years 1911 and 1912.56
53. Ibid.
54. Burhop and Lehmann-Hasemeyer, `Berlin Stock Exchange'.
55. Michie, `British Securities'.
56. Philip L Cottrell, `Banking and Finance', in Atlas of Industrializing Britain, 1780-1914,
ed. John Langton and Robert John Morris (London: Methuen, 1986), 154-155.
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Stock exchange members were stockbrokers by their primary occupation.57 They
were either working individually or as partners of small rms.58 The membership
data presented here refers to the number of individual brokers aliated with a
given stock exchange, not the number of rms.
Since members were brokers, membership gures can provide a rough indic-
ator of the level of activity that took place at each exchange. Someone whose
sole occupation was stockbroking needed to generate sucient revenue to stay in
business, although some brokers may have been wealthy enough to ignore such
constraints. The membership gures are therefore likely to indicate a lower bound
for the activity on a stock market over the longer term. The data does not cap-
ture the yearly variance of activity on a particular stock exchange, as the number
of brokers was presumably somewhat unresponsive to yearly swings in trading
activity.
Several primary sources were used to create the dataset, but two sets of records
were particularly important. First, archival records of the Council of Associated
Stock Exchanges (henceforth also referred to as CASE) provide yearly gures of
members of most of the large stock exchanges from 1890 onwards.59 Second, the
Banker's Almanac reports the membership of a dierent set of exchanges from
1892 to 1914. It provides gures of several smaller stock exchanges which were
not aliated with the Council.60
For the years before 1890, the data is less comprehensive and contains gaps for
several exchanges. The archival collections of some provincial exchanges (Manchester,
Liverpool, Birmingham, Bristol, Sheeld and Leeds) provide yearly gures on
57. Thomas, Provincial , 17-24.
58. Figures from the United Kingdom Stock and Sharebrokers Directory suggest that brokerages
rarely exceeded 3 people who were members of an exchange.
59. Minutes, Council of Associated Stock Exchanges, 1890-1913, MS 332/LSE/4/2/1, Records
of the Liverpool Stock Exchange, Liverpool Record Oce.
60. A few larger exchanges, such as Manchester, were also unaliated with the Council when
it was founded in 1890.
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membership, which have been gathered from 1870 onwards.61 For other exchanges,
data was collected from the United Kingdom Stock and Sharebroker's Directory
from 1881 onwards, and The Country Stock Brokers Directory for 1875.62 For
most stock exchanges, the data thus covers the years 1875-1913. For exchanges
which were not members of CASE, the data is yearly from 1897. Before 1890,
observations from directories are available for the years 1875, 1880-1881 and 1885.
A glance at local trade directories suggested that these gaps would be dicult to
ll for the 1870s and 1880s. Indeed, Edelstein seems to have been able to compile
a very limited set of gures based on such sources.63
The membership gures are comparable across exchanges, given that most of
these institutions operated under similar rules. After 1890, rules were increasingly
set after consultations with the Council of Associated Stock Exchanges, which
was a body composed of provincial stock exchange committees, with the purpose
of standardising rules across exchanges.64 Two factors might aect this compar-
ability. First, outside (non-member) brokers were typically allowed to deal in
exchanges if they came from an area without a stock exchange. These outsiders
were generally seen as bringers of new business, and not as mere free-riders.65
Second, in some towns, a signicant amount of trading happened outside formal
exchanges.66
Table 4.1 shows the number of members of the largest stock exchanges.67 It
indicates that most exchanges retained their vitality over the two decades preced-
61. Committee Minutes, 1870-1913, MS 1598/1/4/1-13, Birmingham Stock Exchange Col-
lection, Library of Birmingham; Bristol Stock Exchange Monthly List, 1876-1903, MS
3810/6W/S/9, Sir George White Papers, Bristol Archives; Minutes, 1870-1913, B18/1/1/4-10,
Records of the Manchester Stock Exchange, Manchester Archives; Association Minutes, 1870-
1909, WYL543/2/2, Records of the Leeds Stock Exchange, West Yorkshire Archives, Leeds;
Minutes of the Committee, 1870-1913, MS 332/LSE/1/2/8-24, Records of the Liverpool Stock
Exchange, Liverpool Record Oce; Minutes and Annual Statements of Accounts, 1870-1912,
LD2007/1/1-2, Records of the Sheeld Stock Exchange, Sheeld Archives.
62. The Country Stock Brokers' Directory (London: E. W. Allen, 1875); The United Kingdom
Stock and Sharebrokers' Directory (London: W. J. Adams & Son). Various years, 1881-1913.
63. Edelstein, `Rigidity', Table 1.
64. Minutes, Council of the Associated Stock Exchanges, May 9, 1890, Records of the Liverpool
Stock Exchange, 332 LSE/4/2/1, Liverpool Record Oce.
65. Thomas, Provincial , 198.
66. Ibid., 148-149.
67. Belfast did not have a formal exchange before 1897, but it still had a group of brokers who
regularly met in order to trade securities.
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ing WW1. The major exchanges in Glasgow, Edinburgh, Birmingham, Liverpool
and Manchester experienced an increase in brokers in 1897-1913. Some smaller
ones, such as Leeds and Newcastle, grew very quickly, albeit from a low starting
point.
Table 4.1: Membership of provincial stock exchanges, 1875-1913




Glasgow 61 118 166 226 263 172% 58%
Liverpool 102 152 140 153 175 37% 25%
Manchester 50 79 90 101 106 80% 18%
Dublin 47 61 80 89 88 70% 10%
Edinburgh 24 45 57 74 69 138% 21%
Birmingham 11 18 37 48 63 236% 70%
Sheeld 26 29 34 32 42 31% 24%
Newcastle 9 8 5 14 33 -44% 560%
Bristol 10 11 27 30 31 170% 15%
Belfast 12 19 32 33 30 167% -6%
Leeds 22 13 15 20 30 -32% 100%
Cork 4 8 26 24 23 550% -12%
Dundee 8 10 11 16 19 38% 73%
Cardi 0 5 14 26 17 NA 21%
Hudderseld 3 6 10 8 17 233% 70%
Aberdeen 11 15 15 13 14 36% -7%
Greenock 2 5 5 12 12 150% 140%
Bradford 7 9 16 14 11 129% -31%
Halifax 11 6 13 9 8 18% -38%
Total 420 617 793 942 1051 89% 33%
London 1979 2608 3962 5463 4855 100% 23%
The exchanges are ordered by the number of members in 1913.
Sources: The Banking Almanac, issues between 1892-1913. Stock Exchanges
of The United Kingdom. Supplemented by records of the Council of Asso-
ciated Stock Exchanges for years after 1890. The United Kingdom Stock
and Sharebrokers Directory was used for the years 1885 to 1892, and The
Country Stock Brokers Directory for the year 1875. No issue of the former
is available for 1895 so 1897 was used instead.
In aggregate, the membership of provincial and London exchanges grew at
roughly the same rate, although London started from a signicantly higher posi-
tion. This is shown in gure 4.1. The line corresponding to the right axis shows
the ratio of provincial stock exchange members to members of the LSE. It indic-
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ates that throughout 1875-1913, the LSE's membership was approximately four
to ve times larger than that of the provincial stock exchanges. There was no
easily discernible trend in this ratio. It can thus be concluded that provincial
exchanges did not fade into irrelevance during the period, but grew in line with
the (remarkable) growth rate of the LSE at least until 1913.
This nding is at odds with previous arguments about the activity and relative
importance of provincial exchanges. Thus far, it has been thought that their
decline began around 1900. This is when telephones linked provincial brokers
with the LSE. Although better communications contributed to the integration
of provincial and London markets, they also helped channel more business to
London.68 Campbell et al., in turn, argue that the relative decline after 1900 was
caused by the trading of larger companies - such as banks and railways - moving
to London.69 However, to the extent that membership data is a better measure of
trading activity than stock exchange listings, the ndings in gure 4.1 suggest a
need to revise these arguments.
Figure 4.1: Comparison of membership of London and provincial exchanges, 1875-
1913
Source: See text. The lines are smoothed for purposes of clarity and missing observations in the
earlier part of the sample.
68. Michie, `British Securities', 70-75.
69. Campbell, Rogers and Turner, `Rise'.
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A further contribution of this chapter is data on provincial stockbrokers in
general - including ones unaliated with formal exchanges. The sources used
for this are the United Kingdom Stock and Sharebrokers Directory for the years
1881 to 1913, and The Country Stock Brokers Directory for 1875. As is the case
with stock exchange membership gures, the data does contain gaps before 1897,
as directories were not published annually. Moreover, the data in 1875 covers
signicantly fewer British towns than data after 1881.
Table 4.2 shows the number of stockbrokers in counties with more than 20
brokers in 1913. It tells two stories. First, it reinforces the notion that most
counties did not have very active stock markets in the 1870s or the 1880s. Only a
handful of counties had more than 10 stockbrokers in 1875, and these tended to be
the ones with existing stock exchanges. On the other hand, it shows a signicant
expansion in the number of brokers in most of these counties from 1875 to 1913.
The number of brokers in Glamorgan (Cardi) grew signicantly after a local
stock exchange was formed in 1886. On the other hand, the increase in brokers in
Fife and Dumfries appears to have occurred largely in the absence of formal stock
exchanges.
Little is known about brokers who were unaliated with stock exchanges.
According to the data, most British counties had at least a few local stockbrokers
by the 1890s, even though they did not have an exchange. It is dicult to answer to
what extent these individuals were engaged in local informal securities markets,
which Michie considers to have been important in this period.70 For example,
Dundee in the 1870s had a signicant market for locally held shares without a
centralised exchange.71 Yet, had a local informal market been illiquid, we would
expect fewer specialised intermediaries (brokers) to have been active, since there
would have been a limited pool of commission fees to support their incomes. In
illiquid markets, it is more probable that many provincial brokers acted also as
conduits for the investment of local capital into larger and more distant markets.
As communication links improved, investors could rely on brokers in nancial
centres, but may still have preferred local brokers due to the personal contact or
70. Ranald C Michie, The London and New York Stock Exchanges 1850-1914 (London: Allen
& Unwin, 1987), 108-109.
71. Michie, Money , 171.
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Table 4.2: Number of stockbrokers by county, 1875-1913




Lancaster 182 314 362 434 503 99% 39%
Lanark 61 127 169 232 269 177% 59%
York 103 107 161 192 223 56% 39%
Dublin 47 61 80 91 86 70% 8%
Warwick 16 28 46 81 84 188% 83%
Edinburgh 24 45 54 77 76 125% 41%
Gloucester 11 16 40 52 55 264% 38%
Northumberland 9 9 16 23 44 78% 175%
Glamorgan 1 9 20 48 43 1900% 115%
Fife 1 0 1 30 40 0% 3900%
Belfast 12 19 35 40 39 192% 11%
Forfar 11 14 23 34 39 109% 70%
Perthshire 3 2 6 24 35 100% 483%
Durham 9 11 16 24 31 78% 94%
Cumberland 12 13 23 28 27 92% 17%
Dumfriesshire 1 2 2 18 27 100% 1250%
Hampshire 4 7 14 21 27 250% 93%
Cork 4 8 18 26 25 350% 39%
Aberdeen 11 15 17 19 22 55% 29%
Lincoln 5 5 7 12 20 40% 186%
Nottingham 10 7 9 17 20 -10% 122%
Renfrewshire 3 6 11 20 20 267% 82%
The table shows the number of brokers in all counties, which had more than 20
brokers in 1913.
Sources: United Kingdom Stock and Sharebrokers Directory for the years 1881
to 1912, and The Country Stock Brokers Directory for the year 1875. No issue
of the former is available for 1895, so data for 1897 is presented instead.
the convenience that they provided.72
Panel (a) in gure 4.2 maps the number of provincial brokers in each county in
1910.73 The brokers are concentrated in the counties with formal stock exchanges.
Agricultural regions, such as Wales outside Cardi (Glamorgan), along with the
East of England and South Eastern regions all tended to have very few brokers.
72. Ibid., 172-174.
73. There are no major dierences in the spatial distribution of stockbrokers between 1890 and










































Given the high variation in population densities between Scottish counties, it is
not surprising that most of the activity concentrated around Edinburgh, Glasgow
and Aberdeen. On a per capita basis, however, even relatively sparsely populated
counties in Scotland tended to have more brokers than rural counties in England
and Wales. This is shown in panel (b) of gure 4.2.
4.3.2 Paid-in Capital
In addition to the membership data, this chapter also uses paid-in capital as
a measure of the development of provincial exchanges. Paid-in capital is the
amount of capital that a company has raised from its shareholders. The series has
the advantage of being available at a yearly frequency from 1870, which makes
it suitable for an alternative econometric approach. It also allows us to focus
on classes of securities which might have been particularly important for local
economies.
The data source on paid-in capital of stocks listed on each exchange is the In-
vestor's Monthly Manual (IMM), which is used in the rst chapter above.74 Data
from this publication is made available by the Yale International Center for Fin-
ance.75 Besides paid-in capital, the IMM provides information on the exchanges
where given securities were primarily traded. It is likely that the IMM omits
exchanges where a share had a secondary listing, but did not have active mar-
kets. This can render the data more informative about the activity on individual
markets.76
The IMM data has been used by Campbell et al. to describe characteristics
of the provincial markets, such as the number of shares listed on each exchange
and the market capitalisation thereof.77 According to the authors, the IMM con-
tains the most comprehensive available statistics on securities listed on provincial
74. See the rst chapter for details about how the data was cleaned.
75. Yale International Center for Finance, London Stock Exchange Project, Yale School of
Management, 2017, https://som.yale.edu/faculty-research/our-centers-initiatives/
international-center-finance/data/historical-financial-research-data/london-
stock-exchange, accessed: 22 December 2017.
76. Campbell, Rogers and Turner, `Rise'.
77. Ibid.
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exchanges. But the gures are not complete. Ocial lists of provincial stock
exchanges often contain slightly wider sets of securities, although these are not
available for all years or all exchanges.78 Additionally, the trading of the securities
of several smaller rms was done by special settlement, even though these securit-
ies were not regularly quoted on the exchanges. Special settlement refers to cases
where a non-listed rm seeks to have its shares quoted on a stock exchange.79 On
provincial exchanges, rms could seek to have their shares traded for a certain
period, and all transactions would be settled on specic days. Even with these
caveats, the IMM appears to be by far the best available source of the listings on
provincial exchanges.
The following categories of stocks are excluded from the statistical analysis:
1. Foreign companies;
2. British companies operating mostly or solely abroad (e.g. mining or land
investment companies);
3. Banks and insurance companies;
4. Railroads
The securities that are included are referred to as `industrial and commercial'
securities, following the LSE's denitions.
Banks, insurance and railway companies are excluded, because these industries
went through a waves of mergers during the period in question, which drew much
of the dealing in these rms' securities away from the provinces to London. As
mentioned above, it was common for the securities of the new, merged, entities
to remain listed in the provinces for some time, even though the primary market
moved to London.80 Including railway and banking securities would show up
as a series of large and abrupt declines in the paid-in capital of the provincial
markets.81 Multiple large breaks in the series, in turn, would render this chapter's
78. Monthly Share Lists, 1884-1894, WYL543/7/1, Records of the Leeds Stock Exchange, West
Yorkshire Archives, Leeds; Bristol Stock Exchange Monthly List, 1876-1903, MS 3810/6W/S/9,
Sir George White Papers, Bristol Archives.
79. Burhop, Chambers and Chens, `Regulating IPOs'.
80. Campbell, Rogers and Turner, `Rise'.
81. This is because, as mentioned earlier, the IMM only lists the markets where a stock was
actively traded.
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econometric results highly inaccurate.
An additional reason for excluding the aforementioned classes of securities has
to do with the scope of their operations. Banks and railways may have operated
only locally when they were formed. But as many of these companies started
operating at a national scale in the late 19th century, it becomes less clear how
their growth contributed to the economies in their counties of origin. For example,
if a bank being listed and operating in Liverpool were to merge with a bank in
Leicester, its paid-in capital could increase substantially. Yet, this increase in
paid-in capital would probably not be commensurate with either how the Liver-
pool Stock Exchange functioned, or the expansion of local economic activity in
Lancashire
Some foreign entities were also listed on provincial exchanges, although much
of the dealing in these securities took place in London. They are excluded, because
the way in which these companies could contribute to local economic growth in
Britain is unclear. The motivation follows that given in the rst chapter, along
with the similar line of reasoning in a study by Nieuwerburgh et al. on the histor-
ical economic impact of the Belgian stock market.82
Figure 4.3 shows the paid-in capital of industrial and commercial companies
on the 10 largest provincial stock exchanges from 1870 to 1913. The source of this
data only lists where a given company's shares were `chiey traded'. This means
it did not attach certain securities to markets where they were listed, but did not
have active markets. Securities could be chiey traded on several exchanges, and
the data in the gure is not adjusted for this.
Figure 4.3 suggests that the markets for commercial and industrial shares ex-
perienced strong growth on most exchanges only from the 1880s or the 1890s
onwards. Based on this observation, it is dicult to argue that these securities
played an important role on most exchanges in the 1870s. In 1870, the com-
bined paid-in capital of domestic industrial and commercial rms on provincial
exchanges was about ¿45 million. Tax assessments on that year's prots from
businesses and highly paid occupations in Lancashire alone (schedules D and E)
82. Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh, Frans Buelens and Ludo Cuyvers, `Stock Market Development
and Economic Growth in Belgium', Explorations in Economic History 43, no. 1 (2006): 1338.
211
Figure 4.3: Paid-in capital of commercial and industrial companies on the main
provincial exchanges, 1870-1913
Note: Data in 5-year intervals starting from 1870 for the sake of clarity, although data from
1913 is included. The gures include securities which are listed on multiple exchanges. Belfast
did not have a formal stock exchange before 1897.
was about ¿27.5m.83 We may therefore question the relevance of these exchanges
for local growth before the 1880s. However, it should also be noted that before the
1890s, a substantial amount of activity on these exchanges took place in securities
not included in the commercial and industrial category.84
Figure 4.4 compares the paid-in capital of industrial and commercial securit-
ies on London and the Provincial Exchanges. The growth of the LSE was very
substantial indeed, but provincial exchanges were by no means suddenly sidelined
by it before 1913 when it came to domestic industrial securities. Nevertheless,
their importance relative to London declined gradually. The paid-in capital of
industrial and commercial securities on provincial exchanges was between 40 and
50% of that listed in London before 1885; 30 to 40% until 1910; and less than 30%
subsequently. On the other hand, data on stockbrokers (discussed above) gives no
83. See previous chapter for discussion on tax schedules.
84. Sheeld Stock Exchange Monthly List, 1884-1914, SY583/B1/1-4, Records of the Sheeld
Stock Exchange, Sheeld Archives. See also: Campbell, Rogers and Turner, `Rise'.
212
indication of a relative decline: the ratio of stockbrokers in the provinces relative
to London remained constant at around 0.2-0.25.85
Figure 4.4: Paid-in capital of commercial and industrial companies on the London
and provincial stock exchanges, 1870-1913
Note: The gures include securities which are listed on multiple exchanges. The black line is
the ratio between provincial and London stock exchanges.
The membership data in section 4.3.1 also diverges from the paid-in capital
series in some other respects. For example, the paid-in capital of Manchester's
commercial and industrial companies was substantially larger than that of Liv-
erpool, although Liverpool had more members. Of course, this might in part be
due to deciencies in the underlying data. But this divergence is more likely to be
the result of dierences in the features of these stock exchanges. Liverpool listed
several railway, nancial and even some overseas securities, which are excluded
from my sample. Manchester did so to a much lesser extent.86 More broadly,
the divergence between the gures on membership and the paid-in capital in the
1870s and 1880s can be explained by similar factors: provincial stock exchanges
tended to focus on provincial nancial and infrastructure-related securities before
commercial and industrial shares became listed to a greater extent in the 1890s.87
85. See: gure 4.1.
86. Liverpool Stock Exchange, The Centenary Book of the Liverpool Stock Exchange, 1836-1936
(Liverpool, 1936); Thomas, Provincial , 118-120.
87. Campbell, Rogers and Turner, `Rise'.
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4.4 Empirical Methodology and Results
This section consists of two parts. The rst part shows that the number of pro-
vincial brokers did not matter for local economic growth in British counties. The
second part is based on an empirical examination of new data on paid-in capital
for a narrower sample of counties with large stock exchanges. The results indicate
that provincial stock exchanges did not inuence local economic growth.
4.4.1 The Role of Provincial Brokers
This section examines the link between provincial brokers (including brokers un-
aliated with exchanges) and local economic growth. As a proxy for county-level
economic growth, I use income tax assessments per capita, used also in the pre-
vious chapter.88 The results are derived using dynamic panel methods, which are
also applied (and described) in the chapter above.89 The approach mitigates the
problem of endogeneity in the growth of stock markets. An obvious source of
endogeneity is that areas with less active stock markets may have fewer promising
rms, leading to less investor interest. Alternatively, a county may have had fewer
brokers because its rms had less demand for external nance. These possibilities
make it dicult to distinguish causality from correlation using simpler models.
Because the data on provincial brokers represents most British towns only
from 1881 onwards, the regressions below use data from 1881 to 1911. In the
sample, only 16 counties in England and Wales had more than 5 stock brokers in
1885. Only these counties are included in the rst set of regressions on brokers
and local tax assessments. Aside from stockbrokers, the data used in these re-
gressions is as described in the previous chapter, summarised in table 3.1. The
variable for the number of stockbrokers per capita in each county is dened as
Ln(numberofstockbrokers/(population ∗ 106)).
As in the previous chapter, the dynamic panel regression equation is as follows:
88. See section 3.3.3 for a discussion.
89. See section 3.4.
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∆yi,t = α + x
′
i,tβ + γyi,t−1 + µi + λt + εit (4.1)
∆yi,t is the growth of per capita income tax assessments in county i at time t.
xi,t includes: stock brokers per capita; banks per square kilometre; and the length
of railways per square kilometre.
Columns 1 and 2 in table 4.3 report ndings from xed eects panel regressions
(abbreviated as `OLS FE'), which do not account for endogeneity. The ndings
in these columns thus lack a causal interpretation, and the results are biased due
to the inclusion of lagged dependent variables. The results reported in columns 3
and 4 are derived from models which correct for this issue using GMM estimation.
In these models, the data is transformed into forward orthogonal deviations, and
the matrix of instruments is collapsed to reduce small-sample bias.90
The results in table 4.3 provide no evidence of stock market-led growth. The
number of brokers correlated with county-level growth, as suggested by column 1.
However, results in columns 3 and 4 show that the number of brokers did not have
a causal impact on local growth. The sample here is truncated - we essentially test
`how much do stock brokers matter for growth, given that a county already has 5
brokers at the start of the sample'. As a robustness check, it is worth examining
stock markets and growth across all counties - even ones without brokers.
Table 4.4 displays regression results based on data from all counties in England
and Wales, from 1881 onwards. Here, the number of brokers in counties without
brokers in a given year has been set to 1. This exercise yields ndings similar to
those reported in table 4.3. There is now stronger evidence for correlation between
the number of stockbrokers per capita and county-level growth (columns 1-2), but
no evidence of causality (columns 3-4). However, one must keep in mind that we
90. David Roodman, `A Note on the Theme of Too Many Instruments', Oxford Bulletin of Eco-
nomics and statistics 71, no. 1 (2009): 135158; Kazuhiko Hayakawa, `First Dierence or Forward
Orthogonal Deviation - Which Transformation should be Used in Dynamic Panel Data Models?:
A Simulation Study', Economics Bulletin 29, no. 3 (2009): 20082017; Manuel Arellano and
Olympia Bover, `Another Look at the Instrumental Variable Estimation of Error-Components
Models', Journal of Econometrics 68, no. 1 (1995): 2951.
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Table 4.3: Stockbrokers and county-level economic growth. Re-
gressions on data covering 16 counties in England and Wales,
1881-1911
1 2 3 4
Brokers pc 0.023 0.021 0.029 -0.026
(0.013)* (0.015) (0.039) (0.093)
Railways per sq km 0.061 0.039 0.080 0.953
(0.046) (0.054) (0.268) (0.850)
Tax pc, lag 1 -0.060 -0.064 -0.088 -0.026
(0.026)** (0.027)** (0.075) (0.093)




Hansen's J-statistic 7.83 9.17
p-value of J-statistic 0.166 0.164
Specication OLS FE OLS FE GMM GMM
The dependent variable is the growth in income tax assessments per cap-
ita. The data is in 5-year non-overlapping averages. Standard errors in
parentheses. * and ** indicate p-values of the corresponding t-statistics
of less than 0.1 and 0.05, respectively. The sample includes 16 counties
in England and Wales. Columns 1-2 are results from xed-eects panel
regression, with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. Columns 3-4
are GMM regressions where the equation is transformed to forward or-
thogonal deviations. The instrument matrix, based on the explanatory
variables, is collapsed and in backward orthogonal deviations. Wind-
meijer (2005) robust standard errors are reported for GMM estimators.
are dealing with data with a few gaps on the number stockbrokers in more rural
counties, which can lower the reliability of the inference.
Expanding the sample to include Scottish counties provides still stronger evid-
ence of correlation between the number of stock brokers and the growth of tax
assessments per capita. These results are reported in table 4.5. But as with pre-
vious tables, the results do not indicate that this association was causal, as shown
in columns 3 and 4.
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Table 4.4: Stockbrokers and county-level economic growth. Regres-
sions on data covering all counties in England and Wales from 1881
to 1911
1 2 3 4
Brokers pc 0.019 0.017 0.004 0.003
(0.007)** (0.007)** (0.011) (0.014)
Railways per sq km 0.083 0.027 -0.049 -0.068
(0.021)*** (0.031) (0.091) (0.184)
Tax pc, lag 1 -0.056 -0.066 0.082 0.058
(0.011)*** (0.011)*** (0.075) (0.101)
Banks per sq km 0.021 0.005
(0.009)** (0.032)
Constant -0.349 -0.111 0.106 0.225
(0.096)*** (0.135) (0.370) (0.701)
Hansen's J-statistic 1.3 2.940
p-value of J-statistic 0.728 0.567
AR(2) test p-value 0.071 0.072
Specication OLS FE OLS FE SGMM SGMM
The dependent variable is the growth in income tax assessments per capita.
Standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate p-values of the cor-
responding t-statistics of less than 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. Columns
1-2 are results from xed-eects panel regression, with heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors. Columns 3-4 report System-GMM regressions with
the rst lags of dependent variables used as instruments. Windmeijer (2005)
robust standard errors are reported for GMM estimators.
4.4.2 Provincial Exchanges and Growth
Did formal stock exchanges have dierent eects on local economies, beyond what
markets composed of individual brokers had? This subsection focuses only on
counties with signicant stock exchanges. I dene `signicant' exchanges as ones
with at least ¿1 million of paid-in capital throughout 1870-1911, in securities not
relating to railways, rms operating abroad, banks or insurance companies. I
also add Warwickshire to the sample, where the paid-in capital of the Birming-
ham stock exchange crossed this threshold in the early 1870s. The econometric
results are robust to the exclusion of this county. The criterion leaves us with
7 counties: Lanarkshire (Glasgow) and Edinburgh in Scotland; along with Lan-
cashire; Northumberland; Gloucester; Warwickshire; and Yorkshire in England.
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Table 4.5: Stockbrokers and county-level economic growth. Regres-
sions on data covering all counties in Britain from 1881 to 1911
1 2 3 4
Brokers pc 0.011 0.010 0.013 0.007
(0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.014) (0.008)
Railways per sq km 0.045 0.031 0.041 0.024
(0.014)*** (0.014)** (0.048) (0.059)
Tax pc, lag 1 -0.033 -0.040 0.084 0.032
(0.007)*** (0.008)*** (0.062) (0.064)
Banks per sq km 0.015 -0.031
(0.006)** (0.022)
Constant -0.171 -0.132 -0.340 -0.090
(0.060)*** (0.057) (0.309) (0.408)
Hansen's J-statistic 2.810 2.120
p-value of J-statistic 0.423 0.347
AR(2) test p-value 0.293 0.077
Specication OLS FE OLS FE SGMM SGMM
Specications are as in table 4.4.
There are advantages to focusing on large stock exchanges. First, it makes it
possible to use annual data on paid-in capital, rather than data on stock exchange
membership, to examine the economic role of provincial exchanges. Compared to
the membership data, the higher annual variance in paid-in capital allows us to
make better use of the time series dimension of the data. Second, these were the
only places where a large volume of transactions in a wide variety of securities
could take place. Third, the function of stockbrokers in smaller towns is some-
what ambiguous: to what extent did they support local capital markets versus
channelling business to larger exchanges? Organised stock markets may therefore
have diered signicantly from informal stock markets in terms of their economic
role.
The dynamic panel GMM methods used in the previous section are not ap-
plicable here given the smaller sample of counties. This is because the GMM
estimators are mainly intended for cases where the number of cross-sectional ob-
servations relative to the time-dimension is large (i.e. large N, small T cases).
These methods would yield very biased estimates in samples of less than 10 cross-
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sectional units (counties).
An alternative approach is to make greater use of the time-dimension of the
data. This can be done by working with tools from multiple time series economet-
rics applied to panel data, which make it possible to deal with endogeneity in a
convenient way. The panel VAR approach has been used by several authors in the
nance-growth literature.91 This chapter uses the Dumitrescu and Hurlin test for
Granger-causality in heterogeneous panels.92 The intuition of this method is the
same as for Granger-causality for individual time-series.93 That is to say, if past
information about stock markets helps predict subsequent economic growth, then
stock markets are said to Granger-cause growth.
Paid-in capital divided by tax assessments is used as the indicator for stock
market development. The data is in nominal terms, as deating the data for each
county with the same price index would introduce articial co-movement between
series pertaining to dierent counties. This would bias our results from models
which take cross-sectional dependence into account. The results are also robust to
using paid-in capital divided by a county's population as the indicator for stock
markets.
The model on which the panel Granger-causality tests are based is constructed
as follows. Let Taxpci,t be the per capita income tax assessment in county i
at time t, and KtoTaxi,t be the paid-in capital on a county's stock exchanges
divided by the county's income tax assessments.94 Let yi,t = [Taxpci,t, KtoTaxi,t]′
be the vector of dependent variables. For each county i = 1, 2...N we estimate the
following vector autoregressive (VAR) model with ρ lags:
91. See, for example: Dimitris K Christopoulos and Efthymios G Tsionas, `Financial Develop-
ment and Economic Growth: Evidence from Panel Unit Root and Cointegration Tests', Journal
of Development Economics 73, no. 1 (2004): 5574; Inessa Love and Lea Zicchino, `Financial
Development and Dynamic Investment Behavior: Evidence from Panel VAR', The Quarterly
Review of Economics and Finance 46, no. 2 (2006): 190210; Nikolay Hristov, Oliver Hülsewig
and Timo Wollmershäuser, `Loan Supply Shocks During the Financial Crisis: Evidence for the
Euro Area', Journal of International Money and Finance 31, no. 3 (2012): 569592.
92. Elena-Ivona Dumitrescu and Christophe Hurlin, `Testing for Granger Non-Causality in
Heterogeneous Panels', Economic Modelling 29, no. 4 (2012): 14501460.
93. See section 1.5.1 in the rst chapter.
94. The tax assessments are dened in section 3.3.3.
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yi,t = αi,t +
ρ∑
j=1
Bi,jyi,t−j + ui,t (4.2)
Where Bi,j is a 2 × 2 matrix of coecients, αi,t is a corresponding vector of
constants and ui,t are the error terms. In system 4.2, the equation for taxes per
capita can be written as follows:






b12,i,jKtoTaxi,t−j + u1,i,t (4.3)
Dene b12,i = [b12,i,1....b12,i,ρ]′. This is the vector of coecients for paid-in
capital divided by taxes, that enters the equation for tax assessments per capita.
If the coecient is zero, for all lags and counties, then we say that stock markets
did not Granger-cause local income tax assessments. This is the null hypothesis
(H0) of the causality test. The alternative hypothesis (H1) is that stock markets
Granger-caused tax assessments at least in some counties.
The hypotheses can be written more formally as follows. Let the number of
counties in which Granger-causality does not exist be denoted by N1, and the total
number of counties by N . Dumitrescu and Hurlin dene the null hypothesis (H0)
and the alternative (H1) as:
H0 : b12,i = 0 ∀ i = 1, ..., N (4.4)
H1 : b12,i = 0 ∀ i = 1, ..., N1 (4.5)
b12,i 6= 0 ∀ i = N1 + 1, N1 + 2, ..., N (4.6)
Where ∀ denotes `for all'. The null hypothesis says that we infer non-causality
if paid-in capital could not predict tax assessments anywhere.
A distinct advantage of panel Granger-causality testing is that it has higher
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statistical power relative to a test based on a single county. The likelihood of
arriving at the correct inference is thus higher. The approach has seen wide-
spread use in recent years, especially in the context of energy economics.95 The
Dumitrescu and Hurlin test allows for heterogeneity in the nance-growth rela-
tionships between counties, and has good small-sample properties.96 According
to the authors' results from Monte-Carlo simulations, the test has high power in
samples similar to the one used here, where the number of cross-sectional units is
larger than 5, and where the number of time periods is higher than 25.
Before testing for panel Granger-causality, it is necessary to test whether the
time series have unit roots, or if they display explosive behaviour. When the
cross-sectional dimension is small and the time-dimension of the panel is reason-
ably large, we can apply standard unit root tests for single time series.97 Both the
Augmented Dickey-Fuller and PhillipsPerron tests reject the null hypothesis of
stationarity for all counties at a p-value below 0.05. Therefore, the data is conver-
ted into dierences for the Dumitrescu and Hurlin test, which requires the series
to be stationary.
The number of cross-sectional observations in the dataset limits the applicab-
ility of panel unit root tests. For example, the widely used test by Pesaran would
have low power in a sample with less than 10 counties.98 However, the Costantini
and Lupi panel unit root test is applicable even in the present case.99 This test
does not reject the null hypothesis that the series have unit roots, yielding a p-
value of 0.36 for the tax series and 0.39 for the paid-in capital series. The test is
able to deal with potential correlation between the tax incomes or stock markets
across various counties, thereby yielding more reliable results than standard unit
root tests applied to individual counties. The result thus reinforces the need to
95. See, for example: Mita Bhattacharya et al., `The Eect of Renewable Energy Consumption
on Economic Growth: Evidence from Top 38 Countries', Applied Energy 162 (2016): 733741;
Wendy N Cowan et al., `The Nexus of Electricity Consumption, Economic Growth and CO 2
Emissions in the BRICS Countries', Energy Policy 66 (2014): 359368 and references therein.
96. Dumitrescu and Hurlin, `Granger Non-Causality'.
97. Jörg Breitung and M Hashem Pesaran, `Unit Roots and Cointegration in Panels', in The
Econometrics of Panel Data, 3rd ed., ed. Mátyás Lázslo and Patrick Sevestre (Berlin: Springer,
2008), 279322.
98. M Hashem Pesaran, `A Simple Panel Unit Root Test in the Presence of Cross-Section
Dependence', Journal of Applied Econometrics 22, no. 2 (2007): 265312.
99. Mauro Costantini and Claudio Lupi, `A Simple Panel-CADF Test for Unit Roots', Oxford
Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 75, no. 2 (2013): 276296.
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use the data in dierences for causality testing.
Testing for cointegration is also necessary before testing for causality. Coin-
tegration implies a common long run equilibrium between tax assessments and
paid-in capital, in which case modelling the processes as a vector error correction
model (VECM) would be appropriate. The panel cointegration test by Pedroni
does not provide strong evidence of cointegration.100 The standardised panel ρ
and Phillips-Perron statistics are both insignicant at the 10% level, indicating no
cointegration.101 The VAR-based Granger-test outlined above is thus appropriate.
Moreover, to make sure that the results are not driven by cointegration that the
Pedroni test could not detect, models which allow for this feature are used for
robustness testing.
Table 4.6 shows the results from Dumitrescu and Hurlin panel causality tests.
If the test statistic is larger than the critical value, Granger-causality runs from
one variable to another. Since the test statistics are well below the critical values,
there is no causality at a statistically signicant level. There is thus no evidence
of provincial stock markets playing a signicant role in local economic growth.
Table 4.6: Dumitrescu and Hurlin (2012) test for Granger-causality in panels
Test Test statistic Critical value (p<0.05) Inference
Stock markets → Tax -1.621 3.801 No causality
Tax → Stock markets -1.677 3.801 No causality
The test statistic refers to the ZHncN,T statistic in Dumitrescu and Hurlin (2012), equation
9. Critical values correspond to a p-value of 0.05.
An important robustness check for the results in table 4.6 is to factor in cross-
sectional correlation when testing for Granger-causality in panels. If the growth
of provincial exchanges (or economies) of dierent counties were intertwined, the
results from the Dumitrescu and Hurlin test might be biased. Granger-causality
testing in the presence of cross-sectional dependence can be performed by using
100. Peter Pedroni, `Panel Cointegration: Asymptotic and Finite Sample Properties of Pooled
Time Series Tests with an Application to the PPP Hypothesis', Econometric theory 20, no. 3
(2004): 597625.
101. The ρ and PP test statistics are 0.12 and -0.20, respectively. Allowing a trend term to
the test equations leads to even weaker evidence. For further details, see: Peter Pedroni, `Crit-
ical Values for Cointegration Tests in Heterogeneous Panels with Multiple Regressors', Oxford
Bulletin of Economics and statistics 61, no. S1 (1999): 653670.
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the method by Emirmahmutoglu and Kose.102 Their bootstrap panel causality test
builds upon the approach by Toda and Yamamoto by augmenting the VAR with
additional lags, which improves the asymptotic properties of the test when vari-
ables have unit roots.103 Besides being robust to nonstationary and cointegrated
series, the panel causality test has the additional benet of allowing the VAR
equations for each county to have dierent lag lengths.104
To fully account for potential cross-sectional dependence, Middlesex is included
in the sample. This controls for the possibility that the growth of provincial
exchanges was linked to the growth of the London stock exchange. Moreover, it
helps factor in potential economic linkages between London and other counties.
In this vein, allowing for cross sectional correlation makes the results more robust
to spatial economic spillovers, whereby a signicant source of potential omitted
variable bias is controlled for.
Table 4.7 shows the result from Granger-causality tests allowing cross-sectional
correlation. The test does not provide any evidence of nance-led growth, as the
test statistics are below the critical values. These ndings thus strengthen the
conclusions drawn from the Dumitrescu-Hurlin test. The results are also robust
to excluding Middlesex from the sample.
Table 4.7: Panel Granger-causality test for nance and growth, robust to cross-
sectional correlation
Test F-statistic 5% cr. val. 10% cr. val. Inference
Stock markets → Tax 17.114 32.489 28.359 No causality
Tax → Stock markets 15.107 33.567 29.291 No causality
`cr. val' refers to critical value. Critical values are derived from 10,000 bootstrap replica-
tions using the methodology by Emirmahmutoglu and Kose (2011). For each county, the
lag length is selected using the Akaike Information Criterion.
Did a provincial stock exchange foster economic growth in any individual
county? This question can be answered by implementing a Toda-Yamamoto test
102. Furkan Emirmahmutoglu and Nezir Kose, `Testing for Granger Causality in Heterogeneous
Mixed Panels', Economic Modelling 28, no. 3 (2011): 870876.
103. Hiro Y Toda and Taku Yamamoto, `Statistical Inference in Vector Autoregressions with
Possibly Integrated Processes', Journal of Econometrics 66, no. 1 (1995): 225250.
104. Because of its robustness to nonstationary data, the series are not dierenced for this test.
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for each county.105 Middlesex (London) has been added to the sample for the
purposes of this test. The results in table 4.8 suggest that stock markets were
not important for the economic growth of any county, except perhaps for Lan-
cashire (home to the Manchester and Liverpool exchanges), for which the result
is signicant at the 5% level.106
Table 4.8: Toda-Yamamoto tests for non-causality between local paid-in capital
and tax assessments
Test County Chi-squared p-value Inference
Stock markets → Tax Edinburgh 0.397 0.82 No causality
Tax → Stock markets Edinburgh 4.265 0.119 No causality
Stock markets → Tax Gloucester 2.001 0.157 No causality
Tax → Stock markets Gloucester 0.004 0.950 No causality
Stock markets → Tax Lanark 1.264 0.261 No causality
Tax → Stock markets Lanark 0.37 0.543 No causality
Stock markets → Tax Lancaster 4.298 0.038** Causality
Tax → Stock markets Lancaster 0.225 0.635 No causality
Stock markets → Tax Middlesex 3.771 0.152 No causality
Tax → Stock markets Middlesex 2.65 0.266 No causality
Stock markets → Tax Northumberland 0.144 0.931 No causality
Tax → Stock markets Northumberland 0.307 0.858 No causality
Stock markets → Tax Warwick 2.698 0.61 No causality
Tax → Stock markets Warwick 4.759 0.313 No causality
Stock markets → Tax York 0.59 0.744 No causality
Tax → Stock markets York 2.126 0.345 No causality
Because the data shown in the previous section suggests that the provincial
exchanges experienced considerable growth only from the 1880s, all tests in this
subsection have been repeated without data from the 1870s. The results based
on a shorter dataset do not change signicantly. As suggested above, the results
are also robust to using paid-in capital per capita (as opposed to paid-in capital
divided by tax assessments) as a proxy for stock market development.
105. Toda and Yamamoto, `Statistical Inference'.
106. The lag length was selected using the AIC for each county.
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4.5 Discussion and Conclusion
This chapter is the rst econometric study on the eects of British provincial stock
markets on county-level economic growth. The empirical results are obtained using
new data on local stockbrokers and paid-in capital of provincial exchanges. The
ndings indicate that the growth of local stock markets was not important for the
economic development of British counties.
Results from panel regressions show that the number of local stockbrokers per
capita correlated with the growth of local tax assessments. However, dynamic
panel models suggest that the eect is not causal. Even when the sample is
restricted to counties with potentially signicant local markets, no evidence can
be found of a causal impact of stock markets on local economic development.
Panel Granger-causality tests yield similar results. The growth of stock ex-
changes, as measured by paid-in capital divided by the income tax assessments in
a given county, did not help predict the subsequent growth of per capita income
tax assessments. The only exception to this nding is Lancashire, in which case
there is some evidence of the stock exchanges helping the county develop eco-
nomically. The Manchester and Liverpool stock exchanges were by far the largest
provincial exchanges in England. It is thus possible that this was the only county
(besides Middlesex) where capital markets were suciently large to have a signi-
cant impact on growth. Their ability to draw on a broader investor base also
meant that these exchanges could support a large class of rms seeking to have
their securities traded, whereas smaller provincial exchanges may have catered to
a more limited set of companies.
How do these results compare with previous studies on provincial stock mar-
kets? Campbell et al. argue that provincial stock exchanges were an important
source of capital for local companies.107 Both Thomas and Michie made similar
statements about their importance for local investment.108 This remains a possib-
ility, but the results of this chapter do not suggest that provincial stock exchanges
were important or irreplaceable enough to make a substantial dierence to local
107. Campbell, Rogers and Turner, `Rise'.
108. Michie, Money , 234-235; Thomas, Provincial , 139-147.
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economic outcomes. Indeed, Thomas also noted that the provincial exchanges'
importance was lessened by the ease of raising capital privately through informal
channels, although he provided little hard evidence to substantiate this claim.109
In light of studies which demonstrate how information asymmetries arise due
to geographic distance, the results are somewhat surprising. If investors were re-
luctant to invest in companies located far away, nearby stock markets should have
served an important economic function. One might expect that the alleviation
of nancing constraints arising from geographic distance would have been partic-
ularly important in cases where companies grew large, and personal connections
were no longer sucient sources of nance.
Perhaps the most straightforward explanation for the insignicant economic
impact of local stock markets is that county-level growth was driven by several
more important factors. But with regards to capital markets, it is possible that
many provincial exchanges were too small to make a meaningful contribution
to local economic growth. Additionally, it is useful to consider the demand for
the services oered by these exchanges. Companies beneting the most from
provincial exchanges were presumably ones which needed a signicant amount of
external capital, and could not raise it privately or from London at a low cost.
In many counties, and for much of the period at issue, the size of this segment of
rms might have been modest. Finally, although the extent to which rms and
investors relied on informal channels for the raising and trading of capital is not
precisely known, it is possible, as mentioned above, that informal capital markets
were highly substitutable for the services provided by formal stock markets.110
Data in this chapter reinforces the view that provincial stock exchanges were
generally rather inactive in the 1870s compared to subsequent decades. We should
therefore not expect these to have played a large role in the 1870s or early 1880s.
The membership of most exchanges more than doubled between the 1870s and
the 1890s. The amount of capital raised by domestic industrial and commercial
enterprises increased at an even faster pace, albeit from a low starting point. In
this sense, their experience mirrors that of the LSE, where listings of domestic
109. Thomas, Provincial , 139-142.
110. Robert Cull et al., `Historical Financing of Small-and Medium-Size Enterprises', Journal
of Banking & Finance 30, no. 11 (2006): 30173042.
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industrial securities grew rapidly after the 1880s.111
This chapter's results suggest several avenues for further research. Most ob-
viously, better data on the trading activity on provincial stock markets would be
helpful to better understand their evolution. It would also be useful to have ag-
gregated measures of the functioning of informal nancial markets in the provinces.
For small businesses, to what extent was nance through personal connections a
viable alternative to issuing shares to the public? Considerable uncertainty also
exists about the role played by provincial stock brokers who were unaliated with
stock exchanges. To what extent did they focus on trading securities of local com-
panies?112 Or did they merely act as conduits between local investors and larger
stock exchanges?
111. See section 1.2.1.
112. We know that markets for local stocks formed in larger Scottish towns without exchanges,









This chapter examines the role of an important type of instrument in
international trade nancing - the merchant bank acceptance - in the British
economy from 1870 to 1913. It contributes to British nancial history in
two ways. First, it presents a new dataset on merchant bank acceptances
from 1870 to 1913. Second, it examines econometrically how acceptances
were linked to British trade performance and economic growth. The results
indicate that the growth of merchant banks acceptances had a signicant
positive impact not only on British trade, but also on the domestic economy.
The British economy thus beneted from having London as a hub for global
trade nancing.
5.1 Introduction
International trade credit has been given little attention in economic history, and
rigorous studies of its role in the British economy from 1870 to 1913 do not cur-
rently exist. More broadly, Bordo and Rousseau note how little attention has
been given to the nexus between trade, nance and economic growth.1 Based
on primarily qualitative evidence, however, economic historians have argued that
trade nancing played a central role in the British nancial system in the late
19th and early 20th centuries, and that it was linked closely to British interna-
tional trade. Indeed, a key dimension of London's functioning as an international
nancial centre was its market for short-term funds, which in turn was connected
tightly to trade nancing.2
Payments related to long-distance trade in the 19th century were commonly
1. Michael D Bordo and Peter L Rousseau, `Historical Evidence on the Finance-Trade-Growth
Nexus', Journal of Banking & Finance 36, no. 4 (2012): 12361243.
2. Youssef Cassis, Capitals of Capital: A History of International Financial Centres, 1780-
2005 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 61-62; Barry Eichengreen and Marc
Flandreau, `The Federal Reserve, the Bank of England, and the Rise of the Dollar as an Interna-
tional Currency, 19141939', Open Economies Review 23, no. 1 (2012): 5787; Marc Flandreau
and Stefano Ugolini, `Where it All Began: Lending of Last Resort and the Bank oEngland During
the Overend-Gurney Panic of 1866', nos. 2011/03 (2011).
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settled using bills of exchange, which were documents acknowledging the debt of
one party to another. Accepting a bill of exchange is the act of guaranteeing
that a bill will be paid. This was primarily done by merchant banks, which
would lend their reputation and accept a potential liability for a commission.
Through having payment insurance from a third party, a bill became more secure
and easier to discount on the money market - the market where short-term debt
obligations were traded.3 In this way the accepted bill became a standardised and
liquid nancial instrument backed by a reputable nancial institution. A seller of
goods could receive immediate payment by selling an accepted bill, known as an
acceptance, onwards.4
Merchant bank acceptances may have been important for enabling trade. In the
19th century, the slow movement of goods tied up a considerable amount of work-
ing capital of those buying and selling goods abroad, while problems with contract
enforcement and information asymmetries were major obstacles for engaging in
international transactions due to their inherent riskiness.5 Having reputable insti-
tutions guaranteeing payments could mitigate these problems. In a world without
acceptances, an exporter of goods would be reluctant to send goods abroad before
being certain of receiving a payment, whereas an importer would be reluctant
to send a payment on credit without certainty of receiving the goods.6 Santarosa
notes how having several endorsers for bills of exchange in 18th century France mit-
igated problems with adverse selection and moral hazard in long-distance trade,
and thus made such transactions more likely.7 Nevertheless, the quality of the
endorsers remained a signicant source of risk until the emergence of merchant
bankers.8
Through the mitigation of risk, acceptances expanded the markets for mer-
3. Stanley D Chapman, The Rise of Merchant Banking (London: Taylor & Francis, 1984),
6-7.
4. Eichengreen and Flandreau, `Federal Reserve'. The seller's bank would commonly provide
funds from a sale immediately in exchange for the accepted bill.
5. Mark Casson, `The Economic Analysis of Multinational Trading Companies', in Multina-
tional Traders, ed. Georey Jones (London: Routledge, 1997), 16.
6. Erik Banks, The Rise and Fall of the Merchant Banks (London: Kogan Page, 1999), 48.
7. Veronica Aoki Santarosa, `Financing Long-Distance Trade: The Joint Liability Rule and




chants: instead of conning activities to ports where they had trusted counter-
parties, they could use acceptances of prominent bankers to make purchases any-
where.9 Without reputable acceptors, it is reasonable to assume that the volume
of British international trade would have been smaller, as payments on credit
and transactions between strangers might have been less common. Indeed, rms
routinely refused foreign orders entirely unless payments (via bills) were guar-
anteed by reputable merchant banks.10 An accepted bill, being easy to convert
to cash, would also provide the exporter with the working capital required for
long-distance trade.11
Another interesting dimension of acceptances was their role in the nancial sys-
tem. Before maturity, accepted bills could be bought by nancial institutions such
as discount houses, which would provide most of the liquidity to the bill market.12
Discount houses were analogous to money market funds today.13 These houses
invested short-term funds (deposits) from other nancial institutions - call money
- into bills, and they could also resell the bills to British or foreign commercial
banks.14
It was the liquidity of the London money market that made acceptances of
the leading merchant banks near-cash assets, which could be readily used for
international business transactions.15 When high quality bills did not nd buyers
on the money market during periods of nancial stress, they could be ooaded
at the Bank of England at the Bank's discount rate, or be posted as collateral
against the Bank's advances.16 Indeed, as they were cash substitutes, operations
9. Edwin J Perkins, Financing Anglo-American Trade: The House of Brown, 1800-1880
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975), 9-11.
10. Chapman, Rise, 6-7.
11. Manuel Llorca-Jaña, `Shaping Globalization: London's Merchant Bankers in the Early Nine-
teenth Century', Business History Review 88, no. 03 (2014): 469495. The exporter's bank could
make an immediate payment against an acceptance related to a given transaction.
12. Lance E Davis and Robert E Gallman, Evolving Financial Markets and International Cap-
ital Flows: Britain, the Americas, and Australia, 18651914 (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2001), 129-131.
13. Flandreau and Ugolini, `Where it all Began'.
14. Youssef Cassis, Crises and Opportunities: The Shaping of Modern Finance (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2011), 19.
15. Wilfred T C King, History of the London Discount Market (London: Routledge, 1936), 264;
Davis and Gallman, Evolving Financial Markets, 129-131.
16. Eichengreen and Flandreau, `Federal Reserve'.
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using these bills were a central aspect of the Bank's policy.17 They were `the
ultimate liquid asset' of the time.18
It was largely through acceptances, along with bills unconnected to goods
trade, that the London discount market functioned as the primary destination for
the world's short-term funds.19 Having London as an outlet for short-term funds,
in turn, was important for British commercial banks, which were concerned with
investing a portion of their surplus funds into relatively liquid and secure assets.20
Foreign nancial institutions would also channel their funds to this market for
similar purposes.21 While the market for London bills was becoming more inter-
national, London acceptances themselves were also increasingly used for nancing
non-British trade. Before the Federal Reserve was established in 1913, it was typ-
ical for US banks to help their customers with acceptance nance through London
correspondents.22
The importance of acceptances was recognised by contemporaries. In the early
1900s, several policymakers and observers working with the US National Monet-
ary Commission saw the acceptance as central to the success of the British money
market. They considered the volume and liquidity of the acceptances, together
with the central bank's willingness to provide additional liquidity by rediscounting
bills during problematic times, to have been an important contributor to British
nancial stability.23 The Federal Reserve made substantial eorts to make the
dollar acceptance competitive, but such trade credit only became prevalent after
WW1.24 Britain had built a substantial head start, and Cassis argues that a sig-
nicant factor in making London a global centre for trade credit originated from
17. Stefano Ugolini, `Liquidity Management and Central Bank Strength: Bank of England
Operations Reloaded, 1889-1910', Norges Bank Working Paper, no. 10 (2016).
18. Nicholas Dimsdale and Anthony Hotson, `Financial Crises and Economic Activity in the
UK Since 1825', in British Financial Crises Since 1825, ed. Nicholas Dimsdale and Anthony
Hotson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 47.
19. Cassis, Capitals, 100.
20. Michael Collins and Mae Baker, Commercial Banks and Industrial Finance in England
and Wales, 1860-1913 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 62-68, 74-76; Michael Collins,
`English Bank Lending and the Financial Crisis of the 1870s', Business History 32, no. 2 (1990):
198224.
21. Charles A E Goodhart, The Business of Banking, 18911914 (London: Weidenfeld /
Nicolson, 1972), 218.
22. Eichengreen and Flandreau, `Federal Reserve'.
23. Flandreau and Ugolini, `Where it all Began'.
24. Eichengreen and Flandreau, `Federal Reserve'.
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Britain's primacy in world trade, and from the associated demand for trade nance
that came from it.25
This chapter presents a new dataset on acceptances from leading merchant
banks at a yearly and monthly frequency from 1870 to 1913. It allows us to gain a
clearer picture of the evolution of the industry from the 1870s onward. New data
from a contemporary discount house provides further evidence of the importance
of merchant bank acceptances for the London money market. Furthermore, this
is the rst study to use time series econometrics to explore the role of acceptances
in the prewar British economy. The empirical results show that acceptances were
not only important for British trade, but that they also inuenced the growth of
the domestic economy. This could have been due to substantial spillovers from
the traded sector to the rest of the economy, or due to acceptances being used as
a bank credit substitute for a subset of rms, thus alleviating credit constraints
in the economy more broadly. Additionally, acceptances retained their economic
importance, even though they were used increasingly to nance non-British trade.
5.2 The Macroeconomics of Trade Credit
While there are several dierences between trade nance today and in the 19th
century, there is no doubt that rms still rely extensively on nancial institutions
for the provision of trade credit insurance. Moreover, sales on credit are still
predominant in transactions between rms. As in the 19th century, acceptance-
like instruments are used by rms to insure themselves against the credit risk of
their customers, a risk which they may not be able to assess in full.26
Beginning with the seminal contribution of Meltzer, research has shown that
trade credit can be used as a substitute for bank credit.27 This is the case especially
when there are constraints on bank nance, or if a country's banking system
25. Cassis, Capitals, 61.
26. Mary Amiti and David EWeinstein, `Exports and Financial Shocks', The Quarterly Journal
of Economics 126, no. 4 (2011): 18411877.
27. Allan H Meltzer, `Mercantile Credit, Monetary Policy, and Size of Firms', The Review of
Economics and Statistics, 1960, 429437; Mitchell A Petersen and Raghuram G Rajan, `Trade
Credit: Theories and Evidence', Review of Financial Studies 10, no. 3 (1997): 661691.
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is not well-developed.28 Trade credit can thus be used to alleviate tight credit
conditions, and its use allows well-resourced rms to make funds available for
credit constrained companies.29
The phenomenon of substituting trade credit for other types of nance is also
relevant in a historical setting. For example, Deloof's and van Overfelt's study
of Belgian rms in 1905-1909 shows that trade credit was a means for rms with
better access to bank nancing to transfer credit to rms with weaker bank rela-
tionships.30 In the context of early 19th century Britain, Collins argues that more
domestic trade credit was issued when money market conditions were tight.31
Trade nancing may thus have reduced credit constraints already before WW1.
Trade credit can be easier to obtain than bank credit, because suppliers of trade
credit have better information about their customers due to the higher frequency
of transactions.32 Additionally, it is dicult for a borrower to use inputs bought on
trade credit (such as machinery or raw materials) irresponsibly, whereas it would
be easy to divert cash from a bank loan. The supplier of trade credit can thus
be more condent of being repaid.33 Trade credit may also be extended because a
seller can nd it much easier to liquidate goods covered by a trade credit agreement
(in case of default) than a bank would.34 This was probably an advantage of 19th
century merchant banks. They often retained a small side-business of buying and
28. Mike Burkart and Tore Ellingsen, `In-Kind Finance: A Theory of Trade Credit', American
Economic Review, 2004, 569590; Inessa Love, Lorenzo A Preve and Virginia Sarria-Allende,
`Trade Credit and Bank Credit: Evidence from Recent Financial Crises', Journal of Financial
Economics 83, no. 2 (2007): 453469; Raymond Fisman and Inessa Love, `Trade Credit, Financial
Intermediary Development, and Industry Growth', The Journal of Finance 58, no. 1 (2003): 353
374.
29. Simona Mateut, Spiros Bougheas and Paul Mizen, `Trade Credit, Bank Lending and Mon-
etary Policy Transmission', European Economic Review 50, no. 3 (2006): 603629; Eddie Casey
and Conor M O'Toole, `Bank Lending Constraints, Trade Credit and Alternative Financing
During the Financial Crisis: Evidence from European SMEs', Journal of Corporate Finance 27
(2014): 173193.
30. Marc Deloof and Wouter Van Overfelt, `Trade Credit and Bank Relationships: Evidence
from Pre-World War I Belgium', Applied Economics 43, no. 13 (2011): 16471655.
31. Michael Collins, `Monetary Policy and the Supply of Trade Credit, 1830-1844', Economica,
1978, 379389.
32. Bruno Biais and Christian Gollier, `Trade Credit and Credit Rationing', Review of Financial
Studies 10, no. 4 (1997): 903937.
33. Burkart and Ellingsen, `In-Kind Finance'.
34. Daniela Fabbri and Anna Maria C Menichini, `Trade Credit, Collateral Liquidation, and
Borrowing Constraints', Journal of Financial Economics 96, no. 3 (2010): 413432.
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selling commodities, which made it easier to liquidate goods used as collateral if
their customers defaulted.35
The literature discussed above implies that rms can rely on trade credit as a
form of working capital. Fluctuations in the extension of trade credit could thus
aect the performance of exporting industries, and of industries which are highly
reliant on imported intermediate goods. Moreover, if trade credit is substitutable
for bank credit, increased availability of trade nance may lead to lower costs of
capital for rms in general. However, the extension of international trade credit,
and the benets that come with it, are often conditional on having credit insurance
for default risk. This is typically the part in the trade credit issuing process in
which nancial institutions play an important role.36 Recent research shows that
the availability of export credit insurance has a signicant positive impact on
rm-level export performance.37 The use of trade credit insurance is especially
prevalent when exporting to riskier destinations, and when macroeconomic risks
make trading partners less likely to repay their debts.38
The link between credit conditions and exports was highlighted during the
nancial crisis in 2007-2009. Sectors in which the need for trade credit and ex-
ternal nance were the greatest saw the largest drops in exports during the `credit
crunch'.39 In this environment, rms demanded an increasing amount of contracts
from banks to guarantee their trade credits.40 But the health and development of
the nancial sector largely dictates the extent to which it can support importers or
exporters. Manova demonstrates this by showing that credit constrained rms are
both less likely to export, and export smaller quantities.41 Amidst the crisis, n-
35. Richard Roberts, Schroders: Merchants & Bankers (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1992), 90-94.
36. Irena Asmundson et al., `Trade and Trade Finance in the 2008-09 Financial Crisis', IMF
Working Papers, 2011, 165.
37. Harald Badinger and Thomas Url, `Export Credit Guarantees and Export Performance:
Evidence from Austrian Firm-Level Data', The World Economy 36, no. 9 (2013): 11151130;
Gabriel J Felbermayr and Erdal Yalcin, `Export Credit Guarantees and Export Performance:
An Empirical Analysis for Germany', The World Economy 36, no. 8 (2013): 967999.
38. Friederike Niepmann and Tim Schmidt-Eisenlohr, `International Trade, Risk and the Role
of Banks', Journal of International Economics 107 (2017): 111126.
39. Davin Chor and Kalina Manova, `O the Cli and Back? Credit Conditions and Interna-
tional Trade During the Global Financial Crisis', Journal of International Economics 87, no. 1
(2012): 117133.
40. Niepmann and Schmidt-Eisenlohr, `International Trade, Risk and the Role of Banks'.
41. Kalina Manova, `Credit Constraints, Heterogeneous Firms, and International Trade', The
Review of Economic Studies 80, no. 2 (2013): 711744.
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ancial institutions cut their trade nancing activities, which ultimately compelled
OECD governments to increase the provision of public export credit insurance.42
5.3 The Merchant Bank Acceptance Business in
1870-1913
Despite the potential relevance of acceptances for the economy and nancial sys-
tem in Britain in 1870-1913, very little empirical research exists on these links.
Acceptances tend also to attract little attention in the business historical literature
on merchant banking in this period. This is surprising, given that this was a cent-
ral component of the typical merchant bank's business.43 Instead, these historical
accounts tend to focus on the more glamorous aspects of merchant banks, such as
their involvement with issuing government and railway bonds, or with the politics
of the time, or the collective biographies of the owning families.44 Chapman's work
remains perhaps the most authoritative book on the merchant banking industry
as a whole, but even here, the discussion on acceptances is overshadowed by a
focus on debt issues.45
The literature on merchant banking for the years 1870-1913 pays even less
attention to the industry's links with the money markets and the nancial sys-
tem. As noted above, acceptances were a popular form of short-term investment
among nancial institutions. Cassis argues that these bills were at the centre of
the London money market.46 The discount market linked the merchant banks to
the commercial banks, which invested in acceptances either directly or through
42. Pamela Blackmon, `OECD Export Credit Agencies: Supplementing Short-Term Export
Credit Insurance During the 2008 Financial Crisis', The International Trade Journal 30, no. 4
(2016): 295318.
43. Work by Perkins is an important exception. See: Perkins, Financing .
44. On some of the most prominent families and banks, see: Joseph Wechsberg, The Merchant
Bankers (New York: Bedminster Press, 1966). For histories of individual banks, see, for example:
Roberts, Schroders; Jehanne Wake, Kleinwort Benson: The History of Two Families in Banking
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); Roger Fulford, Glyn's, 1753-1953: Six Generations in
Lombard Street (London: Macmillan, 1953); Niall Ferguson, The House of Rothschild: Volume
2: The World's Banker: 1849-1999 (London: Penguin, 2000).
45. Chapman, Rise.
46. Cassis, Capitals, 84-86.
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discount houses. Banks goes even as far as maintaining that the increase in bank
lending, especially against bills of exchange as collateral, could create instability in
the nancial system whenever there was a disruption in the bill market.47 Indeed,
Accominotti has recently shown that there was a link between acceptances and
credit conditions in the UK in the interwar period, when the relative importance
of merchant banks in this eld had already begun to decline.48
The activities of merchant banks can be divided into two main functions: trade
credit (acceptances) and the issues of nancial securities (such as government
bonds). However, there were dierences between merchant banks in terms of
how much weight they would put on either of these areas. Moreover, some of
these institutions dealt in insurance, commodities trade, foreign exchange, secur-
ities brokerage, and other areas more typical of modern investment banks.49 Yet,
most of these rms had similar origins. Merchant banks evolved typically from
merchant houses - which traded goods - to rms which focused on international
nance.50 Having developed networks of contacts through their trading activities,
they would be in an advantageous position when deciding whether to guarantee a
payment between two distant parties trading with each other. Furthermore, they
would often be familiar with the markets of the goods that were traded by their
customers.51
The London acceptance market grew at a rapid pace in the late 1800s, with the
volume of acceptances increasing from an estimated gure of ¿60 million in 1875
to about ¿140 million in 1913.52 Acceptance facilities obviously arise in response
to a demand for them. It follows that it is reasonable to posit that the growth of
47. Banks, Rise, 43. The second chapter of this thesis raises certain doubts about this claim,
while acknowledging that a more in-depth study about this subject is required.
48. Olivier Accominotti, `London Merchant Banks, the Central European Panic, and the Ster-
ling Crisis of 1931', The Journal of Economic History 72, no. 01 (2012): 143. Some caution is
necessary when trying to relate his results to my thesis, because the shock of 1931 was presum-
ably much bigger than ordinary trade credit uctuations, as the July moratorium put a stop on
all credit payments by German customers.
49. Chapman, Rise, 57; Kathleen Burk, Morgan Grenfell 1838-1988: The Biography of a Mer-
chant Bank (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 48-52. Indeed, many merchant banks
either became, or were absorbed by, investment banks or investment management rms in the
post-WW2 era.
50. Banks, Rise, 58-90.
51. Ibid., 48, 53.
52. Cassis, Capitals, 85-87.
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acceptances simply followed the expansion of trade. But there are several reasons
to believe that at least in the short term, there were constraints on the supply
of acceptances. Merchant banks habitually turned away customers due to their
perceived riskiness.53 For example, the Kleinworts appear to have closed even signi-
cant accounts because of mildly unfavourable reports from their agents.54 Brown,
Shipley & Co. rejected almost any account whose business seemed `speculative',
no matter what collateral they could oer.55 Additionally, most banks spread their
risk exposure by preferring to have many smaller acceptance accounts to a few large
ones, thus constraining the amount of acceptances issued to any one customer.56
A further factor constraining the supply acceptances results from the fact that
merchant banks were private partnerships (with the exception of Baring after
1890). The capital base of these banks was not stable, as partners died or with-
drew funds. Because banks wanted to avoid having excessive ratios of acceptances
to capital, capital withdrawals were often followed by reductions in acceptances.57
And these capital withdrawals constituted an important driver of uctuations in
acceptances, especially over the short term.58 For example, a nearly 50% contrac-
tion of Schroder's acceptances in 1877-1883 was, to a signicant extent, due to a
substantial withdrawal of capital from the rm after a partner died.59 Similarly,
Rothschild's acceptances fell by nearly 75% in a year in 1878, when a considerable
amount of capital was withdrawn, while the partners tried to maintain a steady
ratio of acceptance liabilities to capital.60
Although an under supplied market might have led to more entrants vying for
this business, the structure of the acceptance market constrained entry. Payment
insurance would have been useless unless the seller of the goods had condence
in the insurer, so new accepting houses needed time to build their reputations.
A further barrier to entry was the need to build networks of international con-
tacts, through which information on the creditworthiness of customers could be
53. Perkins, Financing , 130-133.
54. Wake, Kleinwort Benson, 118-119.
55. Perkins, Financing , 130-133.
56. Ibid., 145-146; Roberts, Schroders, 46-48.
57. Wake, Kleinwort Benson, 123-128.
58. Banks, Rise, 156.
59. Roberts, Schroders, 82, 110-111.
60. Capital and Prot & Loss Accounts, 1876-1884, 000/77, boxes 3 and 4, Records of N M
Rothschild & Sons, Rothschild Archive, London.
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gathered.61 For example, Baring Brothers, a leading merchant bank, had over
1200 correspondents around the world already in the 1850s.62
The lack of the overseas contacts needed for eective risk management made
the business unappealing to several contemporary commercial bankers, before they
could better rely on modern communications.63 British overseas banks proved able
to enter this business with relative ease in the somewhat narrow context of new
colonies. Yet, it was only around the turn of the century that domestic commercial
banks made signicant inroads into the global acceptance business.64 Merchant
houses engaged in the goods trade also granted acceptances for a narrow range of
customers, but compared to merchant banks, the extent of their activities were
minuscule.65 Even at the eve of the First World War, London-based merchant
banks held an estimated 70% of this market in Britain.66 Indeed, still in 1931,
when the role of accepting houses had declined meaningfully, the Committee on
Finance and Industry reported:
In contrast with most other countries, the function of accepting and
discounting bills of exchange is very largely performed in this country by
highly specialised rms [merchant banks] and companies instead of by the
commercial banks, although the latter do a not unimportant share of the
business.67
Reputation mattered greatly for merchant banks. Not only was it important so
that exporters of goods would feel condent about being eventually paid, but also
in relation to the re-saleability of bills on the discount market. The bills of the most
reputable houses could be sold at the best rates on the money market, whereas a
premium was demanded for bills from acceptors that the market deemed less safe.
Whereas the banks did not typically publish accounts, they had to avoid ooding
61. Banks, Rise, 46. See also: Olivier Accominotti, `International Banking and Transmission of
the 1931 Financial Crisis', CEPR Discussion Papers, no. 11651 (2016) on a discussion on these
points.
62. Chapman, Rise, 30-31.
63. William M Scammell, The London Discount Market (London: Elek, 1968), 30; Cassis,
Capitals, 19-20.
64. Some German and French joint-stock banks had gained a modest market share already in
the 1890s.
65. Cassis, Capitals, 89.
66. Chapman, Rise, 1057, 209.
67. Macmillan Committee, Report of the Committee on Finance and Industry, Cmnd. 3897,
1931, 40.
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the money market with bills they had accepted. This meant keeping their accept-
ances to capital ratios at suciently low levels. A common benchmark for this
ratio, that several houses adhered to, was 4:1.68 Major and noticeable deviations
from these standards had repercussions on the discount market. For example, the
Kleinworts' were forced to temporarily reduce their outstanding acceptances in
1907 after several discount houses stopped buying the rm's bills.69
The discussion on the constraints aecting the supply of acceptances serves
to motivate the subsequent econometric analysis. If the supply of acceptances
deviated signicantly from the demand for them, it should be easier to ascertain
whether uctuations in acceptances had implications for British trade or economic
performance at large.
5.4 Observations from the Data
This chapter contributes new data on the outstanding acceptance credit of large
merchant banks from 1870 to 1913. The accounts of the most important merchant
banks have survived, but those of several smaller houses have not. However,
the acceptance business was highly concentrated, so the data covers a signicant
share of total outstanding acceptances. Therefore, the data should be especially
representative when looking at uctuations rather than at the absolute size of the
market.
My data on acceptances builds upon work by Chapman.70 Chapman collec-
ted yearly data on the acceptances of 7 merchant banks from 1890 to 1914.71 The
series presented here runs from 1870 to 1913, it covers 9 banks, and is at a monthly
frequency for the period 1870-1913 for 7 of the banks. From 1880 to 1913, the
monthly data contains some gaps for the two remaining banks, which have been
interpolated at a monthly frequency using estimates described in section 5.4.2.
Higher frequency data is important for formal hypothesis testing, because accept-
68. Wake, Kleinwort Benson, 124-125.
69. Ibid.
70. Chapman, Rise.
71. Yearly acceptance data from an earlier period is collected for Schroders by: Roberts, Sch-
roders; and for Kleinwort by: Wake, Kleinwort Benson.
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ances typically had a three or four month maturity. One would therefore expect
yearly data to hide several short-term uctuations in this business. The data also
corrects for a few errors contained in Chapman's series. Namely, his gures for
the William Brandt's Sons & Co. merchant bank are wrong.72
There is no way to estimate accurately the precise representativeness of the
sample, because we do not know the amount of outstanding acceptances on bills
related to the goods trade. An often cited gure for the amount of outstanding
acceptances in 1913 is ¿140 million, which comes from Robert Kindersley, who
was a director of a merchant bank in the 1930s.73 According to this gure, my
sample would cover approximately 40% of the market. Yet the ¿140m gure is
a very rough approximation: Kindersley was `told this on what [he] believe[d] to
be very good authority', without elaborating further.74 Subsection 5.4.3 provides
further evidence in support of the representativeness of the sample. Including
data from a number of commercial and overseas banks might improve the sample's
coverage, but not greatly, given that merchant banks held an estimated 70% of
the acceptance market in 1913.75
The reason for focusing exclusively on merchant banks is simple: they were
concerned with nancing trade rather than accepting purely nancial bills. Ac-
ceptances by large joint-stock banks, on the other hand, were often against se-
curities, and did not play the same role in the money market or the economy.
These `nance bills' lacked several features that made acceptances attractive: self-
liquidation, goods as collateral, and the eligibility for discount at the Bank of
England.76 Consequently, nance bills were riskier, and were not considered appro-
priate for merchant banks to deal in.77 If one were to be completely indiscriminate
about what types of bills to add to the sample, an appropriate approach would
probably be to use stamp duty records, which record duties collected on any types
72. Chapman's gures represent the amount of new acceptances that Brandt granted in Decem-
ber of each year, instead of the amount of bills the house had outstanding.
73. Macmillan Committee, Report of the Committee on Finance and Industry, Minutes of Evid-
ence, Cmnd. 3897, 1931, Q. 1273.
74. Ibid.
75. Chapman, Rise, 1057, 209.
76. Cassis, Capitals, 86.
77. Wake, Kleinwort Benson, 125-127.
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of bills. This is the approach taken by Nishimura.78 However, Nishimura himself
suggests that to understand the market for bills related to foreign trade, a study
of the records of merchant banks would be fruitful.79
Limiting the acceptance data to merchant bank accounts does introduce a
certain bias, because their operations in British colonies and dominions were less
signicant than they were, for example, in Latin America, continental Europe or
the US. Trade in colonies such as Australia, New Zealand and Canada was often
nanced by British overseas banks.80 The problem with adding colonial banks to
the sample is largely the same as with adding commercial banks: their acceptance
gures may include a considerable amount of nance bills, which would lead to a
new source of bias.
5.4.1 Merchant Bank Accounts
Figure 5.1 plots the acceptances on the balance sheets of the merchant banks in
the sample at the end of each year from 1870 to 1913. There are several apparent
breaks in the series, such as a drop in 1878, the Baring crisis 1890 (which was
preceded by a substantial growth in Baring's acceptances), and a sharp increase
in 1904-1906. These will be discussed briey below.
Baring was clearly the dominant accepting house by a large margin until 1890.
After the Baring crisis of 1890, when the bank nearly failed and had to be rescued,
Schroder and Kleinwort expanded aggressively and captured a large share of the
market.81 However, Baring still remained an important acceptor until WW1, and
the volume of its business grew signicantly in the early 20th century. It appears
that no bank in the sample made up for Baring's decline instantly, and that it
took several years for the industry to compensate for the shock to the market for
acceptances that arose from the rm's near collapse.
78. Shizuya Nishimura, The Decline of Inland Bills of Exchange in the London Money Market,
1855-1913 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971).
79. Ibid., 18.
80. Georey Jones, British Multinational Banking, 1830-1990 (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1995), 16-17.
81. Banks, Rise, 202-204.
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Figure 5.1: Acceptances of merchant banks in the sample, 1870-1913
Sources: see appendix 5.A.1.
From a business historical perspective, it is also interesting to note how another
Anglo-German house alongside Kleinwort and Schroder, W.M. Brandt's Sons &
Co., became one of the largest accepting houses in the early 1900s. To the best
of my knowledge, the rise of this house has not been documented properly in the
literature on merchant banking. As noted above, the gures provided by Chapman
on this bank's acceptances are wrong.82
Growth in merchant bank acceptances appears to have been slow until the
early 1890s, when the business began to expand at a rapid pace. The upper
panel of gure 5.2 shows that until the early 1900s, the growth of acceptances is
not entirely dissimilar to that of British trade. After 1900, these similarities break
down, with the growth of the volume of outstanding acceptances far outpacing that
of trade. Roberts argues that the while the expansion of British trade may have
contributed to this growth in the acceptance business, the main impetus for the
expansion came from the growth of the world economy, and the consequent increase
in non-British trade.83 For example, 45% of Schroder's acceptance revenues in
82. They consist of the amount of new acceptances in December of each year, rather than the
outstanding amount. See: Chapman, Rise, 121, 208.
83. Roberts, Schroders, 115.
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1900-1910 came from its US operations, although the acceptances were discounted
in London.84 However, gure 5.1 indicates that it is dicult to generalise Roberts'
argument to all banks, as some houses were better able to capitalise on the business
opportunities created by the expansion trade. The acceptances of Brown, Shipley
& Co., a prominent Anglo-American house, appear to have stagnated in 1880-
1913, despite the rapid growth of US trade.85 The same appears to hold true for
Morgan Grenfell & Co., which was another rm with strong links to the US.86
A comparison of the series on acceptances with data on world trade does not
provide clear support for the notion that the growth of acceptances was driven
by the growth of world trade. Using the estimates of Lewis and Yeats on world
trade, the lower panel of gure 5.2 suggests that whereas world trade more than
quadrupled in value from 1870 to 1914, the volume of acceptances only tripled.87
There are confounding factors, besides a possible bias in my data, which could
help explain this disparity. For example, alternative ways to nance trade, such
as cheque payments via telegraph, may have grown faster than acceptances, or
the entry of rms other than merchant banks into the business of accepting bills
might progressively have lessened the correlation between world trade and the
acceptance series.
The 1878 Crisis
The rst signicant drop in the acceptance series (plotted in gures 5.1 and 5.2)
appears around 1877-1879. The literature on merchant banking is largely silent
on this episode, although the acceptances of nearly all the merchant banks in the
sample declined in 1877-78 and then jumped sharply from 1878 to 1879. Nev-
ertheless, the severity of the decline of acceptances varied signicantly by bank.
Schroder's and Hambro's acceptances declined by more than 30%. Rothschild's
acceptances contracted by over 70%, from roughly ¿2.2 million in 1877 to ¿0.6
84. Ibid., 129.
85. Perkins, Financing , 78-81.
86. Vincent P Carosso, The Morgans: Private International Bankers, 1854-1913 (Cambridge,
MA.: Harvard University Press, 1987), 133-147, 277-284.
87. Arthur Lewis and Alexander Yeats, `The Rate of Growth of World Trade, 18301973', in The
World Economic Order, ed. Sven Grassman and Erik Lundberg (London: Palgrave Macmillan,
1981), 1181.
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Figure 5.2: Acceptances and trade
(a) Acceptances, trade, and GDP from 1870 to 1913
(b) Acceptances and world trade from 1870 to 1913
Source: Export and Import data from: Ryland Thomas and Nicholas Dimsdale, A Millennium
of UK Data, Bank of England OBRA dataset, 2017, https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-
/media/boe/files/statistics/research-datasets/a-millennium-of-macroeconomic-
data-for-the-uk.xlsx, accessed: 18 January 2018. GDP data from: Solomos Solomou and
Martin Weale, `Balanced Estimates of UK GDP 18701913', Explorations in Economic History
28, no. 1 (1991): 5463. World trade data from: Arthur Lewis and Alexander Yeats, `The Rate
of Growth of World Trade, 18301973', in The World Economic Order, ed. Sven Grassman and
Erik Lundberg (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1981), 1181.
million in 1878, reaching their 1877 level only ten years later. However, this can be
attributed almost entirely to a withdrawal of capital from the rm in 1877. In this
year the rm's capital dropped from ¿6.2m to ¿4.2m, and the house consequently
reduced the amount of contingent liabilities it had against a smaller capital base.88
88. Capital and Prot & Loss Accounts, 1876-1884, 000/77, boxes 3 and 4, Records of N M
Rothschild & Sons, Rothschild Archive, London.
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The City of Glasgow Bank failed in October, 1878. This event occurred in
conjunction with a contraction in monetary and nancial conditions. The open
market interest rate went from 2% in June, 1878, to 4.92% in December, falling to
1.38% a year later. Tightening monetary conditions could have led to a contrac-
tion in outstanding acceptances, since higher rates would make trade credit more
expensive. On the other hand, the recovery in the market for acceptances in 1878-
1879 might have been spurred by the Bank of England acting as a lender of last
resort, which contributed to the recovery of the nancial sector more broadly.89
An expansion of lending to nancial institutions could also have increased the de-
mand for bills eligible for discount, such as acceptances. It seems implausible that
there was any other exogenous shock to the merchant banking industry in general
in 1878. The Russo-Turkish war might have led to a mild contraction in a few
banks' acceptances, although data by Feinstein conrms that British trade did not
drop signicantly in these years.90 The data contributed by this chapter provides
a good starting point for a more detailed historical analysis of this episode from
the perspective of the money markets and the merchant banks.
The Baring Crisis of 1890
The near-failure of Baring in 1890 constitutes another major break in the series on
outstanding acceptances. The bank had issued a large amount of Argentine debt
securities in the 1880s, but was burdened with a large quantity of unmarketable
securities on its balance sheet after 1888, once investor appetite for these waned.91
In the autumn of 1890, the Argentinian government could no longer meet its debt
obligations without more credit from Baring, while the Russian government was
trying to withdraw over ¿2 million of deposits from its account with the bank.
With an illiquid balance sheet (owing to securities it could not sell), Baring was
89. Michael Collins, `The Banking Crisis of 1878', The Economic History Review 42, no. 4
(1989): 504527.
90. Charles Hilliard Feinstein, National Income, Expenditure and Output of the United King-
dom, 1855-1965, vol. 6 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972). Available in: Ryland
Thomas and Nicholas Dimsdale, A Millennium of UK Data, Bank of England OBRA dataset,
2017, https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/statistics/research-
datasets/a-millennium-of-macroeconomic-data-for-the-uk.xlsx, accessed: 18 January
2018.
91. Philip Ziegler, The Sixth Great Power: Barings 1762-1929 (London: Harper Collins, 1988),
236, 239-240.
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close to failing. It could not meet obligations arising from its business, such as
acceptances. The Bank of England assumed that Baring's failure would disrupt the
entire nancial system, and consequently began organising a rescue. Baring was
eventually saved by a consortium of other merchant banks, the Bank of England,
and a number of commercial banks.92 Indeed, what motivated several banks to
participate in the rescue was the fact that Baring's acceptances were so widely
held, that the house's failure would have led to signicant losses on the commercial
banks' liquid assets, and to severe problems on the money markets more broadly.93
Baring had expanded its acceptance business by nearly 50% from 1885 to 1890,
and at one point of 1890 it had liabilities on acceptances in excess of ¿15 million
(see gure 5.1). This indicates that Baring did not act imprudently just with
regards to its involvement with Argentine debt securities, but that it was also
overly aggressive with its acceptances. From the perspective of the bank's risk
management, the acceptance and the loan businesses should not be considered
separate. Both the issuance of securities and acceptances could put a bank's
capital at risk, and banks commonly had to balance how much capital they would
put at risk in each line of business.94 It follows that the narrative of the Baring
crisis that does not include acceptances cannot be considered complete.95
In 1890, problems for accepting houses were compounded by Bank of England's
actions, which were partially due to anxiety over Baring. The Bank raised the
discount rate from 3 to 6% from June to November in order to stem gold outows.
This put pressure on the money market. Among discount houses, it was rumoured
not only that Baring had a substantial amount of illiquid securities on its balance
sheet, but that it had increased the amount of acceptances in circulation, further
increasing investor's risk-aversion towards the bank.96 These rumours proved to
92. Ziegler, Sixth, 243-255.
93. John D Turner, `Holding Shareholders to Account: British Banking Stability and Contingent
Capital', in British Financial Crises Since 1825, ed. Nicholas Dimsdale and Anthony Hotson
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 150.
94. Burk, Morgan Grenfell , 71. However, acceptances would only require a commitment of
resources from the acceptor if a customer failed to meet its commitments, or if the acceptor also
granted a short-term loan to the customer.
95. Marc Flandreau and Stefano Ugolini, `The Crisis of 1866', in British Financial Crises Since
1825, ed. Nicholas Dimsdale and Anthony Hotson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 87;
Chapman, Rise, 121.
96. Wechsberg, The Merchant Bankers, 133.
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be correct.
In the short term, the crisis episode caused a temporary disruption in the entire
market of acceptances.97 The problem was compounded by nancial instability in
Australia and the US in the same year. Pressure was particularly severe for banks
with exposure to Latin America. Acceptances of Gibbs, a medium-sized merchant
bank with links to Latin America, fell by 71%. Those of Hambro, a house with
signicant operations in Northern Europe and Russia along with Latin America,
fell by 53%. This highlights the point that the Baring crisis did not constitute
a problem for just one bank in isolation, but that several other merchant banks
saw their business contract.98 This is not surprising, given that especially the
Argentinian economy contracted signicantly. But merchant banks also had to
tie up capital when they contributed to the guarantee fund for Baring, which
might have temporarily reduced their willingness to increase their acceptances.99
Although Baring eventually recovered from the crisis, its leading position on the
acceptance market was clearly lost for good.100
Growth and Crisis in 1903-1907
The literature on merchant banking does not discuss the rapid growth of accept-
ances in 1903-1906. This is surprising, because the pattern of expansion and
subsequent stagnation of acceptances seems remarkably consistent among banks.
The growth of acceptances between 1903 and 1906 coincides with substantial, al-
beit slowing, economic growth in both Britain and the US. In the second half of
1906, the Bank of England raised its discount rates to prevent gold outows. Both
the higher interest rates and economic weakness in the US led to constraints on
the market for international bills, on which American nancial trust companies
were active. This tightening proved particularly destabilising in the New York
money market. By the beginning of 1907, the US was in the grips of a severe
nancial panic. Several trust companies that operated in New York and which
97. Cassis, Capitals, 85.
98. Wake, Kleinwort Benson, 118-119.
99. Roberts, Schroders, 105.
100. Ziegler, Sixth, 280-290.
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held inadequate reserves suered runs by depositors.101 An additional sharp in-
crease in the Bank of England interest rate in late 1907 - partially in response to
developments in the US - may have further aected the British economy.102 All of
these developments could also have constrained both the supply and demand for
acceptances, which is borne out by the data presented above.
5.4.2 Monthly Acceptance Data
For econometric purposes, this chapter makes use of monthly data on acceptances,
which is plotted in gure 5.3. Data at this frequency is most likely to capture the
exogenous uctuations in the acceptance business, which were discussed above.
Monthly data is available for most banks between 1880 and 1913. In the cases
of William Brandt's Sons & Co. (Brandt) and Brown, Shipley & Co. there are
a few gaps. This section briey describes how these gaps were lled, in order to
incorporate series on these banks into the econometric model outlined below.
Figure 5.3: Monthly acceptance data, 1880-1913
The gures are in thousands of pounds. Sources: see appendix 5.A.1.
101. Jon Moen and Ellis W Tallman, `The Bank Panic of 1907: The Role of Trust Companies',
The Journal of Economic History 52, no. 03 (1992): 611630.
102. Olivier Jeanne, `Monetary Policy in England 1893-1914: A Structural VAR Analysis', Ex-
plorations in Economic History 32, no. 3 (1995): 302326.
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For Brandt, only quarterly data is available before 1904. This bank's accept-
ance business was of relatively modest importance before this year, reaching ¿1.5m
only in 1890 and ¿3.5m in 1904. Nevertheless, the rm's business subsequently
reached a very signicant size (for this period, though, we do have monthly data),
and thus ought to be included in the sample. In order to capture the general trend
in Brandt's acceptances without unduly biasing the aggregated acceptance series,
the quarterly series was interpolated using monthly data on acceptances for all the
other banks. This was performed by tting a mixed-frequency model with local
levels and a monthly regressor (the acceptances of other banks) via the Kalman
lter, as outlined by Harvey.103 Apart from the available quarterly observations,
the bank's acceptances are thus assumed to uctuate in line with those of other
banks.
For Brown, Shipley & Co., monthly data on London acceptances is only avail-
able from 1880 to 1888. After 1903, yearly gures are available. This Anglo-
American rm would primarily nance transatlantic trade by British and US rms.
Most of the trade credit it granted in the US would be matched by British accept-
ances in its London Oces, as explicitly stated in the bank's internal reports.104
Archival records in New York could thus be used to create a monthly credit series
for the bank.105 By assuming a 1-to-1 relationship between the bank's US commer-
cial credits (used for trade) and London acceptances (for insuring and securitising
these trade credits), the missing months were extrapolated from 1888 and then
interpolated from 1903.
103. Andrew C Harvey, Forecasting, Structural Time Series Models and the Kalman Filter
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 309-315.
104. Annual Report of the Bills Payable Department, November 30, 1911,
CLC/B/032/MS20148, Records of Brown, Shipley and Company Limited, London Metro-
politan Archives.
105. For a list of records used, see: table 5.4 in appendix 5.A.1.
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5.4.3 Merchant Bank Acceptances on the Discount Market:
Evidence from the Gillett Brothers & Co. Discount
House
This section provides evidence of the importance of merchant bank acceptances
on the British money market by examining archival data from Gillett Brothers
& Co. (henceforth also referred to as `Gillett'), a medium-sized discount house.
Gillett's main line of business was similar to that of a modern money market fund:
buying short-term debt instruments (in this case bills of exchange) on which it
would earn interest. Against these bills, it would take short-term deposits from
nancial institutions, such as British commercial banks, on which it would pay a
lower interest.106 The data presented here shows the amount of bills discounted by
Gillett Brothers, classied by a bill's acceptor. This makes it possible to show that
the data presented in section 5.4.1 is representative, as the Gillett series includes
acceptors which are not covered by my sample. The data can also be used to get
a sense of the importance of various merchant banks as acceptors compared to
other institutions. The data is available at a monthly frequency from 1892, but
short-term uctuations in each acceptor's bills tend to be large. It is therefore
presented in yearly averages.
25 merchant banks could be identied based on lists of banks provided by
Chapman and the Banking Almanac.107 Out of the 25, table 5.1 ranks the top
10 merchant banks by the share of bills held by Gillett. By this measure, the
acceptance data in this chapter includes the most important merchant banks:
Kleinwort; Schroder; Brown & Shipley; Brandt; and Baring. It is remarkable that
in 1903-1913, the top 5 merchant banks accounted for nearly half of the discount
house's investments in merchant bank bills.108 This reinforces the notion that the
acceptance business was highly concentrated.109 It also suggests that this chapter's
data on acceptances is representative.
106. Richard Sidney Sayers, Gilletts in the London Money Market 1867-1967 (London: Claren-
don Press, 1968).
107. Chapman, Rise, 209-211; The Banking Almanac, 1911, 46-64.
108. Their share might be somewhat lower, however if smaller merchant banks could be identied
in the Gillett data.
109. Assuming, of course, that Gillett's holdings of each bank's acceptances were commensurate
with the volume the acceptor's business.
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Table 5.1: Share of total bills discounted by Gillett & Co. ranked
by acceptor, 1892-1913
Firm Share 1903-1913 (avg.) Share 1892-1902 (avg.)
Kleinwort 13.43% 7.13%
Schroder 11.17% 3.78%




Lazard Bros. 5.98% 2.88%
Wallace Bros. 5.36% 2.28%
Koenig Bros. 4.88% 0.01%
Matheson 4.00% 1.66%
Source: Monthly Figures for each Principal Acceptor, Giving Total Values
of Bills held by Gillett Brothers, 1892-1913, CLC/B/100/MS24688, Records
of Gillett Brothers Limited, London Metropolitan Archive.
Figure 5.4 provides an alternative view of the relative importance of dierent
merchant banks. The gure shows the share of each bank's acceptances of all
merchant bank acceptances held by Gillett Brothers & Co. The series contrast
with those given in gure 5.1. The relative shares of Gillett discounts by acceptor
do not uctuate as much as the market shares that various banks had of the
acceptance market. A possible reason for this is that Gillett would seek to reduce
its exposure to any individual acceptor. Looked over the span of several years,
however, the market shares of acceptors in my data are generally commensurate
with those represented in the Gillett series.
Figure 5.5 can be used to gauge the importance of merchant banks in the
issuance of high-quality bills relative to other nancial institutions. Merchant
banks which could be identied by name continued to account for approximately
30-40% of the bills discounted by Gillet Brothers. While this in itself is a signicant
amount, the real gure is likely to be much larger, because the `unclassied' part
of the gure primarily includes several partnerships, many of which might have
been merchant banks. In addition, as mentioned above, the bills of several other
types of institutions constituted nance bills, which were unconnected to the goods
trade.
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Figure 5.4: Discounts of merchant bank bills by Gillett & Co., 1892-1913
Source: See table 5.1
Figure 5.5: Discounts of bills by Gillett & Co., classied by type of acceptor,
1892-1913
Source: See table 5.1
Overall, this section clearly demonstrates the importance that merchant banks
had for the money market and the acceptance of bills. It also goes against the
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ndings of Flandreau and Ugolini, who use Bank of England discounts to suggest
that British commercial banks were important acceptors of foreign bills already
in the 19th century.110 It is possible that bills accepted by foreign or commercial
banks would be less likely to be bought by discount houses, whereby they would
be under-represented in the Gillett data. However, it is not entirely clear why this
would be the case.
5.5 Econometric Evidence
This chapter tests the following hypotheses:
1. Were acceptances important for the British economy?
2. Did changes in acceptances have an impact on trade?
3. Did the relationship between acceptances, trade and the economy change
over time?
The hypotheses will be tested in two stages. Results from Granger-causality
tests, based on yearly data from 1870 to 1913, are presented rst. This is fol-
lowed by results based on monthly data and more advanced models. Overall, the
econometric evidence suggest that the answer to all of these questions is `yes'.
5.5.1 Granger-causality Tests
This section presents results from Granger-causality tests, outlined in the rst
chapter.111 The Toda-Yamamoto test is applied to a VAR model with the following
variables: GDP; acceptances; and exports. A lag length of 2 is selected using the
Akaike Information Criterion. The data is annual, converted to logarithms and
transformed to real, per capita terms. Exports are in volumes based on data
110. Flandreau and Ugolini, `Where it all Began'.
111. See: Hiro Y Toda and Taku Yamamoto, `Statistical Inference in Vector Autoregressions
with Possibly Integrated Processes', Journal of Econometrics 66, no. 1 (1995): 225250 and
section 1.5.1 of this thesis.
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from Feinstein's work.112 The acceptances are deated using the price index by
O'Donoghue et al., although the results do not change if they are deated by
export prices instead.113 The GDP series is taken from work by Solomou and
Weale, which has been converted into market prices by Thomas et al.114
Results from Granger-causality tests are reported in table 5.2. The model
in panel (a) of the table includes data on British export volumes, whereas the
model in panel (b) uses data on total trade volumes (exports + imports). The
results suggest that acceptances were important for the economy. This is high-
lighted in the Granger-causal relationship from acceptances to subsequent GDP
growth in both model specications. The relationship means that past changes
in acceptances could predict the evolution of GDP, whereas the reverse was not
the case. Acceptances thus contributed independently to the nation's economic
performance, regardless of how their supply was inuenced by macroeconomic fun-
damentals. In fact, yearly changes in acceptances appear to have been driven, to
a signicant extent, by factors other than British trade or economic conditions,
which is consistent with the notion that uctuations in the supply of acceptances
were not merely driven by demand.115
Curiously, however, the tests in table 5.2 give no evidence of a causal link
between acceptances and British exports. These results are puzzling. If accept-
ances were primarily intended to nance international trade, they should also have
been Granger-causally related to British exports and imports. And had accept-
ances only been important for the domestic economy through their role in promot-
ing trade, in light of the insignicant link between British trade and acceptances,
we should also observe a less signicant causal link between acceptances and GDP.
But this is clearly not the case. It follows that the importance of acceptance credit
might have extended beyond its role as an instrument for nancing international
trade. This would be consistent with the notion that trade credit was used as a
substitute for other types of nancing. Even though such credit was only used by
112. Feinstein, National Income. Available in spreadsheet format by: Thomas and Dimsdale,
Millenium, Sheet 35.
113. Jim O'Donoghue, Louise Goulding and Grahame Allen, `Consumer Price Ination Since
1750', ONS Economic Trends, no. 604 (2004).
114. Solomos Solomou and Martin Weale, `Balanced Estimates of UK GDP 18701913', Explor-
ations in Economic History 28, no. 1 (1991): 5463; Thomas and Dimsdale, Millenium.
115. See: section 5.3.
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Table 5.2: Toda-Yamamoto tests for Granger-causality between GDP, trade and
acceptances
(a) Model with export data
Test Chi-squared p-value Inference
Exports → GDP 0.839 0.657 No causality
Acceptances → GDP 9.832 0.007*** Causality
GDP → Exports 1.89 0.389 No causality
Acceptances → Exports 0.47 0.791 No causality
GDP → Acceptances 0.371 0.831 No causality
Exports → Acceptances 2.273 0.321 No causality
(b) Model with data on trade volumes
Test Chi-squared p-value Inference
Trade → GDP 0.055 0.973 No causality
Acceptances → GDP 17.243 0.001*** Causality
GDP → Trade 0.315 0.854 No causality
Acceptances → Trade 0.682 0.711 No causality
GDP → Acceptances 0.34 0.844 No causality
Trade → Acceptances 0.822 0.663 No causality
a subset of rms involved with external trade, the eects of uctuations in accept-
ances could impact credit conditions more widely, which would have a positive
inuence on the domestic economy.
Yet, before placing too much emphasis on these results, it is important to re-
member that acceptances had typical maturities of less than 4 months. Therefore,
the high degree of aggregation in the yearly data may make it dicult to ascer-
tain where causal linkages existed. Additionally, the several uctuations in the
acceptance series, discussed in section 5.4.1, may bias the results, given that the
Toda-Yamamoto test assumes linear relationships between variables. To better
understand the role of acceptances, the sections below use monthly data together
with more exible models.
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5.5.2 TVP-FAVAR
To examine how monthly changes in acceptance credit impacted the economy,
this chapter applies the time-varying parameter factor-augmented vector autore-
gression (TVP-FAVAR) outlined in the second chapter.116 Recall that this model
extends the ordinary VAR by: 1. allowing for the relationship between variables
to change over time; 2. allowing for the possibility of time-varying macroeconomic
volatility without biasing the estimates; and 3. summarising a large amount of
economic data into their common components. It follows from the third point
that the model has the advantage of capturing the variation in a broad array of
economic indicators, which makes it more accurate. Likewise, the second point
implies that the model does not confound temporary economic instability with
changes in the structural relationship between acceptances and the economy.














+ ut ; var(ut) = Rt (5.1)
In the present case, ft are 2 factors extracted from several economic time
series, while zt is a vector such that: zt = [∆acceptancest; open market ratet]. In
other words, the `observed' variables of interest are the change in the logarithm
of outstanding acceptances, and the open market interest rate. The data has also
been seasonally adjusted using the X-13-ARIMA methodology of the US Census
Bureau.117 As in the second chapter, the lag order of the model is set to three.
The model priors are the same as in the second chapter, which are outlined in
section 2.A.2. The underlying macroeconomic data is also the same (outlined in
table 2.3), except that the trade data is in values, not in volumes, which makes it
consistent with the acceptance series (which is also in values). This is important,
because the value of acceptances outstanding would depend on the nominal value
of goods traded over a given period, rather than on their real value.
116. See section 2.3.1.
117. U.S. Census Bureau, X-13ARIMA-SEATS Reference Manual, Washington, DC, 2016, htt
ps://www.census.gov/srd/www/x13as/, accessed: 18 June 2016.
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The equation for the factors which capture macroeconomic conditions is: xt =
Λfft + et. Recall that the matrix Λf links the several macroeconomic time series
in the vector xt to their common components, ft.118 This matrix tells us how
large the weight, or the loading, of each macroeconomic series is in each common
factor. The larger the loading of a given macroeconomic time series, the more
important it is in explaining overall macroeconomic uctuations.
To make the interpretation of the results more straightforward, Λf is specied
so that freight receipts (the best available monthly economic indicator) has a
loading of 1 in the rst factor, whereas exports takes a loading of 1 in the second
factor. This means that the rst factor should strongly proxy domestic economic
conditions, whereas the second one should proxy external trade. These minimal
restrictions are convenient, because they also ensure that the model is identied,
whereby the results are not indeterminate and have an economic interpretation.119
5.5.3 Results from the TVP-FAVAR
This section presents results from the TVP-FAVAR. The model uses monthly data
running from 1880 to 1913. The scarcity of monthly macroeconomic data from the
1870s makes it necessary to shorten the period under study based on the monthly
acceptances series.
Figure 5.6 reports the average error volatilities of the equations in the VAR
model.120 For example, the bottom graph tells us to what extent market interest
rates for high-quality bills deviated from their predicted value, based on macroe-
conomic data (incorporated in the factors), and acceptances. The gures indicate
that the use of a model which allows for stochastic volatility seems warranted due
to signicant changes in volatility in the second factor, acceptances, and open
market rates. These gures also suggest that both money market conditions and
acceptances frequently deviated from their macroeconomic fundamentals, which
118. For further details, see section 2.3.1 and references therein.
119. Ben S Bernanke, Jean Boivin and Piotr Eliasz, `Measuring the Eects of Monetary Policy: A
Factor-Augmented Vector Autoregressive (FAVAR) Approach', Quarterly Journal of Economics
120, no. 1 (2005): 387422.
120. In more technical terms, these are the means of the posterior draws of the error volatilities.
259
is consistent with the discussion in section 5.3. On the other hand, the estimated
residual standard deviations are not unduly high for any of the equations, indic-
ating that the model is able to t the data reasonably well. Note that the data
is normalised so that the standard deviation of each series is one, following the
approach by Bernanke et al.121
Figure 5.6: Posterior means of the standard deviations of the residuals
The error volatility of the equation for acceptances (the chart in the middle)
peaks in the years surrounding the Baring crisis of 1890, suggesting that the
amount of acceptances extended at this time could not be explained solely by the
prevailing macroeconomic or nancial conditions. This lends support to the notion
that the industry's, or at least Baring's, behaviour with regards to acceptances
over the period 1885-1890 deviated considerably from what was warranted by
economic fundamentals. The nding further stresses the need for the historical
literature on the Baring crisis to take into consideration the rm's trade credit
activities.
On the other hand, the low volatility of residuals in the acceptance equation
121. Bernanke, Boivin and Eliasz, `Factor-Augmented'.
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during the period 1903-1907 suggests that the rapid growth in acceptances in these
years can be explained by economic and nancial fundamentals, and that it was
not due to excessive risk-taking by merchant banks. Instead, shocks in the money
markets appear to have been particularly severe in 1906-1907 as indicated by the
chart at the bottom. It is thus likely that the US nancial panic (along with
the preceding economic expansion) and its impact on Anglo-American trade was
behind the uctuations in acceptances in these years.
Figures 5.7-5.9 display impulse responses. These tell us how a one percent
shock to a given variable aects another over dierent horizons. By a `shock', we
refer to an increase or a decrease in a variable that is not accounted for by the
model. Put more concretely, the model states that acceptances are determined in
part by past economic and nancial conditions, and a shock in acceptances is a
change in the series that is not predicted by these fundamentals.
Figure 5.7: Impulse response of trade from acceptances
Figure 5.7 presents impulse responses from a shock to acceptances to British
trade in each decade from 1880 to 1910, with each graph representing the median
response in that decade. The results indicate that the growth of acceptances had
a positive eect on exports and imports until WW1. The impact is also econom-
ically signicant: a 1% shock to acceptances could increase exports or imports
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by about 0.05% in standardised terms. In non-standardised, actual terms, this
would translate to an impact of roughly 0.6%, which constitutes an economically
important relationship between acceptances and trade. Moreover, as implied by
gure 5.6, 1% shocks in acceptances would have been a common occurrence during
the period at issue. Throughout the sample period, the evidence is thus consist-
ent with modern macroeconomic literature on the linkages between trade nance
and exports. British trade appears to have beneted signicantly from a better
availability of trade credit.
Notwithstanding the benets that accrued from the growth of the volume of
acceptances over the long run, these results also indicate that over the short term,
British trade was aected whenever there were constraints on trade credit in-
surance. Any exogenous decrease in acceptances would thus have impacted trade
negatively, as it did during the Baring crisis. Many of these short-term constraints
arose through the accepting houses' exposure to international factors, such as crises
abroad and uctuations on the money markets. However, the structure of the mer-
chant banking industry, along with the prudence of certain merchant banks, may
have also contributed to these constraints.
Figure 5.8 provides further evidence of the importance of acceptances for Brit-
ish trade. The gures show how shipping volumes were inuenced by the growth
of acceptances. Whereas the response of tonnage entered to British ports is not
signicant, the growth of acceptances increased the volume of shipping that was
outbound from Britain (tonnage cleared). In this light, the results highlight the
role of acceptances in driving British exports. Moreover, they provide an import-
ant robustness check for the results in gure 5.7. They indicate that the positive
impact of acceptances on trade values was not merely driven by changes in the
prices of commodities, but in trade volumes themselves. Note also that a shock
to acceptances had its most signicant impact both on trade values and shipping
volumes after four months. This corresponds to the three to four month maturity
of the typical acceptance, after time taken to arrange an order is factored in.
One would not expect merchant banks to have retained their role in promot-
ing trade if, as previous historical literature has argued, these institutions lost a
signicant share of the market in the business of British trade nancing, or if ac-
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Figure 5.8: Impulse response of shipping volumes from acceptances
ceptances were increasingly being used to nance non-British trade. Nevertheless,
the results above suggest that the impact of these changes were limited before
WW1, and that merchant banks were not sidelined during this period. Instead,
British exporters beneted from merchant bank acceptances throughout the years
1880-1913.
The economic importance of acceptances extended beyond their role in foster-
ing trade. Figure 5.9 shows that domestic economic conditions responded posit-
ively to the growth of acceptances. Freight receipts, the best available indicator
of economic conditions, responded positively throughout the period 1880-1910. In
non-standardised terms, it grew by nearly 1% following a 1% shock in acceptances.
This constitutes clear evidence of an economically important relationship between
trade credit and the economy. The impact of acceptances on bank clearings (a
proxy for the amount of goods traded) was mildly positive albeit more ambigu-
ous, and insignicant in the 1880s. The response was positive after three months
from 1890 onwards, but it turned marginally negative in the fourth month. As
discussed in section 2.3.1, however, one should put less weight on results based on
this indicator, given its lower ability to proxy economic conditions.
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Figure 5.9: Impulse response of macroeconomic variables from acceptances
These results are consistent with the notion that trade credit can ease credit
constraints in the economy. Specically, one should recall that trade nancing can
substitute for other types of credit. It is often used to nance working capital
expenditures, whereby changes in the availability of such credit can inuence the
production and trade of goods.122 Although domestic rms in the non-tradable
sector did not use merchant bank acceptances, acceptances issued to exporters
and importers could have eased credit conditions elsewhere in the economy.
There are, of course, more direct ways in which acceptances could have inu-
enced economic growth through their impact on the traded sector. Firms which
engage in international trade and those engaged in purely domestic activity are
interdependent, both in terms of buying their inputs and in terms of selling their
outputs. It follows that the impact of acceptances on the traded sector could have
inuenced domestic economic activity through sectoral spillovers. This channel
would be especially important in an open economy such as Britain from 1870 to
1913, where the value of foreign trade equalled approximately half of economic




This chapter is the rst empirical study on the role of acceptances in the pre-
WW1 British economy. Its original contribution to British nancial history stems
from the analysis of a new dataset on merchant bank acceptances from 1870 to
1913. The data reveals that the volume of bills guaranteed by the largest merchant
banks generally uctuated in line with British trade until the turn of the century.
However, there were signicant departures from this relationship, such as the years
surrounding the Baring crisis in 1890. In the early 20th century, it seems that the
growth of acceptances was considerably faster than that of British trade. This
is consistent with merchant banks taking on an increasingly international role in
nancing trade between foreign countries. Furthermore, new data from the Gillett
Brothers discount house shows that merchant bank acceptances played a central
role on the money markets throughout the pre-WW1 years - there is little evidence
that they had been sidelined by other institutions.
The relationship between acceptances and the economy is examined through
the lens of recent developments in time series econometrics. The results suggest
that the growth of acceptances had a signicant eect on British trade through-
out the period 1880-1913, even as London acceptances were increasingly used for
non-British trade, and alternative means for trade nancing became more wide-
spread. Moreover, increases in acceptances had a positive impact on British do-
mestic economic conditions throughout the period 1870-1913. This is borne out
by Granger-causality tests, along with more advanced models. The impact is also
economically signicant, suggesting that the operations of these rms constituted
an important dimension through which the British nancial sector was linked to
the real economy. The British economy as a whole thus beneted from having the
City of London as the foremost centre for international trade nancing.
123. Guilllaume Daudin, Matthias Morys and Kevin H O'Rourke, `Globalization, 1870-1914', in
The Cambridge Economic History of Modern Europe, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2010), 529.
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A straightforward channel through which acceptances could have increased
British economic activity is through facilitating international trade, which consti-
tuted a substantial share of British GDP. Access to acceptance facilities meant
that exporters could expand the markets to which they exported, whereas im-
porters could buy their inputs at a lower cost. The possibility that acceptances
helped rms in the traded sector produce more could have led to spillovers to the
non-traded sector, as far as the two sectors were interdependent.
It is also useful to consider this chapter's results in light of the macroeconomic
literature on trade credit. An insight supported by recent studies is that trade
nance can substitute for other types of credit, thereby easing domestic credit
constraints. It allows rms themselves to increase nancial intermediation and
reduce credit market imperfections. Even if only a subset of rms - exporters
and importers - use trade credit, the expansion trade nancing can improve credit
conditions in the domestic economy more broadly. This channel is especially
relevant to Britain in 1870-1913, where acceptances were a central component
of the money markets. If acceptances contributed to the liquidity of the discount
market, they could have aected the availability of short-term credit independently
of their role in trade.
A further insight oered by the macroeconomic literature is that trade credit
can be used to facilitate transactions and improve the eciency at which working
capital is used, as its use mitigates agency problems. Firms engaging in interna-
tional trade therefore had a cheap substitute to bank credit, which also functioned
as a near-cash asset. The results in this chapter are consistent with all of these
channels, although further work is needed to conrm their validity.
As for the historical literature on individual merchant banks, the ndings in
this chapter raise new questions. How did Brandt, typically considered a fairly
small nancier of trade, manage to become one of the largest acceptors in the
decade preceding WW1? Why did not Hambro's, Morgan Grenfell or Gibbs ex-
pand their business as signicantly? With regards to the history of merchant
banking more generally, the large uctuations in outstanding acceptances in 1878
and in the period 1903-1907 need to be explained in more detail, as they could
shed further light on how various components of the British nancial sector were
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linked. And although this chapter pays some attention to the Baring crisis, it also
suggests that studying this episode with a closer focus on acceptances, and the
operations of other merchant banks, is now warranted.
Interactions between acceptances, the discount market and the nancial sys-
tem more broadly is an area in need of further study. If possible, it would also
be interesting to match rm-level data to acceptors to understand better how dis-
ruptions in acceptances impacted the operations of importers and exporters. Such
a study would also be able to shed light on potential substitutes for acceptance
credit, on which our knowledge is limited.
It would be dicult to gather more merchant bank acceptance data, as very
few comprehensive archival collections survive in addition to the ones used in this
chapter. However, we know that several foreign, colonial and domestic commercial
banks expanded their trade nancing business over the late 19th century. Their
archives may provide a useful source for further research on British trade nancing.
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5.A Appendix to Chapter 5
5.A.1 Acceptance Data
The yearly acceptance data is presented in table 5.3. Table 5.4 provides the sources
of the yearly and monthly acceptance series. The monthly gures for Schroders
are estimated from the volume of new acceptances that the bank accepted each
month, by assuming a 3 month maturity. These estimates come very close to
the bank's yearly balances of outstanding acceptances.124 Acceptance gures for
Brown & Shipley are available only for the years 1871-1887 and from 1903 onwards.
The house's acceptance liabilities for other years was estimated using data from
the ledgers of the American branches. The accounts of the US branches provide
gures on the amount of commercial credit granted, which was the predominant
constituent of the house's acceptances. Yearly acceptances for the rm for 1870-
1872 was estimated from the rm's US commercial credits, drawn from ledgers,
by assuming that a commercial loans had a 3 month maturity. See section 5.4.2
for further discussion on the data for Brown & Shipley and Brandt.




























































1870 6.7 0.6 2.0 0.7 0.7 2.3 2.0 3.2 0.9 19.0
1871 7.4 0.5 2.6 0.8 0.7 3.0 2.5 2.8 1.8 22.1
1872 6.9 0.5 2.8 1.3 0.8 3.1 3.3 4.2 1.0 24.0
1873 5.9 0.5 2.3 0.8 1.1 2.6 3.1 4.1 1.2 21.6
1874 5.7 0.4 2.3 0.7 0.7 2.1 2.5 3.7 1.6 19.8
1875 4.4 0.5 2.2 0.8 0.9 1.8 2.5 4.6 1.9 19.5
1876 4.5 0.4 1.7 0.8 0.7 1.4 2.2 3.4 1.2 16.3
1877 3.9 0.3 1.7 0.8 0.8 1.3 2.1 2.4 2.2 15.6
1878 3.8 0.4 1.5 0.8 0.6 1.4 1.6 1.8 0.6 12.5
124. To clarify, yearly data on the bank's outstanding acceptances are available.
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1879 8.8 0.6 2.1 0.6 0.9 2.1 2.5 2.1 0.7 20.4
1880 7.6 0.5 2.9 0.5 1.1 2.1 2.2 2.0 0.6 19.5
1881 7.3 0.5 2.7 0.4 1.5 2.3 2.6 2.3 0.9 20.5
1882 8.3 0.7 2.7 0.5 1.3 2.7 2.4 2.1 0.7 21.4
1883 7.5 0.6 2.4 0.8 1.1 2.9 2.5 2.3 0.7 20.7
1884 7.4 0.7 2.4 0.5 1.3 2.8 1.1 2.3 0.9 19.4
1885 7.4 0.6 2.6 0.7 1.0 2.8 1.4 2.5 0.6 19.7
1886 7.0 0.8 2.6 0.6 1.0 2.9 0.9 2.7 0.6 19.0
1887 10.1 1.4 2.8 0.6 1.3 3.9 1.6 3.7 2.1 27.5
1888 11.6 1.2 2.7 1.2 1.4 4.5 1.2 4.4 1.1 29.3
1889 12.6 1.4 3.1 1.3 1.6 4.8 1.2 3.8 1.2 30.9
1890 8.9 1.8 3.3 2.4 1.8 4.9 2.6 4.3 1.4 31.4
1891 3.5 1.6 3.2 0.7 0.9 4.8 2.0 4.3 2.1 23.1
1892 3.9 2.0 3.1 0.6 0.8 5.5 3.2 4.0 3.4 26.4
1893 3.0 2.0 2.3 0.4 0.6 5.6 2.4 4.8 2.8 23.9
1894 3.6 2.1 2.3 0.2 0.9 5.3 2.3 4.8 3.9 25.4
1895 4.9 2.4 2.9 0.7 0.9 6.6 2.3 5.0 3.9 29.6
1896 4.5 2.5 2.3 0.5 2.0 6.6 1.9 5.1 2.1 27.3
1897 4.7 2.5 2.6 0.5 1.2 6.6 1.2 4.5 1.6 25.3
1898 3.6 2.5 2.1 0.6 1.7 7.8 0.7 5.8 1.5 26.2
1899 3.9 2.9 3.0 0.6 1.9 7.8 2.6 5.7 1.4 29.9
1900 4.5 3.1 3.2 0.6 1.9 8.2 2.7 6.1 1.5 31.8
1901 4.5 3.4 2.8 0.6 2.0 8.9 3.1 6.2 1.9 33.6
1902 4.7 3.3 3.0 0.6 1.7 9.5 1.8 6.0 1.4 32.2
1903 3.8 3.5 3.0 0.9 1.7 8.6 1.5 6.7 1.2 30.9
1904 5.5 3.7 3.6 0.9 1.8 11.1 1.5 6.8 2.1 37.2
1905 6.2 4.6 3.9 0.9 2.3 11.7 1.8 8.8 2.7 42.9
1906 6.7 6.9 4.5 0.9 2.1 11.9 2.2 10.3 3.1 48.5
1907 4.7 7.0 3.9 1.0 2.6 12.1 2.5 11.7 5.0 50.7
1908 6.5 6.2 3.3 1.0 2.8 10.8 3.2 9.3 5.1 48.2
1909 7.9 6.9 4.9 1.2 2.4 10.8 4.6 10.2 2.4 51.3
1910 7.5 8.0 4.2 0.9 2.8 10.7 3.0 10.6 7.1 54.8
1911 6.1 10.4 4.2 0.9 3.4 13.4 2.3 11.3 2.2 54.2
1912 6.7 9.7 4.6 1.4 3.5 13.4 2.7 11.9 3.5 57.3














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































This thesis improves and revises our understanding of the nancial sector's role
in British economic growth in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. It demon-
strates that commercial banks played a signicant role in the British economy.
Credit extended by these banks was an important driver of monthly economic
uctuations and business cycles. The spread of bank oces had a substantial
positive impact on economic activity at the local level. Yet, over a horizon of one
year and longer, their inuence on the trajectory of Britain's economic develop-
ment was less signicant. At most, the long-run growth of the banking sector and
that of the real economy was mutually reinforcing. Merchant banks, on the other
hand, through their central role in trade nancing, had a positive inuence both
on British trade and domestic economic performance. In contrast, stock markets
had no impact on economic growth, either at the national or at the local level.
The history of British banking in 1850-1913 is one of signicant regime change,
especially in the case of England and Wales. The banking sector became increas-
ingly concentrated, banks lent a progressively smaller share of their assets to rms
outside the nancial sector, and their relationships with customers became more
transactional in nature. The stock markets, meanwhile, evolved from being mar-
kets for public debt to becoming important institutions for the nancing of a
growing number of domestic rms. However, using new methods in time series
econometrics, I show that the economic impact of these institutional developments
was considerably smaller than previously thought.
The nding that nance did not drive long-run growth diers from empirical
results on other historical cases, where much of the evidence indicates that n-
ancial intermediaries played a causal role in economic development. I posit that
this divergence in ndings stems from the fact that the British nancial sector,
along with the economy, was relatively mature. Macroeconomic research suggests
that it is precisely such countries - with large nancial systems and developed eco-
nomies - that stand to gain less from further nancial development. Seen in this
light, British growth could be reasonably expected to have been less dependent
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on nance. The ndings also suggest that the careful view that historians have
taken about the economic role of the British stock markets and banks in 1850-1913
is justied, although they oer little support for the view that their growth was
merely driven by increasing demand for nancial services. This, in itself, raises
new questions about the underlying forces behind British nancial development
during the period.
Despite their limited long term impact, a new insight oered by the thesis is
that banks were important drivers of economic growth over the short run. Put
dierently, commercial bank credit was a central determinant of business cycles.
This nding is surprising, because the banking sector in the late 19th century was
remarkably stable. In the absence of nancial instability, developments in bank
credit could thus foster growth, rather than constrain it. Interestingly, changes
in bank credit were rapidly diused to the economy, instead of having a lingering
eect over a longer horizon. This result is important, because to the extent that
there were disturbances in the credit markets, their impact on growth was likely
to have been transitory.
The eects of changing banking practices, along with the transformation of
the banking sector after 1870s, have been important topics in British nancial
history. My results support the notion that banks behaved prudently. Banking
practices at the time rendered lending volumes remarkably insensitive to interest
rates when compared to nancial institutions today, whose risk-taking is signic-
antly inuenced by lower interest rates. Yet, despite the growing conservatism of
British banks, credit constraints did not become signicantly worse over the three
decades before WW1. Prudent business conduct by banks therefore did not trans-
late into deteriorating economic conditions over the long run, although declines in
bank lending may have had a temporary impact. These ndings should serve to
revise and moderate the negative assessments of changes that took place in the
British banking sector in the late 19th century. At the same time, they enrich our
views about the causes of British nancial stability at the time.
New data, examined through the lens of recent developments in spatial eco-
nometrics, shows that the growth in the number of bank oces had a positive
impact on economic growth in English and Welsh counties from 1871-1911, but
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not in Scotland. These ndings suggest that there is a need to reconsider our views
of how changes in British banking impacted the economy. A prevalent view among
economic historians is that the consolidation of the banking industry might have
constrained credit by encouraging collusive practices between banks, by increasing
their market power, and by making lending practices more rigid. My results imply
that these eects were outweighed by the increased access to nancial intermedi-
aries aorded by the rapid expansion of branch networks. Indeed, I demonstrate
that the degree of concentration in the banking sector did not hinder local eco-
nomic growth. The thesis therefore challenges the view that collusive practices in
banking were a signicant constraint on the British economy.
Whereas historical research on the local dimension of banking has increased in
recent years, provincial stock exchanges remain an under-researched area of British
economic history. Historians have nevertheless hypothesised that these exchanges
were important for their local economies, because they listed securities of smal-
ler, local enterprises. My thesis tempers such claims through the rst empirical
study on their economic role. It nds no evidence that provincial stock markets
had a positive causal impact on county-level economic growth. The ndings are
consistent with prevalent views that private capital was easily available through
informal means, and may have been substitutable for more formal channels for
raising capital.
This thesis also sheds new light on another under-researched part of the British
nancial sector: merchant banks and the nancing of trade. I show that merchant
bank acceptances were important for the growth of British exports and imports,
and that they also contributed to domestic economic growth. Growth in the sup-
ply of acceptance credit thus led to positive spillovers from the traded sector to
the economy more broadly. A part of this could be explained by the economic
interdependence between the traded and non-traded sectors of the economy. Yet,
trade credit could also act as a substitute for other types of nance for a signicant
number rms, thereby easing credit conditions on a more general level. The nd-
ings imply that Britain derived important economic benets from having London
as a global nancial centre, a key dimension of which was the nancing of interna-
tional trade. Indeed, acceptances remained important for the domestic economy
throughout the three decades before WW1, even though they were increasingly
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used to nance non-British trade.
I have already outlined some specic suggestions for future research in the
context of each chapter. I will therefore close with more general thoughts on
steps one might take to improve our understanding of the nancial sector's role
in historical economic growth. The topic certainly deserves signicant attention,
because what ultimately makes the nancial sector highly relevant to economic
historians generally is its role in the economy. More broadly, research within this
eld can yield policy-relevant insights to wider audiences.
There is scope to expand our understanding of the historical relationship
between nance and growth at a more granular level. In the case of Britain after
1870, branch-level balance sheet data is available for several banks, which could
be linked to other highly localised economic, or even rm-level data. And herein
lies a limitation of this thesis: it does not make use of more disaggregated data
to study the nance-growth nexus, because such an endeavour would require a
substantial and generously funded collaborative eort. Nevertheless, using highly
granular data, such as that gathered at the rm-level, has important benets. It
would lead to more accurate estimates of the eects of nance on growth by mitig-
ating the inuence of several confounding factors found in aggregated data, while
at the same time providing a detailed setting to study more closely the channels
through which the nance-growth nexus operated.
Economic spillovers from neighbouring areas were a central determinant of
British county-level growth. In terms of methodology, I argued that my contri-
bution constitutes a substantial improvement over previous historical studies in
the eld of nance and local growth. By taking spatial economic linkages between
counties into account both in the regressions and the set of instruments, omit-
ted variable bias is signicantly mitigated, the instruments are strengthened, and
the fact that banks mainly branched to neighbouring counties is partially con-
trolled for. Historians should therefore build on this research by making greater
use spatial models to better understand factors underlying local economic growth.
New developments in time series econometrics - namely, time-varying para-
meter models - should also be applied in economic history more frequently for
studying links between nancial and real variables. Over several decades, nan-
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cial systems typically undergo meaningful developments, which may change their
relationship with the economy. And there is no reason to expect that the beha-
viour of the economy more broadly would remain constant. Applying constant
parameter models in these types of studies is thus unnecessarily restrictive. In-
deed, because recent evidence suggests that relationships between nancial and
economic variables tend to strengthen during periods of nancial instability, the
importance of applying these models becomes even clearer. Not accounting for
these shifts in studies on nance and growth risks confounding the negative eco-
nomic impact of nancial instability with the potentially growth-inducing eects
of nancial development. In the context of less liberal legal environments than the
one studied in this thesis, these models can also be used to study how dierent
regulatory environments inuenced the relationship between nancial institutions
and the real economy. As such, they could lend further insight into another grow-
ing eld of research, which investigates the institutional or macroeconomic settings
under which nancial intermediaries foster economic growth, and what types of
settings may reduce their economic importance.
While it is always questionable how much a historical study such as this thesis
can tell us about the present, the case of Britain in 1850-1913 has several appealing
qualities as a laboratory for testing economic theories and addressing questions of
current interest. Having a relatively unregulated nancial sector after the 1860s
meant that the business conduct of banks was not as highly constrained by legal or
regulatory factors as it is today. Likewise, the economy was composed of relatively
unregulated, and small, rms. The way in which banks conducted their business
was thus presumably not distorted by excessive bargaining power of individual
customers. Finally, the banking sector experienced signicant consolidation over
time. These features make it an especially interesting setting to study policy-
relevant topics, such as the impact of bank mergers or bank competition on lending
and economic outcomes.125
Following the nancial crisis of 2007-2009, a growing amount of attention is
being devoted to understanding the short-term impact of nancing constraints,
125. See also: Fabio Braggion, Narly Dwarkasing and Lyndon Moore, `Nothing Special About
Banks: Competition and Bank Lending in Britain, 18851925', The Review of Financial Studies,
2017, 35023537 .
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credit supply shocks, and determinants of bank risk-taking.126 Yet, disentangling
the channels through which the nancial sector aects the economy remains a
challenge, partially because of the complexity of today's nancial institutions.
The functional specialisation of British nancial intermediaries makes it more
straightforward to test how changes in various functions of the nancial system
related to economic conditions. Moreover, the international orientation of parts of
the British nancial system increases its similarities with modern nancial sectors,
alongside its attractiveness as a case study. This thesis is therefore an initial
contribution to what promises to be a fruitful area of research.
126. James Morley, `Macro-Finance Linkages', Journal of Economic Surveys 30 (2015): 698711;
Gabriel Jiménez et al., `Hazardous Times for Monetary Policy: What Do Twenty-Three Million
Bank Loans Say About the Eects of Monetary Policy on Credit Risk-Taking?', Econometrica
82, no. 2 (2014): 463505; Simon Gilchrist and Egon Zakraj²ek, `Credit Spreads and Business
Cycle Fluctuations', The American Economic Review 102, no. 4 (2012): 16921720.
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